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Rajasthan High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 1626 (RAJ)

Subhash Chandra S/o Arjun Ram v. State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department Of Home Affairs, Government Of Rajasthan, Jaipur

2021-09-03

DINESH MEHTA

body2021
JUDGMENT : (1) Instant writ petition and the writ petitions enlisted in the appended schedule, involve common questions of facts and law and hence, they are being decided conjointly. The facts are almost identical so much so, the order under challenge is also one, issued by the Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur on 05.08.2021. (2) The seniority of police personnel, working on the post of Constable and Head Constable is maintained at district level, whereas seniority of Assistant Sub-Inspectors is maintained at range level. In other words, the posts of Constable and Head Constable are district cadre Posts and appointments/promotions to these posts are made on district level; their appointing authority is the Superintendent of Police of concerned district. (3) Whereas, the post of Head Constable is filled-up 100% by way of promotion from amongst Constables on the basis of their seniority in the district. (4) The post of Assistant Sub-Inspector is to be filled in 100% by promotion from Head Constables and the same is a range level post. Seniority of ASIs is maintained at range level. (5) By way of present writ petitions, the petitioners herein, being Constable/Head Constable/Assistant Sub-Inspector working in the Police Department, have challenged their respective transfers affected by the above referred order dated 05.08.2021, inter alia, contending that the same is contrary to Rule 26 of the Rajasthan Police Subordinate Service Rules, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 1989’). (6) It is to be noted that by way of order dated 05.08.2021, various Constables, Head-Constables and Assistant Sub- Inspectors have been transferred out of their range. The basic ground, on which the petitioners have challenged their transfer is, that since the posts of Constable and Head- Constable are district cadre posts, they cannot be transferred out of their cadre/district. Similarly, as the post of Assistant Sub-Inspector is a range cadre post, they (ASIs) cannot be transferred out of their cadre/range. (7) Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that consequent to petitioners’ transfers in the range other than the District/Range they were appointed and working, their seniority will be adversely affected. It was also argued that their transfer will result into change of their appointing authority, which cannot be done by the respondents, except with the consent of the concerned employee. It was also argued that their transfer will result into change of their appointing authority, which cannot be done by the respondents, except with the consent of the concerned employee. (8) Inviting Court’s attention towards Rule 26 of the Rules of 1989, learned counsel argued that not only the vacancy for the posts of Constable and Head-Constable is determined district-wise but also the recruitment on such posts is made district-wise. Highlighting that appointment orders of the petitioners, who are Constables/Head-Constables, have been issued by the concerned Superintendent of Police, it was argued that their transfer out of range (obviously, out of district) is contrary to the Rules. (9) In order to buttress the above argument, Mr. Sidhu, learned counsel for the petitioners, relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court, rendered in the case of Jawahar Lal Nehru University Vs. Dr. K.S. Jawatkar & Ors., reported in 1989 Supp (1) SCC 679 and more particular para No.7 thereof, the same is being reproduced hereunder:- “7. In this appeal the main contention of the appellant is that the respondent was appointed at the Centre of Post-gradate Sutides. Imphal, and when the Centre was transferred to the Manipur University, his services were automatically transferred to that University, and consequently he could not claim to be an employee of the appellant University. The argument proceeds on the assumption that the Centre of Post-graduate Studies at Imphal was an independent entity which existed by itself and was not a department of the appellant University. The submission proceeds on a fallacy. The Centre of Post-graduate Studies was set up at Imphal as an activity of the appellant University. To give expression to that activity, the appellant University set up and organized the Centre at Imphal and appointed a teaching and administrative staff to man it. Since the Centre represented an activity of the appellant University the teaching and administrative staff must be understood as employees of the appellant University. In the case of the respondent, there can be no doubt whatever that he was, and continues to be, an employee of the appellant University. There is also no doubt that his employment could not be transferred by the appellant University to the Manipur University without his consent, notwithstanding any statutory provision to that effect whether in the Manipur University Act or elsewhere. There is also no doubt that his employment could not be transferred by the appellant University to the Manipur University without his consent, notwithstanding any statutory provision to that effect whether in the Manipur University Act or elsewhere. The contract of service entered into by the respondent was a contract with the appellant University and no law can convert that contract into a contract between the respondent and the Manipur University without simultaneously making it, either expressly or by necessary implication, subject to the respondent’s consent. When the Manipur University Act provides for the transfer of the services of the staff working at the Centre of Post-graduate Studies, Imphal, to employment in the Manipur University, it must be construed as a provision enabling such transfer of employment but only on the assumption that the employee concerned is a consenting party to such transfer. It makes no difference that the respondent was not shown in the list of Assistant Professors of the appellant University or that the provision was not indicated in its conception of the status of the respondent. The position in law is clear, that no employee can be transferred, without his consent, from one employer to another. The consent may be express or implied. We do not find it necessary to refer to any case law in support of this conclusion.” (10) Mr. Sushil Solanki, learned counsel appearing for some of the petitioners took the Court through paras Nos.14 and 15 of the reply and argued that the transfers in question are punitive in nature and thus, the same are liable to be quashed. (11) He invited Court’s attention towards the Circular dated 28.12.2020, issued by the Director General of Police, in which it is provided that if a Head Constable is transferred from one district to another, he shall be placed at the bottom of the seniority list of the Head-Constables of such district. He argued that it has been consistent practice of the respondents to place a Constable/Head Constable, who has been transferred from other district, at the bottom of the seniority and thus, the impugned transfer will result into arbitrary and impermissible downward movement of their seniority position. (12) Mr. He argued that it has been consistent practice of the respondents to place a Constable/Head Constable, who has been transferred from other district, at the bottom of the seniority and thus, the impugned transfer will result into arbitrary and impermissible downward movement of their seniority position. (12) Mr. Manish Vyas, learned AAG, appearing for the respondent- State firstly, invited Court’s attention towards an order dated 10.08.2021, issued by the Additional Director General of Police Headquarters and submitted that seniority of the Police Personnel transferred vide orders Nos.2259, 2264 and 2265 dated 05.08.2021 shall be maintained Districtwise/ Rangewise in their own District/Range. (13) He referred to the provisions contained in Section 34 of the Rajasthan Police Act, 2007 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2007’) and argued that petitioners can be posted anywhere in the State. (14) Learned Additional Advocate General further submitted that transfer is an incidence of service and the petitioners, being members of disciplined force, are obliged to honour their respective orders, as they have been transferred in administrative exigency and public interest. (15) Learned Additional Advocate General heavily relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court rendered in the case of State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Kashmir Singh & Anr., reported in (2010) 13 SCC 306 to contend that petitioners can be transferred out of District/Range. The relevant paras, which he read out in the Court, are as under:- “11. Thus, a plain perusal of the Punjab Police Rules shows that transfer can be done from one district to another district or even to another range, and there is no absolute prohibition for doing so. However, in such a case, the seniority of Constables and Head Constables at the district level and of ASIs and Sis at the range level is maintained in the parent district/range despite the transfer. Promotion/ confirmation is also given strictly as per the seniority in the parent district/range level, as per Memo No.43515-22/E-(III) dated 10-8-2010. 12. Transfer ordinarily is an incidence of service, and the courts should be very reluctant to interfere in transfer orders as long as they are not clearly illegal. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. In particular, we are of the opinion that transfer and postings of policemen must be left in the discretion of the State authorities concerned which are in the best position to assess the necessities of the administrative requirements of the situation. The administrative authorities concerned may be of the opinion that more policemen are required in any particular district and/or another range than in another, depending upon their assessment of the administrative matters, and it is well settled that courts must not ordinarily interfere in administrative matters and should maintain judicial restraint, vide Tata Cellular v. Union of India. 14. In our opinion, the High Court has taken a totally impractical view of the matter. If the view of the High Court is to prevail, great difficulties will be created for the State administration since it will not be able to transfer/deploy its police force from one place where there may be relative peace of another district or region/range in the State where there may be disturbed law and order situation and hence requirement of more police. Courts should not, in our opinion, interfere with purely administrative matters except where absolutely necessary on account of violation of any fundamental or other legal right of the citizen. After all, the State administration cannot function with its hands tied by judiciary behind its back. As Holmes, J. of the US Supreme Court pointed out, there must be some free play of the joints provided to the executive authorities.” (16) In rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioners argued that the Rules of 1989, having been promulgated in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India are substantive in nature. While contending that the area of operation and scope of the provisions of the Act of 2007 is entirely different, it was argued that the Rules of 1989 would prevail over the provisions of the Act of 2007. (17) It was argued by learned counsel for the petitioners that Section 34 of the Act of 2007 provides for “Deployment” and not “Transfer”. Elaborating their argument further, learned counsel submitted that deployment has a different meaning altogether – it refers to movement of police force or armed forces to another location in order to meet with the exigencies; whereas “Transfer” suggests posting an individual to another place in administrative exigency. Elaborating their argument further, learned counsel submitted that deployment has a different meaning altogether – it refers to movement of police force or armed forces to another location in order to meet with the exigencies; whereas “Transfer” suggests posting an individual to another place in administrative exigency. They added that deployment of the police force is an exercise to be done in emergency situation, whereas transfer is a routine incidence of service, to be done within the framework of law and policy made in this regard. (18) Learned counsel for the petitioners invited Court’s attention towards the preamble of the Act of 2007 and argued that the Act of 2007 has been enacted to deal with working style of the police force and the Act is not intended to deal with the service conditions of the police personnel. Their argument was, that in the matters relating to transfer(s) of police personnel, the Rules of 1989 shall have primacy. (19) Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following judgments:- “(i) Yad Ram Vs. State & Ors. (SBCWP No.16818/2017, decided on 20.12.2017) (ii) Smt. Premlata Vs. State & Ors. (SBCWP No.216/2015, decided on 25.03.2015) (iii) Harendra Vs. State & Ors. (SBCWP No.3656/2020, decided on 02.02.2021)” (20) Heard learned counsel for the parties. (21) Before proceeding further, it will be apposite to have an appraisal of statutory provisions, germane for the question involved in these cases. (22) Rule 26 of the Rules of 1989:- “26. Eligibility for promotion. - (1) Except in the case of specialised/technical post to be specified from time to time by the Director General-cum-Inspector General of Police, the persons enumerated in Column 5 of Section I, II and IV of the Schedule-I holding substantive rank, shall be eligible in the case of Constable on District/Unit Battalion basis, Head Constables/Assistant Sub-Inspectors on Range basis, and Sub- Inspectors/Platoon Commanders on State basis, for promotion to the posts specified in column 2, of the Schedule-I subject to their possessing such minimum qualification and experience as are specified in Column 6 of the Schedule-I: Provided that for the purpose of this Rule, promotions from the rank of Constables to that of Head Constables and from Head Constables to that of Sub- Inspectors, shall be made on unit/Range and for promotions from the rank of Head Constables to that of Platoon Commanders on Range basis in RAC, "Range" shall mean State basis. Explanation.- (i) In case direct recruitment to a post has been made earlier than regular selection for promotion in a particular year, such of the persons who are or were eligible for appointment to that post by both the methods of recruitment and have been appointed by direct recruitment first, shall also be considered for promotion. (ii) In the case of specialised/technical posts, so specified in sub-rule (1) above the eligibility for promotion of District/Unit/Battalion/Range/State basis of persons holding substantive ranks and enumerated in Column 5 of Section I, II and IV of the Schedule-I shall be laid down by the Director General- cum- Inspector General of Police. (iii) The persons enumerated in Column 5 of Section III of the Schedule-I holding substantive rank, shall be eligible for promotion to posts specified in Column-2 on State basis, in the Police-Tele-Communications Directorate, subject to their possessing such minimum qualifications and experience as are specified in Column 6 of Schedule-I. (iv) The persons eligible for promotion should have completed the requisite number of years of service as laid down in Column-6 of Schedule-I on first of April of the year in which the qualifying examination is held. Explanation.- "State basis" in this rule shall mean all members of a particular category in the entire State in order of seniority. The combined seniority of such official under different Appointing Authority shall be determined on such principles and basis as may be decided by the Government in consultation with the Deptt. of Personnel: Provided that after the determination of the vacancies, the applications of candidates not exceeding six times the number of vacancies, out of the senior most eligible members of service, shall be entertained for appearance in Part-I of the examination.” (23) Section 2(1)(j) of the Act of 2007:- “Definitions.- (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- xxx xxx xxx (j) “Police Personnel” shall include Police Officers and all other persons for whom the appointing authority is the Director General of Police or an officer subordinate to him.” (24) Section 34 of the Act of 2007:- “34. Police officers may be deployed in any part of the State.- Every Police Officer may, at any time, be deployed as a Police Officer in any part of the State.” (25) The Rules of 1989 contain comprehensive provisions dealing with the service conditions of the police personnel, whereas the Act of 2007 consists of general provisions in relation to the deployment of the police force. The preamble of the Act of 2007 makes it abundantly clear that it has been enacted in order to provide impartial and efficient police service to safeguard and in the interest of the society including minorities and also to augment the police personnel to fulfill the societal needs with professionalism and free from extraneous influences. (26) In the opinion of this Court, the Act of 2007 is a citizen centric Act, whereas Rules of 1989, promulgated in exercise of powers under Article 309 of the Constitution of India, are substantive provisions dealing with the service conditions of the police personnel. Hence, so far as the issue or question relating to service conditions of police personnel, including their transfer is concerned, the provisions of Rules of 1989 alone are relevant. The provisions of the Act of 2007 cannot be resorted to with respect to questions relating to transfer or other service conditions. In case of a conflict, the general law, i.e. the provisions of the Act of 2007 will have to yield to the special laws, i.e., provisions of Rules of 1989. (27) Argument of Mr. Manish Vyas emanating from Section 34 of the Act of 2007, is not tenable as the said section uses expression “Deploy”. In the opinion of this Court, the term “Deploy” has an altogether different connotation and purport. The expression “Deployment” means moving troops or forces to a particular location. The expression “Deployment” is used when the entire force or large numbers of police personnel are ordered to converge to a particular location to deal with an unexpected situation or to meet with immediate requirement. Deployment relates to a group of police personnel; whereas transfer deals with posting of an individual police personnel. (28) Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Deployment relates to a group of police personnel; whereas transfer deals with posting of an individual police personnel. (28) Learned Additional Advocate General relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Kashmir Singh (supra) as a trump card to contend that a Constable/Head-Constable can be transferred out of district and similarly an ASI can be transferred out of range. (29) A careful reading of the judgment aforesaid, particularly Rule 12.26 noticed in para No.9 of the judgment, reveals that the concerned Rules, namely, Punjab Police Rules, 1934, contain a specific provision permitting inter-district transfer, subject to approval of Superintendent concerned and inter-range transfers, subject to approval of the Deputy Inspector General concerned; whereas the Rules of 1989, which are applicable in the case in hands, do not have any such provision. Paras 11, 12 and 14 of the judgment, which have been relied upon by Mr. Manish Vyas, cannot be read divorced of the statutory provision applicable in the said case which have been noticed in para No.9 of the judgment in the case of Kashmir Singh (supra). (30) There being a significant difference between the statutory provisions prevailing in the case of Kashmir Singh (supra) and the statutory provisions governing the present petitions, in the opinion of this Court, judgment of Hon’ble the Supreme Court in the case of State of Haryana Vs. Kashmir Singh (supra) would hardly lend any support to the State. (31) The State has used the order/circular dated 10.08.2021, issued by the Additional Director General of Police, Rajasthan, Jaipur, as a sheet anchor. The said order provides that the seniority of the police personnel, who have been transferred vide Orders Nos.2259, 2264 and 2265 dated 05.08.2021, shall be maintained in their previous district/ range. (32) This Court is of the firm view that in the face of substantive provision, namely, Rule 26 of the Rules of 1989, which provides that seniority of Constable and Head-Constable shall be maintained district-wise and the seniority of Assistant Sub-Inspector will be maintained range-wise, no administrative order much less order dated 10.08.2021, issued by the Director General of Police, can protect or affect their seniority. Petitioners’ seniority cannot be maintained de-hors Rule 26 of the Rules of 1989. Petitioners’ seniority cannot be maintained de-hors Rule 26 of the Rules of 1989. (33) This Court has consistently held that inter-district transfers of Constables and Head-Constables and inter-range transfers of ASI’s are contrary to Rule 26 of the Rules of 1989. It will not be out of place to reproduce adjudication made by this Court in the case of Smt. Premlata (supra), which reads thus:- “A perusal of the said Rules shows that the persons mentioned in column 5 of Sections I, II and IV of the Schedule-I holding substantive rank shall be eligible in the case of Constables on District/Unit, Battalion basis, which means that the concerned Constable shall be promoted as and when his/her turn comes in the district to which he/she has been transferred. Mr. Jai Singh, Dy. Superintendent of Police, Traffic, Bikaner is present in the Court and confirms the said fact. Thus, this Court fails to understand as to how the petitioner does not stand to suffer, in case she is transferred from Bikaner to Jhunjhunu because, even though, the seniority is maintained from the date of the appointment, she will be promoted only in case the person senior to her in Jhunjhunu has been promoted though his initial appointment is after the date of the initial appointment of the present petitioner. Thus, the transfer order which places the petitioner in disadvantage vis-a-vis for the purpose of promotion cannot be sustained.” (34) Coordinate Benches of this Court have followed the aforesaid view in the cases of Yadram (supra) and Harendra(supra). (35) As the appointing authority of Constable/Head-Constable is the Superintendent of Police of the district concerned, consequent to their transfer under consideration, the Constables and Head-Constables will be required to receive instructions/directions from the Superintendent of Police of the district in which they have been transferred and as a natural corollary of their transfer, their appointing authority, so also the disciplinary authority will be changed. (36) Such action of the respondents cannot be countenanced as the Appointing Authority and Disciplinary Authority of an employee cannot be changed without his/her consent. (37) The transfers made vide order under challenge are, on the one hand, contrary to the statutory provisions and judgments of this Court and on the other hand reflective of non-application of mind. (36) Such action of the respondents cannot be countenanced as the Appointing Authority and Disciplinary Authority of an employee cannot be changed without his/her consent. (37) The transfers made vide order under challenge are, on the one hand, contrary to the statutory provisions and judgments of this Court and on the other hand reflective of non-application of mind. (38) This Court fails to comprehend that if any disciplinary action is to be taken against a transferred Constable/Head- Constable, then, who will be the competent authority to initiate the enquiry? Subhash Chandra (petitioner in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.10353/2021), being a Constable (General Duty), has been transferred from Jaisalmer to G.R.P., Ajmer; his disciplinary authority prior to the impugned transfer was Superintendent of Police, Jaisalmer. May be, as per the stand of the respondents, his seniority will remain as per his seniority in Jaisalmer, but what would happen if the persons junior to him posted in Jaisalmer are promoted, whereas no promotional avenues are available in G.R.P., Ajmer. Will he still be given promotion? (39) That apart, if due to any delinquency, a disciplinary action is proposed to be taken against the said Constable (Subhash Chandra), whether the Superintendent of Police, Jaisalmer will be the competent authority to initiate the disciplinary proceedings or the Superintendent of Police at Ajmer! (40) There are many more related or ancillary questions attached with such transfer, such as; at which place the service record of the transferred employees will be kept, who will deal with leave applications etc. of the transferred Constable/Head- Constables and A.S.Is? The Rules of 1989 are silent in this regard. The hiatus, if any, cannot be filled by the administrative orders. (41) According to this Court, transfers affected by the impugned order, shunting petitioners even out of range, would entail more complications than serving the cause of administration; let alone, the inconvenience caused to the petitioners. (42) During the course of submission, learned Additional Advocate General apprised the Court that most of the petitioners are facing cases of anti-corruption and hence, in the interest of better administration, the respondent No.2 has decided to transfer these employees out of their respective range, so that they cannot influence the investigation. (43) This Court feels that the same cannot be a reason or ground to transfer a Constable/Head-Constable or even an A.S.I. out of his range. (43) This Court feels that the same cannot be a reason or ground to transfer a Constable/Head-Constable or even an A.S.I. out of his range. Such stand reflects State’s lack of confidence in the officers and investigating agencies. (44) As an outcome of the discussion foregoing, these writ petitions deserve to be, and are hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 05.08.2021, qua each of the petitioners, whose names are mentioned in the schedule, including that of Subhash Chandra, is quashed. (45) The stay applications also stand disposed of accordingly.