JUDGMENT Sharad Kumar Sharma, J. - The appellant before this Court is a plaintiff in a Civil Suit No. 74 of 1999, Bachan Singh Vs. General Manager, Tehri Hydro Power Corporation & Another. By virtue of the suit in question, which was instituted by invoking the provisions contained under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act of 1963, on 02.12.1999, the plaintiff (appellant herein) had sought a decree, to the effect of grant of a decree of mandatory injunction, in relation to the land, which was lying in khatauni No. 117 khet No. 50, out of which 240 sq. meter of land, as shown in schedule (Ka) of the property, described in the plaint map by figure A, B, C, D, for purposes of payment of compensation, as a consequence of the taking over of the property by the defendants/respondents to the suit, without a recourse to the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, which was the subject matter as an issue before the trial Court. A nature of decree was also solicited by the plaintiff/appellant before the Courts below was for the grant of a decree of mandatory injunction and to remove the construction, which has been raised on the land in question by way of boundary wall. In fact, in totality, the relief as claimed by the plaintiff/appellant has been detailed in para 20 of the plaint, which is referred to hereunder:- 2. If the plaint is read in its totality, and particularly, that the pleading, which has been raised by the plaintiff/appellant in paragraphs 18 and 19, the plaintiff/appellant has himself confined his claim for the grant of adequate compensation by way of issuance of a decree of mandatory injunction in relation to 1/5th part of the property only, which was the subject matter of the suit in question. 3. 3. The defendants were noticed, and in response to the notice, the defendants have filed their written statement on 19.05.2000, wherein, in the pleadings, apart from denying the plaint averments, they had submitted that the alleged claim of respective share and with regard to the assessment of the compensation sought for by invoking the provisions contained under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, would not be tenable, in view of the fact that in accordance with the revenue records, the pleadings of which have been specifically raised in para 10 of the written statement, the property has not yet been specifically divested with the co-sharers, who have been still continued to be jointly recorded, over the land in question. Ultimately, the suit in question, the parties led their respective evidence and particularly, the plaintiff/appellant, in order to substantiate his claim with regard to the grant of adequate compensation for the land lying in khasra No. 50 of khata No. 117, has placed reliance on paper No. 14 (Ga) i.e. khatauni pertaining to 1404 to 1409 fasli, in which the property in question has been shown to be a jointly recorded in the name of the plaintiff/appellant, along with other co-tenure holders, and co-sharers, which is a fact not disputed, by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, and even as per records of revenue entries, because it was a document, which the plaintiff/appellant wanted to place reliance, for the purposes of determination of an adequacy of compensation, which he claimed was to be payable for the land, which was allegedly taken over by the defendant/respondent without the recourse to the land acquisition proceedings. 4. The suit proceeded and ultimately, the learned trial Court, after the exchange of the pleadings, had formulated the following issues on the basis of the pleadings:- 5. The parties led their respective evidence and particularly the plaintiff/appellant, by way of documents produced on record by way of list paper No. 7C and paper No. 42C, had produced 6 documents on record apart from recording the oral statement of PW1 and PW2 Mr. Amardev Uniyal, who was the Patwari at the relevant point of time. The defendants had also led their oral evidence by producing DW1, as his sole witness in support of their contentions raised in the written statement. Amardev Uniyal, who was the Patwari at the relevant point of time. The defendants had also led their oral evidence by producing DW1, as his sole witness in support of their contentions raised in the written statement. The suit in question, being Suit No. 74 of 1999, as it was initially numbered was dismissed by the trial Court vide its judgment dated 10.07.2001. Against the dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff/appellant had preferred a Civil Appeal, being Civil Appeal No. 4 of 2001, Bachan Singh Vs. General Manager, Tehri Hydro Development Corporation and others, and the Appellate Court, after considering the rival contentions had allowed the appeal of the plaintiff/appellant by the judgment dated 17.10.2003, had set aside the judgment of the trial Court and remanded the matter back to the learned trial Court to decide it afresh. It was on the revival of the proceedings afresh after remand before the trial Court, the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Tehri Garhwal had framed the same issues as was framed earlier, which were required to be considered. 6. One of the main issues, which would be the subject matter of consideration, would be the findings which has been recorded pertaining to the issue Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 6, which was related to the sustainability of the proceedings of the suit under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act. 7. The coordinate bench of this Court, at the time of admission of the Second Appeal, had formulated the following substantial questions of law, vide its order dated 14.11.2014, which are extracted hereunder:- "1. Whether both the courts below have wrongly held that the suit is barred by the provision of section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950? 2. Whether both the courts below have erred in law in holding that the suit is barred by non-joinder of necessary parties?" 8. Whether both the courts below have wrongly held that the suit is barred by the provision of section 331 of U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950? 2. Whether both the courts below have erred in law in holding that the suit is barred by non-joinder of necessary parties?" 8. For the purposes of addressing upon the two substantial questions of law, as had been framed by the coordinate Bench of this Court, to be answered in the present Second Appeal, the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, had submitted that the first substantial question of law, pertaining to the bar created by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, as has been adjudicated by the learned trial Court while deciding issue No. 6, it ought to have made a reference under Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, because wherever, as per his argument, there arises a disputed question with regard to the nature of land and to the use to which it has been put in, in order to facilitate the civil Court to decide the question of maintainability of the civil proceedings, which are instituted before it in relation to the revenue land and its rights, a reference under Section 331A of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, ought to have been made. 9. Admittedly, and even as per records too, which were placed before this Court, too, either in the first phase of litigation, which stood culminated by the judgment of the appellate Court, by way of an order of remand or even thereafter also on the revival of the proceedings before the Civil Court for its fresh adjudication, no such specific plea was ever raised by the plaintiff/appellant, for the purposes of formulation of question to be referred to be decided by the Civil Court under Section 331A of U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, and remitting an issue to the Court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, to get the finding returned by invoking the provisions as stipulated under Section 331A. 10. A very interesting question, which has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant to sustain his suit, to be maintainable before the Civil Court, and in order to override the effect of the bar, which has been created by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act. 10. A very interesting question, which has been argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant to sustain his suit, to be maintainable before the Civil Court, and in order to override the effect of the bar, which has been created by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act. His argument is from the perspective that the bar of Section 331, if it comes as one of the issues under consideration, then it was rather the duty which was exclusively casted on the Courts, to have formulated the question and remitted back, the issue to the Court of Assistant Collector, to get the findings returned on that aspect. What he wanted to convey through his arguments, in fact, it was that it was not the responsibilities of the parties to the proceedings against whom the bar of Section 331 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, has been raised in order to maintain a suit before the Civil Court, who is required to have the recourse to Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, its rather the duty was to be discharged by the Civil Court, itself for formulating the question. 11. In order to answer the said argument, the reference to Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, becomes inevitable, which is extracted hereunder:- "[331A. Procedure when plea of land being used for agricultural purposes is raised in any suit. - (1) If in any suit, relating to land held by a bhumidhar, instituted in any court, the question arises or is raised whether the land in question is or is not used for purposes connected with agriculture, horticulture or animal husbandry, which includes pisciculture and poultry farming, and a declaration has not been made in respect of such land under Section 143 or 144, the court shall frame an issue on the question and send the record to the Assistant Collector in-charge of the sub-division for the decision of that issue only: Provided that where the suit has been instituted in the court of Assistant Collector-in-charge of the sub-division, it shall proceed to decide the question in accordance with the provisions of Section 143 or 144, as the case may be. (2) The Assistant Collector-in-charge of sub-division after reframing the issue, if necessary, shall proceed to decide such issue in the manner laid down for the making of a declaration under Section 143 or 144, as the case may be, and return the record together with his finding thereon to the court which referred the issue. (3) The court shall then proceed to decide the suit accepting the finding of the Assistant Collector-in-charge of the sub-division on the issue referred to it. (4) The finding of the Assistant Collector-in-charge of the sub-division on the issue referred to it shall, for the purpose of appeal, be deemed to be part of the finding of the court which referred the issue]" 12. This Court is not in agreement with the tenacity of arguments, as has been extended by the learned Senior Counsel, for the appellant, for the reason being that if the language, intention and purpose of Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, which has been extracted hereinabove, is taken into consideration, where it casts a duty that any land, which is outside the ambit of the land as declared under Sections of 143 and 144 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, "the Court shall frame an issue on the question and send the record to the Collector in-charge of the said division for decision". 13. 13. The argument extended by the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, from the perspective that it was the Court's duty, who was supposed to frame the issue, as per opinion of this Court it is not exclusively to be discharged by the Court itself and as per the opinion of this Court, is not acceptable for the reasons, that since according to the provisions contained under Section 341 of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, the provisions of CPC has been specifically made applicable in its totality, over all the proceedings, which are contemplated under the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act and where an issue is required to be referred to be decided under Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, it was also the corresponding responsibility, which was to be discharged by the plaintiff/appellant, too because it was he who has to maintain his suit and the responsibility was casted upon the plaintiff/appellant, more to ensure and get an issue formulated by invoking the provisions contained under Order 14 Rule 4/5 of the CPC, and getting the findings returned from the Assistant Collector, to override the embargo of Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, as was pleaded in the proceedings. That is what has been spirited by Section 331A of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, that the plaintiff/appellant cannot shy away from its responsibility to get an appropriate issue framed, which is the responsibility statutorily casted on the plaintiff/appellant, so as to maintain its suit before the Civil Court, in relation to a revenue land. The burden of formulation of proper issue was vested on him under Section 341 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, to be read with Order 14 Rule 3/4 of C.P.C. 14. That was not done admittedly. That was not a case which was either pleaded or established in the first phase of proceedings, till the matter was remitted by the Appellate Court, nor even at the subsequent stage also on the revival of the proceedings with the Civil Court, when the matter was yet again decided by the Civil Court, by one of the impugned judgement, which has been put to under challenge, in the present Second Appeal i.e. judgement dated 27.07.2009. Hence, in view of the aforesaid circumstances, I am of the view that once the appellant himself has not attracted the provisions of Section 331A of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, at either of the stages of the proceedings and not even before this Court by way of pleadings or even by invoking Section 100(4) of CPC, also in the Second Appeal nor any substantial question of law has been attempted to be framed in that regard, this argument about the embargo which was being attempted to be shifted on the Court for compliance of section 331A of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, is not sustainable and hence this argument is not accepted and particularly in an eventuality, where there is no declaration is sought to be made of an agricultural land, falling within the ambit of a land as it had been defined under Section 3(14) of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act and unless the process of conversion Section 143 and 144 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act is resorted to, it would be deemed to be a land under Section 3(14), and if it falls to be a land under Section 3(14) of the U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, then I am of the view that the bar of Section 331, would come into play as U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, since being a special statute, which is contained under the 9th Schedule, Entry 11 of the Constitution of India, it will not be overridden by the provisions of Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act. 15. The learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant has submitted that the bar of Section 331, would not come into play, for the reason being that according to his oral assertion, and which was contrary to evidence on record, and even to the oral testimony, which was recorded by way of a statement before the Court below, his contention is that the land in dispute which was lying in khasra Nos. 49 and 50 (in particular khasra No. 50 of khata No. 117) was not being actually utilised as an agricultural land and there were constructions existing on it and based on the said statements, which has been recorded before the Court below with regard to the manner in which khasra No. 50, was being used, his submission is that, that in itself would be sufficient to oust the land from the ambit of the land as defined under Section 3(14) of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, and hence the bar of Section 331, will not be applicable. 16. This Court is in an absolute disagreement with the argument of the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant and the reason being that, which needs not much elaboration that a land which is covered under Section 3(14) of the Act, as the land defined therein and is recorded as a revenue land, according to his own document which was placed on record, which in itself shows that it is being recorded as an agricultural land, it is sufficient enough and will be treated, as to be an agricultural land for all practical purposes, until and unless there happens to be a declaration made under Section 143 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act, and till any conversion is made irrespective of its user to which the land has been put in, the land for all judicial and practical purposes would enjoy same status of land under Section 3(14) and be treated to be a land falling and having the trapping under 3(14) and hence the provisions of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act would be applicable and consequently the bar of Section 331 of U.P.Z.A & L.R. Act, will come into play. Hence this substantial question of law as framed is answer against the plaintiff/appellant. 17. The second substantial question of law, and very interestingly, as modulated by the counsel is with regard to the impact of non-joinder of necessary parties, over the suit in question, particularly, for which the plaintiff/appellant, was claiming a compensation, as a consequence of the acquisition of the land which was taken over by the defendants/respondents. As per the revenue records, the land is shown to be jointly recorded in the name of different co-tenure holders. As per the revenue records, the land is shown to be jointly recorded in the name of different co-tenure holders. The entries made in Column 9 and 12 of the khatauni, which was on record does not show that any apportionment of the property had ever taken place between the co-owners, so far, by recourse to judicial proceedings by the competent revenue or a Civil Court. Nor does it reflects that its nature of use has been changed by any specific order passed under Section 143, as khatauni on record as evidence does not record any entries in relation thereto also. No entry with regards to any proceedings of partition of holding under Section 176 of U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act; has been shown to have been taken between co-sharers of the property. Hence, each co-sharers has a right over the land jointly which continues to be jointly recorded, in their names. 18. The argument extended by the learned Senior Counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, Mr. Mahavir Singh Tyagi, is in the light of the pleadings raised in para 2 of the plaint, where it uses the word "hissa". He substantiate the said pleading on the pretext that there had been a family settlement and that is why the appellant has used the word "hissa". The fact of a family settlement or an oral family settlement is not a pleading which was ever raised by him in the plaint or proved by evidence on record. Oral family settlement do have a significance in an adjudication of a respective rights in relation to a land, but then entering into an oral family settlement and apportionment of rights, which is a fact which ought to have been established by evidence on record. As far as this aspect case is concerned. There is nothing brought on record, either by way of an evidence or by way of revenue entries in order to show that the plaintiff/appellant, was ever by any judicial order was ever specifically recorded in relation to a specific share of a land as recorded in khata No. 117 and that the khasra No. 50 has fallen in his share. Hence in the absence of there being any such settlement or apportionment of holding in dispute being proved, as per the evidence on record, it would be deemed that all the co-tenure holders who were recorded, as against khasra No. 117 and were the joint tenure holders hence each and every recorded co-tenure holder has its specific rights over the land for which the compensation was claimed by the plaintiff/appellant by way of grant of decree of mandatory injunction by invoking the provisions contained under Section 38 of the Specific Relief Act. 19. Considering the pleadings raised, and particularly the pleading that has been raised in para 18 and 19 of the plaint, where the plaintiff/appellant had himself voluntarily confined his claim to the extent of 1/5th share of the property only for the reason being that the determination of 1/5th share has been taken, as to be the foundation for the claim of compensation of the plaintiff/appellant for the purposes of remittance of the Court fees. 20. If that be so, then the determination of exclusive 1/5th, share on the basis of the pleadings raised in the plaint itself, cannot be exclusively be taken as to be the basis to decide the settlement of rights of the plaintiff/appellant, and in such an eventuality, where a compensation has to be determined to the so-called alleged claim of 1/5th, share of an immovable property, which could not have been appropriately decided in the absence of other co-sharers, being made as party to the proceedings, because any determination, if it was to be made by the learned trial Court, with regard to the specific share for khasra No. 50, and claim of compensation, until and unless, it is proved beyond doubt by evidence that it has fallen in the specified share of the plaintiff/appellant, no determination of an appropriate compensation in the absence of the other co-tenure holders, being made as a party to the suit, could have been effectively decided by the trial Court. In such an eventuality, this Court holds that the suit was suffering from the vices of non-joinder of necessary party, as all the co-tenure holders of khata No. 117, were not made as party and any determination of payment of compensation, to a land falling as a part in an undivided joint holdings recorded in the revenue records, would entail a consideration of rights of all the other co-tenure holders, consequently it is held that the suit also suffered from the vices of non-joinder of necessary parties, apart from the fact that and as already answered above that it was not sustainable before the Civil Court, on account of the bar created by Section 331 of the U.P.Z.A. & L.R. Act. 21. In view of the aforesaid reasoning, the finding which has been recorded by both the Courts below being concurrent in nature, this Court concludes that the Second Appeal does not entails the consideration of any other substantial question of law, apart from the above substantial question of law as answered, based on which the Second Appeal was admitted. 22. Consequently, the Second Appeal lacks merits and the same is dismissed.