JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J. 1. Precise question, which has fallen for adjudication in the case at hand, is, “whether the option once exercised in terms of rule 19 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter, ‘Rules’) to count past military service, can be withdrawn at a subsequent stage, that too after lapse of about 10 years or not?” 2. For having birds’ eye view of the matter, certain undisputed facts as emerge from the record are that the petitioner, after having rendered service in the Indian Air Force, came to be reemployed as a Assistant District Attorney in the Department of Prosecution in the year 2001 against the post reserved for the ex-serviceman category. Petitioner joined against the aforesaid post in the Department of Prosecution on 28.12.20001. On 4.10.2002, petitioner opted to count his previous military service as qualifying service for the purpose of retirement benefits on account of military service on his superannuation in terms of rule 19 of the Rules. Vide letter No. DPr-B(3)3/2001-4314 dated 3.5.2003, Director Prosecution, Himachal Pradesh called upon the petitioner to deposit /refund amount received by the petitioner on account of commutation amount, interest on commutation, gratuity, interest on gratuity and pension received during re-employment. Besides above, vide communication dated 21.5.2003 (Annexure R-5 of the reply), District Attorney, Sirmaur at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh while acknowledging the letter written by the petitioner disclosing therein factum with regard to receipt of Rs. 1,93,678 also furnished /made available detail of the payment proposed to be recovered by the Department in terms of rule 19(3) (a), wherein it has been specifically provided that a Government servant, who opts for Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) shall be required to refund the pension, bonus or gratuity received in respect of his earlier military service, in monthly instalments not exceeding thirty-six in number, the first instalment beginning from the month following the month in which he exercised the option. Vide aforesaid communication, office of District Attorney, Sirmaur also informed the petitioner that a sum of Rs. 5,150/- on account of first installment and remaining 19 installments at the rate of Rs.5,147 per month shall be recovered from his salary for the month of May, 2003 paid in June, 203. Vide aforesaid communication, office of District Attorney, Sirmaur also informed the petitioner that a sum of Rs. 5,150/- on account of first installment and remaining 19 installments at the rate of Rs.5,147 per month shall be recovered from his salary for the month of May, 2003 paid in June, 203. After issuance of aforesaid communication, petitioner vide communication dated 25.9.2003, (Annexure P-2) addressed to the Director of Prosecution, furnished complete details with regard to the amount received by him on account of pension, gratuity and commutation of pension etc. and informed the Department that a total sum of Rs. 2,99,118/- received by him from his previous service rendered in the Indian Air Force stands deposited and said factum qua aforesaid deposit be recorded in his service record. Vide communication dated 23.3.2004 (Annexure P-3), Senior Deputy Accountant General (A&E), Himachal Pradesh informed the District Attorney, Sirmaur at Nahan that sums of Rs.90,735/- and Rs. 1,98,086/- stand received in July, 2003 (7/2003) through Challans Nos. 7 and 16. Vide communication dated 20.9.2004, Annexure P-5, District Attorney Sirmaur informed the Director of Prosecution Himachal Pradesh that the petitioner has refunded the amount of commutation and pension with interest to the State of Himachal Pradesh and also enclosed with the aforesaid communication verification certificate issued in favour of the petitioner by Accountant General (A&E) Himachal Pradesh. It appears that the office of Director of Prosecution, after having received aforesaid communication from the office of District Attorney, Sirmaur, sent a letter No. DPr-B(3)3/2001- 9102 dated 20.11.2003, to the office of Additional Chief Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, who in turn vide letter No. Home(Prose)B(3)3/2001 dated 24.11.2003 (Annexure P-4), addressed to the Director of Prosecution advised the Department to get the amount refunded by the petitioner recalculated/authenticated from the DDO concerned in the prescribed manner, so that whole amount along with interest is refunded to the State complete in all respects, as per prevalent Government instructions. After having received aforesaid instructions from the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Director of Prosecution directed the District Attorney Sirmaur vide communication dated 16.10.2004 (Annexure P-6) to supply the complete details with regard to the amount refunded by the petitioner. After having received aforesaid instructions from the Additional Chief Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, Director of Prosecution directed the District Attorney Sirmaur vide communication dated 16.10.2004 (Annexure P-6) to supply the complete details with regard to the amount refunded by the petitioner. However, it appears that before aforesaid information could be furnished to Director of Prosecution by the District Attorney Sirmaur, petitioner, vide communication dated 10.11.2010 (Annexure P-7), prayed for withdrawal of option exercised by him under Rule 19 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. In the aforesaid communication, petitioner claimed that though he after exercise of option under Rule 19 of the CCS (Pension) Rules had deposited Rs.2,99,118/- through different vouchers in the year 2003 but since his option under Rule 19 of the Rules has not been accepted by the Government despite lapse of 7 years and no Notification in this regard has been published, he should be permitted to withdraw his option. Besides above, petitioner claimed that he was intimated that the rate of interest is not 6% but it was to be calculated at the rate of interest applicable to GPF accumulations plus 2% penal rate of interest, which is on higher side, as such, while expressing his inability to deposit another sum of Rs.20,000/-, petitioner prayed for withdrawal of option. Vide communication dated 10.8.2011 (Annexure P-8), Under Secretary (Home) to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, asked the Director of Prosecution, Himachal Pradesh to inform whether the required amount of Rs.20,000/- has been deposited with the Government treasury till date or not and, if not, what action has been initiated by the concerned office. However, the petitioner again vide communication dated 16.9.2011 (Annexure P-9), addressed to the Director of Prosecution, while expressing his inability to pay the additional amount, prayed that the option given by him earlier may be treated as withdrawn not being financially beneficial to him. In response to the aforesaid representation filed by the petitioner, Director of Prosecution, vide communication dated 12.7.2012 (Annexure P-10), informed the petitioner that the matter was taken up with the Government and vide letter No. Home(Prose)-B(3)-3/2001, dated 3.7.2012, it has been conveyed that once the petitioner has already exercised the option to count his past military service under Rule 19 of the Rules, same has attained finality and it cannot be withdrawn at this stage after a lapse of ten years. Petitioner, despite having received aforesaid decision from the department, made representations dated 6.5.2013 and 20.2.2018, Annexures P-11 and P-12, respectively, seeking therein permission of the Government to withdraw the option exercised by him under Rule 19 of the Rules, at the time of his reemployment. Office of Director of Prosecution, vide communications dated 1.8.2018 (Annexure P-14)and 10.8.2018 (Annexure P-13), reiterated that the option once exercised cannot be withdrawn. 3. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein for the following main reliefs: “(a) That the impugned orders dated 12-07-2012 (Annexure P10) and orders dated 03.07.2012, 31.08.2013 and 01.08.2018 (Annexure P14) may kindly be ordered to be quashed and set-aside and consequently the option of the petitioner under Rule 19(1) may kindly be declared to have been validly withdrawn in the interest of justice. (b) That the respondents may be directed to refund the amount of Rs.2,99,118/- deposited by the petitioner in the year 2003 along with interest @ 12% from the date of deposit by the petitioner with the respondents till its refund.” 4. Respondents by way of a detailed reply, have refuted aforesaid claim on the ground that the option once exercised under Rule 19 of the Rules cannot be allowed to be withdrawn after a lapse of 10 years. Besides above, the respondents have claimed that once the petitioner himself deposited amount of Rs.2,99,118/- vide communication dated 25.9.2003, and prayed to record the factum of aforesaid deposit in service record, prayer to withdraw the aforesaid option after a considerable period of ten years cannot be allowed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Before proceeding further to adjudicate the matter, rule 19 of the Rules ibid, may be taken note, which provides as under: 19. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 6. Before proceeding further to adjudicate the matter, rule 19 of the Rules ibid, may be taken note, which provides as under: 19. Counting of military service rendered before civil employment (1) A Government servant who is re-employed in a civil service or post before attaining the age of superannuation and who, before such re-employment, had rendered military service, may, on his confirmation in a civil service or post, opt either – (a) to continue to draw the military pension or retain gratuity received on discharge from military service, in which case his former military services shall not count as qualifying service; or 2(b) to cease to draw his pension and refund - (i) the pension already drawn, and (ii) the value received for the commutation of a part of military pension, and (iii) the amount of 3[retirement gratuity] including service gratuity, if any, and count previous military service as qualifying service, in which case the service so allowed to count shall be restricted to a service within or outside the employee's unit or department in India or elsewhere which is paid from the Consolidated Fund of India or for which pensionary contribution has been received by the Government : Provided that - (i) the pension drawn prior to the date of re-employment shall not be required to be refunded. (ii) the element of pension which was ignored for fixation of his pay including the element of pension which was not taken into account for fixation of pay on re-employment shall be refunded by him, (iii) the element of pension equivalent of gratuity including the element of commuted part of pension, if any, which was taken into account of fixation of pay shall be set off against the amount of 1[retirement gratuity] and the commuted value of pension and the balance, if any, shall be refunded by him. Footnote : 1. Substituted vide G.I., Dept. of P. & P.W., Notification No. 2/18/87-P. & P.W. (PIC), dated the 30th July, 1988. Published as S.O. No. 2388 in the Gazette of India, dated the 6th August, 1988. EXPLANATION. Footnote : 1. Substituted vide G.I., Dept. of P. & P.W., Notification No. 2/18/87-P. & P.W. (PIC), dated the 30th July, 1988. Published as S.O. No. 2388 in the Gazette of India, dated the 6th August, 1988. EXPLANATION. - In this clause, the expression `which was taken into account' means the amount of pension including the pension equivalent of gratuity by which the pay of the Government servant was reduced on initial re-employment, and the expression `which was not taken into account' shall be construed accordingly. (2) 2(a) The authority issuing the order of substantive appointment to a civil service or post as is referred to in sub-rule (1) shall along with such order require in writing the Government servant to exercise the option under that sub-rule within three months of date of issue of such order, if he is on leave on that day, within three months of his return from leave, whichever is later and also bring to his notice the provisions of Clause (b). (b) If no option is exercised within the period referred to in Clause (a), the Government servant shall be deemed to have opted for Clause (a) of sub-rule (1) (3) (a) A Government servant, who opts for Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) shall be required to refund the pension, bonus or gratuity received in respect of his earlier military service, in monthly instalments not exceeding thirty-six in number, the first instalment beginning from the month following the month in which he exercised the option. (b) The right to count previous service as qualifying service shall not revive until the whole amount has been refunded. (4) In the case of a Government servant, who, having elected to refund the pension, bonus or gratuity, dies before the entire amount is refunded, the unrefunded amount of pension or gratuity shall be adjusted against the 3[death gratuity] which may become payable to his family. (5) When an order is passed under this rule allowing previous 1[ ] military service to count as part of the service qualifying for civil pension, the order shall be deemed to include the condonation of interruption in service, if any, in the military service and between the military and civil services.” 7. (5) When an order is passed under this rule allowing previous 1[ ] military service to count as part of the service qualifying for civil pension, the order shall be deemed to include the condonation of interruption in service, if any, in the military service and between the military and civil services.” 7. Aforesaid rule clearly reveals that the Government servant, who is reemployed in civil service or post before attaining age of superannuation and, before such reemployment had rendered military service may, on his appointment to civil service or post, opt, either to continue to draw military pension or retain the gratuity received by such member from military service, in which case his approved military service shall not be counted as a qualifying service or he shall cease to draw his pension or refund the pension already drawn and value received for the commutation of military pension and amount of retirement gratuity including service gratuity and count previous military service as qualifying service. Rule 192(a) provides that the authority issuing the order of substantive appointment to a civil service or post as is referred to in sub-rule (1) shall along with such order require in writing the Government servant to exercise the option under that sub-rule within three months of date of issue of such order. Rule 19(2)(b) further provides that if no option is exercised within the period referred to in Clause (a), the Government servant shall be deemed to have opted for Clause (a) of sub-rule (1). Rule 19(3)(a) further provides that the Government servant, who opts for Clause (b) of sub-rule (1) shall be required to refund the pension, bonus or gratuity received in respect of his earlier military service, in monthly instalments not exceeding thirty-six in number. 8. In the case at hand, it is not in dispute that the petitioner after having rendered service in Indian Air Force, came to be selected as an Assistant District Attorney in the Department of Prosecution in the year 2001, against vacancy reserved for exserviceman. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner, pursuant to his appointment against the aforesaid post, exercised the option under Rule 19(1)(b) to count his previous military service as qualifying service for the purpose of retirement benefits on account of military benefits. It is also not in dispute that the petitioner, pursuant to his appointment against the aforesaid post, exercised the option under Rule 19(1)(b) to count his previous military service as qualifying service for the purpose of retirement benefits on account of military benefits. It is also not in dispute that pursuant to aforesaid option exercised by the petitioner in terms of rule 19(1)(b) of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972, respondent Department vide communication dated 21.5.2003, furnished details of recoveries proposed to be effected from the salary of the petitioner on account of military pension received by him. However, perusal of communication dated 25.9.2003 (Annexure P-2) placed on record by the petitioner suggests that he deposited entire sum of Rs.2,99,118/- on account of commutation amount, interest on commutation amount, gratuity amount and interest and gratuity pension received during reemployment. Aforesaid amount deposited by the petitioner was duly acknowledged by the office of Senior Deputy Accountant General vide communication dated 8.5.2004 and 23.5.2004, Annexure P-3. 9. Vide letter dated 16.10.2004, annexure P-6, Director of Prosecution directed District Attorney, Sirmaur to supply recalculation of the DDO concerned in the prescribed manner and to ensure that the whole amount alongwith interest as applicable on GPF accumulations from time to time for the period from the date of receipt of pensionary benefit to the date of their refund to the Government is deposited. Though, the Department, after having received aforesaid communication from the office of respondent No.3, requested the petitioner to furnish aforesaid details but as per record available with respondent No.4 no information was furnished by the petitioner. In the meantime, petitioner was transferred to Chachyot at Gohar, District Mandi, Himachal Pradesh and he relinquished charge of the post of Assistant District Attorney Nahan on 2.10.2005 and as such, in his absence, recalculation in terms of aforesaid communication could not be carried out. Subsequently, the DDO/District Attorney, Sirmaur at Nahan recalculated the interest on pensionary benefits, DCRG and commutation of pension. On recalculation of interest on the amounts of Death-cum- Retirement Gratuity and commutation of pension on the interest applicable to GPF accumulations alongwith penal interest at the rate of 2%, District Attorney found the petitioner liable to pay initial amount of Rs.8,430/- (Annexure R-4). On recalculation of interest on the amounts of Death-cum- Retirement Gratuity and commutation of pension on the interest applicable to GPF accumulations alongwith penal interest at the rate of 2%, District Attorney found the petitioner liable to pay initial amount of Rs.8,430/- (Annexure R-4). After ascertaining the amount through respondent No.4, vide letter No. DA/SRM/NHN/B(3)11/2001-53 dated 30.5.2003 (Annexure R-5), it was found that the petitioner was required to deposit interest at the rate of 6%, however, the fact remains that the petitioner instead of depositing aforesaid amount, vide communications dated 10.11.2010, 16.9.2011, 6.5.2013 and 20.2.2018, requested the respondents to permit him to withdraw the option exercised by him at the time of joining the post of Assistant District Attorney. 10. As has been taken note herein above, aforesaid request having been made by the petitioner was not acceded to by the Department on the ground that the option once exercised under Rule 19 of the Rules cannot be withdrawn that too after a lapse of 10 years. 11. Mr. Ajay Chandel, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, while making this Court peruse the provisions contained under Rule 19 of the Rules ibid, vehemently argued that since the option exercised by the petitioner on 4.10.2002 in terms of Rule 19 was never accepted by the Department, same would be deemed to have been withdrawn. He further submitted that though the petitioner of his own had deposited a sum of Rs.2,99,118/- on account of military pension but since he had not deposited the complete amount, the option, if any, exercised by him cannot be termed to be an option in terms of Rule 19(1), which provides for deposit of complete amount of pension received prior to civil employment. Lastly, Mr. Chandel while referring to Rule 19(5) argued that since no order at any point of time was passed allowing previous military service to count as part of service qualifying for civil pension, option, if any, exercised by the petitioner is of no consequence. 12. To the contrary, Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned Additional Advocate General, vehemently argued that there is no provision under Rule 19 of the Rules to withdraw an option once exercised. Mr. 12. To the contrary, Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar, learned Additional Advocate General, vehemently argued that there is no provision under Rule 19 of the Rules to withdraw an option once exercised. Mr. Bhatnagar, learned Additional Advocate General, strenuously argued that once petitioner himself deposited Rs.2,99,118/-, on account of military service, it cannot be said that there was any requirement as such, for the Department to pass written order accepting the option. 13. Having carefully perused rule 19 of the Rules, this Court finds substantial force in the submissions made by learned Additional Advocate General, that there is no provision to withdraw option once exercised. Similarly, this Court does not find any provision under Rule 19 of the Rules that specific order, if any, is/was required to be passed by the Government accepting the option exercised by the petitioner in terms of Rule 19(1) of the Rules. If the provision contained under Rule 19(5) are perused minutely, same suggest that written order allowing previous military service to count as part of service qualifying for civil pension is required to be passed. This provision nowhere suggests that order accepting the option, if any, exercised under Rule 19(1) of the Rules is required to be passed by the Department. 14. True, it is that in the case at hand, this Court was unable to lay its hand to order, if any, passed by the respondents under Rule 19(5) of the Rules, allowing previous military service rendered by the petitioner to count as part of service qualifying for civil pension, but such omission, if any, on the part of respondents would in no manner, help the petitioner as far as prayer with regard to withdrawal of option exercised by him is concerned. It appears that since the petitioner failed to deposit entire amount received by him on account of military pension, necessary order/Notification under rule 19(5) could not be issued by the respondents. Since there was a dispute inter se petitioner and the respondents with regard to the calculations qua amount received by the petitioner from military pension, matter remained pending for quite considerable time. Since there was a dispute inter se petitioner and the respondents with regard to the calculations qua amount received by the petitioner from military pension, matter remained pending for quite considerable time. Respondent Department asked the petitioner to deposit Rs.20,000/- in addition to what he had already deposited at the time of exercise of option under Rule 19(1) of the Rules, but he instead of depositing aforesaid amount, made request to permit him to withdraw his option as such, necessary orders in terms of Rule 19(5) of the rules never came to be issued /passed. 15. Leaving everything aside, this court from bare perusal of aforesaid provisions contained under CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 is unable to find out any provision which enables the petitioner to withdraw the option exercised by him at the time of reemployment. In the case at hand, prayer for withdrawal of option came to be made on behalf of the petitioner for the first time in the year 2010 i.e. ten years after his reemployment as Assistant District Attorney in the Department of Prosecution. 16. Material available on record clearly reveals that the aforesaid prayer of the petitioner was rejected in the year 2012, itself but the petition at hand came to be filed in the year 2020 i.e. after an inordinate delay of eight years. Though, the petitioner has placed on record certain representations suggestive of the fact that even after rejection of claim in the year 2012, he kept on pursuing his case with the Department till the year 2018 but it is well settled by now that the repeated representations do not give limitation. 17. True it is that there is no limitation period provided for filing writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India, but even then, a person approaching a court in writ jurisdiction, is expected to approach the Court within a reasonable time. There is no plausible explanation rendered on record qua delay of eight years and as such, prayer having been made by the petitioner otherwise deserves to be rejected on the ground of inordinate delay. 18. By now, it is well settled that relief cannot be extended to the persons who have approached the court after a long delay, especially who approach the court after inordinate delay. 18. By now, it is well settled that relief cannot be extended to the persons who have approached the court after a long delay, especially who approach the court after inordinate delay. Reliance is placed on B.S. Bajwa and another vs. State of Punjab and others, (1998)2 SCC 523 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- "7. Having heard both sides we are satisfied that the writ petition was wrongly entertained and allowed by the single Judge and, therefore, the Judgments of the single Judge and the Division Bench have both to be set aside. The undisputed facts appearing from the record are alone sufficient to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of laches because the grievance made by B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor only in 1984, which was long after they had entered the department in 1971-72. During this entire period of more than a decade they were all along treated as junior to the other aforesaid persons and the rights inter se had crystallised which ought not to have been re-opened after the lapse of such a long period. At every stage the others were promoted before B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor and this position was known to B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor right from the beginning as found by the Division Bench itself. It is well settled that in service matters the question of seniority should not be re-opened in such situations after the lapse of a reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition." 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, 2014 AIR SCW 6519, held that relief cannot be extended to the persons who have approached the Court after long delay, that too, who are fence-sitters. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein: "24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein: "24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above." 20. Even Division Bench of this Court, while placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, has held in LPA No.604 of 2011, titled Karan Singh Pathania vs. State of H.P. and Others that “fencer cannot be held entitled to any relief” 21. In I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. versus State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: “17. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. This aspect of the matter was also brought to the notice of the Single Judge but he proceeded with the matter without saying anything on that issue, one way or the other. It was, therefore, perfectly open to the Division Bench to take into consideration the conduct of the appellants-writ petitioners and the consequences, apart from the legality and validity, of the reliefs granted to them by the learned single Judge.” 22. In Banda Development Authority, Banda vs. Moti Lal Agarwl and Ors., 2011 AIR SCW 2835, similar principle has enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein it has been held as under: 15. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. xxx xxxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to respondent No.1.” 23. Hon'ble Apex Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, 2014 AIR SCW 1171, has held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 24. Though, the claim of the petitioner is that at no point of time, option exercised by him under Rule 19 was accepted by the Department but bare perusal of the communication dated 29.5.2003 (Annexure R-5) annexed with the reply clearly reveals that the Department after having received information with regard to certain deposits made by the petitioner, apprised the petitioner with regard to recoveries proposed to be effected from his salary on account of military pension received by him. There may not be any formal order available on record accepting the option exercised by the petitioner but aforesaid communication itself suggests that the Department after having accepted the option exercised by the petitioner under Rule 19, started effecting recoveries from the salary of the petitioner, so that military pension received by him is recovered in terms of Rule 19 (3) (a). 25. 25. Having taken note of the fact that the petitioner after having deposited Rs.2,99,118/-, himself requested the Department to record factum with respect to deposit made by him in service record, this court finds no force in the claim of the petitioner that the option exercised by him under Rule 19 was never accepted by the Department, rather, the material available on record suggests that the Department, after having accepted the option exercised by the petitioner under Rule 19 permitted him to deposit a sum of Rs.2,99,118/- and subsequently on having found deficiency in the amount, again called upon the petitioner to deposit Rs.20,000/-. 26. Otherwise also, the writ petition filed by the petitioner suggests that he while expressing his inability to deposit the additional amount of Rs.20,000/- informed the Department that since he has already received substantial amount on account of military pension, it would not be beneficial for him to exercise option under Rule 19(1) of the Rules. However, aforesaid excuse rendered on record by the petitioner, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to be reasonable and plausible enabling the Department to accept his request for withdrawal of option exercised by him since there is no specific provision, under the rules for withdrawal of option once exercised. 27. Leaving everything aside, this Court is of the view that since there is no specific provision contained under Rule 19, making it incumbent upon the Department to accept the option in writing coupled with the fact that there is no provision with regard to withdrawal of option once exercised by him, prayer made in the instant petition cannot be allowed. 28. It is quite apparent from the averments contained in the petition that the petitioner after having found the benefits attached to military service more beneficial has now purposely decided to withdraw his option which otherwise is not permissible at this stage. 29. Moreover, despite the Department asking the petitioner time and again to deposit the additional amount , it is the petitioner who chose not to deposit the same, as such, now, he cannot be allowed to take benefit of his own wrongs, by claiming that since the entire amount in terms of option exercised by him was not deposited, same has not attained finality or that the same can be withdrawn at this stage. 30. 30. There is yet another aspect of the matter viz., in case petitioner is permitted to withdraw his option, natural corollary would be that the petitioner would be stripped off, of the benefits received by him, by counting past military service as qualifying service for civil post, which may include seniority and promotion and, if at this stage, these benefits are undone, it would result in unsettling a settled position, i.e. re-determination of seniority, promotions etc. Otherwise also, it is settled law that in service matters, a person should approach the court of law within a reasonable time, but in the case at hand, petitioner has approached this Court for withdrawal of option exercised by him in the year 2001, after around nineteen years i.e. in the year 2020, as such, the writ petition at hand is hopelessly barred by limitation. 31. In view of detailed discussion made herein above, I find no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.