JUDGMENT 1. In 2007, the petitioners filed WP No.403 of 2007 with the principal allegation that the 8th respondent had constructed a hotel in the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ). The petitioners later noticed that the 8th respondent had not secured any approval from the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MEF); thus, the construction was in 'No Development Zone'. Besides, the 8th eight respondent is said to have started a wholly new project based on the revised plans. That prompted the petitioners to file another writ petition: WP No.659 of 2010. They wanted the Court to quash all permissions the civic authorities had granted to the 8th respondent and, consequently, order demolition of the hotel, too. 2. A Division Bench of this Court, through its Judgment, dated 26 February 2014, rendered a split verdict. One learned Judge declared the construction illegal and ordered demolition; the other learned Judge directed Goa Coastal Zone Management Authority (GCZMA), Town & Country Planning, and Village Panchayat authorities to "consider the legality of the construction put up by the private respondents in the said area between 50 to 100 meters from the High Tide Line in the light of observations made herein above in accordance with law". 3. On reference, through judgment, dated 20 January 2015, a third learned Judge endorsed the latter view: the GCZMA, Town & Country Planning, and Village Panchayat authorities must consider the legality of the construction put up by the private respondents. The Deliberations: 4. Gczma, in August 2015, communicated the judgment to the Town Planning Authority and Village Panchayat. After deliberating on the issue in the light of the judicial directive, a subcommittee of the Town Planning Department submitted a report, in March 2017, to the GCZMA. That report, according to the petitioners, concluded that the structures could not be saved. In the last week of May 2019, the petitioners secured a copy of Town Planning Subcommittee's report but felt that the authorities had not acted on it. So, in June 2019, the petitioners filed PIL Writ Petition No. 40 of 2019. Later Developments: 5. In PIL WP. No. 40 of 2019, all the respondents, including the GCZMA, were put on notice before admission. But, pending further consideration of the case, a particular development took place: on 13th December 2019, the Town & Country Planning Department granted technical clearance to the 8th respondent's project. Later Developments: 5. In PIL WP. No. 40 of 2019, all the respondents, including the GCZMA, were put on notice before admission. But, pending further consideration of the case, a particular development took place: on 13th December 2019, the Town & Country Planning Department granted technical clearance to the 8th respondent's project. Therefore, the petitioners have come up with this amendment petition "to update the petition and to challenge the wholly unsound, unwarranted, and unsustainable technical clearance" issued by the Town & Country Planning Department. This amendment is being very stiffly resisted by the eight respondent, who has pleaded every conceivable ground against the amendment and has cited every decided case on this point, almost. The Contentions: The Petitioners : 6. Ms Norma Alvares, the learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that this Court earlier directed the Town & Country Planning Department to examine the constructions raised by the 8th respondent "in terms of the 1989 Development Regulations or any other laws in force". So, the authority ought to have decided the structure's legality strictly in tune with the judicial directive. 7. According to Ms Alavers, though the judgment was passed in 2015, the authorities dragged the matter endlessly. It was despite the petitioners' diligent pursuit. Then, they were compelled to file another writ petition: PIL WP 40 of 2019. That writ petition sought the demolition of structures. In this context, she stresses that GCZMA granted the "technical clearance" only on 13.12.2019 pending the writ petition. And that prompted the petitioners to seek the Court's leave to amend the writ petition. Ms Alvares argues that the amendment is only to bring on record the later developments, which also require the petitioners to seek consequential reliefs. She stoutly denies that the amendment changes the cause of action or expands the scope of litigation. The 8th respondent: 8. Shri Atmaram N. S. Nadkarni, the learned Senior Counsel for the 8th respondent, has advanced a very elaborate argument, besides filing two sets of written arguments. It suffices if we summarise the submissions: (1) The amendment changes the nature and scope of PIL WP No. 40 of 2019. (2) It intends to litigate "decided on concluded issues". (3) In the garb of an amendment, the petitioners want to advance "the selfsame arguments/contentions". (4) As to the scope of the Supreme Court order, dated the 01.03.2010, the petitioners earlier advanced elaborate arguments. (2) It intends to litigate "decided on concluded issues". (3) In the garb of an amendment, the petitioners want to advance "the selfsame arguments/contentions". (4) As to the scope of the Supreme Court order, dated the 01.03.2010, the petitioners earlier advanced elaborate arguments. In fact, this Court has already considered those arguments and rejected them. So, the petitioners cannot reagitate what has already been concluded. (5) The petitioners' allegations about the alleged fraud the 8th respondent practiced are without any substance. (6) The petitioners have raised certain pleas based on the observations made by one of the judges in the split verdict. Given the final judgment, the minority view cannot be touted as if it were a binding directive. 9. Indeed, the learned Senior Counsel argued various aspects touching on the merits of the case as well. But we need not refer to them. 10. Shri Nadkarni, the learned Senior Counsel, has relied on these judgments: (1) Satish Nambiar v. Union of India, (2008) 150 DLT 312 (DB) , (2) Ishwar Dutt v. Land Acquisition Collector, (2005) 7 SCC 190 , (3) Swamy Atmananda v. Sri Ramakrishna Tapovanam, (2005) 10 SCC 51 (4) M. Nagabhshana v. State of Karnataka, (2011) 3 SCC 408 (5) Hope Plantations Ltd. v. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, (1999) 5 SCC 590 , (6) Makhija Construction & Engg. (P) Ltd. v. Indore Development Authority, (2005) 6 SCC 304 , (7) S. Nagaraj (dead) by LRs v. B. R. Vasudeva Murthy, (2010) 3 SCC 353 , (8) K. K. Modi v. K. N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573 , (9) Union of India v. Videocon Industries Ltd., (2012) 129 DRJ 396 , (10) Bharat Karsondas Thakker v. Kiran Construction Co., (2008) 13 SCC 658 (11) Prasanna Kumar Keshan v. Pradip Gogoi, 2018 1 GauLR 496 (12) Balaji Mohaprabhu v. Narasingha Kar, (1978) AIR Orissa 199. Discussion: 11. In the first round of litigation, this Court's Division Bench wanted the authorities concerned to examine the issue and take a decision. That direction was in 2015. For the next four years, the authorities had been deliberating. Then, in May 2019, the petitioner realised that the authorities had decided against the 8th respondent. So, they have filed this writ petition seeking a direction for the demolition of the building. Pending that writ petition, GCZMA gave technical clearance to the existing structures. That direction was in 2015. For the next four years, the authorities had been deliberating. Then, in May 2019, the petitioner realised that the authorities had decided against the 8th respondent. So, they have filed this writ petition seeking a direction for the demolition of the building. Pending that writ petition, GCZMA gave technical clearance to the existing structures. There had been no occasion for the petitioners to plead in the writ petition about the GCZMA's action; it is, indeed, a later development. Through an elaborate amendment, the petitioners want to plead that the GCZMA's action falls foul of the statutory scheme and the judicial mandate. 12. But the 8th respondent contends that the amendment changes the cause of action and the nature of the proceedings. According to it, the petitioners are trying to agitate issues that have already been closed. The Question: 13. Can the petitioners' plea for an amendment to the writ petition to bring on record 'the later developments' and seek relief in tune with those later developments be sustained? The Amendment: 14. To answer the above question, first we must see what amendment the petitioners have sought. Let us see : The para to be incorporated as 34A pleads that the impugned order (technical clearance) has considered the plan "afresh". GCZMA provided no reasons why these illegal buildings are being regularised "in such a simplistic fashion". The impugned order is, therefore, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. Para 34B pleads that the approval is "for a wholly new plan for a completely new project erected illegally" by the 8th respondent. Para 34C refers to the Supreme Court's directions in this matter and attempts to explain how the impugned order falls foul of the Apex Court's observations. In para 34D, the petitioners take an alternative plea about the applicability of Regulations-1989 and attempt to point out the flaws in the impugned order. In para 34E, the petitioners contend that "the so-called revised plan which is now granted Technical Clearance" is a wholly new plan, which cannot be countenanced. Para 34F points out that the Regulations do not permit occupancy without approval for changes "under 8 (1) or (2) at site". Then, para 34G, sets out the grounds demonstrating how the impugned technical clearance is "completely unsound". Para 34F points out that the Regulations do not permit occupancy without approval for changes "under 8 (1) or (2) at site". Then, para 34G, sets out the grounds demonstrating how the impugned technical clearance is "completely unsound". In para 34H, the petitioners put in perspective their plea: "Technical Clearance order under Ref No. DE/5453/Bam/TCP/19/2222 dated 13.12.2019-and any permissions granted consequent to it-ought to be quashed and set aside." 15. Then, because of the developments after their filing the writ petition and because of the pleas they have taken, they have amended the relief clause, too. That additional relief relates to "an order quashing the Technical Clearance order under Ref No. DE/5453/Bam/TCP/19/2222 dated 13.12.2019 and any other consequential permissions issued thereafter". Decisions: 16. It serves well to remember in the manner of Chief Justice Marshall that we are dealing with public interest litigation, which is less adversarial and more justice-oriented. In the PIL, we have a lis pendens development. And that development needs, as the petitioners feel, its incorporation into the writ petition. For achieving that objective, the petitioners want the pleadings amended. 17. In Mc Culloch v. Maryland, tasked with finding the congressional power in the concealed constitutional crevasses, that is beyond the enumerated legislative powers; John Marshall CJ famously explains that the Constitution's nature requires that only its great outlines should be marked, and its important objects designated. The "minor ingredients" that make up those important constitutional objects must "be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves." Pithily put, when analysing the Constitution's text, "We must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding." After all we have before us a PIL; in that PIL, we have an application for amendment; that amendment speaks of later events; and for passing judicial muster, the application has not been shackled by the statutory constraints as contained in Rule 17 of Order 6, CPC. The standard of consideration is broader and wider in the sphere of writ jurisdiction, more particularly, in the sphere of public cause-if it is genuine. 18. Now let us check the precedents the 8th respondent has cited at the bar-one too many-but seem to be off-target. 19. In Ishwar Dutt, the Supreme Court has held that res judicata is a specie of the principle of estoppel. 18. Now let us check the precedents the 8th respondent has cited at the bar-one too many-but seem to be off-target. 19. In Ishwar Dutt, the Supreme Court has held that res judicata is a specie of the principle of estoppel. When a proceeding based on a particular cause of action has attained finality, the principle of res judicata shall fully apply. In Swamy Atmananda, the Supreme Court has, again, dealt with the same principle. Further, in Satish Nambiar, a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court, too, has dealt with the issue of res judicata. It holds that the principles of res judicata, applicable to writ proceedings, prevent parties from agitating the same question repeatedly. That is true, according to Satish Nambiar, even when the earlier determination may be erroneous. We may refer to one more Delhi High Court's judgment which affirms the same principle of law: Videocon Industries Ltd. The last in this series of judgments on the principle of res judicata is Prasana Kumar Keshan. 20. In M. Nagabhushana, the Supreme Court has reiterated the well established principles of res judicata. It has elucidated on the principle of finality of litigation. According to M. Nagabhushana, the plea of res judicata is not a technical doctrine but a fundamental principle which sustains the rule of law in ensuring finality to litigation. This principle seeks to promote honesty and a fair administration of justice and to prevent abuse in the matter of accessing court for agitating issues which have become final between the parties. To the same effect is Balaji Mohaprabhu. 21. In Hope Plantations Ltd., the Supreme Court has dealt with the principles of estoppel and res judicata, which are "based on public policy and justice". If we move on to Makhija Construction, there the Supreme Court has pointed out the fine distinction between the principle of precedent and that of res judicata: A precedent operates to bind in similar situations in a distinct case; res judicata, on the other hand, operates "to bind parties to proceedings for no other reason but that there should be an end to litigation." To the same effect is S. Nagaraj. 22. 22. In K. K. Modi, the Supreme Court has termed it an abuse of the Court's process and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him. The reagitation may or may not be barred as res judicata. But if the same issue is sought to be reagitated, it also amounts to an abuse of the Court's process. A judicial proceeding for a collateral purpose or a spurious claim in that proceeding may also in a given set of facts amounts to an abuse of the process of the court. Besides, frivolous or vexatious proceedings may also amount to an abuse of the process of the court, especially where the proceedings are absolutely groundless. The court then has the power to stop such proceedings summarily and save the time of the public and the court from being wasted. 23. In Bharat Karsondas Thakker, the respondent filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale. Neither to the agreement nor to the suit was the appellant a party. Later, the respondent wanted to convert the suit for specific performance into one of declaration of title. Into that suit for declaration of title, the respondent wanted to bring the appellant. Besides, he wanted to have another declaration that the consent decree the appellant secured in another suit would not bind him. The High Court allowed the amendment and permitted the respondent to implead the appellant, a third party to the contract. 24. In the above factual background, on appeal, the Supreme Court has wondered whether the High Court was right in allowing the amendment since it completely changed the nature and character of the suit. Along with that is the other question: Can a stranger to an agreement for sale be added as a party in a suit for specific performance of an agreement for sale in view of Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963? In answer, the Supreme Court has held that admittedly the appellant is a third party to the agreement and does not, therefore, fall within the category of "parties to the agreement". The appellant also does not come within the ambit of Section 19 of the said Act, which provides for relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. 25. The appellant also does not come within the ambit of Section 19 of the said Act, which provides for relief against parties and persons claiming under them by subsequent title. 25. All the above judgments deal with either res judicata or estoppel. They also underline the salutary judicial safeguard against the abuse of process. None deals with an amendment in the face of subsequent events pending litigation. What Matters? 26. With an amendment, a plea may pass the test of pleadings, not that of proof. When a particular plea, brought in by amendment, becomes a part of the pleadings, it allows the party to place proof before the court about that plea, for proof without a plea lacks foundation. On the converse, a plea without proof lacks justification. If the court allows a party to plead something, it does not amount to the court's accepting the plea as true. No plea, I reckon, can be opposed to be brought on record merely on the premise that it is false. Its veracity comes into question at a different stage. 27. In Cropper v Smith,1884 26 Ch 700 (CA) , Bowen LJ treats it as a well-established principle that the object of Courts is to decide the rights of the parties, and not to punish them for mistakes they make in the conduct of their cases by deciding otherwise than in accordance with their rights. For Bowen LJ, there is no kind of error or mistake which, if not fraudulent or intended to overreach, the Court ought not to correct, if it can be done without injustice to the other party. Courts do not exist for the sake of discipline, but for the sake of deciding matters in controversy. Such an amendment is not a matter of favour or of grace. Indeed, all such amendments shall be made as may be necessary for determining the real questions in controversy between the parties. In the end, Bowen LJ holds that as soon as it appears that the way in which a party has framed his case will not lead to a decision of the real matter in controversy, it is as much a matter of right on his part to have it corrected if it can be done without injustice, as anything else in the case is a matter of right. Granted, these seemingly sweeping observations must be read in the light of the amendment Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC has suffered. 28. Liberal as the provision for amendment is, it cannot be granted if the amendment (a) is forbidden by law; (b) mala fide; (c) is unnecessary; (d) is merely technical; (e) is useless or unsubstantial; (f) is based on no material; (g) seeks to take away right accrued by lapse of time; (h) raises a complete new ground, totally inconsistent with an earlier one; (i) makes a fundamental change in the character of the suit; (j) changes the nature of the suit; (k) places the opposite party in a position which cannot be compensated by costs; (l) introduces a new cause of action; (m) ousts jurisdiction of the court; (n) is sought to be introduced in a case pending before a court having no jurisdiction in the matter; (o) raises a new question of fact; (p) is "improper or unjust"; (q) allows a party to take advantage of his own default; (r) cures and revives a suit which was a nullity; (s) is after the withdrawal of the first application; (t) is to wipe out the earlier admission; (u) is after gross and inordinate delay; (v) after the commencement of trial[14]. 29. It will suffice if we examine the case holding of Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu, (2002) 7 SCC 559 . In that case, the plaintiff through an amendment proposed to introduce a cause of action that had arisen to the plaintiff during the suit's pendency. In response, the defendant contended that the averments in the application for the amendment were factually incorrect. In that context, the Supreme Court has noted that the proposed amendment has not changed the basic nature of the suit. What is sought to be changed is the nature of relief the plaintiff required. In fact, the trial Court and the High Court felt that the plaintiff could file a fresh suit. So they refused the amendment. 30. Taken in appeal, the Supreme Court has observed thus: "We fail to understand, if it is permissible for the plaintiff to file an independent suit, why the same relief which could be prayed for in a new suit cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending suit. In the present case's facts and circumstances, allowing the amendment would curtail multiplicity of legal proceedings". 31. In the present case's facts and circumstances, allowing the amendment would curtail multiplicity of legal proceedings". 31. According to the Supreme Court, if no fresh suit is barred, it only avoids multiplicity of proceedings if the party is allowed to amend the pleadings. On facts, the Court has observed that the plaintiff wanted to amend the pleadings almost 11 years after his instituting the suit. But he was not barred from instituting a new suit. So Sampath Kumar has held that to avoid multiplicity of suits, it would be a sound exercise of discretion for the court to permit the plaintiff to amend the pleadings and seek appropriate relief. It has also noted that the cause of action for the reliefs now sought has arisen to the plaintiff during the pendency of the suit. Besides, "the merits of the averments sought to be incorporated by way of the amendment are not to be judged at the stage of allowing prayer for amendment". 32. We reckon Sampath Kumar squarely applies to the case before us. Here, the petitioners pro bono publico have filed this writ petition seeking a particular relief: demolition of certain structures. Pending that writ petition, a supervening event occurred. The GCZMA has granted 'technical clearance'. This lis pendens development has rendered the writ petition untenable; the relief no longer survives. So, with that development, the petitioners had one straightforward option: the option of filing a fresh writ petition. Instead, they have chosen to persist with the same writ petition by bringing on record the later developments through amendment and seek, as a consequence, appropriate reliefs. That is what they have done here. 33. As the Apex Court has wondered in Sampath Kumar, we, too, feel bemused. If it is permissible for the petitioners to file an independent writ petition, why the same relief which could be prayed for in a new writ petition cannot be permitted to be incorporated in the pending writ petition-more particularly in the face of subsequent events. We have another justification as well. In a writ petition filed pro bono publico the procedural rigours as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure apply, if ever, in an attenuated form. There are two reasons for this. One is Section 141 of CPC. We have another justification as well. In a writ petition filed pro bono publico the procedural rigours as contained in the Code of Civil Procedure apply, if ever, in an attenuated form. There are two reasons for this. One is Section 141 of CPC. True, broad procedural principles do apply, but that is not by way of a statutory mandate but only as principles of justice, equity, and good conscience. Second, a PIL is less adversarial and more justice - oriented. 34. Indeed, there is no denying the fact that the 8th respondent has made herculean efforts to impress upon us that the issues the petitioners have raised through the amendment have already been agitated and have attained finality. That said, we must note that "the merits of the averments sought to be incorporated by way of an amendment are not to be judged at the stage" when the Court considers the prayer for amendment. So says Sampath Kumar. And we respectfully follow it. We only observe that the 8th respondent's plea on that count is premature. It may advance all its pleas at an appropriate stage of the litigation. In the meanwhile, it cannot stall the amendment, nor stop the litigious juggernaut rolling-to reach the ends of justice. 35. At this juncture, the learned counsel for the 8th respondent wants the order stayed for six weeks. As it is interlocutory order, we refuse to do so. 36. Post the matter on 25.02.2021.