ORDER : 1. In this Writ Petition the petitioner seeks a direction to declare the action of the second respondent in issuing the proceedings No.72/A2/2015, dated 18.3.2021, which are impugned herein, terminating the services of the petitioner from the post of Additional Public Prosecutor in the Court of the VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Mahabubabad, with effect from 19.3.2021 as illegal and arbitrary. 2. The case of the petitioner, in brief, is that in pursuance of the guidelines laid down in G.O.Ms.No.187, dated 06.12.2000, the petitioner was appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor in the Court of the VI Additional District & Sessions Judge, Mahabubabad, on 18.3.2015, vide G.O.Rt.No.206 dated 18.3.2015 and upon expiry of the period of three years on 18.3.2018, the third respondent herein, by virtue of his powers conferred under Instruction 11 of the G.O.No.187, continued the petitioner for a period of three months beyond his tenure from 19.3.2018 to 18.6.2018 and subsequently from 19.6.2018 till regular appointment of Additional Public Prosecutor to the said Court is made. The said action of the third respondent herein was ratified by the Government vide G.O.Rt.No.1053 dated 19.7.2018. The petitioner is continuing in the said post as such without any allegation of any kind at any point of time. While so, the services of the petitioner came to an end by 18.3.2021. As such the second respondent issued the impugned proceedings which were served on the petitioner through email. The grievance of the petitioner is that as on date the appointment of regular Additional Public Prosecutor to the said Court has not been made and hence the impugned proceedings are without jurisdiction. 3. As such the second respondent issued the impugned proceedings which were served on the petitioner through email. The grievance of the petitioner is that as on date the appointment of regular Additional Public Prosecutor to the said Court has not been made and hence the impugned proceedings are without jurisdiction. 3. The respondents filed counter contending inter-alia that the Government issued orders of amendment to Instruction No.11 of the G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 06.12.2000, vide G.O.Rt.No.591 Law (L2) Department dated 06.4.2010, by virtue of which the second respondent herein may take interim arrangements in case of death, resignation, absence, expiry of term of the Public Prosecutors where there is necessity and urgency and obtain ratification from the Government and in pursuance of which the second respondent issued the impugned proceedings terminating the services of the petitioner with effect from 19.3.2021 in consonance with the standing instructions of the Government issued through Memo No.915/LSP/RL/L1/02, dated 01.7.2002 wherein it has been directed to terminate the engagement of a Law Officer appointed in a subordinate court after expiry of period of six years in office at a stretch either by way of appointment in successive terms or where a Law Officer is initially appointed for a period of three years and thereafter he is continued on in charge basis for a further period of three years and that in such cases other nearby Law Officer or an eligible advocate may be placed in charge of the post. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that there is no provision of appointing in-charge for the post of Additional Public Prosecutor while the duly appointed person is rendering his services in accordance with G.O.Rt.No.1053 dated 19.7.2018. He further submits that no notice is served on the petitioner well in advance as per instruction No.9 of G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 16.12.2000. It is his final submission that the termination of the services of the petitioner on the ground of completion of six years term is arbitrary as the list of names of second panel of advocates is still pending before the Government. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held between Pathuri Venkateswarlu V. Government of A.P., (2005) 1 ALD (Cri) 658. 5. Heard the learned Government Pleader for Home and perused the record. 6. The learned counsel relied on the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh held between Pathuri Venkateswarlu V. Government of A.P., (2005) 1 ALD (Cri) 658. 5. Heard the learned Government Pleader for Home and perused the record. 6. The very grievance of the petitioner is that there is no provision of appointing in-charge for the post of Additional Public Prosecutor while the duly appointed person is rendering his services in accordance with G.O.Rt.No.1053 dated 19.7.2018 and hence the impugned orders are arbitrary. As far as this contention is concerned, initially through G.O.Rt.No.206 dated 18.3.2015 the petitioner was appointed as Additional Public Prosecutor in the Court of the Additional Public Prosecutor, Mahabubabad. Subsequently through G.O.Rt.No.1053 dated 19.7.2018 he was placed in charge of the said post. However, the petitioner successfully completed six years of his employment as Additional Public Prosecutor at a stretch. But the petitioner has lost sight of the subsequent standing instructions of the Government issued through Memo No.915/LSP/RL/L1/02, dated 01.7.2002 wherein it has been directed to terminate the engagement of a Law Officer appointed in a subordinate court after expiry of period of six years in office at a stretch either by way of appointment in successive terms or where a Law Officer is initially appointed for a period of three years and thereafter he is continued in charge basis for a further period of three years and that in such cases other nearby Law Officer or an eligible advocate may be placed in charge of the post. The said Memo No.915/LSP/RL/L1/02 dated 01.7.2002 issued by the Government reads as under: “……that under the provisions to Instruction No.8 of the Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions 2000, the Government Pleaders and Assistant Government Pleaders in the Subordinate Courts may be appointed for a maximum two terms of 6 years i.e. three years each term if their performance is very good. Instructions were issued in the reference 2nd cited (Memo No.37019/L1/2002, Law, dated 23.5.2002) directing the District Collectors not to continue any Law Officer who has hold office for two terms and on expiry of second term, a near by Law Officer may be placed in full additional charge of the post. Instructions were issued in the reference 2nd cited (Memo No.37019/L1/2002, Law, dated 23.5.2002) directing the District Collectors not to continue any Law Officer who has hold office for two terms and on expiry of second term, a near by Law Officer may be placed in full additional charge of the post. The above instructions will not cover a case where a Law Officer is appointed for a period of 3 years and after expiry of first term he is continued for a further period of three years on in charge basis. All the District Collectors are hereby requested to terminate the engagement of a Law Officer appointed in Subordinate Courts after expiry of period of 6 years at a stretch either by way of appointment in successive terms or where a Law Officer is initially appointed for a period of 3 years and thereafter he is continued on in charge basis for a further period of 3 years. In such cases, any other nearby Law Officer or an eligible Advocate may be placed in charge of the post.” 7. So, from a bare reading of the above Memo clearly demonstrates that the services of the petitioner were terminated since he worked in the said post for a period of six years at a stretch i.e. initially for a period of three years on appointment and subsequently on in charge basis. Therefore, by virtue of the above Memo, the second respondent is justified in terminating the services of the petitioner and also in making alternative arrangements. 8. The second respondent has issued the impugned Proceedings No.72/A2/2015 dated 18.3.2001 under which the petitioner was terminated from the said post and one Mr. Mallaiah @ Mahender, Additional Public Prosecutor, Assistant Sessions Court, Narsampet was placed in charge of the post of the Additional Public Prosecutor, VI Additional Sessions (FT) Court, Mahabubabad until further orders. The learned Government Pleader submits that the said Mr.Mallaiah has already taken charge of the present post and is rendering services as such. The contention of the petitioner is that the said Mr.Mallaiah has to travel almost 100 K.M every day to attend the Court at Mahabubabad, that too, this is an additional charge for him without any honorarium and hence much prejudice will be caused to the said Mr.Mallaiah. The contention of the petitioner is that the said Mr.Mallaiah has to travel almost 100 K.M every day to attend the Court at Mahabubabad, that too, this is an additional charge for him without any honorarium and hence much prejudice will be caused to the said Mr.Mallaiah. As far as this contention is concerned, it is not for this Court nor for the petitioner to show concern about the physical strain which Mr.Mallaiah would face in travelling 100 K.Ms. It is for Mr.Mallaiah to consider the strain. Therefore, the argument of the petitioner leaves no water for consideration on this aspect. 9. The further contention of the petitioner that no notice was served on him well in advance as mandated under Instruction No.9 of G.O.Ms.No.187 dated 16.12.2000. The second respondent in their counter affidavit clearly stated that Instruction No.9 contemplates to issue notice to a Prosecutor under contract and not to a Prosecutor who is continuing on in charge basis which is not under subsisting contract. Since, as per the G.O.Rt.No.1053, the petitioner was continued in the said post on in charge basis but he was not reappointed nor there was any contract between him and the Government, he is not entitled to such relief. Moreover, the petitioner was not terminated from the said post during the currency of the tenure. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner is misconceived and question of issuing any notice before termination or payment of one month salary does not arise. 10. The ratio laid down in Pathuri Venkateswarlu case relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand. In the said case, the petitioner therein was appointed for another term of three years after completion on initial period of three years. In the present case, the petitioner was placed in charge of the post. Moreover, standing instructions of the Government issued through Memo No.915/LSP/RL/L1/02, dated 01.7.2002 might not have been brought to the Court while rendering the orders. In the said case, the petitioner therein was appointed for another term of three years after completion on initial period of three years. In the present case, the petitioner was placed in charge of the post. Moreover, standing instructions of the Government issued through Memo No.915/LSP/RL/L1/02, dated 01.7.2002 might not have been brought to the Court while rendering the orders. In the said Memo it has been directed to terminate the engagement of a Law Officer appointed in a subordinate court after expiry of period of six years in office at a stretch either by way of appointment in successive terms or where a Law Officer is initially appointed for a period of three years and thereafter he is continued in charge basis for a further period of three years. 11. In an identical situation, the erstwhile High Court of Andhra Pradesh in G. Raja Ram V. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2004 (4) ALT 472 held as under: “The next question is whether the District Collector has power to pass the impugned order. As noticed hereinabove, as and when a regularly appointed Public Prosecutor/ Additional Public Prosecutor comes to end, it is the Collector who make temporary arrangements by asking Additional Public Prosecutor to continue till a successor is appointed. However, this could not be done in view of the policy of the Government as adumbrated in the Government memo dated 23-5-2002 not to continue Public Prosecutors/ Additional Public Prosecutors who completed two terms, District Collector issued the impugned order. There is no infirmity in the same nor should it fall on the ground of Collector's incompetency. In O. Abbai Reddy v. Government of A.P. (supra) upholding the Government memo dated 23-5-2002, the Division Bench of this Court as under: The respondent clarified the position in the instructions wherein there is a categorical stand that after appointment of Public Prosecutor his term would be for a period of six years (which period includes the second term of three years), and that he will cease to be a Public Prosector upon completion of six years thereby enabling the District Collector to ask the nearby public Prosecutor to take additional charge of the said post till arrangement is made in accordance with law for appointment of a fresh Public Prosecutor. The person who asked to be incharge of the post by the District Collector may also be a Public Prosecutor. The person who asked to be incharge of the post by the District Collector may also be a Public Prosecutor. Therefore, there is no force in the submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that this arrangement is contrary to the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 24 Cr.P.C. Learned counsel, in support of his contention, relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in Rajdeo Sharma (II) v. State of Bihar [(2000) 7 SCC 604] and states that the Supreme Court laid down guidelines that on expiry of the term it will be permissible to continue services of the same Public Prosecutor till a fresh appointment is made. The Supreme Court was dealing with a situation where there was no arrangement like the one which has been envisaged by the two impugned Memos under challenge. Insofar as the State of Andhra Pradesh is concerned, the two memos do take care of any eventuality in the event of the term of Public Prosecutors coming to an end. In other words, on expiry of the term, the Public Prosecutor who is nearby the area is made in-charge of the said post and such an arrangement is not prohibited in law. The mere fact that the District Collectors have been asked to make this arrangement does not amount to divesting them with the power of the State Government since the person who is asked to take additional charge of the post is also a Public Prosecutor. Insofar as the Memo dated 1st July, 2002 is concerned, it also says that an eligible Advocate may also be placed in charge of the post of Law Officer. Such instruction contained in this Memo, of course, apply to the post other than the posts of Public Prosecutors also, since the term "Law Officer" also includes 'Government Pleaders' and 'Assistant Government Pleaders'. Thus, there is nothing wrong in the respondent having issued instructions, which, of course, are meant for a stop gap arrangement.” 12. The relevant instructions stated in Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 are extracted hereunder:- 8. Term of Law Officers:- Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. Thus, there is nothing wrong in the respondent having issued instructions, which, of course, are meant for a stop gap arrangement.” 12. The relevant instructions stated in Andhra Pradesh Law Officers (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Instructions, 2000 are extracted hereunder:- 8. Term of Law Officers:- Law Officers shall ordinarily be appointed for a term of three years. The Law Officers so appointed may be considered for a second term, if the Government are satisfied that he has proven efficiency, high rate of success and good performance and for a third term in exceptional cases. Provided that Government Pleaders, Assistant Government Pleaders, Public Prosecutors and Additional Public Prosecutors in Subordinate Courts may be considered for appointment for a second term if their performance is very good and in the case of persons belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes if their performance is satisfactory. 9. Termination of Service- Notwithstanding anything contained in instruction 8, either the Government of the Law Officer may terminate the engagement with one month’s notice. Provided that the Government may terminate the engagement by paying one month honorarium in lieu of one month’s notice. 13. Though it is termed as termination, if the order is tested in the facts of the case and in the light of instruction 9 “termination of service” and instruction No.8 “period of appointment”, the word termination in the impugned order is not a termination, but it has to be read as completion of the tenure of the petitioner for two terms (3 years + 3 years), the petitioner is not entitled for 3rd term. 14. The petitioner is not entitled for any prior notice of one month or salary under the instructions. The question of violation of principles of natural justice under the present facts of the case do not arise. The first period of appointment of the petitioner is from 19.03.2015 to 18.03.2018 and the second set of period of appointment of the petitioner is from 19.03.2018 to 18.03.2021. It came to an end by afflux of time and after the last date of his service, the petitioner ceases to continue and thus he has no locus standi to question the appointment of Mr.Mallaiah and also cannot challenge his so called termination order. 15. It is the client and Advocate relationship between the petitioner and respondent. It came to an end by afflux of time and after the last date of his service, the petitioner ceases to continue and thus he has no locus standi to question the appointment of Mr.Mallaiah and also cannot challenge his so called termination order. 15. It is the client and Advocate relationship between the petitioner and respondent. The second term which petitioner continued from 19.03.2018 to 18.03.2021 is as an in-charge and it do not confer any legitimate right upon the petitioner to continue for further period. The petitioner cannot force the respondent to permit him to continue as Additional Public Prosecutor. The respondent is free to engage the services of his counsel or terminate the services as per his requirement. An Advocate cannot compel his client to continue his vakalat against the will of the client and as a consequence, he cannot claim as a matter of right to continue his service. 16. The facts of the case on hand are squarely applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case cited supra. Therefore, in the above facts and circumstances and in the light of the principle enunciated in the cases cited supra, this Court is of the firm view that the petitioner has not made out the case either in terms of violation of law or violation of his lawful right and its infringement. Hence the Writ Petition is devoid of any merit and is liable to be dismissed. 17. However, keeping in view the requirement and importance of a Public Prosecutor to assist the Courts, the arrangement of in-charge Public Prosecutor is obviously for a short period, this Court express its concern that an appointment of full time Public Prosecutor be made to the above Court by the respondents at the earliest by following due process of law. 18. In the result, the Writ Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions if any pending in this Writ Petition shall also stand dismissed.