JUDGMENT : 1. The instant application under section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1996”) has been filed by the applicant inter-alia praying that an Arbitrator be appointed in terms of Standard General Conditions of Contract for resolution of the dispute between the applicant and the respondent – Railway. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the facts are that the applicant submitted his tender/offer dated 27.04.2016 with respect to NIT No.3 of 15-16 for the work of “Design, Supply, Installation, Testing & Commissioning of (VVVF type) Dyna drive for load sharing test of AC Coach and testing of 25 kW Alternator in New AC POH shop at Railway Carriage workshop Jodhpur.” 3. An agreement dated 29.07.2016 was executed between the applicant and the Union of India through respondent No.2 – General Manager, North Western Railway, Jaipur. The contract aforesaid was governed by Indian Railways Standard General Conditions of Contract issued in July, 2014. 4. Finding that the applicant’s progress in the work was not up to the mark, the respondent No.3 issued various letters/notices to the applicant to accelerate the work. Regardless of those letters/notices, when satisfactory progress did not take place, the respondent No.3 issued notice dated 31.01.2018 requiring the applicant – Contractor to show the progress in work and cautioned that on failure the contract in question would be rescinded and the work would be carried out at applicant’s risk. It was also notified that applicant’s security deposit would be forfeited and performance guarantee be encashed. 5. The respondents rescinded the contract in question vide order dated 12.02.2018, citing applicant’s failure to show requisite progress. 6. On determination of the contract, the applicant through his counsel served a notice dated 20.04.2018 inter alia stating that the applicant has completed his substantial work due to which 70% of the contract amount had been disbursed and further that the termination of the contract was one sided. While referring to the General Conditions of the Contract and section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, a request was made to appoint an Arbitrator. 7. The applicant’s such notice was responded to by the respondent No.3 vide letter dated 28.05.2018. In the letter aforesaid, the respondent Railways highlighted the defects and deficiencies in the work performed by the applicant. While referring to the General Conditions of the Contract and section 11 of the Arbitration Act, 1996, a request was made to appoint an Arbitrator. 7. The applicant’s such notice was responded to by the respondent No.3 vide letter dated 28.05.2018. In the letter aforesaid, the respondent Railways highlighted the defects and deficiencies in the work performed by the applicant. It was further indicated that the request for arbitration is to be decided by the Zonal Headquarters with the suggestion to the applicant to contact North Western Railways Headquarters. 8. Instant application under section 11 of the Act of 1996 has been preferred stating that the applicant is not agreeable to the appointment of the Arbitrator as per the Standard General Conditions of the Contract and thus, a prayer has been made to appoint an independent Arbitrator. 9. A reply to the application had been filed on 27.02.2019 stating that the applicant has failed to follow the prescribed procedure for appointment of Arbitrator. Thereafter, an additional reply came to be filed by the Railways on 02.09.2019 highlighting that the dispute sought to be adjudicated by the applicant by way of arbitration is not arbitrable. It has been contended by the respondents that the contract in question has been determined in terms of clause 62 of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract, which contingency has been specifically kept out of the purview of the arbitration as per clause 63 of the General Conditions of the Contract. 10. Mr. Gautam, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that as a consequence of pre-mature termination of the contract, the applicant has been put to grave financial loss, which needs to be adjudicated by dispute resolution mechanism as stipulated in clause 64 of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract. While pointing out that clause 64.(1) incorporates an arbitration clause, he implored that an independent arbitrator be appointed and the matter be referred to a sole arbitrator for resolution of the dispute between the parties. 11. Learned counsel eagerly yet courtly, stated that after insertion of sub-section (6A) in the Act of 1996 by Act No.3 of 2016 w.e.f. 23.10.2015, the Court is simply required to see the existence of arbitration clause and appoint an arbitrator. 12. While inviting Court’s attention towards the notice dated 31.01.2018 and the order of determination of the contract dated 12.02.2018 more particularly the reasons thereof, Mr. 12. While inviting Court’s attention towards the notice dated 31.01.2018 and the order of determination of the contract dated 12.02.2018 more particularly the reasons thereof, Mr. Deepak Vyas, learned counsel appearing for the respondents-Railway submitted that the dispute in question is not amenable to arbitration. 13. While underscoring that the order dated 12.02.2018 bringing an end to the contractual relationship was in terms of clause 62 of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract, learned counsel took the Court through clause 63 of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract and urged that the matters in which the decision has been taken in exercise of power under clause 62.(1) to 62.(1)(xiii)(B) of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract, fall within “excepted matters”. He added that such matters not arbitrable and, the decisions of the Railway are final. 14. His argument in other words was that, since the contract has been rescinded in terms of clause 62.(1)(vii) of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract, the same falls in “excepted matters” and thus is outside the purview of arbitration. 15. It was vehemently argued that mere presence of arbitration clause in a contract does not make all the disputes arbitrable, particularly when the nature of dispute has been kept out of the scope of the arbitration. He argued that the applicant has simply referred to clause 64 of the Conditions of Contract, whereas the said clause is required to be read with the other relevant clauses, particularly clause 63. 16. Mr. Gautam, learned counsel for the applicant submitted in the rejoinder that the question as to whether a dispute is arbitrable or not is required to be decided by the arbitrator, once reference is made and the Court while deciding an application under section 11 of the Act need not go into the question as to whether the dispute is arbitrable or not. He added that all the questions including the one being canvassed by Mr. Vyas can be raised before and decided by the Arbitration Tribunal under section 16 of the Act. 17. Expanding the above argument further, he added that after insertion of sub-section (6A) in section 11 of the Act of 1996, the scope of designate of the Chief Justice has been minimized. The Court is now supposed to ascertain the existence of arbitration clause. 18. 17. Expanding the above argument further, he added that after insertion of sub-section (6A) in section 11 of the Act of 1996, the scope of designate of the Chief Justice has been minimized. The Court is now supposed to ascertain the existence of arbitration clause. 18. In a bid to buttress the above submission, learned counsel relied upon the following judgments of Hon’ble the Supreme Court:- (i) (2020)2SCC445 (Uttarkhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited Vs. Northern Coal Field Limited); (para 7.5 and 7.11) (ii) (2019)8SCC714 (Mayavati Trading Private Limited Vs. Pradyuat Deb Burman); (iii) (2011)5SCC758 (J.G. Engineers Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Anr.) (para-19) 19. Mr. Deepak Vyas, learned counsel for the respondents on the other end relied upon the following judgments to lend support to his stance :- (i) AIR 2018 SC 3932 (United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Company Limited & Ors.) (ii) Judgment and order dated 06.04.2021 rendered in Civil Appeal No.975/2021 (Sanjiv Prakash Vs. Seema Kukreja & Ors.) (para 146-147). 20. Heard. 21. Before adverting to rival contentions, it would be useful to go through the relevant clauses of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract :- “63. Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Hyundai Engineering & Construction Company Limited & Ors.) (ii) Judgment and order dated 06.04.2021 rendered in Civil Appeal No.975/2021 (Sanjiv Prakash Vs. Seema Kukreja & Ors.) (para 146-147). 20. Heard. 21. Before adverting to rival contentions, it would be useful to go through the relevant clauses of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract :- “63. Matters finally Determined By The Railway : All disputes and differences of any kind whatsoever arising out of or in connection with the contract, whether during the progress of the work or after its completion and whether before or after the determination of the contract, shall be referred by the contractor to the GM and the GM shall, within 120 days after receipt of the contractor’s representation, make and notify decisions on all matters referred to by the contractor in writing provided that matters for which provision has been made in Clauses 8, 18, 22(5), 39, 43(2), 45(a), 55, 55-A(5), 57, 57A, 61(1), 61(2) and 62(1) to (xiii) (b) of Standard General Conditions of Contract or in any Clause of the Special Conditions of the Contract shall be deemed as ‘excepted matters’ (matters not arbitrable) and decisions of the Railway authority, thereon shall be final and binding on the contractor; provided further that ‘excepted matters’ shall stand specifically excluded from the purview of the Arbitration Clause.” 64.(1) Demand for Arbitration : 64.(1) (i) In the event of any dispute or difference between the parties hereto as to the construction or operation of this contract, or the respective rights and liabilities of the parties on any matter in question, dispute or difference on any account or as to the withholding by the Railway of any certificate to which the contractor may claim to be entitled to, or if the Railway fails to make a decision within 120 days, then and in any such case, but except in any of the “excepted matters” referred to in Clause 63 of these Conditions, the contractor, after 120 days but within 180 days of his presenting his final claim on disputed matters shall demand in writing that the dispute or difference be referred to arbitration.” 22. One cannot but dilate upon the issue under consideration without going through the below quoted provision contained in sub-section (6A) of section 11 of the Act of 1996, inserted vide Arbitration & Amendment Act, 2016 (Act No.3 of 2016) with retrospective effect from 23.10.2015. “6A The Supreme Court or, as the case may be, the High Court, while considering any application under sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) or sub-section (6), shall, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of any Court, confine to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement.” 23. It is further to be noted that though sub-section (6A) has been omitted by virtue of clause (v) of section 3 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Amendment Act, 2019, but this provision of the Amendment Act, 2019 has not been brought into force though other provisions such as sections 1, 4, 11 and 15 of the Amendment Act have been enforced vide notification No.3154(E) of notification dated 30.08.2019. 24. This being the position, the fact that sub-section (6A) of section 11 of the Act of 1996 is applicable in the present case is beyond any pale of doubt, as the agreement in question came to be signed on 16.07.2016 and notice invoking arbitration clause was issued on 20.04.2018. 25. Sub-section (6A) reproduced hereinabove unequivocally suggests that the High Court while considering an application under section 11 of the Act of 1996 is required to confine itself to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement. A plain reading of above referred provision suggests that legislative intent is, that the High Court or the designate of Chief Justice be divested of the power to examine other ancillary issues at the time of considering an application under sub-sections (4), (5) or (6) of section 11. 26. This recently inserted provision has been a subject matter of various judicial pronouncements. First of the series was, Himangin Enterprises Vs. Kamaljeet Singh Ahluwalia [ (2017) 10 SCC 706 ] followed by ONGC Mangalore Petrochemicals Ltd. Vs. ANS Constructions Ltd. [ (2018) 3 SCC 373 ]; United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Antique Art Exports (P) Ltd. [ (2019) 5 SCC 362 ]; Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. Vs. Pradyuat Deb Burman [ (2019) 8 SCC 714 ]; and Duro Felguera, SA Vs. Gangavaram Port Limited [ (2017) 9 SCC 729 ]. 27. ANS Constructions Ltd. [ (2018) 3 SCC 373 ]; United India Insurance Company Limited Vs. Antique Art Exports (P) Ltd. [ (2019) 5 SCC 362 ]; Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. Vs. Pradyuat Deb Burman [ (2019) 8 SCC 714 ]; and Duro Felguera, SA Vs. Gangavaram Port Limited [ (2017) 9 SCC 729 ]. 27. After wading through the judgments aforesaid, this Court finds that the judgment in case of Himangin Enterprises (supra) has been held to be legislatively over-ruled by a three Judges Bench in the case of Mayavati Trading (P) Ltd. (supra) with the following observation :- “10. This being the position, it is clear that the law prior to the 2015 Amendment that has been laid down by this Court, which would have included going into whether accord and satisfaction has taken place, has now been legislatively overruled. This being the position, it is difficult to agree with the reasoning contained in the aforesaid judgment, as Section 11(6-A) is confined to the examination of the existence of an arbitration agreement and is to be understood in the narrow sense as has been laid down in the judgment in Duro Felguera, SA – see paras 48 & 49”. 11. We, therefore, overrule the judgment in Antique Art Exports (P) Ltd. as not having laid down the correct law but dismiss this appeal for the reason given in para 3 above.” 28. Thereafter, a two Judges Bench hearing an appeal (being appeal No.2402/2020) between Vidya Drolia and Durga Trading Corporation, referred the matter to a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges in order to pronounce upon the scope and impact of insertion of sub-section (6A) in section 11 of the Act of 1996. 29. The referral order has been reported in 2019 (20) SCC 406 . Para 7, 34 and 35 thereof needs special mention, for which, it is being reproduced hereunder : “7. It will be noticed that “validity” of an arbitration agreement is, therefore, apart from its “existence”. One moot question that therefore, arises, and which needs to be authoritatively decided by a Bench of three learned Judges, is whether the word “existence” would include weeding out arbitration clauses in agreements which indicate that the subject-matter is incapable of arbitration. … * * * 34. In this view of the matter, this case is referred to a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges. 35. … * * * 34. In this view of the matter, this case is referred to a Bench of three Hon’ble Judges. 35. Given the facts of this case and the fact that 18 hearings have been held, the stay that has been granted to the arbitral proceedings by our order dated 13-8-2018 is lifted, and the proceedings may go on and culminate in an award. The award cannot be executed without applying to this Court. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.” 30. Pursuant to the reference above, the three Judges Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court extensively dealt with the statutory provisions, pari-materia provisions in other Countries and pronouncements on the subject and concluded that scope of judicial review under section 11 and the jurisdiction of the Court under section 8 of the Act of 1996 is identical but extremely limited and restricted. Their Lordships of Hon’ble the Supreme Court have authoritatively opined in (2021) 2 SCC 123 that in rare cases as an exception, the Court may interfere at the stage of section 8 and 11 when it is manifestly clear that the arbitration agreement does not exist. 31. Their Lordships Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna, speaking for himself and for Hon’ble Mr. Justice Krishna Murari has answered the reference culling out the following principle in para – 154 : “(i) Ratio of the decision in Patel Engg. Ltd. on the scope of judicial review by the court while deciding an application under Sections 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act, post the amendments by Act 3 of 2016 (with retrospective effect from 23-10-2015) and even post the amendments vide Act 33 of 2019 (with effect from 9-8-2019), is no longer applicable. (ii) Scope of judicial review and jurisdiction of the court under Sections 8 and 11 of the Arbitration Act is identical but extremely limited and restricted. (iii) The general rule and principle, in view of the legislative mandate clear from Act 3 of 2016 and Act 33 of 2019, and the principle of severability and competence-competence, is that the Arbitral Tribunal is the preferred first authority to determine and decide all questions of nonarbitrability. The court has been conferred power of “second look” on aspects of non-arbitrability post the award in terms of sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Section 34(2)(a) or sub-clause (i) of Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. The court has been conferred power of “second look” on aspects of non-arbitrability post the award in terms of sub-clauses (i), (ii) or (iv) of Section 34(2)(a) or sub-clause (i) of Section 34(2)(b) of the Arbitration Act. (iv) Rarely as a demurrer the court may interfere at Section 8 or 11 stage when it is manifestly and ex facie certain that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the disputes are nonarbitrable, though the nature and facet of nonarbitrability would, to some extent, determine the level and nature of judicial scrutiny. The restricted and limited review is to check and protect parties from being forced to arbitrate when the matter is demonstrably “non-arbitrable” and to cut off the deadwood. The court by default would refer the matter when contentions relating to nonarbitrability are plainly arguable; when consideration in summary proceedings would be insufficient and inconclusive; when facts are contested; when the party opposing arbitration adopts delaying tactics or impairs conduct of arbitration proceedings. This is not the stage for the court to enter into a mini trial or elaborate review so as to usurp the jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal but to affirm and uphold integrity and efficacy of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.” 32. Hon’ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana, while concurring with the above view has given his own reasoning and has supplemented the view of other two Hon’ble Judges while opining thus :- “244.1. Sections 8 and 11 of the Act have the same ambit with respect to judicial interference. 244.2. Usually, subject-matter arbitrability cannot be decided at the stage of Section 8 or 11 of the Act, unless it is a clear case of deadwood. 244.3. The court, under Sections 8 and 11, has to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an arbitrator, as the case may be, unless a party has established a prima facie (summary findings) case of non-existence of valid arbitration agreement, by summarily portraying a strong case that he is entitled to such a finding. 244.4. The court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis, as laid down above i.e. “when in doubt, do refer”. 244.5. The scope of the court to examine the prima facie validity of an arbitration agreement includes only: 244.5.1. Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? 244.4. The court should refer a matter if the validity of the arbitration agreement cannot be determined on a prima facie basis, as laid down above i.e. “when in doubt, do refer”. 244.5. The scope of the court to examine the prima facie validity of an arbitration agreement includes only: 244.5.1. Whether the arbitration agreement was in writing? Or 244.5.2 Whether the arbitration agreement was contained in exchange of letters, telecommunications, etc.? 244.5.3. Whether the core contractual ingredients qua the arbitration agreement were fulfilled? 244.5.4. On rare occasions, whether the subjectmatter of dispute is arbitrable?” 33. In the opinion of this Court, when the larger Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court has laid down the principles in relation to the arbitrability of a dispute with certitude, any further deliberation on this issue is redundant rather against the judicial propriety. 34. Adverting to judgments cited by Mr. Gautam, suffice it to observe that the judgment rendered in case of J.G. Engineers Private Limited Vs. Union of India & Anr., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 758 , is a judgment prior to amendment in section 11 of the Act of 1996. After the amendment, statutory position is that, if an arbitrator is to be appointed, he/she has to be an independent arbitrator i.e. some one other than the officer of the Railways. The said judgment has been cited by learned counsel in order to bring home his point that the arbitrator to be appointed by the Railway is not acceptable to him, and hence, independent arbitrator be appointed. Para 19 of the judgment aforesaid reads thus : “19. In fact the question whether the other party committed breach cannot be decided by the party alleging breach. A contract cannot provide that one party will be the arbiter to decide whether he committed breach or the other party committed breach. That question can only be decided by only an adjudicatory forum, that is, a court or an Arbitral Tribunal.” 35. The judgment in the case of Mayawati Trading Pvt. Ltd. (supra) delivered by three Hon’ble Judges of the Supreme Court over-ruled the judgment delivered in the case of United India Vs. Antique Art Export while observing that consequent to amendment of 2015, the Court or designate of Chief Justice is required to confine itself to the existence of the arbitration agreement. Antique Art Export while observing that consequent to amendment of 2015, the Court or designate of Chief Justice is required to confine itself to the existence of the arbitration agreement. Said judgment reiterates what was held by the Supreme Court in Duro Felguera, SA’s case (supra). 36. In the case of Uttarakhand Purv Sainik Kalyan Nigam Limited (supra), the Division Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court also relied upon sub-section (6A) of section 11 and held that doctrine of “kompetenz-kompetenz” or “competence-competence” implies that the Arbitrtal Tribunal alone is empowered to rule on its own jurisdiction, including the aspect of existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. 37. However, later on, larger Bench of Hon’ble the Supreme Court while answering the reference in Vidya Drolia (supra), has held that there is no absolute bar on the High Court to examine the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. It has been held that in rare cases, with circumspection and demurrer, the High Court can examine the existence and validity of the arbitration agreement. 38. In this regard, the observation made by Delhi High Court in case of NCC Ltd. Vs. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd. [2019SCC Online Del 6964], particularly para 107 and 108 are relevant and worthy of reproduction, which I hereby do :- “107. In my view, the scope of examination as to whether or not the claims lodged are Notified Claims has narrowed down considerably in view of the language of Section 11(6-A) of the 1996 Act. To my mind, once the Court is persuaded that it has jurisdiction to entertain a Section 11 petition all that is required to examine is as to whether or not an arbitration agreement exists between the parties which is relatable to the dispute at hand. The latter part of the exercise adverted to above, which involves correlating the dispute with the arbitration agreement obtaining between the parties, is an aspect which is implicitly embedded in sub-section (6-A) of Section 11 of the 1996 Act, which, otherwise, requires the Court to confine its examination only to the existence of the arbitration agreement. Therefore, if on a bare perusal of the agreement it is found that a particular dispute is not relatable to the arbitration agreement, then, perhaps, the Court may decline the relief sought for by a party in a Section 11 petition. Therefore, if on a bare perusal of the agreement it is found that a particular dispute is not relatable to the arbitration agreement, then, perhaps, the Court may decline the relief sought for by a party in a Section 11 petition. However, if there is a contestation with regard to the issue as to whether the dispute falls within the realm of the arbitration agreement, then, the best course would be to allow the arbitrator to form a view in the matter. 108. Thus, unless it is in a manner of speech, a chalk and cheese situation or a black and white situation without shades of grey, the court concerned hearing Section 11 petition should follow the more conservative course of allowing parties to have their say before the Arbitral Tribunal.” 39. In view of the aforesaid, the question, which has cropped up for consideration of this court is, as to whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is manifestly and ex-facie clear that the arbitration agreement is non-existent, invalid or the dispute is non-arbitrable, so that the application in hands can be rejected, as has been held by their Lordships in Vidya Drolia’s case (supra). 40. In the opinion of this Court, mere bodily or physical existence of a clause in the contract providing a remedy of arbitration completely divorced of a nexus or relatability with the dispute is like an uprooted tree having lost connection with the soil; …… at the first flush it may appear to be a tree but it actually is a log – A stem not having its roots connected to the ground to draw water and nutrients; It is just a deadwood. In order to be a valid; existing and alive arbitration clause, it is quintessential that the same is applicable to the issue(s), on which the contracting parties have locked horns. 41. In other words, in short, it can be said that after insertion of section 11(6A) in the Act of 1996 and in light of the verdict of the Supreme Court in the case of Vidya Drolia’s case (supra), pursuant to an application under Section 11(6) of the Act, appointment of an arbitrator is a rule. The only exceptions are, when the arbitration agreement is manifestly non-existent/invalid or the dispute(s) is/are ex-facie non arbitrable. 42. The only exceptions are, when the arbitration agreement is manifestly non-existent/invalid or the dispute(s) is/are ex-facie non arbitrable. 42. Coming back to the facts of the present case, indisputably, the Railways had issued a notice dated 31.01.2018 to the applicant inter-alia giving him 48 hours’ time in terms of clause 62 of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract. Similarly, a notice under clause 62 was also issued by the Railways on 17.07.2017. It will not be out of context to reproduce the notice dated 31.01.2018, which preceded the determination/termination of the subject contract. Image 43. It is, therefore, apparent that the applicant’s contract was annulled or rescinded in terms of clause 62 of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract. 44. A bare look at the relevant clause 63, which has been given under the heading “Settlement of Disputes – Indian Railway Arbitration Rules” shows that all disputes and differences, whether during the progress of the work or after its completion or after determination of the contract are required to be intimated by the Contractor to the General Manager, who within 120 days of the receipt of the representation is supposed to notify all matters, subject of course to the exception that has been carved out in clause 63 to the effect that the matters in which action/decision has been made in clauses 8, 18, 22(5), 39, 43(2), 45(a), 55, 55- A(5), 57, 57A, 61(1), 61(2) and 62(1) to (xiii)(B) of the Standard General Conditions of the Contract would be deemed as ‘excepted matters’ (matters not arbitrable) and decisions of the Railway authorities thereon will be final and binding. 45. Clause 63 has further been cemented by use of the expression “provided further that ‘excepted matters’ shall stand specifically excluded from the purview of the Arbitration clause.” 46. A further look at clause 64.(1) of the Standard General Conditions shows that apart from the ‘excepted matters’ referred to in clause 63 of the Conditions, all disputes are liable to be referred to arbitration. 47. True it is, that an arbitration clause does exist in the form of clause 63 and 64 of the Standard Terms and Conditions of the Contract. But mere existence of an arbitration clause in the contract or in the Standard General Conditions of the Contract does not lead to existence of an arbitration clause. 47. True it is, that an arbitration clause does exist in the form of clause 63 and 64 of the Standard Terms and Conditions of the Contract. But mere existence of an arbitration clause in the contract or in the Standard General Conditions of the Contract does not lead to existence of an arbitration clause. Bouquet of conditions in the Standard General Conditions are required to be read as a whole. A simple look at clause 63 shows that certain clauses of the general conditions have been kept out of the precincts of the dispute resolution mechanism by the arbitrator and clause 62 is one of them. 48. No rocket-science, forensic skill or even scrutiny of host of documents is required to decide this fundamental question in the instant case. A simple look at the notice dated 31.01.2018; the order dated 12.02.2018, rescinding the contract and a conjoint reading of clause 62/63 of the agreement is enough to enable a person to conclude or hold that the dispute in question is not arbitrable and that the determination of the contract in applicant’s case falls within the ‘excepted matters’ or the matters not arbitrable. 49. In the extant factual matrix, since the contract had been rescinded while invoking clause 62.(1)(vii) of the General Terms and Conditions, the arbitration clause namely clause 63 has been rendered innately and intrinsically redundant – like a vestigial organ in the human body – which exists but is non-functional … … 50. As an upshot of the discussion aforesaid, this Court is of the considered view that the applicant does not even have an arguable case about existence of arbitration clause - it is a clear case of non-existence of an arbitration clause and the dispute being non-arbitrable. 51. Instant application is, therefore, rejected. 52. The parties are left to seek remedies available under and in accordance with law.