B. E. Manu, S/o. B. N. Eshwara v. Union of India By Secretary Department of Posts
2021-01-27
SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, V.SRISHANANDA
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The present writ petition is arising out of the order dated 29.11.2018 passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Bangalore Bench, in OA.No.170/00147/2018 between B.E. Manu and Union of India and Others. 2. The facts of the case reveal that the petitioner before this Court was serving in the Postal Department on the post of Gramin Dak Sevak Packer at Kuttandi B.O a/w Virajpet MDG. A charge sheet was issued on account of an alleged incident, wherein it was alleged that on 12.5.2006 the officials of Corporation Bank, Virajpet, have posted an envelop containing a cheque book addressed to one Sri. Shahul Hamid resident of UAE and it was the petitioner who cleared that post box. It was further alleged that he retained the envelop containing the cheque book and handed over the same to his friend one Mr. N.A. Manu Kumar, who withdrew fraudulently Rs.2,000/- and again on another occasion made an attempt to draw Rs.10,000/-. Hence, a criminal case was registered against the petitioner as well as against the other person for offences under Sections 379, 419, 420 r/w 34 of IPC and at the same time, a departmental inquiry was also initiated against the petitioner. 3. The charge sheet was issued on 29.12.2006 and Annexure-I to the charge sheet showing the statement of article of charge reads as under : “ARTICLE I That Sri B.E. Manu, GDSMD, Kuttandi BO while working as GDS packer Virajpet and while clearing of the letter box in the Virajpet MDG premises on 12.05.2006, retained an envelope containing a cheque book addressed to Sri. Shahul Hamid, P.B 13414, Ajman UAE posted by Corporation Bank Virajpet and in connivance with one Sri. N.A Manu Kumar of Kuttandi village fraudulently withdrew an amount of Rs.2000.00 on 08.06.2006 from Corporation Bank Virajpet using cheque no.115151 of the cheque book. Therefore, it is alleged that Sri. B.E. Manu, GDSMD, Kuttandi BO failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty as required by Rule 21 of DOP Gramin Dak Sevak (C&E) Rules, 2001.” 4. A departmental inquiry was held after following the due process of law and the inquiry officer has held the petitioner guilty of the alleged misconduct. Thereafter, he has preferred an appeal in the matter. The appeal was dismissed and the petitioner came up before the Central Administrative Tribunal (‘Tribunal’ for short) by preferring an Original Application.
A departmental inquiry was held after following the due process of law and the inquiry officer has held the petitioner guilty of the alleged misconduct. Thereafter, he has preferred an appeal in the matter. The appeal was dismissed and the petitioner came up before the Central Administrative Tribunal (‘Tribunal’ for short) by preferring an Original Application. At the time the Original Application was heard i.e., on 25.8.2008 the criminal case was also pending and in those circumstances, the Original Application was dismissed with a liberty to file a fresh Original Application in case of acquittal. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of this Court towards the judgment of acquittal and his contention is that once the petitioner has been acquitted, he cannot be punished in the departmental inquiry. The judgment in the criminal case was delivered on 5.12.2017 passed in CC.No.1096/2017. The judgment of acquittal makes it very clear that the petitioner has been acquitted by granting him benefit of doubt and the learned Judge has gone to the extent of stating that the bank was negligent by dispatching the cheque book through ordinary post. 6. It is pertinent to note that the acquittal of the petitioner was not an honourable acquittal and in the earlier round of Original Application it was categorically mentioned that in case there is an honourable acquittal, the matter will be looked into afresh. However, after his acquittal, he preferred another Original Application before the Tribunal and the Tribunal has dismissed the Original Application. 7. The learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently argued before this Court that once the petitioner has been acquitted by the trial Court in respect of the crime arising out of the same incident, he cannot be punished in the departmental inquiry. He has placed reliance upon the judgments delivered in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors., reported in 2009 (3) All India Services Law Journal 14 and in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. reported in 1999 (3) All India Services Law Journal 152. 8. This Court has gone through the order passed by the Tribunal and the entire record. The record reveals that the departmental inquiry was held strictly in consonance with the statutory provisions.
M. Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. and Anr. reported in 1999 (3) All India Services Law Journal 152. 8. This Court has gone through the order passed by the Tribunal and the entire record. The record reveals that the departmental inquiry was held strictly in consonance with the statutory provisions. The learned counsel has not pointed out violation of a single provision in respect of the departmental inquiry which was conducted by the department. His contention is that once the petitioner has been acquitted in the criminal case, no punishment can be imposed based upon the departmental inquiry. 9. This Court has carefully gone through the inquiry report and the findings of the inquiry officer and the same reveals that the cheque book was recovered from the residence of the petitioner. There is an independent witness to the aforesaid recovery and the witness was examined during the course of the inquiry in the presence of the present petitioner, meaning thereby the recovery of cheque book from the petitioner’s house was established in the departmental inquiry and therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court once the cheque book was recovered from the house of the petitioner, the statement of other person who has been examined in the departmental enquiry cannot be brushed aside. 10. It is a settled position of law that in the departmental inquiry the theory of preponderance of probability is applicable, whereas in a criminal case an offence has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, keeping in view the theory of preponderance of probability, the misconduct has been established in the departmental inquiry and hence, the disciplinary authority was justified in passing an order in dismissing the petitioner from the services of the department. 11. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (referred supra) is concerned, in paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 the Supreme Court has held as under:- “33. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents.
11. So far as the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Capt. M. Paul Anthony (referred supra) is concerned, in paragraphs 33, 34 and 35 the Supreme Court has held as under:- “33. There is yet another reason for discarding the whole of the case of the respondents. As pointed out earlier, the criminal case as also the departmental proceedings were based on identical set of facts, namely, ’the raid conducted at the appellant’s residence and recovery of incriminating articles therefrom.’ The findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, a copy of which has been placed before us, indicate that the charges framed against the appellant were sought to be proved by Police Officers and Panch witnesses, who had raided the house of the appellant and had effected recovery. They were the only witnesses examined by the Inquiry Officer and the Inquiry Officer, relying upon their statements, came to the conclusion that the charges were established against the appellant. The same witnesses were examined in the criminal case but the court, on a consideration of the entire evidence, came to the conclusion that no search was conducted nor was any recovery made from the residence of the appellant. The whole case of the prosecution was thrown out and the appellant was acquitted. In this situation, therefore, where the appellant is acquitted by a judicial pronouncement with the finding that the "raid and recovery" at the residence of the appellant were not proved, it would be unjust, unfair and rather oppressive to allow the findings recorded at the ex-parte departmental proceedings, to stand. 34. Since the facts and the evidence in both the proceedings, namely, the departmental proceedings and the criminal case were the same without there being any iota of difference, the distinction, which is usually drawn as between the departmental proceedings and the criminal case on the basis of approach and burden of proof, would not be applicable to the instant case. 35. For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge, in so far as it purports to allow the Writ Petition, is upheld. The learned Single Judge has also given liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings.
For the reasons stated above, the appeal is allowed, the impugned judgment passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and that of the learned Single Judge, in so far as it purports to allow the Writ Petition, is upheld. The learned Single Judge has also given liberty to the respondents to initiate fresh disciplinary proceedings. In the peculiar circumstances of the case, specially having regard to the fact that the appellant is undergoing this agony since 1985 despite having been acquitted by the criminal court in 1987, we would not direct any fresh departmental inquiry to be instituted against him on the same set of facts. The appellant shall be reinstated forthwith on the post of Security Officer and shall also be paid entire arrears of salary, together with all allowances from the date of suspension till his reinstatement, within three months. The appellant would also be entitled to his cost which is quantified as Rs.15,000/-.” 12. In the aforesaid case, the enquiry was held ex parte and the employee therein was acquitted in the criminal case. In the aforesaid case, the employee was undergoing agony since 1985 and it was the High Court which has remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority to proceed afresh. However, keeping the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, as the employee therein was undergoing agony since 1985, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed his reinstatement. 13. In the present case, there was ample material before the inquiry officer to establish the charges and the employee could not offer any explanation in respect of the cheque book recovered from his house which was established by a witness who has recovered the cheque book, the aforesaid witness was examined during the course of inquiry. Hence, the petitioner is not entitled for any relief based upon the judgment delivered in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony (referred supra). 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also placed reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of Roop Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank & Ors. (referred supra). 15. In the aforesaid case, the inquiry officer has relied upon only on a confession made before the police authorities and the disciplinary authority has passed the consequential order of punishment. However, in the present case, there is no such contingency involved.
(referred supra). 15. In the aforesaid case, the inquiry officer has relied upon only on a confession made before the police authorities and the disciplinary authority has passed the consequential order of punishment. However, in the present case, there is no such contingency involved. There is a seizure of cheque book from the house of the petitioner which was established in the domestic inquiry by examining PW.5. PW.5 has categorically stated in the departmental inquiry that he has recovered the cheque book from the house of the petitioner and therefore, the judgment delivered in the case of Roop Singh Negi (referred supra) also does not benefit the petitioner. 16. In the considered opinion of this Court, as no procedural irregularity has been established by the petitioner in the matter of departmental inquiry and there is no violation of principles of natural justice and as the inquiry has been held as per the statutory provisions, the Tribunal was certainly justified in dismissing the Original Application though some other reasoning has been assigned by the Tribunal. Hence, no case for interference is made out in the matter. Writ petition is dismissed. No orders as to costs.