JUDGMENT : Manju Rani Chauhan, J. 1. As the basic facts, impugned order and legal aspects involved are identical in both the writ petitions, they have been clubbed and heard together and are being decided by this common judgement. The facts recorded in Writ C No. 30950 of 2021 (Adhoc C/M Sri Kashi Annapurna And Another Versus State of U.P. And 6 Others) are being treated to be the leading case. 2. Heard Mr. H.N. Singh, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Vineet Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners’ Committee of Management, Mr. Mangala Prasad, Senior Advocate assisted by Mr. Abhishek Dwivedi, learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Kartikeya Saran, learned counsel for respondent nos.3 and 4, Mr. Shailendra Singh and Mr. Aseem Mukherjee, learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 3. The writ petition has been filed by the petitioners with the following prayer:- “(a) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the impugned order dated 02.11.2021 passed by the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Varanasi so far it denied the membership to 27411 members of the Society and confined its membership to 286 only. (b) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents not to give effect to the impugned order referred to above and to stay all further proceedings consequent thereupon during the pendency of the writ petition before this Hon’ble Court. (c) Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus commanding the respondents to allow further 27411 members of the general body of Society namely Sri Kashi Annapurna Vasavi Arya Vyaya Vrudhashramam and Nityanna Satram,Varanasi apart from 286 members finalized by the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Varanasi in the election of the Society to be held under Section 25(2) of the Societies Registration Act, 1860.” 4. Brief facts of the case are that “Sri Kashi Annapurna Vasavi Arya Vyaya Vrudhashramam and Nityanna Sataram, Varanasi (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Society’) is a Society duly registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act, 1860’). The aforesaid society was initially registered on 10.09.1999 and has been renewed from time to time. 5. As per the bye-laws of the Society, the first Executive Committee will function for the term of five years and this period was liable to be extended for another five years. The aforesaid society was initially registered on 10.09.1999 and has been renewed from time to time. 5. As per the bye-laws of the Society, the first Executive Committee will function for the term of five years and this period was liable to be extended for another five years. The founder Committee dated 10.09.1999 functioned for five years and its term was extended for another five years, as such, the founder Committee worked up to 10.09.1999. That as per the byelaws of the Society amended from time to time, there is no specific provision of induction of person as member of the general body by any resolution either of managing committee, executive committee or general body. 6. Clause 5 of the bye-laws of the Society enunciates that the person, who are from Arya Vysya Community, are eligible for membership of old age home and Sataram and the founder members and any donor, who contributes Rs.25,156/-or more to any existing donations schemes or any other donations schemes, to be introduced in future, shall be a general body member, only after the full payment is realized, thus, the criteria of the membership is only donation to the Society and it is automatic subject to condition that the person is of Arya Vysya Community and has contributed Rs.25,156/- as a donation to the Society. 7. Clause 7 of the bye-laws provides that membership of the general body of the Society is hereditary and in case of death or retirement of the general body member, their legal heirs or nominees will become members, which means that the member of Arya Vysya Society, who has once donated Rs.25,156/- will be considered as member along with his legal heirs. 8. A dispute arose, as the rival set has claimed that, on the basis of alleged election held on 29.7.2012 Jakka Naag Bhushanam was elected as President, as he resigned on 27.07.2013, on the same day, the Committee of Management has co-opted Yakkali Balakrishna Murthy as President. The aforesaid dispute was raised before Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Varanasi and after hearing the parties, the Assistant Registrar vide order dated 07.09.2016, holding that the term of the Committee of Management of the Society had already expired and no election of the Committee of Management was held on 29.7.2012, hence, there was no question of resignation of Jakka Naag Bhushanam and co-option of Yakkali Balakrishan Murthy. He has further directed to hold the election of the Society in question in terms of Section 25(2) of the Act, 1860, at Hyderabad Administration office. 9. The Hon’ble Court on 02.08.2017 finally disposed off the writ petition by holding that there was no illegality in the order of the Assistant Registrar but the order dated 07.09.2016 was modified to the extent directing the Assistant Registrar to conduct the fresh election after inviting the objections of the electoral college. For managing the affairs of the Society, an Adhoc Committee was appointed in August, 2017 information of which was given to the Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, Varanasi by the coordinator. 10. A modification application was filed by Yakkali Balakrishna Murthy with a request to modify the order dated 02.08.2017 to the extent that the charge of the President of Committee of Management may be handed to him till the fresh elections are held. The said modification application was dismissed on 20.4.2018. 11. Against the order of the Writ Court dated 20.04.2018, Yakkali Balakrishna Murthy filed Special Appeal No. 495 of 2018 which is still pending and no interim order has been passed therein. 12. In the meantime, Dr. Raj Kumar Verma filed Writ-C No.45743 of 2017 (Dr. Raj Kumar Vemula Vs. State of U.P. and 3 Others) questioning the appointment of Adhoc Committee and the Hon’ble Court vide order dated 22.09.2017 disposed off the writ petition with direction to the Assistant Registrar to dispose off the objections filed by Dr. Raj Kumar Vemula. It was further observed that the Assistant Registrar may ensure that the parties shall not syphon the money of the Society. 13. The Special Appeal Defective No.561 of 2017 was filed against the order dated 16.11.2017, which was allowed by a Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 16.11.2017 and the order of the Hon’ble Single Judge, to the effect, that the parties shall not syphon the money of the Society, was set aside. 14. In compliance of the order dated 16.11.2017, the Assistant Registrar, has passed an order dated 14.01.2020 requesting the District Magistrate/Collector, Hyderabad, to nominate an appropriate Election Officer as per the exigency, to conduct the elections of the Society. 15. 14. In compliance of the order dated 16.11.2017, the Assistant Registrar, has passed an order dated 14.01.2020 requesting the District Magistrate/Collector, Hyderabad, to nominate an appropriate Election Officer as per the exigency, to conduct the elections of the Society. 15. The aforesaid order was assailed on the ground that responsibility under the statue to determine the list of members is that of Assistant Registrar when he proceeds to exercise his power under Section 25(2) of Act, 1860. Questioning the order dated 14.01.2020 one Gande Ganganna has filed Writ-C No.8618 of 2020 which was disposed off by the judgement and order dated 06.03.2020 directing the Assistant Registrar to finalize the list of the members after obtaining the objections in the matter. A further direction was issued to the Assistant Registrar to convene the election meeting, thereafter, it would be open for him to allow any other responsible officer to preside over the meeting of the election. The Court has further observed that the Adhoc committee arrangement, which was continuing as on date, shall remain subject to fresh elections and the orders passed by the competent authority. It was also expected from the Assistant Registrar to conduct the elections within further period of six weeks, thereafter. 16. Pursuant to the direction of this Hon’ble Court, the Assistant Registrar has proceeded to finalize the list of members of general body and in continuation of the same, respondent nos. 3 to 6 with their joint signatures have submitted a list of 995 members of the general body, as is referred in the meeting of general body dated 28.4.2002. The aforesaid four persons have subsequently filed their objections before the Assistant Registrar on 12.06.2018 separately submitting that they have no objection, if the election is to be held by all founder members and members, who were the members of the Society at the time of amendment of the bye-laws in the year 2002, 2012 and 2015. Thereafter another joint application was submitted by aforesaid respondents annexing the alleged list of 286 members of the Society to which, there is no basis and relying upon the aforesaid, the Assistant Registrar has published a tentative list of 286 members of the general body vide his order dated 20/21.8.2018. An objection to the tentative list was filed by B.N. Vilas, member of Adhoc Committee pointing out that there are more than 25000 members of the Society. An objection to the tentative list was filed by B.N. Vilas, member of Adhoc Committee pointing out that there are more than 25000 members of the Society. The Assistant Registrar fixed 08.10.2021 as the date of hearing, and on the said date, the petitioners have submitted the list of members in 14 volumes which contains the list of members since 1999 to 29.02.2020, which is total 27697 members. The Assistant Registrar has closed the oral hearing on 22.10.2021 and the petitioners have submitted written argument on 25.10.2021 again clarifying the position of the members and have also disclosed that there are total 27697 members, detailing as to how the aforesaid persons became the members of the general body of the Society as per the required bye-laws. 17. On the basis of objections filed by the petitioners as well as respondent nos. 3 to 6, the Assistant Registrar has proceeded to pass impugned order dated 02.11.2021 finalizing the list of 286 members, as was published in the tentative list, inviting objections against the tentative membership. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that the impugned order dated 02.11.2021 passed by Assistant Registrar finalizing the list of 286 members is arbitrary and wholly unjustified in the eyes of law. 19. The Hon’ble Court vide order dated 06.03.2020 had directed the Assistant Registrar to finalize the list of members after obtaining objections in the matter within a period of two months. However, there is nothing on record to show that any publication in this respect was made to invite objections, which was required to be done, as the objections were to be raised by members coming from five main States i.e. Hyderabad,Varanasi, Tirupati, Sirdiand Haridwar and no information whatsoever was given to the petitioner for filing the objections against the tentative list. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that the Assistant Registrar, while finalizing the list of 286 members, has not disclosed as to what is the basis of accepting the claim of the respondents, when once they had initially submitted the list of general body of 995 members. The Assistant Registrar has also not taken into consideration the provisions of the bye-laws as detailed in the aforesaid paragraphs while finalizing the list of 286 members of the general body. 21. The Assistant Registrar has also not taken into consideration the provisions of the bye-laws as detailed in the aforesaid paragraphs while finalizing the list of 286 members of the general body. 21. Learned counsel for the petitioners then submits that the Assistant Registrar has passed the order, without applying his mind, in an arbitrary manner, by not taking into consideration the objections raised by the petitioners, recording therein that the adhoc committee of the petitioners does not have any locus, ignoring the fact that the constitution of the adhoc Committee for looking after the affairs of the Society, has already been affirmed by various orders of this Court. 22. On the cumulative strength of the aforesaid, the learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it is within the jurisdiction of the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere in such orders which have been passed in an arbitrary manner or are illegal or irrational. In support of the submissions, he has placed the following judgements:- (i). The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Harshit Agarwal and Others Vs. Union of India and Others reported in (2021) 2 SCC 710 has held as under:- “10. Judicial review of administrative action is permissible on grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. An administrative decision is flawed if it is illegal. A decision is illegal if it pursues an objective other than that for which the power to make the decision was conferred 1. There is no unfettered discretion in public law2. Discretion conferred on an authority has to be necessarily exercised only for the purpose provided in a Statute. The discretion exercised by the decision maker is subject to judicial scrutiny if a purpose other than a specified purpose is pursued. If the authority pursues unauthorized purposes his decision is rendered illegal. If irrelevant considerations are taken into account for reaching the decision or relevant considerations have been ignored, the decision stands vitiated as the decision maker has misdirected himself in law. It is useful to refer to R. vs. St. Pancras Vestry in which it was held: - “… If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account maters which the Courts consider not to be proper for the exercise of their discretion, then in the eye of law they have not exercised their discretion”.” (ii). Pancras Vestry in which it was held: - “… If people who have to exercise a public duty by exercising their discretion take into account maters which the Courts consider not to be proper for the exercise of their discretion, then in the eye of law they have not exercised their discretion”.” (ii). The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Punjab Vs. Bandeep Singh and others reported in (2016) 1 SCC 724 also held as under:- “4. There can be no gainsaying that every decision of an administrative or executive nature must be a composite and self sustaining one, in that it should contain all the reasons which prevailed on the official taking the decision to arrive at his conclusion. It is beyond cavil that any Authority cannot be permitted to travel beyond the stand adopted and expressed by it in the impugned action. If precedent is required for this proposition it can be found in the celebrated decision titled Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi [1978] 2 SCR 272, of which the following paragraph deserves extraction: “8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise. Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by additional grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. in Gordhandas Bhanji [1952] 1 SCR 135: 9. ……..Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority cannot be construed in the light of Explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself. Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older”. 7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 . Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older”. 7. The same principle was upheld more recently in Ram Kishun Vs. State of U.P. (2012) 11 SCC 511 . However, we must hasten to clarify that the Government does not have a carte blanche to take any decision it chooses to; it cannot take a capricious, arbitrary or prejudiced decision. Its decision must be informed and impregnated with reasons. This has already been discussed threadbare in several decisions of this Court, including in Sterling Computers Ltd. v. M & N Publications Ltd. (1993) 1 SCC 445 , Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 , Air India Ltd. v. Cochin International Airport Ltd. (2000) 2 SCC 617 , B.S.N. Joshi & Sons Ltd. v. Nair Coal Services Ltd. (2006) 11 SCC 548 , Jagdish Mandal v. State of Orissa (2007) 14 SCC 517 .” (iii). This Court in the case of Committee of Management, Arya Kanya Pathshala Inter College, Bulandshahar Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2011 (2) ADJ 65 (DB) has also observed as under:- “11. The Division Bench in Rajveer Singh's case (supra) had placed reliance on another Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Ratan Kumar Solanki vs. State of U.P. reported in 2010(1) Additional District Judge 262 (Division Bench). The Division Bench in Ratan Kumar Solanki's case had elaborately considered the issue in question and after considering laid down that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election depends on facts of each case and an individual member may have locus to challenge the election if he is person aggrieved. There is no such proposition that an individual member cannot, in no circumstance, challenge the election of the Committee of Management. The Division Bench in Ratan Kumar Solanki's case (supra), laid down following in paragraphs 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the judgment:- "23. In Satya Narain Tripathi (supra) the question whether a member of the general body can challenge the election by filing a writ petition was considered by the Hon'ble Single Judge (Hon'ble Janardan Sahai, J.) and his Lordship held that participation either by contesting election or exercising right to franchise is not a fundamental right, but merely a common right originating from the statute or the rules and bye-laws of an association etc. A breach of such statutory rights or right under the rules and regulations can be redressed by the available remedy which the statute or bye-laws provide or by a civil suit where such remedy is not otherwise barred. Where the elections are held under statutory provision, the remedy of challenging the election, if provided under the statute, has to be availed as an alternative remedy which would ordinarily bar the maintainability of a writ petition. The infringement of a right under the bye-laws of the society would not make the writ petition maintainable under Article 226 but in such a case the incumbent would have to avail remedy either by filing a civil suit or under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. His Lordship also observed if there is a breach of a right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which is a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution, in that case or where there is breach of the statute, the writ petition may be maintainable subject to the Court exercising its discretion if an alternative remedy is available. The proposition, therefore, that an individual member cannot challenge an election in any circumstance is not correct. When a writ petition can be maintainable at the instance of an individual member of the general body of the society or the office bearer of the society or by the body itself is a different issue but when an election itself can be challenged is another aspect. Similarly whether a writ petition would be maintainable at the instance of an individual or the collective body and in what circumstances stands on different footings. 24. What is discernible from the above discussion is where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, if such rights of the individual concerned are borne out from the statute or the provision of bye-laws etc. having the flavour of statute, a writ petition at his instance may be maintainable subject to attracting the condition where the Court may decline to interfere namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. having the flavour of statute, a writ petition at his instance may be maintainable subject to attracting the condition where the Court may decline to interfere namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. but where a legal right of an individual is not directly affected, a writ petition expousing the cause of the collective body or other members of the collective body would not be maintainable at the instance of an individual who himself is not directly affected. We may add here that in a given case, if it is found that an election was held by an imposter and he is supported by District Inspector of Schools or other educational authorities, such an action of DIOS as also the election can be challenged by the individual member since it cannot be said that he is not a person aggrieved but whether a writ petition at his instance would be maintainable or he can challenge the election by filing a civil suit etc., would be a different aspect of the matter and has to be considered in each and every case considering the facts, relevant provision and other relevant aspects of the matter. 25. Now coming to the present dispute, we find that here the election was held in accordance with scheme of administration which has been prepared in accordance with 1921 Act and the Regulations framed thereunder and is duly approved by the educational authorities. The petitioner was a contestant in the election. Complaining some irregularities, he made a complaint before District Inspector of Schools who after getting a report from the Authorised Controller and prima facie getting satisfied directed for re-counting of the votes and accepted the request of the petitioner to this extent. But thereafter no re-counting took place. The elections were recognised by the education authorities without such recounting. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner is not an aggrieved person or has no locus standi. Whether the writ petition was filed for infringement of a legal or statutory right or a right under bye-laws having force of law is not an issue raised by the respondents in the earlier petition as well as the present one but their basic objection is that the petitioner cannot be said to be an aggrieved person and thus has no locus standi. From the record of the earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner, we find that the respondents at no point of time raised this issue since the locus standi of the petitioner appellant was writ large. It is a different aspect as to why and in what circumstances, the writ petition was dismissed as having rendered infructuous by observing that term of the Committee of Management has expired. It is the consequential order passed by the DIOS after dismissal of the first writ petition of the petitioner-appellant that he has to file the second writ petition which is concerned with the correctness of the order of DIOS, and in the above facts and circumstances, we find it difficult to subscribe the view as canvassed by the respondents that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the writ petition and, therefore, reject the same. We hold that the petitioner is a person aggrieved and has locus standi in the matter. 26. We again clarify that our observations are only confined for the purpose of the present case to the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents that the petitioner-appellant has no locus standi i.e. he is not the person aggrieved. In respect to the wider issue as to when a writ petition can be entertained challenging the validity of an election is a different aspect of the matter and in this respect neither any objection has been raised by the respondents nor the arguments have been advanced, therefore, we are leaving this issue to be considered in some other case at appropriate time.” 12. From the proposition as laid down in the above Division Bench judgments, it is clear that the question as to whether an individual member has locus to challenge the election of the Committee of Management depends on facts of each case. In the present case, the objection was raised on behalf of the present appellant, who was respondent to the writ petition, that the writ petition at the instance of respondent No.4, who is alleged to be member of general body, is not maintainable. The Hon'ble Single Judge has accepted the said objection and, in fact, has held that writ petition is not maintain been closed there and there was no occasion for issuing any direction at the instance of a person on whose instance the writ petition was held to be not maintainable. The Hon'ble Single Judge has accepted the said objection and, in fact, has held that writ petition is not maintain been closed there and there was no occasion for issuing any direction at the instance of a person on whose instance the writ petition was held to be not maintainable. There is no appeal by the writ petitioner challenging the said view taken by the Hon'ble Single Judge. Thus it is not necessary for us to proceed to examine as to whether in the present case writ petition could have been entertained at the instance of respondent No.4 who alleged himself to be member of the general body. It is suffice to say that Hon'ble Single Judge having taken the view that the writ petition was not maintainable at the instance of respondent No.4, the matter should have been closed there and there was no occasion for issuing any direction at the instance of a person on whose instance the writ petition was held to be not maintainable.” (iv). This Court in the case of Ratan Kumar Solanki Vs. State of U.P. and others reported in 2010 (1) ADJ 262 (DB) has also held as under:- 23. In Satya Narain Tripathi (supra) the question whether a member of the general body can challenge the election by filing a writ petition was considered by the Hon'ble Single Judge (Hon'ble Janardan Sahai, J.) and his Lordship held that participation either by contesting election or exercising right to franchise is not a fundamental right, but merely a common right originating from the statute or the rules and bye-laws of an association etc. A breach of such statutory rights or right under the rules and regulations can be redressed by the available remedy which the statute or bye-laws provide or by a civil suit where such remedy is not otherwise barred. Where the elections are held under statutory provision, the remedy of challenging the election, if provided under the statute, has to be availed as an alternative remedy which would ordinarily bar the maintainability of a writ petition. The infringement of a right under the bye-laws of the society would not make the writ petition maintainable under Article 226 but in such a case the incumbent would have to avail remedy either by filing a civil suit or under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. The infringement of a right under the bye-laws of the society would not make the writ petition maintainable under Article 226 but in such a case the incumbent would have to avail remedy either by filing a civil suit or under Section 25 of the Societies Registration Act. His Lordship also observed if there is a breach of a right of a person affecting his right to form an association, which is a fundamental right under Article 19 (1) (c) of the Constitution, in that case or where there is breach of the statute, the writ petition may be maintainable subject to the Court exercising its discretion if an alternative remedy is available. The proposition, therefore, that an individual member cannot challenge an election in any circumstance is not correct. When a writ petition can be maintainable at the instance of an individual member of the general body of the society or the office bearer of the society or by the body itself is a different issue but when an election itself can be challenged is another aspect. Similarly whether a writ petition would be maintainable at the instance of an individual or the collective body and in what circumstances stands on different footings. 24. What is discernible from the above discussion is where the right of an individual is affected or infringed, and, he has no other effective remedy, if such rights of the individual concerned are borne out from the statute or the provision of bye-laws etc. having the flavour of statute, a writ petition at his instance may be maintainable subject to attracting the condition where the Court may decline to interfere namely availability of alternative remedy, delay, laches etc. but where a legal right of an individual is not directly affected, a writ petition expousing the cause of the collective body or other members of the collective body would not be maintainable at the instance of an individual who himself is not directly affected. but where a legal right of an individual is not directly affected, a writ petition expousing the cause of the collective body or other members of the collective body would not be maintainable at the instance of an individual who himself is not directly affected. We may add here that in a given case, if it is found that an election was held by an imposter and he is supported by DIOS or other educational authorities, such an action of DIOS as also the election can be challenged by the individual member since it cannot be said that he is not a person aggrieved but whether a writ petition at his instance would be maintainable or he can challenge the election by filing a civil suit etc., would be a different aspect of the matter and has to be considered in each and every case considering the facts, relevant provision and other relevant aspects of the matter.” (v). This Court in the case of Deepak Sharma Vs. State of U.P. and others, reported in 2005 0 Supreme(All) 2628 has also held as under:- “45. The parameters of the Court's power have been analyzed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay & Ors,. Vs. Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1182 as under-: "By now, the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative or executive action or decision and the grounds on which the Court can interfere with the same are well settled and it would be redundant to recapitulate the whole catena of decisions of this Court commencing from Barium Chemicals, AIR 1967 SC 295 case on the point. Indisputably, it is a settled position that if the action or decision is perverse or is such that no reasonable body of persons, properly informed, could come to, or has been arrived at by the authority misdirecting itself by adopting a wrong approach, or has been influenced by irrelevant or extraneous matters the Court would be justified in interfering with the same. This Court in one of its later decisions in Smt. Shalini Soni Vs. This Court in one of its later decisions in Smt. Shalini Soni Vs. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 431 , has observed thus: "It is an unwritten rule of the law, constitutional and administrative, that whenever a decision-making function is entrusted to the subjective satisfaction of a statutory functionary, there is an implicit obligation to apply his mind to pertinent and proximate matters only, eschewing the irrelevant and the remote". Suffice it to say that the following passage appearing at pages 285-86 in Prof. de Smith's treatise Judicial Review of Administrative Action' (4th Edn.) succinctly summarises the several principles formulated by the Courts in that behalf thus: "The authority in which a discretion is vested can be compelled to exercise that discretion, but not to exercise it in any particular manner. In general, a discretion must be exercised only by the authority to which it is committed. That authority must genuinely address itself to the matter before it: it must not act under the dictation of another body or disable itself from exercising a discretion in each individual case. In the purported exercise of its discretion it must not do what it has been forbidden to do, nor must it do what it has not been authorised to do. It must act in good faith, must have regard to all relevant considerations, must not be swayed by irrelevant considerations, must not seek to promote purposes alien to the letter or to the spirit of the legislation that gives it power to act, and must not act arbitrarily or capriciously. Nor where a judgment must be made that certain facts exist can a discretion be validly exercised on the basis of an erroneous assumption about those facts. These several principles can conveniently be grouped in two main categories; failure to exercise a discretion, and excess or abuse of discretionary power. The two classes are not, however, mutually exclusive. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account; and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidly contained within each category". 46. In State of U.P. & Ors., Vs. Renusagar Power Co. & Ors,. Thus, discretion may be improperly fettered because irrelevant considerations have been taken into account; and where an authority hands over its discretion to another body it acts ultra vires. Nor, is it possible to differentiate with precision the grounds of invalidly contained within each category". 46. In State of U.P. & Ors., Vs. Renusagar Power Co. & Ors,. AIR 1988 SC 1737 it was held that exercise of administrative power will be set aside if there is a manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary. 47. The famous "Wednesbury Case" Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. Us. Wednesbury Corp. (1947) 2 All ER 680 (CA) is considered to be the landmark in so far as the basic principles relating to judicial review of administrative or statutory direction are concerned. We quote a passage from the judgment of Lord Greene which is as follows:- "It is true that discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? Lawyers familiar with the phraseology used in relation to exercise of statutory discretions often use the word unreasonable' in a rather comprehensive sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to the matters, which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration matters, which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those rules, he may truly be said, and often is said, to be acting unreasonably'. Similarly, there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could even dream that it lay within the powers of the authority . In another, it is taking into consideration extraneous matters. It is unreasonable that it might almost be described as being done in bad faith; and in fact, all these things run into one another.” 48. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarized in 1985 by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) Al. ER. 935, (commonly known as CCSU case) as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. The principles of judicial review of administrative action were further summarized in 1985 by Lord Diplock in Council of Civil Service Unions Vs. Minister for the Civil Service 1984 (3) Al. ER. 935, (commonly known as CCSU case) as illegality, procedural impropriety and irrationality. He said more grounds could in future become available, including the doctrine of proportionality which was a principle followed by certain other members of the European Economic Community. Lord Diplock observed in this case as follows:- "…….Judicial review has I think, developed to a stage today when, without reiterating any analysis of the steps by which the development has come about, one can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground I would call illegality', the second irrationality' and the third procedural impropriety'. That is not to say that further development on a case-by-case basis may not in course of time add further grounds. I have in mind particularly the possible adoption in the future of the principle of proportionality' which is recognized in the administrative law of several of our fellow members of the European Economic Community." Lord Diplock explained irrationality' as follows: "By irrationality' I mean what can by now be succinctly referred to as Wednesbury unreasonableness'. It applies to a decision which is so outrageous in its defiance of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it." 49. In Union of India & Anr,.Vs.G.Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 the Supreme Court after referring to the aforesaid two cases namely Wednesbury case and CCSU case held:- "We are of the view that even in our country-in cases not involving fundamental freedoms-the role of our courts/tribunals in administrative law is purely secondary and while applying Wednesbury and CCSU principles to test the validity of executive action or of administrative action taken in exercise of statutory powers, the courts and tribunals in our country can only go into the matter, as a secondary reviewing court to find out if the executive or the administrator in their primary roles have arrived at a reasonable decision on the material before them in the light of Wednesbury and CCSU tests. The choice of the options available is for the authority; the court/tribunal canot substitute its view as to what is reasonable." 50. In Indian Railway Construction Co. Ltd. Vs. Ajay Kumar AIR 2003 SC 1843 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held : "It is trite law that exercise of power, whether legislative or administrative, will be set aside if there is manifest error in the exercise of such power or the exercise of the power is manifestly arbitrary. If a power (whether legislative or administrative) is exercised on the basis of facts which do not exist and which are patently erroneous, such exercise of power will stand vitiated." 51. In People's Union for Civil Liberties & Anr. Vs. Union of India & ors., AIR 2004 SC 456 while dealing with the same issue, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "The jurisdiction of this Court in such matter is very limited. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review in such matters unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fide, dishonesty or corrupt practice. The order can be set aside if it is held to be beyond the limits for which the power has been conferred upon the authorities by the Legislature or is based on the grounds extraneous to the legislation and if there are no grounds at all for passing it or if the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion or satisfaction required thereunder." 52. In State of N.C.T. of Delhi & Anr. Vs. Sanjeev alias Bittoo (2005) 5 SCC 181 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "One can conveniently classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is subject to control by judicial review. The first ground is illegality' the second irrationality' and the third procedural impropriety' The Court will be slow to interfere in such matters relating to administrative functions unless decision is tainted by any vulnerability enumerated above; like illegality, irrationality, and procedural impropriety. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient." 53. The principles applied in judicial review of administrative decisions have also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular Vs. Whether action falls within any of the categories has to be established. Mere assertion in that regard would not be sufficient." 53. The principles applied in judicial review of administrative decisions have also been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Tata Cellular Vs. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 11 and the same are as follows:- "(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicial scrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract. Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or award the contract is reached by process of negotiations through several tiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitatively by experts. (5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In other words, a fairplay in the joints is a necessary concomitant for an administrative body functioning in an administrative sphere or quasi administrative sphere. However, the decision must not only be tested by the application of Wednesbury principle of reasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) but must be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuated by mala fides. (6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure." 54. In Monarch Infrastructure (P) Ltd. Vs. Commissioner, Ulhasnagar Municipal Corporation & Ors,. AIR 2000 SC 2272 it was held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court:- "Broadly stated, the courts would not interfere with the matter of administrative action or changes made therein, unless the Government's action is arbitrary or discriminatory or the policy adopted has no nexus with the object it seeks to achieve or is mala fide." 55. In Air India Ltd. Vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & Ors,. In Air India Ltd. Vs. Cochin International Airport Ltd. & Ors,. AIR 2000 SC 801 the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:- "Even when some defect is found in the decision-making process the court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 with great caution and should exercise it only in furtherance of public interest and not merely on the making out of a legal point. The court should always keep the larger public interest in mind in order to decide whether its intervention is called for or not. Only when it comes to a conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference, the court should intervene." 56. The decisions referred to by us clearly highlight the parameters of the Court's power of judicial review of administrative action or decision. The jurisdiction of the Courts in such a matter is very limited. The order can be set-aside if it is based on extraneous grounds or there are no grounds at all for passing it or the grounds are such that no one can reasonably arrive at the opinion. The Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. The Court will not normally exercise its power of judicial review unless it is found that formation of belief by the statutory authority suffers from mala fide, dishonesty or corrupt practice. In other words the authority must act in good faith. This apart, even when some defect is found in the decision-making process, the Court must exercise its discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution with great caution keeping in mind the larger public interest and only when it comes to the conclusion that overwhelming public interest requires interference that the Court should intervene.” 23. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents as well as learned Standing Counsel submit that it is well settled proposition of law that in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Courts should not interfere with election process and finalisation of list is not amenable to challenge in writ jurisdiction. It has also been observed in various judgements of this Court that the dispute regarding correctness of such list which is highly disputed can be decided only by Civil Court. In support of the aforesaid submissions, they have relied upon the several judgements, which are as follows:- (i). It has also been observed in various judgements of this Court that the dispute regarding correctness of such list which is highly disputed can be decided only by Civil Court. In support of the aforesaid submissions, they have relied upon the several judgements, which are as follows:- (i). This Court in the case of Achin Jain and others Vs. Assistant Registrar, Firms, Societies and Chits, U.P., Moradabad and others, reported in 2006 (3) AWC 2846 has held as under:- “9. I am supported in my view by judgment of this Court in (1993) 2 UPLBEC 1333, Basant Prasad Srivastava and others Vs. State of U.P. and others, in which it has been held that where in the educational institution the election/finalisation of election process of Committee of Management is challenged under Article 226, the writ petition under Article 226 would not be maintainable and the only remedy in such cases is by filing election petition or filing civil suit. Paragraph 4 of the aforesaid judgment is quoted as under: "The learned Single Judge has observed that it was well settled proposition of law that in proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution Courts should not interfere with election process and finalisation of list is not amenable to challenge in writ jurisdiction. It has also been observed that dispute regarding correctness of voters list is a highly disputed question of fact which can be decided only by Civil Court. With these observations the learned Single Judge directed that the result of the be declared forthwith and further steps be taken in accordance with law." (ii). This Court in the case of Committee of Management of Krishak Sevasamiti, Ghazipur and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in 2009 (1) ADJ 460 has also held as under:- “17. Contrary to it, Sri P.N. Saxena, learned counsel appearing for respondent no.5 has tried to justify the impugned order dated 27.10.2008 passed by the Prescribed Authority in exercise of powers under Section 25(1) of Societies Registration Act, 1860. Before making submission on merits Sri Saxena has raised preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition. He submitted that by impugned order the Prescribed Authority has decided the dispute of members of general body of society and directed to hold fresh election on the basis of valid members of society. Before making submission on merits Sri Saxena has raised preliminary objection about the maintainability of writ petition. He submitted that by impugned order the Prescribed Authority has decided the dispute of members of general body of society and directed to hold fresh election on the basis of valid members of society. The nature of dispute raised in the writ petition involves factual question which requires appreciation on the basis of material evidence on record. Therefore, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India this Court cannot go into factual dispute and take different view in the matter than that of taken by the Prescribed Authority on the question of validity of members of general body of society, which constitutes electoral college for holding election of governing body of society, therefore, the writ petition filed by the petitioners is liable to be dismissed on this ground alone and for adjudication of the question in controversy involved in the case the only course open to the petitioners is to take re-course of civil suit before competent court having jurisdiction to decide such civil suit. The submissions of Sri P.N. Saxena, learned counsel for respondent no.5 appears to have substance and deserves to be accepted.” (iii). This Court in the case of Basant Prasad Srivastava and Ors. Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in AIR 1994 All 112 has also held as under:- “4. ……….in proceeding under Art. 226 of the Constitution Courts should not interfere with election process and finalisation of list is not amenable to challenge in writ jurisdiction. It has also been observed that dispute regarding correctness of voters' list is a highly disputed question of fact which can be decided only by Civil Court.” (iv). This Court in the case of Pt. Suraj Pal Sharma And 3 Others Vs. State of U.P. And 2 Others, decided on 21.10.2021 in Writ-C No. 21092 of 2021 has held as under:- “15. This Court finds that no interference can be made in a writ petition for contesting the validity of the claim of members and the electoral college finalised by Assistant Registrar and the remedy open for petitioners is either for filing a civil suit or election petition.” (v). In he case of Katar Singh Baliyan Vs. This Court finds that no interference can be made in a writ petition for contesting the validity of the claim of members and the electoral college finalised by Assistant Registrar and the remedy open for petitioners is either for filing a civil suit or election petition.” (v). In he case of Katar Singh Baliyan Vs. State of U.P. And 6 Others, decided on 26.3.2019 in Special Appeal No.355 of 2019, this Court has held as under : “ ……….Assistant Registrar was not competent enough to go into the question of determination of membership of the Society again when this Court had specifically directed that in the event of any dispute subsisting after finalization of the list by the Assistant registrar, the parties would take recourse to the proceedings of a civil suit.” 24. The Court finds that there is no publication inviting objections before finalizing the list of members of general body and the order has been passed without taking into consideration the objections as filed by the petitioners and it has also not been disclosed as to what is the basis of finalizing the list of 286 members, hence, the orders appears to be arbitrary and unreasonable. 25. With respect to the power of this Court regarding judicial review of such order, it has already been held in several judgements of this Court that such order which are arbitrary, illegal can always be looked into. 26. In such facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned order dated 02.11.2021 is set aside. It is directed that the Assistant Registrar may after inviting objections and considering the same finalize the list of members of general body in accordance with law, within a period of three months from the date of certified copy of this order. 27. It is made clear that the Court has not looked into the maintainability of the writ filed by Yerra Prakash Gupta and others in Writ-C No.34056 of 2021.