JUDGMENT : SANDEEP SHARMA, J. 1. In the year, 1988, respondent No.1, advertised three posts of Regional Manager to be filled up by way of direct recruitment in consonance with R&P Rules. Out of aforesaid three posts, two were meant for General Category and one for Scheduled Caste category. Petitioner being fully qualified, also applied alongwith other eligible candidates and respondent-corporation, having found him eligible though called him for interview on 11.1.1989, but fact remains that he was not selected against the post in question i.e. Regional Manager. Though petitioner had applied against the one post reserved for Scheduled Caste category, but since he was not found fit, he was not offered appointment against the post of Regional Manager, reserved for SC category, whereas respondents No. 2 and 3 were declared selected against two posts of Regional Manager, falling in the share of General Category. It also emerges from the record that though respondent-department did not find the petitioner fit for post of Regional Manager, but offered him lower post of Assistant Manager (now Traffic Manager) on 30.6.1989. Petitioner accepted the aforesaid offer and joined against the post of Assistant Manager. Respondent Corporation did not make any regular promotion to the post of Regional Manager, from the feeder category of Assistant Manager (Traffic Manager)/Superintendents Grade-1/Private Secretaries for quite long, rather kept on making ad-hoc promotions on the basis of seniority of Assistant Managers. It also emerges from the material available on record that at that relevant time, 40 point roster was being followed by the respondent-corporation for the purpose of promotion. As per aforesaid 40 point roster, 1st, 8th, 14th, 22nd, 28th and 36th roster points were to be given to the Scheduled Caste category. 2. Pleadings available on record reveal that till 24 roster point, none of the Scheduled Caste candidate ever came to be appointed against the post of Regional Manager as none from the feeder category belonging to the Scheduled Caste category was found eligible to be promoted against the post of Regional Manager. Vide order dated 6.10.1995, respondent-corporation promoted the petitioner on adhoc basis against the post of Regional Manager alongwith other eligible candidates in order of seniority and petitioner joined against the aforesaid post on 21.10.1995. Vide order dated 6.10.1995, respondent-corporation promoted the petitioner on adhoc basis against the post of Regional Manager alongwith other eligible candidates in order of seniority and petitioner joined against the aforesaid post on 21.10.1995. Subsequently, respondent department with a view to regularize the ad-hoc promotions conducted the meeting of Departmental Promotion Committee on 28.2.1996, wherein all the vacancies starting from 1990 came to be filled up on regular basis. 3. Memorandum for consideration of Departmental Promotion Committee for the post of Regional Manager (Traffic) /Regional Manager (P&S) (available at page 199 of the writ record) reveals that there were 27 posts of Regional Manager in the pay scale of Rs.2410-4000 (Rs.2410-4000 w.e.f. 1.1.1993) in the sanctioned cadre of HRTC as per details given herein below: 1. Regional Manager 25 posts. 2. Regional Manager (Traffic) 1 post. 3. Regional Manager (P&S) 1 post. Total: 27 posts Out of these 27 posts, 16 posts came to be filled on regular basis, 13 on ad-hoc basis. It appears that 16 posts filled on regular basis also include 2 posts occupied by Sh. K.L. Sharma and S.R. Dogra, who at that relevant time, were working as Dy. Divisional Manager (NT) on adhoc basis. Since aforesaid persons were also likely to be promoted to the post of Deputy Divisional Manager (NT), 13 posts including 10 posts filled on ad-hoc basis from various dates became available to be filled on regular basis. In all, 75 % posts were to be filled in by promotion from amongst Assistant Managers with three years’ service and Superintendent, Grade-1, etc, with three years’ service in the ratio of 3:2. Memorandum further reveals that 20 point roster was to be followed for identifying the post in following rotation: 1. Assistant Manager, 2. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 3. Assistant Manager, 4. Direct 5. Assistant Manager, 6. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 7. Assistant Manager 8. Direct 9. Assistant Manager 10. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 11. Assistant Manager 12. Direct 13. Assistant Manager 14. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 15. Assistant Manager 16. Direct 17. Assistant Manager 18. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 19. Assistant Manager 20. Direct.” 4. Assistant Manager, 2. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 3. Assistant Manager, 4. Direct 5. Assistant Manager, 6. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 7. Assistant Manager 8. Direct 9. Assistant Manager 10. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 11. Assistant Manager 12. Direct 13. Assistant Manager 14. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 15. Assistant Manager 16. Direct 17. Assistant Manager 18. Superintendent Grade-1 etc., 19. Assistant Manager 20. Direct.” 4. It further stands recorded in para-2 of the memorandum that last officer was promoted to the post of Regional Manager on regular basis w.e.f. 1.7.1990 against point No.1 of the second cycle of the roster (rotation of vacancies) and as such, vacancy position of 13 posts was to be apportioned from second point onwards. At page 209 of the paper book, it has been recorded that “As per the position stated above, five posts fall for the category of Superintendent Grade- I/ PA/ Superintendent Grade-II and 8 for the category of Traffic Manager. Similarly, at page 210 of the memorandum, it stands recorded that 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 12th and 13th vacancy has been identified for the feeder post of Traffic Manager. Perusal of page 211 of paper book reveals that against 5th vacancy, it has been recorded that “5th Vacancy for TM w.e.f. 2.8.1991 (this post is reserved for SC category). However, in case the officer belonging to the SC category, (Sh. Chaman Lal) is selected against 3rd vacancy then this post shall be treated as unreserved.” 5. Precise grouse of the petitioner is that since 3rd vacancy filled up by Departmental Promotion Committee was against roster point No.20 and same went to Sh. Chaman Lal (SC candidate) on his own seniority, Departmental Promotion Committee unlawfully and illegally recorded note in the DPC proceedings that if Sh. Chaman Lal gets selected against the third vacancy falling to roster point No.20, in that eventuality, roster point No.22 shall be unreserved and would fall to the general category. As per the petitioner, aforesaid modus operandi adopted by the Departmental Promotion Committee is absolutely incorrect/ illegal. It has been further claimed by the petitioner that since Sh. Chaman Lal gets selected against the third vacancy falling to roster point No.20, in that eventuality, roster point No.22 shall be unreserved and would fall to the general category. As per the petitioner, aforesaid modus operandi adopted by the Departmental Promotion Committee is absolutely incorrect/ illegal. It has been further claimed by the petitioner that since Sh. Chaman Lal, who belongs to the Scheduled Caste category was selected against roster point No.20 on his own merit, there was no occasion, if any, for the Departmental Promotion Committee to de-reserve roster point No.22, against which, petitioner being Scheduled Caste category ought to have been promoted over and above respondent Nos.4 and 5. It has been further claimed on behalf of the petitioner that since upto roster point No. 22, four posts had fallen to the quota of Scheduled Caste category and none was selected, petitioner being eligible candidate ought to have been promoted to the post of Regional Manager against roster point No. 22, which has been illegally given to one Sh. Kulbhushan R-2, candidate belonging to the General Category. As per the petitioner, Mr. Chaman Lal, selected against roster point No.20 though belongs to Scheduled Caste category, but since he was promoted against roster point No.20 on his own merit, there was no justification to de-reserve vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste category against roster point No.22. 6. Besides above, this Court finds from the record that respondent department prior to ad-hoc promotion of Assistant Manager to the posts of Regional Manager also appointed/recruited seven persons as Regional Manager in the month of August 1995 on direct recruitment basis. As per the petitioner, aforesaid seven direct recruits were wrongly offered appointment in excess of their quota. Petitioner claims that since against 25% quota of direct recruitment, only seven posts fell in their shares out of total cadre of 27 and as on that date, many direct recruits were already performing their duties, respondents could not have appointed 7 persons as Regional Manager on the basis of direct recruitment in August, 1995. 7. On 28.2.1996, seniority list came to be circulated, wherein petitioner was placed at Serial No. 24. Petitioner being aggrieved with his placement at Sr. 7. On 28.2.1996, seniority list came to be circulated, wherein petitioner was placed at Serial No. 24. Petitioner being aggrieved with his placement at Sr. No. 24 in the seniority list, made a representation stating therein that his regular promotion is against the rules and he is liable to be appointed against roster point No.22 and further, he was to be appointed on and w.e.f. 19.11.1993, but since such representation of him was not decided, he filed OA(D) No. 103 of 1998, which subsequently came to be registered as CWP(T) No. 5508 of 2008 after abolishment of the Erstwhile HP State Administrative Tribunal, praying therein for following reliefs: (i) That the action of respondent corporation in not deciding the objections submitted by him against the seniority list of RMs dated 9.9.1996 and the representations dated 13.10.1996, 16.12.1996, 14.2.1997 i.e. vide Annexure A-17 to A-20 may kindly be declared illegal and arbitrary. (ii) That the seniority list of Regional Managers dated 9.9.1996 vide Annexure A-16 may be quashed and set aside. (iii) That the respondents may be directed to consider the case of applicant for placement at the appropriate place in the seniority list forthwith. (iv) That orders dated 6.3.1996 vide Annexure A-14 promoting the applicant on regular basis as RM, may be quashed and set aside. (v) That the action of the respondent corporation in not considering the case of applicant for regular promotion as RM, firstly against the vacancy of RMs which occurred in the year 1993 and then the vacancies of RMs which occurred in the year 1994, may be declared unfair, unjust, illegal and arbitrary. (vi) That the respondent corporation may be directed to hold review DPC for making regular promotions to the post of RMs forthwith. (vii) That the respondent corporation may be directed to consider the case of applicant for regular promotion of RM in the review DPC forthwith. (viii) That the regular promotion orders of respondents No.4 to 7 as RMs on 6.3.1996 vide Annexure A-14 may also be quashed and set aside. (ix) That the respondent corporation may be directed to give all consequential benefits like arrears of salary and seniority after considering him for regular promotion w.e.f. 1993/1994 forthwith. (x) That the action of respondent corporation in appointing the applicant as Assistant Manager/Traffic Manager on a lower post on 24.6.1989 (A-4) may be quashed and set aside. (ix) That the respondent corporation may be directed to give all consequential benefits like arrears of salary and seniority after considering him for regular promotion w.e.f. 1993/1994 forthwith. (x) That the action of respondent corporation in appointing the applicant as Assistant Manager/Traffic Manager on a lower post on 24.6.1989 (A-4) may be quashed and set aside. (xi) That in continuation to above, the respondent corporation may be directed to consider and to appoint the applicant as a Regional Manager in the respondent corporation w.e.f. 30.6.1989 i.e. the date of direct recruitment of the respondent 2 and 3 as RMs forthwith. (xii) That the respondent corporation may also be directed to give all consequential (sic benefits) w.e.f 30.6.1989 forthwith. 8. By way of detailed reply, respondent-corporation No.1, besides contesting the claim of the petitioner, on merits, specifically took the objection of limitation and claimed that since appointment of the applicant against the post of Traffic Manager was made vide order dated 24.6.1989 (A-4) and adhoc /regular promotion of respondents No. 4 to 7 was ordered vide orders dated 12.11.1993, 10.2.1994, 2.11.1994 and 6.3.1996 (Annexures R1 to R4, respectively), petitioner is estopped from filing the present petition at this belated stage for the following reasons: “Under Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the Tribunal shall not admit an application(s) in a case where a final order such as mentioned in Clause (a) of Sub Section 2 of Section 20 of Rule ibid, has been made in connection with the grievances unless the application is made within one year from the date of such orders. Since the applicant has not filed any objection against the aforementioned orders for a considerable period, as such, the application, in question, is barred by time and can not be permitted to be assailed at this belated stage. 9. Respondent No.1 also claimed in the reply that respondent-corporation had advertised the post of Assistant Manager reserved for Scheduled Caste category and interviews were held in Sepetember, 1988, but since selection committee did not recommend any of the candidate appeared in that interview for appointment against the post of Assistant Manager, decision was taken to readvertise the post. 9. Respondent No.1 also claimed in the reply that respondent-corporation had advertised the post of Assistant Manager reserved for Scheduled Caste category and interviews were held in Sepetember, 1988, but since selection committee did not recommend any of the candidate appeared in that interview for appointment against the post of Assistant Manager, decision was taken to readvertise the post. However, during January, 1989, interviews for the post of Regional Manager were held (including one post reserved for Scheduled Caste category) and only one candidate belonging to the reserved category of Scheduled Caste appeared in the interview i.e. applicant, but since he was not found fit by the selection committee for the appointment against the post of Regional Manager, he was not selected against the post of Regional Manager, however, petitioner was recommended for appointment against the post of Assistant Manager in the pay scale of Rs. 800-1400 (pre-revised) against the reserved vacancy of Assistant Manager. Since the petitioner accepted the offer and joined as such w.e.f. 1.9.1989, he now cannot make any complaint with regard to rejection of his candidature against the post of Regional Manager. It has been further averred in the reply of respondent No.1 that post of Regional Manager reserved for Scheduled Caste category was re-advertised and was duly filled in the year, 1990 by appointing one Sh. Ajay Dogra, belonging to reserved category of Scheduled Caste. Since petitioner was not recommended for the post of Regional Manager and he had happily accepted the post of Assistant Manager, now he cannot claim is appointment as Regional Manager retrospectively, merely on the basis of his participation in the interview conducted for the post of Regional Manager in the year 1989. It has been further averred in the reply that three posts of Regional Manager were filled during the year 1993 and out of these three posts, one post was meant for the category of Assistant Manager/Traffic Manager and as per instructions, only three eligible Assistant Manager/Traffic Managers were required to be considered for this post. Since petitioner was at serial No.5 of the zone of consideration and three eligible Assistant Managers/Traffic Manager, who were senior to the petitioner, were available, there was no occasion for the department to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion. In the aforesaid promotion/process carried out in the year, 1993, Mr. Since petitioner was at serial No.5 of the zone of consideration and three eligible Assistant Managers/Traffic Manager, who were senior to the petitioner, were available, there was no occasion for the department to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion. In the aforesaid promotion/process carried out in the year, 1993, Mr. Kulbhushan i.e. respondent No.4, being senior most Assistant Manager came to be promoted against the post of Regional Manager on adhoc basis in the month of November, 1993. It has been categorically averred in the reply that post against which Mr. Kulbhushan was appointed on adhoc basis as Regional Manager in the year, 1993, was meant for General Category. Similarly, reply filed by respondent No.1 reveals that in the year, 1994, three posts of Regional Manager again came to be filled up from the quota of Assistant Manager/Traffic Manager purely on adhoc basis, whereby three senior most candidates i.e. respondents No. 5 to 7 came to be promoted against the post of Regional Manager on adhoc basis. However, at the time of regular Departmental Promotion Committee, petitioner was also kept in zone of consideration in accordance with his placement in the seniority as Assistant Manager/Traffic Manager, but respondents No. 5 to 7 being senior to the petitioner came to be recommended to be promoted against the post of Regional Manager on adhoc basis by the Departmental Promotion Committee. Petitioner was promoted to the post of Regional Manager on adhoc basis, w.e.f 21.10.1995 on the basis of seniority list. 10. For completion of facts, it is necessary to take note of the fact that after completion of pleadings, case at hand came to be finally heard and disposed of by a coordinate bench of this Court vide judgment dated 24.11.2010, passed in CWP(T) No. 5508 of 2008. Vide aforesaid judgment, coordinate Bench of this court while holding that the petitioner had vested legal right for being considered against roster point No.22 reserved for Scheduled Caste category, directed the respondent corporation to hold review Departmental Promotion Committee within a period of three months and consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Regional Manager against reservation roster point No.22 on regular basis w.e.f 19.11.1993 in accordance with law. 11. 11. Being aggrieved with aforesaid judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge of this Court, respondent-corporation preferred a review petition on the ground that seven direct recruits engaged in the year 1995 were not impleaded as party to the petition and secondly, one Sh. Chaman Lal, belonging to the Scheduled Caste category had already been promoted against the unreserved vacancy w.e.f. 2.3.1991 against roster point No.20 i.e. roster point meant for candidate belonging to the General Category and as such, DPC rightly recorded in the proceedings that 5th vacancy against roster point No.22 would be deemed to be un-reserved. However, fact remains that court, which had passed the judgment dated 24.11.2010 dismissed the review on the ground that since respondent corporation has been directed to consider the case of the petitioner for promotion to the post of Regional Manager against reservation roster point No.22 on regular basis w.e.f 19.11.1993, seven persons recruited in August, 1995 shall have fresh cause of action, if any, consequent upon consideration of the case of the petitioner in terms of judgment sought to be reviewed. Besides above, court while dismissing the review petition also observed in order dated 31.8.2011 that in case reserved category candidate is granted accelerated promotion against a roster point meant for General Category, it cannot legally amount to de-reservation of later roster point. 12. Pursuant to passing of the aforesaid judgment dated 31.8.2011 besides respondents-corporation, seven direct recruits appointed against the post of Regional Manager in the month of August, 1995 also filed LPAs No. 590, 652 and 728 of 2011 before the Division Bench of this Court, seeking therein quashment of judgment passed by the learned Single Judge. The Division Bench of this Court having taken note of the averments contained in LPAs, as referred herein above, vis-à-vis reasoning assigned by the learned Single Judge while passing judgments dated 24.11.2010 and 31.8.2011 in writ petition as well as review petition set aside the judgments passed by the learned single Judge and ordered for impleadment of seven direct recruits as respondents No. 8 to 12 in the CWP filed by the petitioner Amar Nath and remanded the case back to the learned Single Judge for fresh decision. While passing aforesaid order, Division Bench of this court ordered that appeals filed by the parties shall be treated as reply to the writ petition and reply, if any, to these appeals would be treated as rejoinder to the main writ petition. In the aforesaid background, matter again came to be listed before the learned Single Judge, but before same could be decided, case was again transferred to the Tribunal on account of its re-establishment. Since now Tribunal stands abolished, matter has again come up for consideration before this court. 13. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records. 14. It is admitted case of the parties that pursuant to advertisement issued by respondent No.1 in the year 1989 for the post of Regional Manager, petitioner had appeared against the post reserved for Scheduled Caste category. It is also not in dispute that prior to issuance of advertisement for the aforesaid post of Regional Manager, respondent-corporation had advertised one post of Assistant Manager, belonging to the reserved category, but since none was found suitable, decision was taken to re-advertise the post. Though petitioner has claimed that he being sole candidate available against the post reserved for Scheduled Caste category ought to have been selected against the post of Regional Manager pursuant to advertisement issued in 1989, but since selection committee did not find his candidature suitable against the post of Regional Manager and petitioner happily without there being any protest accepted the post of Assistant Manager, prayer/claim made on his behalf to consider him against the post of Regional Manager w.e.f 30.6.1989 deserves outright rejection being hopelessly time barred. 15. Reply filed by the respondent-corporation as well as other respondents clearly reveals that they have taken specific objection with regard to limitation and as such, needs to be dealt with at the first instance. 16. Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, representing the petitioner argued that since non-selection of the petitioner against the post of Regional Manager in 1989 is itself void abinitio, period of limitation as prescribed under the Act cannot be applied in the instant case. 16. Mr. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel, representing the petitioner argued that since non-selection of the petitioner against the post of Regional Manager in 1989 is itself void abinitio, period of limitation as prescribed under the Act cannot be applied in the instant case. He further contended that since respondents No. 4 to 7 came to be promoted as Regional Managers on adhoc basis vide orders dated 12.11.1993, 10.2.1994 and 2.11.194 (R1 to R3) and then were regularized on 6.3.1996 vide Annexure R-4, from the date of their ad-hoc promotion and had been wrongly shown as senior to the applicant in the seniority list of Regional Managers issued on 9.6.1996 (A16), against which, the petitioner had represented vide Annexure A-17 on 13.10.1996, challenge to the regular promotion orders and seniority list of Regional Managers is well within a period of one and half year. However, having carefully perused material available on record vis-à-vis prayer made in the instant petition, especially in clauses-10 to 12, para-7 of the petition, this court finds no merit in the aforesaid submission of learned Senior Counsel. Under Section 21 of the Tribunals Act, OA is/was required to be filed within period of one year from the date, on which, relief, as prayed for, is/was denied to him. In the case at hand, petitioner prayed for grant of regular promotion to the post of Regional Manager w.e.f. 1933 to 1995 by way of filing OA in 1998 i.e. after four years of rejection of his claim. In the case at hand, besides above, this Court finds from the pleadings that the petitioner in para-5 of the OA though declared that present application is within a period of limitation as provided under Section 21 of the Act, but chose not to file any application for condonation of delay even after filing of the reply on behalf of the respondent corporation, wherein it took specific plea/objection with regard to limitation. Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Secretary to the Govt. of India v. Shivram Mahadu Gaikwad, 1995 Supp. (3) SCC 231, set aside the judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that Tribunal overlooked the question of limitation. In that case, no application was filed by the applicant for condonation of delay. In another case titled Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal, 1999 (8) SCC 304 , Hon’ble Apex Court observed as Under: 7. (3) SCC 231, set aside the judgment of Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that Tribunal overlooked the question of limitation. In that case, no application was filed by the applicant for condonation of delay. In another case titled Ramesh Chand Sharma v. Udham Singh Kamal, 1999 (8) SCC 304 , Hon’ble Apex Court observed as Under: 7. On perusal of the materials on record and after hearing counsel for the parties, we are of the opinion that the explanation sought to be given before us cannot be entertained as no foundation thereof was laid before the Tribunal. It was open to the first respondent to make proper application under Section 21(3) of the Act for condonation of delay and having not done so, he cannot be permitted to take up such contention at this late stage. In our opinion, the O.A. filed before the Tribunal after the expiry of three years could not have been admitted and disposed of on merits in view of the statutory provision contained in Section 21(1) of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. The law in this behalf is now settled, see Secretary to Government of India and Others v. Shivam Mahadu Gaikwad, [1995] Supp. 3 SCC 231. 17. Though in the case at hand, this Court having taken note of the fact that the petitioner firstly accepted the post of Assistant Manager in 1989 and then chose not to file any representation either against his non-selection to the post of Regional Manager or to the adhoc promotion made in the year, 1995 till the year, 1996, this Court has no hesitation to hold that claim of the petitioner, as has been raised in the present petition, deserves to be dismissed being hopelessly time barred. Apart from above, petition having been filed on behalf of the petitioner deserves to be dismissed on the ground of acquiescence. Since the petitioner after having accepted post of Assistant Manager acquiesced, there is no occasion for him at this stage to rake up the issues, which had happened four years prior to filing of the present petition. Moreover, during the aforesaid period of four years, much water has flown under the bridge. In the aforesaid four years, not only petitioner, but several other eligible persons have been promoted to the post of Regional Manager. Moreover, during the aforesaid period of four years, much water has flown under the bridge. In the aforesaid four years, not only petitioner, but several other eligible persons have been promoted to the post of Regional Manager. Interestingly, the petitioner never chose to raise any objection while he was being promoted against the post of Regional Manager, on ad-hoc basis on the basis of seniority, rather he waited till the time Departmental Promotion Committee in the year, 1998 regularized the adhoc promotions on year wise basis. Otherwise also, careful perusal of averments contained in the writ petition itself suggests that petitioner being fully aware of the aforesaid delay has made an alternative prayer as detailed in clauses 1 , 2 and 8 of the relief clause: 18. Though in the petition, it has been averred on behalf of the petitioner that he after finalization of the seniority list pursuant to minutes of Departmental Promotion Committee held on 20.2.1996 filed representations, but since same remained pending before the competent authority for considerable time, he filed OA in the year 1998 before the erstwhile HP State Administrative Tribunal. By now it is well settled that repeated representations would not extend the period of limitation. Once the representation is filed and no decision qua the same is taken by the competent authority within a reasonable period, representationist has two options; either to accept the decision against which he filed representation; and/or to file appropriate proceedings in the appropriate court of law without there being any delay. In the case at hand, petitioner kept on filing representations without there being any response from the competent authority and as such, again claimed limitation on the ground of pendency of the representations before the competent authority. 19. Reliance is placed on judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Karnataka Power corporation Ltd. V. K. Thangappan and Anr, (2006) 4 SCC 322, wherein it has been held as under:- “8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation with Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that Article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in R.N. Bose v. Union of India ( AIR 1970 SC 470 ) that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9.It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal ( AIR 1987 SC 251 ), that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Raja Lakshmiah v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1967 SC 973 ). 10. It has been pointed out by this Court in a number of cases that representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of delay. This was first stated in K.V. Raja Lakshmiah v. State of Mysore ( AIR 1967 SC 973 ). This was re- iterated in R.N. Bose's case (supra) by stating that there is a limit to the time which can be considered reasonable for making representations and if the Government had turned down one representation the making of another representation on similar lines will not explain the delay. In State of Orissa v. P. Samantaraj (AIR 1976 SC 1617) making of repeated representations was not regarded as satisfactory explanation of the delay. In that case the petition had been dismissed for delay alone. (See State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar ( AIR 1976 SC 1639 also). 20. By now, it is well settled that relief cannot be extended to the persons who have approached the court after a long delay, especially who approach the court after inordinate delay. Reliance is placed on B.S. Bajwa and another vs. State of Punjab and others, (1998)2 SCC 523 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:- "7. Having heard both sides we are satisfied that the writ petition was wrongly entertained and allowed by the single Judge and, therefore, the Judgments of the single Judge and the Division Bench have both to be set aside. The undisputed facts appearing from the record are alone sufficient to dismiss the writ petition on the ground of laches because the grievance made by B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor only in 1984, which was long after they had entered the department in 1971-72. During this entire period of more than a decade they were all along treated as junior to the other aforesaid persons and the rights inter se had crystallised which ought not to have been re-opened after the lapse of such a long period. At every stage the others were promoted before B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor and this position was known to B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor right from the beginning as found by the Division Bench itself. At every stage the others were promoted before B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor and this position was known to B. S. Bajwa and B. D. Kapoor right from the beginning as found by the Division Bench itself. It is well settled that in service matters the question of seniority should not be re-opened in such situations after the lapse of a reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This alone was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition." 21. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled as State of Uttar Pradesh and others vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and others, 2014 AIR SCW 6519, held that relief cannot be extended to the persons who have approached the Court after long delay, that too, who are fencesitters. It is apt to reproduce para 24 of the judgment herein: "24. Viewed from this angle, in the present case, we find that the selection process took place in the year 1986. Appointment orders were issued in the year 1987, but were also cancelled vide orders dated June 22, 1987. The respondents before us did not challenge these cancellation orders till the year 1996, i.e. for a period of 9 years. It means that they had accepted the cancellation of their appointments. They woke up in the year 1996 only after finding that some other persons whose appointment orders were also cancelled got the relief. By that time, nine years had passed. The earlier judgment had granted the relief to the parties before the Court. It would also be pertinent to highlight that these respondents have not joined the service nor working like the employees who succeeded in earlier case before the Tribunal. As of today, 27 years have passed after the issuance of cancellation orders. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above." 22. Therefore, not only there was unexplained delay and laches in filing the claim petition after period of 9 years, it would be totally unjust to direct the appointment to give them the appointment as of today, i.e. after a period of 27 years when most of these respondents would be almost 50 years of age or above." 22. Even Division Bench of this Court, while placing reliance upon the aforesaid judgments passed by Hon’ble Apex Court, has held in LPA No.604 of 2011, titled Karan Singh Pathania vs. State of H.P. and Others that “fencer cannot be held entitled to any relief” 23. In I. Chuba Jamir & Ors. versus State of Nagaland & Ors., reported in 2009 AIR SCW 5162, the Apex Court has held that the inordinate delay is a very valid and important consideration. It is apt to reproduce para 17 of the judgment herein: “17. On a careful consideration of the materials on record and the submissions made by Mr. Goswami we are unable to accept the claims of the appellants-writ petitioners. In our view the inordinate delay of 7 or 8 years by the appellants-writ petitioners in approaching the High Court was a very valid and important consideration. This aspect of the matter was also brought to the notice of the Single Judge but he proceeded with the matter without saying anything on that issue, one way or the other. It was, therefore, perfectly open to the Division Bench to take into consideration the conduct of the appellants-writ petitioners and the consequences, apart from the legality and validity, of the reliefs granted to them by the learned single Judge.” 24. In Banda Development Authority, Banda vs. Moti Lal Agarwl and Ors., 2011 AIR SCW 2835, similar principle has enunciated by Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein it has been held as under: 15. In our view, even if the objection of delay and laches had not been raised in the affidavits filed on behalf of the BDA and the State Government, the High Court was duty bound to take cognizance of the long time gap of 9 years between the issue of declaration under Section 6(1) and filing of the writ petition and declined relief to respondent No.1 on the ground that he was guilty of laches because the acquired land had been utilized for implementing the residential scheme and third party rights had been created. The unexplained delay of about six years between the passing of award and filing of writ petition was also sufficient for refusing to entertain the prayer made in the writ petition. xxx xxxx xxx 25. In this case, the acquired land was utilized for implementing Tulsi Nagar Residential Scheme inasmuch as after carrying out necessary development i.e. construction of roads, laying electricity, water and sewer lines etc. the BDA carved out plots, constructed flats for economically weaker sections and lower income group, invited applications for allotment of the plots and flats from general as well as reserved categories and allotted the same to eligible persons. In the process, the BDA not only incurred huge expenditure but also created third party rights. In this scenario, the delay of nine years from the date of publication of the declaration issued under Section 6(1) and almost six years from the date of passing of award should have been treated by the High Court as more than sufficient for denying equitable relief to respondent No.1.” 25. Hon'ble Apex Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board and others vs. T.T. Murali Babu, 2014 AIR SCW 1171, has held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant – a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent-employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who compete with ‘Kumbhakarna’ or for that matter ‘Rip Van Winkle’. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold.” 26. Since reliefs, as prayed for, in clauses No. 10 to 12 cannot be granted to the petitioner being stale and hopelessly time barred, nothing remains to be adjudicated in the instant proceedings, but having taken note of the fact that parties to the lis are at loggerheads for more than 22 years, this Court deems it fit to deal with issue raised by the petitioner qua his promotion to the post of Regional Manager against roster point No.22. 27. 27. As per the petitioner, he ought to have been promoted by the Departmental Promotion Committee against roster point No.22 i.e. point falling to the share of Scheduled Caste category because Sh. Chaman Lal, selected by the DPC being SC candidate, was selected against roster point No.20 on his own merit, however, having carefully perused material available on record, there appears to be no merit in the aforesaid claim of the petitioner for the reasons given herein after. 28. Proceedings of DPC placed on record reveal that 75% posts were to be filled in by promotion amongst Assistant Managers with three years’ service and superintendent Grade 1 etc, with three years’ service in ratio of 3:2. In the year, 1993, the date from which the petitioner is claiming promotion as Regional Manager, the cadre strength of Regional Managers was 24 and out of these posts, 25% share was meant for direct recruitment, meaning thereby, after deducting direct recruitment quota, the share of promotees would be 24-6=18. The promotion quota was further divided amongst Assistant Managers/Traffic Managers and Superintendents grade 1 and II, in the ratio of 3:2, as a consequence of which, 11 posts fell to the share of Assistant Managers/Traffic Managers and seven to the share of Superintendents etc. 29. As has been taken note herein above, as per memorandum of Departmental Promotion Committee, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 12th and 13th vacancy came to be identified for the feeder post of Traffic Manager. It is similarly true that 5th vacancy, though was reserved for Scheduled Caste category, but since officer belonging to Scheduled Caste category namely Mr. Chaman Lal, came to be selected against 3rd vacancy, Departmental Promotion Committee took a decision to de-reserve 5th vacancy, which admittedly fell against roster point No. 22 reserved for Scheduled Caste category. 30. Perusal of memorandum prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 28.2.1996 Annexure P-3 (available at page 199 of the writ record) reveals that Departmental Promotion Committee was held for recommending promotions against 13 posts of Traffic Manager. Mr. Chaman Lal was recommended for promotion as Regional Manager by Departmental Promotion Committee against 3rd vacancy w.e.f. 7.6.1991 on ad-hoc basis. Perusal of memorandum prepared by the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 28.2.1996 Annexure P-3 (available at page 199 of the writ record) reveals that Departmental Promotion Committee was held for recommending promotions against 13 posts of Traffic Manager. Mr. Chaman Lal was recommended for promotion as Regional Manager by Departmental Promotion Committee against 3rd vacancy w.e.f. 7.6.1991 on ad-hoc basis. Aforesaid recommendation was made by Departmental Promotion Committee in view of the observation made in memorandum submitted for consideration of Departmental Promotion Committee (available at page 211 of the writ record), wherein it has been categorically recorded that “5th vacancy for TM w.e.f. 2.8.1991 (this post is reserved for SC category). However, in case the officer belonging to SC category (Sh. Chaman Lal) is selected against 3rd vacancy then this post shall be treated as unreserved.” 31. It is not in dispute inter-se parties that Mr. Chaman Lal candidate belonging to the Scheduled Caste category was an accelerated promotee to the post of Assistant Manager from the feeder post of Chief Inspector. Mr. Chaman Lal was promoted against roster point reserved for Scheduled Caste category to the post of Assistant Manager on regular basis on 11.5.1998 and during this process, he jumped over his general category counterparts senior to him as Chief Inspectors i.e. respondents No. 4 and 5, Mr. Kulbhushan and Mr. Ram Swaroop. When aforesaid person namely Chaman Lal was considered against the third vacancy of Traffic Manager, which was basically meant for General Category, he was not considered on the basis of original seniority, but on account of his consequential seniority attained by him on account of accelerated promotion to the post of Assistant Manager against roster point reserved for SC category, therefore, no fault can be said to have been committed by the DPC treating 5th vacancy against roster point No.22 as dereserved. Since Sh. Chaman Lal came to be considered against 3rd vacancy of Traffic Manager on account of his accelerated promotion to the Assistant Manager against post reserved for Scheduled Caste category, no fault, if any, can be said to have been committed by Departmental Promotion Committee while de-reserving the 5th vacancy falling at roster point No. 22. Since Sh. Chaman Lal came to be considered against 3rd vacancy of Traffic Manager on account of his accelerated promotion to the Assistant Manager against post reserved for Scheduled Caste category, no fault, if any, can be said to have been committed by Departmental Promotion Committee while de-reserving the 5th vacancy falling at roster point No. 22. Otherwise, decision of Departmental Promotion Committee tantamount to saying that the 3rd vacancy meant for General Category be treated as reserved for Scheduled Caste category by exchanging the same with 5th vacancy meant for Scheduled Caste category, which in turn was treated as General Category. 32. In the aforesaid scenario, petitioner cannot claim promotion against any vacancy prior to 12th vacancy as recommended by Departmental Promotion Committee dated 28.2.1996, vide which he came to be recommended for promotion w.e.f. 21.10.1995. 33. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled Ajeet Singh Januja v. State of Panjab, (1996) 2 SCC 715 , has held that the equality principle requires exclusion of the factor of extra weightage of earlier promotion to a reserved category candidate because of reservation alone, when he competes for further promotion to a general category with a general category candidate, senior to him in the panel, relevant paras whereof read as under: “When framers of the Constitution by Article 16 guaranteed equality of opportunity in matters of public employment, they armed at combining democratization with efficiency. In the process of democratization Article 16(4) enabled the State to make provisions for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the State. As has been pointed out by this Court that at the same time Article 335 of the Constitution enjoins to take into consideration the claims of the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes "consistently with the maintenance of efficiency of the administration" while the making of appointments to services and posts in connection with the affairs of the union or of a State. Thus it has been conceived by our Constitution that a process should be adopted while making appointments through direct recruitment or promotion in which the merit is not ignored. Thus it has been conceived by our Constitution that a process should be adopted while making appointments through direct recruitment or promotion in which the merit is not ignored. For attracting meritorious and talented persons to the public services, a balance has to be struck, while making provisions for reservation in respect of a section of the society. This Court from time to time has been issuing directions to maintain that balance in the public services so that there should not be discontentment, heart-burning and frustration, which can never be held to be in the larger interest of the society. It has been pointed out in the case of Indra Sawhney (supra) that reservation in promotions at various stages has resulted in considerable discontentment because many senior persons inspite of their efficiency and dedicated work find themselves superseded by their juniors belonging to the Scheduled Castes or Tribes for that reason alone. In many cases seniors to their horror find themselves made junior to even those who actually worked as their subordinates due to this factor alone. All concerned who are involved and interested in the uplift and growth of the nation have to work out a system by which the injustice done to a section of people in our society at certain period of history can be rectified by providing protections to their descendants, but we have to be conscious, at the same time that the efficiency of the administration of the country is not harmed and there is no reverse discrimination. Promotion is an important incident of service. It covers both advancement between srades within the same class and between different classes. Seniority in service is one of the important factors in making promotion. Even where process of promotion by selection is adopted, seniority has an importance in case of equal merit. The principal object of a promotion system is to secure the best possible incumbents for the higher position while maintaining the morale of the whole organization. The best public interest is served when equal opportunities for promotion exists for all qualified employees. Civil servants are able to move up 'the promotion ladder' as the merit deserves and the vacancies occur. Right to equality enshrined in the Constitution is to be reserved by preventing reverse discrimination as well. The best public interest is served when equal opportunities for promotion exists for all qualified employees. Civil servants are able to move up 'the promotion ladder' as the merit deserves and the vacancies occur. Right to equality enshrined in the Constitution is to be reserved by preventing reverse discrimination as well. The guarantee of equality requires maintenance of original or panel inter se seniority between the general category candidate and the earlier promoted reserved category candidate under the reservation policy, for promotion to the higher general vacancy. The equality principle requires exclusion of the factor of extra weightage of earlier promotion to a reserved category candidate because of reservation alone, when he competes for further promotion to a general category with a general category candidate, senior to him in the panel. Any other view would amount to reverse discrimination and violative of the guarantee of equality in Articles 14 to 16. 34. Again, in case titled Ajit Singh (II) v. State of Punjab, (1999) 7 SCC 209 , a Constitution Bench of five Hon’ble Judges of the Hon’ble Apex Court held that roster point promotees (reserved category) cannot count their seniority in the promoted category from the date of their continuous officiation in the promoted post vis- a-vis the general candidates, who were senior to them in the lower category and who were later promoted. To the contrary, the senior general candidate at the lower level, if reaches the promotional level later but before the further promotion of the reserved candidate he will have to be treated as senior at the promotional level to the reserved candidate even if the reserved candidate was earlier promoted to that level. Relevant paras of the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under: “Prospectivity of Sabharwal: (i) What Sabbarwal (1995) 2 SCC 745 , 1995 SCC (L&S) 548, (1995) 29 ATC 481 ) said in regard to "prospectivity": 87. Before Sabharwal was decided on 10.2.1995, it appears that, in several services, the roster was initially put in operation and promotions at all the roster points were filled up. But the roster was once again operated on future vacancies, even though all the required reserved candidates were in position at the promotional level. Before Sabharwal was decided on 10.2.1995, it appears that, in several services, the roster was initially put in operation and promotions at all the roster points were filled up. But the roster was once again operated on future vacancies, even though all the required reserved candidates were in position at the promotional level. It was not realised that once the roster points were all filled, the roster had served its purpose and fresh members of the reserved classes could claim promotional posts only if any promotional posts already filled by the reserved candidates fell vacant. This misapplication of the roster came to be removed for the first time on 10.2.95 when Sabharwal was decided. Obviously, by that time several reserved candidates had got promotion in excess of their quota because of the wrong "re- operation" of the roster points. If the law declared in Sabbarwal were to be treated as retroactive as is the normal position whenever the law is declared by this Court, it would have resulted in reversions of several officers of the reserved classes as their promotions before 10.2.95 by the fresh operation of the roster as aforesaid was wholly unjustified. This Court in Sabbarwal therefore tried to prevent such reversions and declared ( P. 753 of SCC, Para 11) as follows at the end of the judgment: "We, however, direct that the interpretation given by us to the working of the roster and our findings on this point shall be operative prospectively". (ii) The rival contentions: 88. To the extent of saving the reversions of those from reserved classes promoted before 10.2.95 though such promotions were made contrary to what was decided in Sabharwal, there is no serious dispute from the side of the general candidates, but a contention is raised by the reserved candidates who got such promotions in excess of the reservation quota that they should in addition get the benefit of the seniority in the promotional post even if such promotion made before 10.2.95 was wrong in view of what was decided in Sabharwal . This plea is strongly opposed by the general candidates. (iii) Our conclusion: 89. It is axiomatic in service jurisprudence that any promotions made wrongly in excess of any quota are to be treated as ad hoc. This applies to reservation quota as much as it applies to direct recruits and promotee cases. This plea is strongly opposed by the general candidates. (iii) Our conclusion: 89. It is axiomatic in service jurisprudence that any promotions made wrongly in excess of any quota are to be treated as ad hoc. This applies to reservation quota as much as it applies to direct recruits and promotee cases. If a Court decides that in order only to remove hardship such roster point promotees are not to face reversions, - then it would, in our opinion be, necessary to hold - consistent with our interpretation of Articles 14 and 16(1) - that such promotees cannot plead for grant of any additional benefit of seniority flowing from a wrong application of the roster. In our view, while Courts can relieve immediate hardship arising out of a past illegality, Courts cannot grant additional benefits like seniority which have no element of immediate hardship. Thus, while promotions in excess of roster made before 10.2.95 are protected, such promotees cannot claim seniority. Seniority in the promotional cadre of such excess roster point promotees shall have to be reviewed after 10.2.95 and will count only from the date on which they would have otherwise got normal promotion in any future vacancy arising in a post previously occupied by a reserved candidate. That disposes of the 'prospectivity'' point in relation to Sabharwal. Prospectivity of Ajit Singh: 90. Coming to the 'prospectivity' of Ajit Singh, decided on 1.3.96 the question is in regard to the seniority of the reserved candidates at the promotional level where such promotions have taken place before 1.3.96. 91. We have accepted, while dealing with Points 1 and 2 that the reserved candidates who get promoted at two levels by roster points ( say) from Level 1 to Level 2 and level 2 to level 3 cannot count their seniority at Level 3 as against senior general candidates who reached Level 3 before the reserved candidates moved upto Level 4. The general candidate has to be treated as senior at Level 3. 92. The general candidate has to be treated as senior at Level 3. 92. Where, before 1.3.96,i.e. the date of Ajit Singh's judgment , at the level 3, there were reserved candidates who reached there earlier and also senior general candidates who reached there later, (but before the reserved candidate was promoted to level 4) and when in spite of the fact that the senior general candidate had to be treated as senior at level 3 (in view of Ajit Singh), the reserved candidate is further promoted to level 4 - without considering the fact that the senior general candidate was also available at level 3 - then, after 1.3.96, it becomes necessary to review the promotion of the reserved candidate to level 4 and reconsider the same (without causing reversion to the reserved candidate who reached level 4 before 1.3.96). As and when the senior reserved candidate is later promoted to level 4, the seniority at level 4 has also to be refixed on the basis of when the reserved candidate at level 3 would have got his normal promotion, treating him as junior to the senior general candidate at level 3. Chander Paul Vs. State of Haryana ( 1997(10) SCC 474 ) has to be understood in the manner stated above.” 35. There is yet another aspect of the matter, it is not in dispute that share of the Traffic Managers against 24 posts was only 11 out of which only 1 post could be given to SC category. In the cadre consisting of posts upto 13, 13 point roster is applicable. Therefore, petitioner cannot claim that 3rd vacancy of Traffic Managers given to Sh. Chaman Lal (SC) an accelerated promotee, be treated as having been consumed by a general category candidate and the fifth vacancy, which was treated as unreserved by giving 3rd vacancy to Sh. Chaman Lal, be treated available for SC candidate. By accepting aforesaid submission of the petitioner, out of 11 posts available for Traffic Managers, 2 posts would go to SC category, which is otherwise not permissible on account of 15% cap of reservation. Chaman Lal, be treated available for SC candidate. By accepting aforesaid submission of the petitioner, out of 11 posts available for Traffic Managers, 2 posts would go to SC category, which is otherwise not permissible on account of 15% cap of reservation. Otherwise also, aforesaid plea raised on behalf of the petitioner is against the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab AIR 1995 SC 1371 , wherein it has been categorically held that the percentage of reservation has to be worked out in relation to the number of posts which form the cadrestrength. The concept of vacancy has no relevance in operating the percentage of reservation. No doubt, in the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it has been held that the prescribed percentage cannot be varied or changed simply because some of the members of the backward class have already been appointed/promoted against the general seats and roster point which is reserved for a backward class has to be filled by way of appointment/promotion of the member of the said class, but Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment has observed that the fact that considerable number of members of a backward class have been promoted against general seats in the State Services may be a relevant factor for the State Government to review the question of continuing reservation for the said class, but so long as the instructions/ Rules providing certain percentage of reservations for the backward classes are operative, the same have to be followed. Otherwise also, very crux of the aforesaid judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the R.K. Sabharwal’s case (supra) is that prescribed percentage for promotion against the post in question cannot be varied/changed. 36. In the case at hand, admittedly, 11 posts came to be available for promotion against the post of Regional Manager amongst the category of Traffic Managers. By applying reservation roster, share of Scheduled Caste category against 11 posts would be 11x1.5 =1.65, meaning thereby, not more than one post could have been offered to Scheduled Caste category. Since in the instant case, Chaman Lal, who was an accelerated promotee, in the cadre of AM/TM on his promotion against 3rd vacancy, came to be promoted against the post of Regional Manager, there was no fault in treating 5th vacancy as de-reserved. Since in the instant case, Chaman Lal, who was an accelerated promotee, in the cadre of AM/TM on his promotion against 3rd vacancy, came to be promoted against the post of Regional Manager, there was no fault in treating 5th vacancy as de-reserved. Law relating to 13 point roster has been very ably explained by the Division Bench of this court in its judgment dated 5.11.2018 passed in CWP No. 550 of 2003 titled Dharampal v. State of HP, wherein it has been explained that judgment in RK Sabharwal’s case dealt with cadre strength upto 100 posts and with a view to obviate reservation in excess of prescribed percentage, 13 point model roster has been prescribed by the State Government. It would be apt to take note of paras 8 to 10 of the aforesaid judgment:- 8. In R.K. Sabharwal's case (supra), Hon’ble Constitution Bench was dealing with a case where the cadre strength was more than 100. It was held that when appointments to all the posts, in a cadre, are made by giving due representation to all the categories, as per roster points, the purpose of the roster is achieved and, therefore, it becomes inoperative and future vacancies are required to be filled by following replacement theory, that is to say by appointing the persons of the categories who have vacated the posts. As already noticed, the cadre, in which the aforesaid judgment was given, consisted of more than 100 posts. 9. In the case of Union of India and others versus Virpal Singh Chauhan and others (supra), placing reliance on R.K. Sabharwal's case (supra), it was held that once the number of posts reserved for being filled by reserved category candidates in a cadre, category or grade are filled by the operation of roster, the object of rule of reservation should be deemed to have been achieved and thereafter the roster cannot be followed. 10. In Prabhash Chand Jain’s case (supra), R.K. Sabharwal's case (supra) was referred to in a different context. That was a case where the cadre consisted of only two posts. There was a circular dated 9th February, 1979, which provided for reservation to persons of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes, to the extent of 20 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, and for giving representation to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes, 100- Point roster was prescribed. There was a circular dated 9th February, 1979, which provided for reservation to persons of Scheduled Castes and Backward Classes, to the extent of 20 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively, and for giving representation to persons belonging to Scheduled Castes or Backward Classes, 100- Point roster was prescribed. Lateron instructions were issued by the Chief Secretary and Finance Commissioner, saying that reservation was not to be given in a cadre consisting of two posts. Instructions of the Chief Secretary and Finance Commissioner were held to be not in consonance with the instructions, dated 9th February, 1979, issued by the Government and reservation, in terms of the aforesaid circular of 9th February, 1979, which prescribed 100-Point roster, was upheld. The judgment instead of supporting the writ petitioner supports the respondents’ plea that where a cadre consists of 13 or less number posts, roster is required to be rotated to give due representation to all the categories.” 37. Sh. Sanjeev Bhushan, learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner submitted that catch-up principle was interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajeet Singh’s case supra, which came in existence in only 1999 and as such, this judgment cannot be applied in the facts and circumstances of the cases. He further submitted that in all seniority lists Mr. Chaman Lal figures over and above, the other persons and since he was officiating on account of his own seniority much ahead of others, his promotion against 3rd vacancy against roster point No. 20 cannot be said to be against the reserved post rather against the General Category on his own merits. However, this Court is unable to accept the aforesaid contention of learned Senior Counsel representing the petitioner in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajit Singh-(II)’s case (supra), wherein it has been held in para-77 that roster point promotees cannot count their seniority in the promoted category from their date of continuous officiation in the promoted post vis-à-vis the general candidates, who were senior to them in the lower category and who were later promoted. In view of the aforesaid exposition of law laid down by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme court, there appears to be no merit in the claim of the petitioner that when he was recommended for regular promotion by the Departmental Promotion Committee held on 28.2.1996, he should have been recommended for promotion against 5th vacancy available w.e.f. 2.3.1991, which was admittedly treated as unreserved on account of the fact that instead of 5th vacancy reserved for Scheduled Caste category, Sh. Chaman Lal i.e. candidate belonging to SC Category, was granted regular promotion against 3rd vacancy meant for General Category. Otherwise also, if the plea of the petitioner is accepted, same would be against the verdict of Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in R.K. Sabharwal’s and Ajit Singh (II) cases supra. Had the petitioner been granted promotion in Departmental Promotion Committee held on 28.2.1996 in violation of the exposition of law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, he could not have been reverted from the said post in terms of Ajit Singh (ii)’s case supra, but definitely he cannot claim any benefit by filing the petition in 1998. 38. Though in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this court sees no merit in the claim of the petitioner, but even otherwise, acceptance of the claim of the petitioner at this belated stage would amount to unsettling the seniority, which stood settled way back in 1996. In the case at hand, petitioner has approached the court after an inordinate delay as has been taken note in the earlier part of the judgment and hence, acceptance of the claim of the petitioner, which has otherwise no merit at this stage, would result into multiplicity of litigation. In the regard, reliance is placed upon judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case titled H.S. Vankani and Ors. V. State of Gujarat and Ors, (2010) 4 SCC 301 , relevant para whereof reads as under: “38. Seniority is a civil right which has an important and vital role to play in one's service career. Future promotion of a Government servant depends either on strict seniority or on the basis of senioritycum- merit or merit-cum-seniority etc. V. State of Gujarat and Ors, (2010) 4 SCC 301 , relevant para whereof reads as under: “38. Seniority is a civil right which has an important and vital role to play in one's service career. Future promotion of a Government servant depends either on strict seniority or on the basis of senioritycum- merit or merit-cum-seniority etc. Seniority once settled is decisive in the upward march in one's chosen work or calling and gives certainty and assurance and boosts the morale to do quality work. It instills confidence, spreads harmony and commands respect among colleagues which is a paramount factor for good and sound administration. If the settled seniority at the instance of one's junior in service is unsettled, it may generate bitterness, resentment, hostility among the Government servants and the enthusiasm to do quality work might be lost. Such a situation may drive the parties to approach the administration for resolution of that acrimonious and poignant situation, which may consume lot of time and energy. The decision either way may drive the parties to litigative wilderness to the advantage of legal professionals both private and Government, driving the parties to acute penury. It is well known that salary they earn, may not match the litigation expenses and professional fees and may at times drive the parties to other sources of money making, including corruption. Public money is also being spent by the Government to defend their otherwise untenable stand. Further it also consumes lot of judicial time from the lowest court to the highest resulting in constant bitterness among parties at the cost of sound administration affecting public interest. 39. Courts are repeating the ratio that the seniority once settled, shall not be unsettled but the men in power often violate that ratio for extraneous reasons, which, at times calls for departmental action. Legal principles have been reiterated by this Court in Union of India and Another v. S.K. Goel and Others (2007) 14 SCC 641 , T.R. Kapoor v. State of Haryana (1989) 4 SCC 71 , Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana, (2003) 5 SCC 604 . In view of the settled law the decisions cited by the appellants in G.P. Doval's case (supra), Prabhakar and Others case, G. Deendayalan, R.S. Ajara are not applicable to the facts of the case.” 39. In view of the settled law the decisions cited by the appellants in G.P. Doval's case (supra), Prabhakar and Others case, G. Deendayalan, R.S. Ajara are not applicable to the facts of the case.” 39. Another submission made on behalf of the petitioner that since vacancy against which, he has been promoted w.e.f. 1996 had fallen vacant w.e.f. 26.12.1994, DPC ought to have promoted him w.e.f. 26.12.1994, has no merit because minutes of DPC proceedings held on 28.2.1996, clearly reveal that all the vacancies starting from 1990 came to be filled up on regular basis and all the eligible candidates were given promotion on regular basis from the date of their ad-hoc promotion to the post in question. Since in the case at hand, petitioner was given ad-hoc promotion on 6.10.1995 and he joined against the aforesaid post on 21.10.1995, he has been rightly given promotion on regular basis against the post of Regional Manager from the aforesaid date. 40. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this court finds no merit in the claim of the petitioner and accordingly, present petition is dismissed being devoid of any merits and hopelessly time barred. Interim order, if any, vacated. Records be sent back forthwith. Pending application(s), if any, also stand(s), disposed of accordingly.