JUDGMENT : The insurance company is the appellant in this appeal. It is aggrieved by the impugned judgement and decree dated 16.2.2018 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Tiruttani in MCOP No. 155 of 2013. 2. By the impugned judgement and decree, the tribunal has awarded a sum of Rs.6,75,000/- as compensation under section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to the claimants who are respondent No. 1-5 herein. 3. The impugned judgement and decree passed by the tribunal is sought to be assailed by the appellant insurance company purely on the ground that section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 applies only to third party to and not to the wrong doer/Tortfeasor. It is submitted that the claimants have not discharged the burden of proof to fasten the liability on the appellant insurance company. It is further submitted that the Tribunal ought to have deducted one third towards personal expenses of the deceased. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant Insurance Company drew attention of this court to the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi Vs United Insurance Co Ltd. [2020] 2 SCC 550 and submits that the present appeal filed by the Insurance Company deserves to be allowed. 5. Defending the impugned judgement and learned counsel for the claimants has placed reliance on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in United Insurance Company Versus Sunil Kumar [2019] 12 SCC 398. Learned counsel for the respondent claimants submits that the impugned judgement and decree are well reasoned and requires no interference. 6. I have consider the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent and also perused the impugned judgment and decree. 7. In Ramkhiladi Vs United Insurance Co Ltd. referred to supra, the claim petition was preferred only against the owner of the motorcycle bearing registration No. RJ 02 SA 7811 and its insurance company. Neither the driver nor the owner or (of) the insurance company of the vehicle bearing registration No. RJ 29 2M 9223 which was responsible for the accident were made party in the claim petition. 8. It is to be noticed that the language in section 163-A starts with a Non Obstante clause. Neither the driver nor the owner or (of) the insurance company of the vehicle bearing registration No. RJ 29 2M 9223 which was responsible for the accident were made party in the claim petition. 8. It is to be noticed that the language in section 163-A starts with a Non Obstante clause. Sub-clause (2) merely declares that in any claim for compensation under sub- clause (1) to section 163-A, a claimant is not required to prove or establish that the death or permanent disablement in respect of which the claim has been made was due to any wrongful act on neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle or vehicles concerned or of any other person. 9. In fact, section 166 of the Act also does not contemplate a requirement that the rider/driver of the insured vehicle should be a third-party for claiming compensation in case of injury or in the case of death due to the accident. Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 merely cast a statutory obligation on the insurer. The tested and accepted interpretation that has been arrived by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is that the injured or the person who dies in the motor accident must be a third-party for the insurer to be made liable. 10. If the decision of the Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi Vs. United Insurance Co Ltd case cited by the learned counsel for the appellant insurance company is applied, the present has to be allowed. 11. On the other hand, if the ratio of the Supreme Court in United Insurance Company Limited Versus Sunil referred to supra and cited by the learned counsel for the respondent is applied to the facts of the case, the appeal has to be dismissed. However, the ratio of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has to confined to the facts of the case therein. It cannot be applied. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had to deal with the issue as in present appeal as well i.e. “whether the insurance company of the vehicle driven by the deceased himself would be liable to pay the compensation under Section 163A of the Act? 13. It cannot be applied. 12. The Hon’ble Supreme Court had to deal with the issue as in present appeal as well i.e. “whether the insurance company of the vehicle driven by the deceased himself would be liable to pay the compensation under Section 163A of the Act? 13. In para 5.3 the Hon’ble Supreme Court answered the issue as follows:- It is true that, in a claim under Section 163A of the Act, there is no need for the claimants to plead or establish the negligence and/or that the death in respect of which the claim petition is sought to be established was due to wrongful act, neglect or default of the owner of the vehicle concerned. It is also true that the claim petition under Section 163A of the Act is based on the principle of no fault liability. However, at the same time, the deceased has to be a third party and cannot maintain a claim under Section 163A of the Act against the owner/insurer of the vehicle which is borrowed by him as he will be in the shoes of the owner and he cannot maintain a claim under Section 163A of the Act against the owner and insurer of the vehicle bearing registration No. RJ 02 SA 7811. In the present case, the parties are governed by the contract of insurance and under the contract of insurance the liability of the insurance company would be qua third party only. In the present case, as observed hereinabove, the deceased cannot be said to be a third party with respect to the insured vehicle bearing registration No. RJ 02 SA 7811. There cannot be any dispute that the liability of the insurance company would be as per the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance. As held by this Court in the case of Dhanraj (supra), an insurance policy covers the liability incurred by the insured in respect of death of or bodily injury to any person (including an owner of the goods or his authorized representative) carried in the vehicle or damage to any property of a third party caused by or arising out of the use of the vehicle. In the said decision, it is further held by this Court that Section 147 does not require an insurance company to assume risk for death or bodily injury to the owner of the vehicle. 14. In the said decision, it is further held by this Court that Section 147 does not require an insurance company to assume risk for death or bodily injury to the owner of the vehicle. 14. In para 5.6, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as under:- In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, in the present case, as the claim under Section 163A of the Act was made only against the owner and insurance company of the vehicle which was being driven by the deceased himself as borrower of the vehicle from the owner of the vehicle and he would be in the shoes of the owner, the High Court has rightly observed and held that such a claim was not maintainable and the claimants ought to have joined and/or ought to have made the claim under Section 163A of the Act against the driver, owner and/or the insurance company of the offending vehicle i.e. RJ 29 2M 9223 being a third party to the said vehicle. 15. In United Insurance Company Versus Sunil Kumar referred to supra also a similar issue fell for consideration. The Hon'ble Supreme Court answered as follows in para 8 and 9:- 8. From the above discussion, it is clear that grant of compensation under Section 163-A of the Act on the basis of the structured formula is in the nature of a final award and the adjudication thereunder is required to be made without any requirement of any proof of negligence of the driver/owner of the vehicle(s) involved in the accident. This is made explicit by Section 163A(2). Though the aforesaid section of the Act does not specifically exclude a possible defence of the Insurer based on the negligence of the claimant as contemplated by Section 140(4), to permit such defence to be introduced by the Insurer and/or to understand the provisions of Section 163A of the Act to be contemplating any such situation would go contrary to the very legislative object behind introduction of Section 163A of the Act, namely, final compensation within a limited time frame on the basis of the structured formula to overcome situations where the claims of compensation on the basis of fault liability was taking an unduly long time. In fact, to understand Section 163A of the Act to permit the Insurer to raise the defence of negligence would be to bring a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act at par with the proceeding under Section 166 of the Act which would not only be self-contradictory but also defeat the very legislative intention. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we answer the question arising by holding that in a proceeding under Section 163A of the Act it is not open for the Insurer to raise any defence of negligence on the part of the victim. 16. The above observation was made pursuant reference to a Full Bench of the Supreme Court. However, it must be recalled that the decision in United Insurance Company Limited Versus Sunil arose from a decision of the Punjab and High Court. Both in the reference order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and order dated October 29, 2013 (2014) 1 SCC 680 while making a reference to the Full Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, facts have been not fully discussed. 17. On perusing the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, it is noticed that the petition was allowed under Section 170 of the Act from which the matter went up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court. There the injured person was wheeled before the Punjab and Haryana Court. 18. Facts indicate that the injured claimant had travelled in a vehicle beyond its seating capacity. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that unless the accident was due to overloading of passengers in the insured vehicle, the insurance company cannot avoid its liability. 19. In the present case, the deceased had borrowed the insured motorcycle of the 6th respondent herein on the fateful day. The deceased was riding the insured motorcycle of the 6th respondent, when a dog is said to have crossed the path all of a sudden and therefore to avoid hitting the dog, the deceased applied sudden break resulting in the skidding of the insured motorcycle. Thus, the injured hit a nearby electric pole and suffered fatal injuries and died on the spot. 20. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi Vs United Insurance Co Ltd cited by the learned counsel for the appellant insurance company squarely applies to be facts and circumstances of the case. Thus, the injured hit a nearby electric pole and suffered fatal injuries and died on the spot. 20. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi Vs United Insurance Co Ltd cited by the learned counsel for the appellant insurance company squarely applies to be facts and circumstances of the case. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above case in Ramkhiladi Vs United Insurance Co Ltd, I am inclined to allow this appeal filed by the insurance company. 21. At the same time, I direct the appellant insurance company to pay compensation under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 to mitigate the hardship on the claimants together with interest thereon while parting. I would like to remind the Legislature to take note of the lamentation expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jai Prakash Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 607 and correct the course by either amending the Act altogether or in the alternative remedy the situation by amending Section 147 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jai Prakash Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others, (2010) 2 SCC 607 held that to ensure that all accident victims get compensation, it is necessary to formulate a more comprehensive scheme for payment of compensation to victims of road accidents, in place of the present system of third-party insurance and an alternative scheme involving a collection of a one-time (lifetime) third-party insurance premium by a central insurance agency in respect of every vehicle sold (in a manner similar to the collection of lifetime road tax). The fund created by collection of such third-party insurance can be augmented/supplemented by an appropriate road accident cess/surcharge on the price of petrol/diesel sold across the country. 22. The above appeal stands partly allowed with the above observation and consequential relief to the appellant and the respondent/claimant. No cost. Consequently connected miscellaneous petition is closed.