Research › Search › Judgment

Bombay High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 1605 (BOM)

Ganesh v. Sau. Pratibha Ganesh Wankhede

2021-11-26

M.S.SONAK, PUSHPA V.GANEDIWALA

body2021
JUDGMENT M.S.SONAK, J. 1. Heard Mr. S.R. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr. S.S. Sanyal with Mrs. Shibha Thakare, learned counsel for respondent No.1, Mr. Atharva Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Mr. T.A. Mirza, learned counsel for the respondent No.6-State. 2. The challenge in this petition is to the judgment and order dated 8/2/2021 made under the provisions of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (in short, "said Act") declining the relief of maintenance and cancellation of gift deed dated 1/8/2019 executed by the petitioner in favor of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein. 3. At the very outset Mr. Atharva Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy of instituting an appeal under Sec. 16 of the said Act against the impugned order dated 8/2/2021 and, therefore, this petition may not be entertained. He referred to the provisions of the said Act, including in particular provisions in Sections 16 and 23 of the said Act to submit that the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy. He relied on the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Ranjana Rajkumar Makharia vs. Mayadevi Subhkaran Makharia and others, 2020(3) Mh.L.J. 587 in support of his submissions. 4. Mr. S.S. Sanyal, learned counsel for respondent No.1 as well as Mr. T.A. Mirza, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for respondent No.6 supported the submission of Mr. Manohar, learned counsel for respondent No.1, and submitted that the petitioner may be relegated to avail the alternate remedy under the said Act rather than entertain this petition. Mr. T.A. Mirza learned Additional Public Prosecutor pointed out that the District Collector of Nagpur has been designated as the Appellate Tribunal in terms of Sections 15 and 16 of the said Act and, therefore, this is not some case where the Appellate Tribunal is yet to be constituted or is otherwise not functioning on account of any vacancies or such other reasons. 5. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that as against the impugned order particularly to the extent the impugned order denies the petitioner the relief of cancellation of gift deed dated 1.8.2019, no appeal will lie to the appellate Tribunal. Elaborating on this aspect, Mr. 5. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner, however, submitted that as against the impugned order particularly to the extent the impugned order denies the petitioner the relief of cancellation of gift deed dated 1.8.2019, no appeal will lie to the appellate Tribunal. Elaborating on this aspect, Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that Sec. 2(j) of the said Act defines "Tribunal" to mean the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act. He pointed out that Sec. 7 of the said Act provides for the constitution of a Maintenance Tribunal for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon the order for maintenance under Sec. 5 and for no other purposes. He submitted that on the conjoint reading of provision in Sec. 16(1) and its proviso, it is apparent that both the Maintenance Tribunal as well as Appellate Tribunal are empowered to go into the issue of maintenance alone and not the issue as to whether the transfer of property by a senior citizen is void. He submitted that Chapter V of the said Act is a complete Code and, therefore, for the protection of life and property of senior citizen Authorities have been provided under Sec. 22 of the said Act and these Authorities do not include either the Maintenance Tribunal or the Appellate Tribunal. He submitted that only the District Magistrate or his delegate will have the power to declare the transfer of property made by a senior citizen void under certain circumstances. He submitted that since the impugned order at least to the extent of declining to cancel the gift deed dated 1.8.2019 as void is made by the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO) as the delegate of the District Magistrate, there is no question of relegating the petitioner to the non-existence remedy of an appeal before the District Magistrate. He, therefore, submitted that the petitioner has no other alternate or efficacious remedy available to him other than instituting the present writ petition. Mr. Deshpande learned counsel relied upon Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhai Nagjibhai, AIR (1966) SC 459, and the judgment and order dated 15th September 2021 in Ashish vs. Vinod Dalal (Writ Petition No.2400/2021), decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in support of his submission. 6. Mr. Deshpande learned counsel relied upon Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula vs. Motibhai Nagjibhai, AIR (1966) SC 459, and the judgment and order dated 15th September 2021 in Ashish vs. Vinod Dalal (Writ Petition No.2400/2021), decided by the learned Single Judge of this Court in support of his submission. 6. The rival contentions on the limited aspect of whether the impugned order is appealable to the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Sec. 15 of the said Act now fall for our determination. 7. The said Act was enacted to provide for more effective provision for the maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens guaranteed and recognized under the Constitution and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The statement of objects and reasons refers to how the traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to the withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that aging has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive, and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents. 8. The statement of objects and reasons accompanying the bill which ultimately became the said Act proposed to cast an obligation on the persons who inherit the property of their aged relatives to maintain such aged relatives and also proposes to make provisions for setting up old age homes for providing maintenance to the indigent older persons. The statement of objects and reasons also refers to the provision for better medical facilities to senior citizens and provisions for the protection of their life and property. There is further reference to the providing appropriate mechanism to be set up to provide need-based maintenance to the parents and senior citizens, better medical facilities to senior citizens, for the institutionalization of a suitable mechanism for protection of life, property of older persons and setting up of old age homes in every district. There is further reference to the providing appropriate mechanism to be set up to provide need-based maintenance to the parents and senior citizens, better medical facilities to senior citizens, for the institutionalization of a suitable mechanism for protection of life, property of older persons and setting up of old age homes in every district. 9. Sec. 2(b) of the said Act defines "maintenance" to include provision for food, clothing, residence, and medical attendance and treatment. 10. Sec. 2(f) defines "property" to mean property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestral or self-acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interest in such property. 11. Sec. 2(j) of the said Act defines "Tribunal" to mean Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act. This is no doubt unless the context otherwise requires. 12. Chapter 2 of the said Act is concerned with the maintenance of parents and senior citizens and comprises Sections 4 to 18. Sec. 4 makes provision for maintenance of parents and senior citizens inter alia by their children or relatives. Sec. 5 is concerned with an application for maintenance by a senior citizen or a parent or if they are in- capable then by any other person or organization authorized by them. There are provisions for the Tribunal taking cognizance of maintenance issues suo moto. Sec. 6 is concerned with the jurisdiction and procedure of the Tribunal. 13. Sec. 7 of the said Act is concerned with the constitution of the Maintenance Tribunal and it provides that State Government shall constitute for each Sub-division one or more Tribunal as may be specified in the notification for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon the order for maintenance under Sec. 5 of the said Act. Sec. 7(2) of the said Act provides that the Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer, not below the rank of Sub-Divisional Officer of a State. 14. Sec. 8 is concerned with the summary procedure in case of inquiry before the Tribunal. Sec. 9 is concerned with the order of maintenance. Sec. 10 is concerned with alteration in allowance. Sec. 11 is concerned with the enforcement of an order of maintenance. Sec. 12 gives an option regarding maintenance in certain cases. Sec. 13 is concerned with the deposit of the maintenance amount. Sec. 14 is concerned with the award of interest where any claim is allowed. 15. Sec. 10 is concerned with alteration in allowance. Sec. 11 is concerned with the enforcement of an order of maintenance. Sec. 12 gives an option regarding maintenance in certain cases. Sec. 13 is concerned with the deposit of the maintenance amount. Sec. 14 is concerned with the award of interest where any claim is allowed. 15. Sec. 15 of the said Act provides for the constitution of the Appellate Tribunal for each district to hear the appeal against the order of the Tribunal. Sec. 15(2) of the said Act provides that the Appellate Tribunal shall be presided over by an officer, not below the rank of District Magistrate. 16. Sec. 16 of the said Act provides for appeals against an order of a Tribunal and matter connected therewith. Sec. 16 of the said Act reads as follows : "(1) Any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be, aggrieved by an order of a Tribunal may, within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal: Provided that on appeal, the children or relative who is required to pay any amount in terms of such maintenance order shall continue to pay to such parent the amount so ordered, in the manner directed by the Appellate Tribunal: Provided further that the Appellate Tribunal may, entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of sixty days, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. (2) On receipt of an appeal, the Appellate Tribunal shall, cause a notice to be served upon the respondent. (3) The Appellate Tribunal may call for the record of proceedings from the Tribunal against whose order the appeal is preferred. (4) The Appellate Tribunal may, after examining the appeal and the records called for either allow or reject the appeal. (5) The Appellate Tribunal shall, adjudicate and decide upon the appeal filed against the order of the Tribunal and the order of the Appellate Tribunal shall be final: Provided that no appeal shall be rejected unless an opportunity has been given to both the parties of being heard in person or through a dully authorised representative. (6) The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to pronounce its order in writing within one month of the receipt of an appeal. (6) The Appellate Tribunal shall make an endeavour to pronounce its order in writing within one month of the receipt of an appeal. (7) A copy of every order made under sub-section (5) shall be sent to both the parties free of cost." 17. Sec. 17 bars representation by the legal practitioners before a Tribunal or Appellate Tribunal. Sec. 18 provides for the designation of Maintenance Officer to represent a parent during the proceedings of the Tribunal, or the Appellate Tribunal, as the case may be. 18. Chapter V of the said Act is concerned with the Protection of Life and Property of Senior Citizen. This comprises Sections 21 to 23 both inclusive. Sec. 21 provides for measures for publicity, awareness, etc. for the welfare of senior citizens. Sec. 22 provides for authorities who may be specified for implementing the provisions of the said Act. 19. Sec. 23 of the said Act provides how the transfer of property by a senior citizen can be void in certain circumstances. Sec. 23 of the said Act reads as follows : "(1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. (2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right. (3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of sec. 5." 20. From the above scheme of the said Act, it is quite clear that the "Tribunal" referred to in the said Act means the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act. 5." 20. From the above scheme of the said Act, it is quite clear that the "Tribunal" referred to in the said Act means the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act. No doubt, a cursory reading of the provision of Sec. 7(1) of the said Act suggests that the Maintenance Tribunal has to be constituted for the purpose of adjudicating and deciding upon the order of maintenance under Sec. 5 of the said Act. However, this does not mean that the Maintenance Tribunal so constituted can adjudicate and decide only upon the order for maintenance under Sec. 5 or that the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act has no power or jurisdiction to determine whether a transfer of property made by a senior citizen in the circumstances set out in Sec. 23 of the said Act is void or not. 21. Based on the provision in Sec. 7(1) of the said Act as also the scheme of the Chapter in the said Act, there is no warrant to conclude that the jurisdiction of a maintenance Tribunal is restricted only to adjudicating and deciding upon the order for maintenance under Sec. 5 of the said Act or that the Maintenance Tribunal has no power or jurisdiction to declare as void the transfer of property by a senior citizen under the circumstances specified in Sec. 23 of the said Act even though Sec. 23 of the said Act confers such jurisdiction on such Tribunal. 22. Sec. 23 of the said Act, without any ambiguity, provides that where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal. 23. Thus, the power of declaration of a transfer of property by the senior citizen as void has been conferred upon the "Tribunal". 23. Thus, the power of declaration of a transfer of property by the senior citizen as void has been conferred upon the "Tribunal". Since the expression "Tribunal" has been defined under Sec. 2(j) of the said Act as the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act, it is apparent that such Maintenance Tribunal has power and jurisdiction to determine and declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen to be void under the circumstances so specified in Sec. 23 of the said Act. 24. According to us, there is nothing in the scheme of the said Act or the placement of its Chapter to suggest that the Maintenance Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 of the said Act will have no power or jurisdiction to declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen as void under the circumstances set out in Sec. 23(1) of the said Act. Rather, Sec. 23(1), in terms provides that such a declaration can be granted by the Tribunal, meaning the Maintenance Tribunal as defined under Sec. 2(j) and Sec. 7 of the said Act. Mr. Deshpande learned counsel was unable to point out to any other provision under the said Act, in terms of which the "Tribunal" referred to Sec. 23(1) could be regarded as some other Tribunal or some other authority. Incidentally, even the petitioner, instituted an application before the Maintenance Tribunal seeking relief of both maintenance as well as a declaration of gift deed dated 1.8.2019 as void. 25. Mr. Deshpande, learned counsel, however, tried to urge that the "Tribunal" referred to in Sec. 23(1) is in fact the District Magistrate or his delegate having regard to the provisions of Sec. 22 of the said Act. He submitted that the District Magistrate has delegated his power under Sec. 22 to the Sub-Divisional Officer (S.D.O.) and that is the reason why the petitioner instituted a proceeding before the S.D.O. seeking a declaration that the gift deed dated 1.8.2019 was void. Mr. Deshpande learned counsel submitted that since the S.D.O. was only the delegate of the District Magistrate, no appeal would even otherwise lie before the District Magistrate. 26. Mr. Deshpande learned counsel submitted that since the S.D.O. was only the delegate of the District Magistrate, no appeal would even otherwise lie before the District Magistrate. 26. Merely because Sections 22 and 23 of the said Act are to be found in Chapter V of the said Act concerning the protection of life and property of senior citizens, we cannot hold that the Tribunal referred to in Sec. 23(1) of the said Act is not the Tribunal defined under Sec. 2(j) of the said Act but rather, the Tribunal means the District Magistrate or the delegate of the District Magistrate. This according to us, is quite strained construction that neither flows from the plain reading of the statutory provisions nor will the same in any manner advance the objects of the said Act. Sec. 22, in our opinion, is a general provision for specifying the authorities for implementing the provision of the said Act. Such a general provision will have to yield to the specific provision provided in the said Act itself. 27. For example, the obligation to pay maintenance to a senior citizen or a parent is contained in one of the provisions of the said Act. For this purpose, however, a Tribunal has been created with the power to make orders for payment of maintenance. Similarly, Sec. 23 makes a provision to declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen, in the specified circumstances to be void. This provision further expressly speaks of declaration of such voidness by the "Tribunal" and not by any authority or authorities specified under Sec. 22 of the said Act. It is based on this correct understanding and interpretation of the statutory provision that the petitioner in the present case instituted proceeding both maintenance as well as cancellation of the gift deed dated 1.8.2019 before the Maintenance Tribunal as defined under Sec. 2(j) of the said Act. The impugned order dated 8/2/2021 has been made by the maintenance Tribunal itself even though the learned counsel for the petitioner now submits that this is an order made by the S.D.O. and not the Maintenance Tribunal. 28. Sec. 15 of the said Act provides for the constitution of Appellate Tribunal to hear the appeal against "the order of Tribunal". The impugned order dated 8/2/2021 has been made by the maintenance Tribunal itself even though the learned counsel for the petitioner now submits that this is an order made by the S.D.O. and not the Maintenance Tribunal. 28. Sec. 15 of the said Act provides for the constitution of Appellate Tribunal to hear the appeal against "the order of Tribunal". Sec. 16(1) also provides that any senior citizen or a parent, as the case may be, aggrieved by "an order of a Tribunal" may, within sixty days from the date of the order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. 29. Thus, it is quite clear that the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Sec. 15 of the said Act has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal against the order of the Tribunal whether such order concerns the issue of maintenance or the declaration or non-declaration of the transfer of property by a senior citizen as void despite fulfillment of circumstances set out in Sec. 23 of the said Act. There is nothing in the provisions of Sections 15 and 16 of the said Act that restrict the appeals to the Appellate Tribunal only to the orders of maintenance made by the Tribunal. 30. Ishverlal Thakorelal Almaula (supra) relied upon by Mr. Deshpande provides that, though a proviso is in the nature of an excepting clause but on appropriate occasions it can be treated as a substantive clause itself. The proper function of a proviso is to except or qualify something enacted in the substantive clause, which but for the proviso would be within that clause. It may ordinarily be presumed in construing a proviso that it was intended that the enacting part of the sec. would have included the subject-matter of the proviso. But the question is one of interpretation of the proviso : and there is no rule that the proviso must always be restricted to the ambit of the main enactment. Occasionally in a statute a proviso is unrelated to the subject-matter of the preceding section, or contains matter extraneous to that section, and it may have then to be interpreted as a substantive provision, dealing independently with the matter specified therein, and not as qualifying the main or the preceding section. 31. There can obviously be no dispute about the aforesaid proposition. 31. There can obviously be no dispute about the aforesaid proposition. However, the aforesaid proposition is not even remotely attracted to the interpretation of the provision in Sec. 16 of the said Act. The proviso to Sec. 16(1) of the said Act no doubt deals with the issue of maintenance. However, by applying the proposition in Ishverlal Almaula (supra) there is no reason to hold that the powers of Appellate Authority under Sec. 16(1) of the said Act are restricted only to entertain an appeal against an order of maintenance or that the order of the Tribunal declining to declare the transfer of property of a senior citizen as void in terms of Sec. 23 of the said Act is not appealable to the Appellate Tribunal. According to us, even the strained construction of the proviso to Sec. 16(1) of the said Act does not lead to the conclusion that the Tribunal as defined under Sec. 2(j) of the said Act is not the proper authority to declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen as void or that no appeal lies to the Appellate Tribunal against the order of the Tribunal refusing to declare such transfer of property as void. 32. Ashish Dalal (supra), which was relied upon by Mr. Deshpande also refers to senior citizens instituting proceedings before the Maintenance Tribunal inter alia for maintenance as well as a declaration of transfer of property made by such senior citizens in favor of their children as void. In that sense, therefore, even this decision, except that the Maintenance Tribunal as defined under Sec. 2(j) of the said Act is the proper Tribunal to decide on the issue of whether a transfer of property by senior citizens or parents is void under the circumstances specified under Sec. 23 of the said Act. 33. Ranjana Makharia (supra) relied upon by Mr. Manohar discusses the scheme of the provisions of the said Act. In paragraph 7, the discussion relates to the provisions of Sec. 23 of the said Act, and the learned Single Judge has held that it is only when all the three conditions specified in Sec. 23 of the said Act are met that an application lies to the senior citizen Tribunal constituted under Sec. 7 to declare any transfer of property to be void under the deeming provision of Sec. 23 of the said Act. This decision supports the contentions of the respondents that the Maintenance Tribunal has the jurisdiction to declare the transfer of property by a senior citizen under the circumstances specified under Sec. 23 of the said Act as void and, therefore, an appeal against the order of the Tribunal on this aspect will lie before the Appellate Authority constituted under Sec. 15 of the said Act. 34. Having regard to the above discussion we are satisfied that the "Tribunal" referred to in Sec. 23 of the said Act is the Tribunal as defined under Sec. 2(j) of the said Act. Therefore, as against the order made by such Tribunal declining to declare as void, the transfer of property by a senior citizen, an appeal will lie to the Appellate Tribunal constituted under Sec. 15 of the said Act. This means that as against the impugned order dated 8.2.2021 made by the Tribunal in the present matter, the petitioner has an alternate and efficacious remedy by way of an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. If such an appeal is indeed instituted by the petitioner, the Appellate Tribunal will have to entertain the same and adjudicate upon not only the prayer for maintenance but also the prayer for declaration of gift deed dated 1.8.2019 as null and void. 35. In terms of Sec. 16(1) of the said Act, any senior citizen or parent as the case may be, aggrieved by the order of Tribunal may, within sixty days from the date of order prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. The second proviso to Sec. 16(1) provides further that the Appellate Tribunal may, entertain the appeal after the expiry of the said period of 60 days if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal in time. 36. Since, the period of 60 days has expired from the date of the Tribunal's order, we inquired with Mr. Manohar and Mr. Sanyal if the parties they represent would have any serious objections for condonation of delay in the institution of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. 36. Since, the period of 60 days has expired from the date of the Tribunal's order, we inquired with Mr. Manohar and Mr. Sanyal if the parties they represent would have any serious objections for condonation of delay in the institution of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal. Learned counsel, quite fairly, pointed out the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court In Re: Cognizance For Extension of Limitation, 2021 SCC Online SC 947 by which the Hon'ble Supreme Court, taking cognizance of the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020 has extended the period of limitation prescribed under the general law of limitation or under any special law (both central and/or State). They pointed out that in terms of this order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court the period of limitation to institute an appeal against the Tribunal's order dated 8.2.2021 will expire on the 19th day reckoned from 3.10.2021. 37. The above order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia provides that in cases where limitation would have expired during the period between 15.3.2020 and 2.10.2021, notwithstanding the actual balance period limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 3.10.2021. From this, it is quite clear that if the petitioner chooses to avail of the remedy of appeal before the Appellate Tribunal against the Tribunal's order dated 8.2.2021, then, the petitioner's appeal, if instituted within 90 days from 3.10.2021, will have to be held as instituted within limitation. Even otherwise, we are satisfied that the petitioner, was bona fide pursuing this petition and it is not as if the petitioner was indolent or had slept over his rights in seeking redressal. 38. Mr. T.A. Mirza, learned A.P.P. referred to the affidavit filed by respondent No.6 in this petition and pointed out that the District Collector, Nagpur has been constituted as the Appellate Tribunal under Sec. 15 of the said Act to hear the appeal against the order of Tribunal. In paragraph 2 of the affidavit, even respondent No.6 has urged that the petitioner in the present case, has an alternate remedy of instituting an appeal before the District Collector, Nagpur under Sec. 16 of the said Act. 39. The learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent Nos.1 and 2 did attempt to make some submissions on the merits of the matter. 39. The learned counsel for the petitioner and respondent Nos.1 and 2 did attempt to make some submissions on the merits of the matter. From the limited submissions made before us, all that we can say is that this is an unfortunate dispute between the parents and the children when both the parents, though arraigned on the opposite side, are in the evening of their lives. Such disputes, according to us, ought to be attempted to be resolved by mediation in the first instance. 40. On a suggestion from this Court, the learned counsel for the parties agreed to explore the possibility of resolution of their disputes through mediation. They suggested the name of Mr. Sumant Deopujari, learned Advocate of this Court as the "Mediator". Thus, even after the petitioner, institutes an appeal against the impugned order dated 8/02/2021 before the Appellate Authority so as not to attract the bar of limitation, the parties, can always make a serious attempt to resolve their disputes through mediation by Advocate Deopujari. 41. We, therefore, refer the parties to such mediation without prejudice to their rights to institute, contest, and defend the proceedings before the Appellate Authority. We request the learned Mediator to submit his report to the Appellate Authority within six weeks, in case the petitioner indeed institutes an appeal or otherwise before the Tribunal, even though no proceedings may be pending before the Tribunal. 42. For all the aforesaid reasons, we decline to entertain the present petition and relegate the petitioner, if he so chooses, to avail the alternate remedy of appeal under Sec. 16 of the said Act to question the Tribunal's order dated 8/2/2021. 43. All contentions of all parties on merits are expressly left open for adjudication by the Appellate Tribunal should the petitioner institute his appeal against the Tribunal's order dated 8/02/2021. 44. The petition is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. There shall be no order for costs.