JUDGMENT : ALEXANDER THOMAS, J. Writ Appeal No.2500/2015 arises out of the impugned judgment dated 28.07.2015 in W.P.(C) No.8283/2015 filed by the appellant herein. During the pendency of this appeal, the employer concerned [respondents herein/respondents in the W.P.(C).] had preferred Review Petition, R.P.No.1066/2015 before the learned Single Judge to seek review of the abovesaid judgment in W.P.(C). 8283/2015 to the limited extent it has ordered the employer to consider and pass orders on the representation for disbursal of leave encashment. The learned Single Judge had allowed the said review plea as per the impugned order dated 31.05.2017 in the said R.P. No.1066/2015. Thus the petitioner has challenged both the impugned judgment in W.P.(C) by filing the former Writ Appeal and has also challenged the impugned order in the Review Petition, by filing the latter Writ Appeal. 2. Heard Sri.S.P.Aravindakshan Pillay, learned Advocate instructed by Sri. V.Varghese, learned counsel appearing for the appellant in both these cases/writ petitioner and Sri.M.Gopikrishnan Nambiar, learned standing counsel for FACT Ltd. instructed by Ms.Pooja Menon, learned counsel appearing for the respondents in the W.A./respondents in the W.P.(C). 3. Prior to his retirement, the appellant was holding the post of Senior Regional Manager, Fertilizers and Chemicals Travancore Ltd. (FACT), Coimbatore. Later the competent disciplinary authority had issued Ext.P1 memo of charges dated 25.08.2014 raising certain allegations and proposing to hold major penalty proceedings in terms of Ext.R1(a) Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules (see page 129 of the paper book in W.A.No.2500/2015). According to the respondents, they had actually despatched and forwarded Ext.P1 memo of charges dated 25.08.2014 to the appellant. Further it appears that it is thereafter that the appellant has retired from service on 31.08.2014. 4. The learned Single Judge as per the impugned judgment in the W.P.(C). According to the respondents, they had actually despatched and forwarded Ext.P1 memo of charges dated 25.08.2014 to the appellant. Further it appears that it is thereafter that the appellant has retired from service on 31.08.2014. 4. The learned Single Judge as per the impugned judgment in the W.P.(C). had held that in view of the provisions contained in the abovesaid Employees (Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules [“CDA Rules” for short], more particularly, Rule 32 thereof and in view of the decision rendered by the Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in State Bank of India V. Ram Lal Bhaskar [ (2011) 10 SCC 249 ] and also in view of the order passed by the Apex Court in the case in Rabindranath Choubey V. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. [ (2013) 16 SCC 411 ] referring the matter for the consideration of Three Judge Bench on account of certain divergent views expressed by certain Two Judge Bench rulings of the Apex Court and as the CDA Rules governing this case are almost pari materia to the CDA Rules considered in State Bank of India's case supra [ (2011) 10 SCC 249 ] as well as in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. Case supra [ (2013) 16 SCC 411 ] and as memo of charges for taking major penalty proceedings has already been issued to the appellant even prior to his retirement, the respondents are justified to withhold the gratuity pending finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings as permitted in Section 4(6) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Incidentally there was yet another direction that the competent authority of the respondent FACT should also consider and pass orders on the representation marked as Ext.P6 in the W.P.(C)., filed by the appellant in the matter of disbursal of earned leave surrender benefits, etc. As indicated hereinabove, the respondent FACT had preferred the abovesaid Review Petition to impugn the judgment in the W.P.(C) to the limited extent it has granted the said direction and the learned Single Judge has set aside the said order in the matter of consideration of the representation (marked as Ext.P3 and P4) for disbursal of earned leave surrender benefits in view of the pending proceedings under Rule 32 of the CDA Rules. It is the abovesaid judgment in the W.P.(C) as well as the order in the R.P., that is under challenge in these Writ Appeals. 5. It is the abovesaid judgment in the W.P.(C) as well as the order in the R.P., that is under challenge in these Writ Appeals. 5. It is common ground that the Apex Court has finally disposed the case in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s Case [ (2013) 16 SCC 411 ] by pronouncing the judgment in the case in Chairman-cum-M.D., Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. v. Rabindranath Choubey [AIR 2020 SC 2978 = AIR online 2020 SC 565]. The CDA Rules concerned in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra as well as the provisions in Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act have been extracted in para.6 of the Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. [hereinafter referred to for convenience as Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'case supra (AIR 2020 SC 2978)] and it would be profitable to extract para No.6 of the said decision of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. supra; “6. While considering the issues involved in the present appeal, the relevant provisions of the CDA Rules and Section 4 of the Payment of Gratuity Act are required to be referred to and considered, which are as under: “34.2 Disciplinary proceeding, if instituted while the employee was in service whether before his retirement or during his reemployment shall, after the final retirement of the employee, be deemed to be proceeding and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service. 34.3 During the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority may withhold payment of gratuity, for ordering the recovering from gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the company if have been guilty of offences/ misconduct as mentioned in Subsection (6) of Section 4 of the payment of gratuity act, 1972 or to have caused pecuniary loss to the company by misconduct or negligence, during his service including service rendered on deputation or on reemployment after retirement. However, the provisions of Section 7(3) and 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act 1972 should be kept in view in the event of delayed payment in the case the employee is fully exonerated.” Section 4 Payment of gratuity (1) Gratuity shall be payable to an employee on the termination of his employment after he has rendered continuous service for not less than five years, (a) on his superannuation, or (b) on his retirement or resignation, or (c) on his death or disablement due to accident or disease: Provided that the completion of continuous service of five years shall not be necessary where the termination of the employment of any employee is due to death or disablement: Provided further that in the case of death of the employee, gratuity payable to hi m shall be paid to his nominee or, if no nomination has been made, to his heirs, and where any such nominees or heirs is a minor, the share of such minor, shall be deposited with the controlling authority who shall invest the same for the benefit of such minor in such bank or other financial institution, as may be prescribed, until such minor attains majority. Explanation. For the purposes of this section, disablement means such disablement as incapacitates an employee for the work which he was capable of performing before the accident or disease resulting in such disablement. Xxx xxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (1), (a) the gratuity of an employee, whose services have been terminated for any act, wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss to, or destruction of, property belonging to the employer' shall be forfeited to the extent of the damage or loss so caused; (b) the gratuity payable to an employee may be wholly or partially forfeited]— (i) if the services of such employee have been terminated for his riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence on his part, or (ii) if the services of such employee have been terminated for any act which constitutes an offence involving moral turpitude, provided that such offence is committed by him in the course of his employment.” 6. After exhaustively considering a series of Rulings rendered by the Apex Court in various related Rules dealing with disciplinary action before and after retirement in various statutory and other employer organizations, the Apex Court has held that in view of the non obstante clause in Section 4(6), the same would also affect the claims for forthwith payment of the gratuity in terms of Section 4(1) thereof and that the Parliament by engrafting the provisions contained in Clauses A & B of subsection (6) of Section 4, has left the field of disciplinary action at the pre-retirement and post-retirement stages to the discretion of the employer organization concerned and they could regulate the field either by way of Statutory Rules or Non-statutory Rules, as the case may be. Further that, Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra [see page 6 of AIR (2020) SC 2978] would permit the employer to continue the disciplinary action, which has been taken by the issuance of memo of charges prior to the retirement and the same could be continued even after retirement and concluded by the authority concerned by which it was commenced in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service. The Rules so provide that subject to strict compliance of the procedure and Rules of the employer organisation concerned, the disciplinary action could also be finalised and if the ultimate result of the major penalty proceedings taken by the employer organization results in penalty of termination of service on account of the matters envisaged in Clause A or Sub Clause (i) or Sub Clause (ii) or Clause B of Sub Section 6 of Section 4, in the matter of wilful omission or negligence causing any damage or loss or destruction of property, etc., riotous or disorderly conduct or any other act of violence, etc. as envisaged in the Sub Clauses in Section 4(6), then depending upon the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings, the employer concerned will have the liberty to take a decision whether to forfeit the gratuity and if so to what extent it can be forfeited from the gratuity amount otherwise payable to the employee in terms of Section 4(1) of the Act. 7. 7. The abovesaid views have been rendered by the majority view of the Three Judge Bench (2:1) and it may be pertinent to extract paragraph 10.30, 10.31, 10.32 and 11 of the majority judgment of the three Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra [AIR (2020) SC 2978] which read as follows: “10.30 In view of the various decisions, it is apparent that under Rule 34.2 of the CDA Rules inquiry can be held in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and the appropriate major and minor punishment commensurate to guilt can be imposed including dismissal as provided in Rule 27 of the CDA Rules and apart from that in case pecuniary loss had been caused that can be recovered. Gratuity can be forfeited wholly or partially. 10.31 Several service benefits would depend upon the outcome of the inquiry, such as concerning the period during which inquiry remained pending. It would be against the public policy to permit an employee to go scotfree after collecting various service benefits to which he would not be entitled, and the event of superannuation cannot come to his rescue and would amount to condonation of guilt. Because of the legal fiction provided under the rules, it can be completed in the same manner as if the employee had remained in service after superannuation, and appropriate punishment can be imposed. Various provisions of the Gratuity Act discussed above do not come in the way of departmental inquiry and as provided in Section 4(6) and Rule 34.3 in case of dismissal gratuity can be forfeited wholly or partially, and the loss can also be recovered. An inquiry can be continued as provided under the relevant service rules as it is not provided in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 that inquiry shall come to an end as soon as the employee attains the age of superannuation. We reiterate that the Act does not deal with the matter of disciplinary inquiry, it contemplates recovery from or forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially as per misconduct committed and does not deal with punishments to be imposed and does not supersede the Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules. We reiterate that the Act does not deal with the matter of disciplinary inquiry, it contemplates recovery from or forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially as per misconduct committed and does not deal with punishments to be imposed and does not supersede the Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules. The mandate of Section 4(6) of recovery of loss provided under Section 4(6)(a) and forfeiture of gratuity wholly or partially under Section 4(6)(b) is furthered by the Rules 34.2 and 34.3. If there cannot be any dismissal after superannuation, intendment of the provisions of Section 4(6) would be defeated. The provisions of section 4(1) and 4(6) of Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 have to be given purposive interpretation, and no way interdict holding of the departmental inquiry and punishment to be imposed is not the subject matter dealt with under the Act. 10.32 Thus considering the provisions of Rules 34.2 and 34.3 of the CDA Rules, the inquiry can be continued given the deeming fiction in the same manner as if the employee had continued in service and appropriate punishment, including that of dismissal can be imposed apart from the forfeiture of the gratuity wholly or partially including the recovery of the pecuniary loss as the case may be. 11. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above and in view of the decision of three Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Lal Bhaskar (supra) and our conclusions as above, it is observed and held that (1) the appellant – employer has a right to withhold the gratuity during the pendency of the disciplinary proceedings, and (2) the disciplinary authority has powers to impose the penalty of dismissal/major penalty upon the respondent even after his attaining the age of superannuation, as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated while the employee was in service.” 8. The Rules in this case given as per Ext.R2(a) produced at page No.129 of the paper book of W.A.No.2500/2015 read as follows: “Rule 32 (i) Disciplinary proceedings, if instituted while the employee was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall after the final retirement of the employee, be deemed to be proceeding and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which it was commenced in the same manner as the employee had continued in service. (ii) During the pendency of the disciplinary proceeding, the disciplinary authority may withhold payment of gratuity in accordance with sub-section (6) of Section (4) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972.” 9. A reading of the respondent FACT CDA Rules, as per Rule 32 thereof given on Ext.R1(a) would indicate that it is broadly pari materia with the Rules with respect to the employer concerned in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra, which is dealt with in para.6 of [AIR (2020) SC 2978]. Therefore the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge that the employer is at liberty to proceed further with the disciplinary action on the basis of the aforesaid Rules even after retirement so as to finalise the same and then to take a decision in the matter as to whether the conditions in Section 4(6) have satisfied, etc. appears to be correct and may not require any interdiction at the hands of this Court, more so particularly, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Three Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra [AIR (2020) SC 2978]. 10. Now we are apprised that during the pendency of these appeals, the competent disciplinary authority concerned (Chief General Manager) of the respondent FACT has finalised the disciplinary proceedings taken in pursuance of the abovesaid impugned Ext.P1 memo of charges dated 25.08.2014 by issuing final order dated 08.02.2019 exonerating the appellant from all the allegations raised in the aforesaid memo of charges. A copy of the said final proceedings dated 08.02.2019 issued by the respondent Chief General Manager (competent authority of the respondent FACT) has been produced as Annexure A1 along with I.A.No.1 of 2020 in W.A.No.2500/2015. Thereafter, during the pendency of these appeals, we have issued an interim order on 15.01.2021 in these writ appeals, after hearing both sides, that since the appellant has already been exonerated, the payment of the gratuity cannot be delayed any further and that the full gratuity amount due to the petitioner/appellant should be paid without any further delay. Later, we have also issued yet another interim order dated 29.01.2021 in these appeals directing that the withheld leave encashment benefit amounts should also be disbursed to the writ appellant without any further delay. Later, we have also issued yet another interim order dated 29.01.2021 in these appeals directing that the withheld leave encashment benefit amounts should also be disbursed to the writ appellant without any further delay. Now we are apprised by both sides that later the respondents have disbursed full gratuity amount of Rs.10 lakhs to the appellant on 27.01.2021, and that thereafter the respondents have also disbursed the leave encashment benefits coming to an amount of Rs.8,26,305/-to the appellant on 09.02.2021. Now what remains is only the claim of the appellant for grant of interest on the delayed payment of the terminal amounts. In that regard, it is also relevant to note that the Three Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra [AIR (2020) SC 2978] more particularly para 9.1 thereof has held that if ultimately in a case of this nature, the delinquent employee is exonerated from the charges consequent to finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings after retirement etc. then the retired employee concerned will be legally entitled to get interest as mandated in Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act reads as follows: “(3-A) If the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) is not paid by the employer within the period specified in sub-section (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate, not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long-term deposits, as that Government may, by notification specify: Provided that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground.” 11. It is mandated in sub-section (3-A) of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act that if the amount of gratuity payable under sub-section (3) of Section 7 is not paid by the employer within the period specified in subsection (3), the employer shall pay, from the date on which the gratuity becomes payable to the date on which it is paid, simple interest at such rate not exceeding the rate notified by the Central Government from time to time for repayment of long term deposits, as the Government may, by notification specified. Proviso to sub-section (3-A) says that no such interest shall be payable if the delay in the payment is due to the fault of the employee and the employer has obtained permission in writing from the controlling authority for the delayed payment on this ground. In the instant case, there cannot be any dispute that the proviso to Section 7(3-A) will apply. It has been already held by the Apex Court in the aforecited decision in Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd.'s case supra [AIR (2020) SC 2978] that where ultimately the employee is exonerated consequent to finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement as provided under the Rules, then the employee is entitled for interest in terms of Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. We have requested both sides to ascertain and make available copies of the notification issued by the Union Government under Section 3(A) and Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act in the matter of regulating the interest payable in terms of that provision. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has made available a photocopy of a notification issued by the Union Government on 01.10.1987 and published in Gazette of India extraordinary dated 01.10.1987 and issued as S.O.No.874/E stating that the said notification is issued in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section (3A) of Section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 [Central Act 39 of 1972], that the Central Government specifies ten percent per annum as the rate of simple interest payable for the time being by the employer to his employee in cases where the gratuity is not paid within the specified period, etc. The respondent authorities have not placed reliance on any notification issued, which may have been issued subsequently superseding the said notification either by way of enhancement or reduction of the interest rate. 12. The respondent authorities have not placed reliance on any notification issued, which may have been issued subsequently superseding the said notification either by way of enhancement or reduction of the interest rate. 12. In a recent decision rendered by a Division Bench of this Court, various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court in the matter of award of interest for delayed payment of gratuity in terms of the Payment of Gratuity Act had been considered. The said decisions are State of Kerala & Ors. V. M.Padmanabhan Nair [ (1985) 1 SCC 429 ], wherein 12% interest has been granted, in O.P.Gupta V. Union of India & Ors. [ (1987) 4 SCC 328 ] 12% interest was awarded, in Vijay L Mehrotra V. State of U.P. [ 2000 (2) SLR 686 (SC)], the Apex Court has awarded 18% interest for the delayed payment of gratuity in that case. In Gorakhpur University & Ors. V. Shitla Prasad Nagendra and Ors. [ (2001) 6 SCC 591 ], 18% interest has been awarded, in H.Gangahanume Gowda V. Karnataka Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd. [ 2000 3 SCC 40 ] = [ AIR 2003 SC 1526 ], the Apex Court has awarded 10% interest with a cost of Rs.10,000/-. In the case of Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd. and Anr. & V. N.Asokan [ (2009) 16 SCC 758 ], the Apex Court has held that interest shall be paid in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 7(3-A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. 9% interest has been awarded in D.D.Tewari V. Uttar Hariyana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Ors. [ (2014) 8 SCC 894 ], in State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. V. Dhirendra Pal Singh [ (2017) 1 SCC 49 ], the Apex Court has ordered 8%. A Division Bench of this Court in the case in University of Kerala V. Dr.V.Sobha Sreemangalam [(2020) SCC online Kerala 949 (DB)] has after considering various decisions ordered that 9% interest may be given for the delayed payment of gratuity covered by the provisions contained in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 13. A Division Bench of this Court in the case in University of Kerala V. Dr.V.Sobha Sreemangalam [(2020) SCC online Kerala 949 (DB)] has after considering various decisions ordered that 9% interest may be given for the delayed payment of gratuity covered by the provisions contained in the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. 13. The learned standing counsel appearing for respondents would specifically point out that the respondent company is running at a loss for about the last two decades or so and that this Court may either avoid interest altogether or may award interest only at a very nominal rate in view of the financial difficulties faced by the respondent company. 14. After hearing both sides, we are not in a position to accept the plea of the respondent that interest should be altogether waived. In the instant case there is no dispute that the appellant had retired from service as early as on 30.08.2014. He has faced the perils of the disciplinary proceedings even after his retirement and he has been fully exonerated ultimately after the lapse of 7 long years as per Annexure 1 proceedings issued on 08.02.2019. It is only thereafter that the full DCRG amount of Rs.10 lakhs has been released to him on 27.01.2021. There cannot be any dispute that the said DCRG amount is the precious property right of the appellant who is a retiree. It does not require citation of the judicial authority that though right to property is no longer a fundamental right covered by Part III of the Constitution of India, right to property is a constitutional right in terms of Article 300A of the Constitution of India. Article 300A of the Constitution of India envisages that property right can be deprived only in accordance with the procedure established by law. By now it is well established that such a procedure should not only be a mere procedure established by law, but should also be a procedure established by law, which is just, fair and reasonable. Moreover, the right to livelihood of the appellant in terms of Article 21 of the Constitution of India is also directly affected in the case of this nature. The respondent organization is a public sector corporation which is expected to be a model employer. Therefore the full DCRG amount has been withheld from the appellant only on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. The respondent organization is a public sector corporation which is expected to be a model employer. Therefore the full DCRG amount has been withheld from the appellant only on account of the pending disciplinary proceedings. No satisfactory explanation is given as to why the disciplinary action took about 6½ long years for its finalisation. Taking note of the long delay in finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings even after retirement and also taking note of the mandate made by the Parliament in accordance with Section 7(3A) of the Payment of Gratuity Act as well as taking into consideration the submissions of both the appellant as well as the respondents, we are of the view that ends of justice would be advanced by directing that the said DCRG amount of Rs.10 lakhs will carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from the date of retirement (30.08.2014) up to its disbursal (27.01.2021). Even after the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings on 08.02.2019, we are not made aware as to why the DCRG amount was thereafter not forthwith paid to the appellant. It is only on the basis of interim direction passed by this Court on 15.01.2021 that ultimately the DCRG amount of Rs.10 lakhs was released to the appellant on 27.01.2021. However it is ordered that in case the respondents do not pay the said interest amount at the rate of Rs.8% per annum for the aforesaid period in question within an outer limit of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, then the abovesaid DCRG amount will carry interest at the rate of 9% per annum from the date of retirement (30.08.2014) upto the date on which the gratuity was actually released to the appellant (27.01.2021). 15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant would point out that the appellant is also entitled for interest of the delayed payment of leave encashment benefits which was due to him at least prior to the retirement or immediately thereafter and which has been paid only as late as on 09.02.2021 and that too on account of interim direction passed by this Court on 29.01.2021 and that the said amount is also a proprietary right of the appellant. It can be deprived only in accordance with the procedure which is just fair and reasonable. It can be deprived only in accordance with the procedure which is just fair and reasonable. Further that at best the respondents may be able to contend that Rule 32 of Ext.R1(A) CDA Rules may justify withholding of gratuity till the finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings after the retirement of the employee concerned in such cases, but that there are no Rules to justify withholding of leave surrender benefits/leave encashment benefits to the retired employee and that therefore since the appellant has been fully exonerated, he is also entitled to the interest in that regard. Learned standing counsel for the respondents would plead that taking into account the financial difficulties faced by the respondent company, the said direction may not be given by this Court. The learned standing counsel for the respondents would also point out that in view of certain pay revision orders issued for the respondent company's employees and in view of the financial hardships of the company, orders were later passed freezing leave encashment benefits, about which pleadings have been made by the respondent company in the abovesaid Review Petition R.P.No.1066/2015, etc. However, no justification is pointed out by the respondents as to why they have not released the leave surrender benefits at least after the appellant was fully exonerated on 08.02.2019. Taking note of the submission of both sides, it is ordered that in case the respondents do not pay interest amount on the delayed payment of the DCRG at the rate of 8% within the outer time limit two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the judgment as directed hereinabove, then the abovesaid leave encashment benefits paid to the appellant will also carry interest at the rate of 8% per annum from 08.02.2019 (date of finalisation of the disciplinary proceedings) upto the date of release of the leave encashment benefits (09.02.2021). We are desisting from ordering interest for the entire delayed period only on account of the financial hardships stated to be faced by the respondent company. With these observations and directions, the above Writ Appeals will stand disposed of.