JUDGMENT : MEHTA, J. 1. These two intra-court appeals have been preferred under Section 134 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949 against the common judgment dated 15.02.2021 whereby, the learned Single Bench of this Court decided Civil Misc. Appeals Nos.2526/2017 and 1367/2017 preferred by the claimants and the Insurance Company respectively. 2. At the outset, this Court posed a question regarding maintainability of these appeals upon which, Shri G.J. Gupta, learned counsel representing the appellants, drew our attention to the Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Prabha Ojha & Ors. reported in 2012(1) WLN 459 (Raj.) and urged that the issue regarding maintainability of an intra-court appeal against the judgment passed by a Single Bench in an appeal against the judgment and decree of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal has been affirmative answered, while upholding maintainability of such appeal. He thus urged that the appeals are maintainable. 3. We have heard and considered the submissions advanced by Shri Gupta on the aspect of maintainability of these appeals and have given respectful consideration to the Division Bench judgment cited at bar and have considered the relevant statutory provisions. 4. The issue regarding maintainability of an intra-court appeal in these very circumstances came to be considered by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of RSRTC & Ors. v. Vaibhav Kumar & Ors. reported in AIR 2007 Raj 147 wherein, the precise question involved was regarding the right of maintaining an intra-court appeal from the judgment/order of the Single Judge passed in appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 or whether such right was taken away by Section 100-A of the Civil Procedure Code amended vide Act 22 of 2002. After deliberating upon the controversy, the Division Bench of this Court concluded that the issue was no longer res integra in view of the Supreme Court decision in case of Kamal Kumar Dutta & Anr. v. Ruby General Hospital Ltd. & Ors. reported in 2006 AIR SCW 4594 and observed:- “23. The legal position exposited by the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta 2006 AIR SCW 4594, applies on all fours to the order/award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and where such order/award is carried in an appeal under Section 173 of that Act. The legal position exposited by the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta 2006 AIR SCW 4594, applies on all fours to the order/award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and where such order/award is carried in an appeal under Section 173 of that Act. Even if it be assumed that the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is not a Court as is the term ordinarily understood, it is beyond doubt that such Tribunal has all the trapping of a Court. Though the Tribunals occupy a special position of their own under the scheme of the Courts and Tribunals and special matters and questions are entrusted to them for their decision yet they share with the Courts one common characteristic viz.; both the Courts as well as Tribunals are constituted by the State and are invested with judicial functions as distinguished from purely administrative or executive functions. It is the State's inherent judicial power which is discharged by the Courts and Tribunals. If the Company Law Board constituted under the Companies Act in its adjudicatory powers has the trappings of a Court and an appeal under Section 10F of the Companies Act from its order to the Single Judge is not amenable to further appeal (Letters Patent) to the Division Bench of the same Court because of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure, a fortiori, an order passed by the Single Judge in appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act from the order/ award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal shall not be subject to intra- Court appeal in view of the bar created by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure effective from 1st July, 2002. 24. In Kamal Kumar Dutta 2006 AIR SCW 4594 (supra), the Supreme Court noticed the Full Bench decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and Kerala High Court in Gandla Pannal Bhulaxml AIR 2003 AP 458 and Kesava Pillai Sreedharan Pillai AIR 2004 Kerala 111, respectively and accepted the legal position expostulated therein that the right of appeal available under the Letters Patent is taken away by Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure even in respect of the matter arising under special enactments having force of law. 25. 25. On behalf of the appellants it was urged that Section 100A of the Civil Procedure Code does not use the expression 'award' and the only restriction to further appeal is from the Judgment, decree or order in an appeal from the appellate or original decree. They would submit that the 'Judgment', 'decree' and 'order' defined under the Code of Civil Procedure under Sections 2(2) and 2(14) respectively do not cover the 'award' passed by the Tribunal under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act and, therefore, Section 100A does not take away the right of further appeal from the decision in the appeal by Single Judge against the award. 26. The distinction drawn by the learned Counsel for the appellants between 'Judgment', 'decree' and 'order' as defined in the Code of Civil Procedure on the one hand and the 'award' passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is of no real help to the appellants. What is important is that the decision of the Single Judge in the appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is nothing but a Judgment. It is only because it constituted as 'Judgment' that special appeal were maintainable under Section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance prior to amended Section 100A. The bar of further appeal is from the judgment and decree of the Single Judge passed in the appellate Jurisdiction. Surely the decision of the Single Judge in the appeal under Section 173 is a 'Judgment'. 27. The Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta 2006 AIR SCW 4594, has expounded the legal position with reference to Section 100A in unambiguous terms that where appeal has been decided from an original order by a Single Judge, no further appeal has been provided and that power which used to be there under the Letters Patent of the High Court has been subsequently withdrawn. Applying this ratio, it would be seen that the order/award passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal is an original order and against that an appeal has been provided before the High Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, that is, an appeal from the original order. In this view of the matter, no further appeal (by whatever name called, Letters Patent Appeal or Special Appeal) shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. 28. In this view of the matter, no further appeal (by whatever name called, Letters Patent Appeal or Special Appeal) shall lie to the Division Bench of the same High Court. 28. The decision of this Court in Fazal Ali AIR 2004 Raj 39 (supra) thus, stands Impliedly overruled by the decision of the Supreme Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta's case, 2006 AIR SCW 4594. Fazal Ali does not lay down the correct law. 29. In what we have discussed above, we conclude that the Special Appeal from the judgment and order passed by Single Judge of this Court in an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act against the award of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, is not maintainable with effect from the cut-off date i.e. 1st July, 2002 in view of Section 100A of the Code of Civil Procedure amended by Section 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 2002.” 5. Manifestly, thus, the Division Bench of this Court after examining the relevant statutory provisions and more particularly the amended Section 100-A of Civil Procedure Code and the interpretation thereof by the Apex Court in Kamal Kumar Dutta’s case went on to hold that an intra-court appeal is not maintainable for challenging the judgment passed by a Single Bench while deciding an appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act arising out of judgment and decree of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal. 6. The Division Bench judgment in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Smt. Prabha Ojha & Ors. (supra) relied upon by Shri Gupta was rendered without considering the earlier Division Bench judgment in the case of RSRTC & Ors. Vs. Vaibhav Kumar & Ors. (supra). Furthermore, the import of the amendment to Section 100-A of Civil Procedure Code and the interpretation thereof by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kamal Kumar Dutta (supra) was also not considered in the said Division Bench judgment. 7. The Division Bench relied upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Santosh & Ors. reported in 1996 (3) WLC (Raj.) 674 for holding that the intra-court appeal was maintainable in such a situation. 7. The Division Bench relied upon the Full Bench judgment of this Court in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Santosh & Ors. reported in 1996 (3) WLC (Raj.) 674 for holding that the intra-court appeal was maintainable in such a situation. It may be mentioned here that position of law which has changed with the amendment in the Civil Procedure Code (Act No.22 of 2002) and the introduction of Section 100-A was obviously not under consideration before the Full Bench in the case of New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Santosh & Ors. (supra). 8. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has, time and again laid down that not only the judgment rendered by a Larger Bench strength is binding on a Bench of smaller strength but the judgment of a Bench of co-equal strength is also binding on a Bench of judges of co-equal strength. In case, the earlier judgment of a Bench of co-equal strength is not considered by the subsequent Bench comprising of same number of judges, then the previous judgment would hold sway and the subsequent judgment of co-equal strength would have to be considered per incuriam. Reference in this regard may be had to the following observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2011 SC 312 :- “149. The analysis of English and Indian Law clearly leads to the irresistible conclusion that not only the judgment of a larger strength is binding on a judgment of smaller strength but the judgment of a co-equal strength is also binding on a Bench of judges of co-equal strength.” 9. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, we are of the firm opinion that the view taken by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd Vs. Smt. Prabha Ojha (supra) that an intra-court appeal lies against the judgment rendered by the Single Bench of this Court in an appeal against the judgment while deciding an appeal under Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable, does not lay down correct proposition of law. Manifestly, an intra-court appeal cannot be maintained in such a situation as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of RSRTC & Ors. Vs. Vaibhav Kumar & Ors. (supra). Manifestly, an intra-court appeal cannot be maintained in such a situation as has been held by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of RSRTC & Ors. Vs. Vaibhav Kumar & Ors. (supra). Thus, both these inter-court appeals are dismissed as being not maintainable.