00060152 Shri Manish Yadav @ Munesh Kumar v. Amaresh Debnath
2021-09-21
AKIL KURESHI, S.G.CHATTOPADHYAY
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT Akil Kureshi; CJ.:-- These appeals arise out of the common judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 25.01.2021 passed in WP(C) No. 512 of 2017, WP(C) No. 513 of 2017 & WP(C) No. 514 of 2017. WA No. 189 of 2021, WA No. 191 of 2021 and WA No. 192 of 2021 are filed by the original private respondents. WA No. 246 of 2021, WA No. 247 of 2021 and WA No. 248 of 2021 are filed by the State government. [2] Facts being common, may be recorded from WA No. 189 of 2021. Respondent No. 1 original petitioner was appointed as a Havilder (GD) in Tripura State Rifles on 15.01.2000. The petitioners of other two petitions were appointed to the same post on 21.01.2000 and 22.01.2000 respectively. As against this the appellants, the original private respondents of all three writ petitions were appointed to the same post on 06.06.2000, 05.06.2000, 09.06.2000 and 27.06.2000. According to the petitioners, they were recruited and appointed not only prior to the private respondents but that through a separate recruitment process. According to the petitioners thus they had a claim of seniority over the private respondents in the cadre. It appears that the appellants herein were treated as senior to the petitioners by the department on the ground that upon completion of a mandatory training for confirmation in the service, they had fared better than the petitioners. According to the department, this seniority position was reflected in series of seniority lists published from time to time. The private respondents were promoted to the next higher post of Naib Subedar (GD) in the years 2010 and 2011 when the petitioners were not granted such promotion. [3] In the year 2017, the petitioners filed these three petitions in which initially they had challenged the seniority list of Havilder (GD) dated 17.01.2009 and challenged promotion orders dated 20.09.2010, 01.10.2010 and 07.07.2011 under which the private respondents were promoted to the post of Naib Subedar (GD). The State government appeared and filed reply and pointed out that the final seniority lists for the post Havilder (GD) were published and circulated in the year 2003, 2005 and 2007. The therefore petitioners amended the petitions and included a challenge to these seniority lists also.
The State government appeared and filed reply and pointed out that the final seniority lists for the post Havilder (GD) were published and circulated in the year 2003, 2005 and 2007. The therefore petitioners amended the petitions and included a challenge to these seniority lists also. In the amended petition they took the stand that these seniority lists were not to their knowledge and were finalized without publication of tentative seniority lists and therefore invalid. [4] The official respondents had appeared and filed replies in which the stand taken was that the seniority lists were circulated from time to time. The private respondents had completed their training so also the petitioners. The private respondents had scored higher aggregate marks in the test conducted at the completion of the training than the petitioners and therefore their seniority was fixed ahead of the petitioners in terms of Rule 9 of the Tripura State Rifles (Discipline, Control, Service Conditions etc.), Rules, 1986 (hereinafter to be referred to as the said rules). [5] The private respondents had also appeared and resisted the petitions raising the grounds of delay, laches and acquiescence. [6] The learned Single Judge proceeded to accept the stand of the petitioners that seniority lists of 2003, 2005 and 2007 were not circulated. This was in view of inability of the department to produce evidence of the circulation thereof. The learned Single Judge also believed that the petitioners and the private respondents were recruited through two separate recruitment processes. With respect to delay and laches, on the ground that the earlier seniority lists were not brought to the notice of the petitioners the objection was turned down. However with respect to the promotions of the private respondents the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the same was in public domain and the petitioners would be aware about such promotions and therefore on account of delay in challenging the promotions the learned Single Judge refused to set aside the promotions. However, on the basis that the petitioners were recruited through a selection process which was prior and different from the selection process through which the private respondents were recruited, on an interpretation of Rule 9 of the said Rules, the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the petitioners should have been shown senior to the private respondents in the seniority list of Havilder (GD).
The Single Judge granted liberty to the respondents to frame the seniority list in view of the observations and the respondents would thereafter consider the petitioners for promotion to the post of Naib Subedar (GD) after recasting the seniority list. It was further provided that if vacancies are not available, supernumerary posts in the promotion cadre may be created and if the petitioners are found fit for promotion they will rank senior to the private respondents in the cadre of Naib Subedar (GD). The relevant portion of the judgment of the learned Single Judge reads as under: “22. Thus, it is apparent that the said rule is required to be applied in the recruitment batch and therefore, it would ordinarily mean a batch of direct recruitment and not batch of basic training. In this case, two separate batches have been merged and the seniority has been determined on the basis of the result or the score in the test held on completion of basic training. This is erroneous. The mode that has been adopted by the respondents in fixing the seniority between the petitioners and the private respondents is contrary to the provisions of Rule 9(2)(b) of the said rules. Thus, the respondents are directed to reframe the seniority list between the petitioners and the private respondents notwithstanding the outcome of this writ petition. For that purpose, the batch where the petitioners are included and the batch where the private respondents are included will be separately dealt for determining the seniority as per Rule 9(2)(b) of the said Rules by segregating two batches from the result sheet of the test conducted after the basic training. There cannot be any doubt that the petitioners were recruited in the earlier batch. For that batch, seniority will be determined by applying the Rule 9(2)(b). 23. Having observed thus and taking the aspect of laches as deterrent to give reliefs as sought, this Court is not inclined to interfere with the impugned promotion order of the respondents No.5 to 8 in the post of Naib Subedar (GD). But the respondents are given liberty to reframe the seniority list following the above observation within a period of three months from the day when a copy of this order will be placed by the petitioners.
But the respondents are given liberty to reframe the seniority list following the above observation within a period of three months from the day when a copy of this order will be placed by the petitioners. The respondents are further directed to consider the promotion of the petitioner in the post of Naib Subedar (GD) within a period of four months from the day of framing the seniority list. If vacancies are not available in the post of Naib Subedar, supernumerary/personal posts be created to do away with the wrong done to the petitioners. If the petitioners are considered fit for promotion, their seniority will be restored in the cadre of Naib Subedar having deemed them promoted before the respondents No.5, 6, 7 and 8. All financial benefits be released from the date of the notification of promotion to the post of Naib Subedar in view of the above direction, meaning prospectively. In terms of the above, this writ petition stands disposed of. No order as to costs.” [7] We have heard learned counsel for the parties for final disposal of the writ appeals. On the face of it the approach of the petitioners before the High Court suffered from gross delay. We may recall, the final seniority list was published by the department for the first time in the year 2003. In this seniority list, the private respondents were shown at serial Nos. 168, 171, 172 and 174. As against this, the petitioners were shown at Serial Nos. 239, 240 and 242. This position was maintained in all subsequent seniority lists published by the department in the year 2005, 2007 and 2009. On the basis of such inter se seniority the private respondents were also granted promotions to the next higher post of Naib Subedar (GD) in the years 2010 and 2011. At no stage the petitioners raised any objection or filed any proceedings to challenge the stand of the department. For first time the petitioners approached the Court in the year 2017 i.e. 14 years after publication of the first seniority list and 7 years after promotion of at least one of the private respondents. The petitioners thus owed a heavy duty to explain the time consumed in pursuing the legal remedies.
For first time the petitioners approached the Court in the year 2017 i.e. 14 years after publication of the first seniority list and 7 years after promotion of at least one of the private respondents. The petitioners thus owed a heavy duty to explain the time consumed in pursuing the legal remedies. Perusal of the petition and particularly paragraph 7 and 7A of the petition would show that the stand was that they were not aware of these seniority lists. With respect to the seniority lists of 2003, 2005 and 2007 their main challenge was that before finalizing the seniority the department had not circulated tentative seniority lists and this was in breach of principles of natural justice. The requirement of publishing draft seniority lists inviting objections from the members of the cadre can be accepted. However, even if no such procedure was followed, the petitioners’ delay does not get explained. The department had stated on oath that such seniority lists were circulated from time to time. The seniority lists which were sent to the Divisional Officers carried such a mandate. Only because the department could not produce evidence of its circulation which the department was called upon to do after 14 years, would not be a good ground to discard the statement of a responsible Officer made on oath. [8] Far more serious and fundamental issue is, as held by the learned Single Judge, the promotions of the private respondents to the exclusion of the petitioners were in the public domain. If the petitioners were aggrieved by such promotions, they ought to have challenged the same within a reasonable time. When persons of the same cadre whom the petitioners thought should have been their juniors are promoted and the petitioners are not, this phenomenon should have activated the petitioners into finding out the correct seniority position. The double presumption, therefore would be that the petitioners were or ought to have been aware about the promotion orders and their seniority position vis-a-vis the private respondents. [9] Under the circumstances, the petitions and the challenges made in the petitions were grossly belated and ought to have been rejected on the grounds of delay, laches and acquiescence. As per the well settled principles, seniority position in a cadre should not be disturbed after a reasonable period of time.
[9] Under the circumstances, the petitions and the challenges made in the petitions were grossly belated and ought to have been rejected on the grounds of delay, laches and acquiescence. As per the well settled principles, seniority position in a cadre should not be disturbed after a reasonable period of time. Delay and laches in challenging seniority list is always viewed by the Courts more carefully since it is not merely a question of a citizen asserting his individual rights, but it affects several persons, disturbs the entire cadre and often times upsets the promotions already granted. In the present case itself, the learned Single Judge not only required the department to recast the seniority of Havilder (GD), also required the department to consider the petitioners for promotion on the basis of such recasted seniority. As a result, if the petitioners are found fit for promotion and there are no vacancies, the department was expected to create supernumerary posts and the petitioners in the promotional cadre would rank senior to the private respondents though such promotions may take place more than 10 years after the promotion of the private respondents. [10] Quite apart from these grounds, on merits also we do not think that the petitioners had made out any case for interference. Rule 9 of the said rules pertains to seniority and reads as under: “9.The inter se seniority of the persons appointed to a rank by direct recruitment in a given batch shall be determined in the following manner namely: (1) The inter se seniority of the members of the Rifles appointed to a rank by promotion shall be determined in the following manner, namely: (a) Before confirmation in the rank concerned every such person shall take his seniority from the date from which he is continuously holding such ranks; and if such date be the same, then according to respective position in the concerned approved list/panel for promotion.
(b) After confirmation seniority shall follow the date of confirmation: Provided that in case of persons confirmed on the same date their seniority immediately before confirmation shall remain unaffected; (2) The inter se seniority of the persons appointed to a rank by direct recruitment in a given batch shall be determined in the following manner, namely: (a) Before attestation every such person shall take his seniority in the rank to which he is recruited in accordance with the order of merit at the recruitment test; (b) After attestation every such person shall take his seniority according to aggregate of his score in the test held on completion of basic training; (c) On confirmation, he shall take his seniority from the date of such confirmation. Provided that in case of persons confirmed on the same date their seniority immediately before confirmation shall remain unaffected.” [11] Rule 9 itself starts with the expression “the inter se seniority of the persons appointed to a rank by direct recruitment in a given batch shall be determined in the following manner namely :”. Sub rule 2 of Rule 9 which is relevant for our purpose provides that the inter se seniority of the persons appointed to a rank by direct recruitment in a given batch shall be determined in the manner provided in Clauses (a), (b) and (c) thereof. As per clause (a), before attestation every person shall take his seniority in accordance with the order of merit at the recruitment test. According to clause (b), after attestation every such person shall take his seniority according to aggregate of his score in the test held on completion of basic training. [12] Few things thus become clear upon interpretation of this rule. Inter se seniority of direct recruitment has to be determined batch wise. As noted, Rule 9 itself starts with expression “assignment of inter se seniority of direct recruits in a given batch”. This is repeated in Sub rule (2) also. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge as well as the counsel for the original petitioners before us were perfectly correct in coming to the conclusion that the question of inter se seniority would arise only between the recruits of the same batch.
This is repeated in Sub rule (2) also. In that view of the matter, the learned Single Judge as well as the counsel for the original petitioners before us were perfectly correct in coming to the conclusion that the question of inter se seniority would arise only between the recruits of the same batch. In other words, if the petitioners and the private respondents were recruited through different recruitment batches, their inter se seniority had to be on the basis of priority of the batch and not on the basis of the formula provided in Sub rule (2). However, on the other hand, if the recruitment of the petitioners and the private respondents was sourced from the same recruitment batch, Sub rule (2) of Rule 9 would apply. [13] In this respect, the petitioners have neither properly pleaded nor proved that they and the private respondents were recruited through different recruitment batches. In the petition they that the private respondents were recruited later. This is a matter of record and nobody has disputed. The department had filed two affidavits. In first such affidavit it was admitted that the private respondents were appointed as Havilders (GD) subsequent to the petitioners and they joined the duty at a later date. This is not an admission, contrary to what the learned Single Judge has recorded, that the private respondents were recruited through a subsequent recruitment batch. Whatever ambiguity may have been, was clarified by the department in the subsequent affidavit dated 21.11.2017 in which it was stated that the petitioners and the private respondents were recruited in the same batch. In absence of any evidence produced by the petitioners and in absence of any inconsistency between the stand of the department in two affidavits we have no hesitation in accepting this factual aspect. If the learned Single Judge had some doubt about the correctness of the statement, the issue could have been probed further by asking the department to produce evidence. However, the conclusions based on comparative reading of the two affidavits of the department in our opinion was erroneous. [14] If this is the position, Rule 9(2) would be relevant. As noted, as per this Rule till attestation of a direct recruit the seniority will proceed on the basis of merit in the recruitment test.
However, the conclusions based on comparative reading of the two affidavits of the department in our opinion was erroneous. [14] If this is the position, Rule 9(2) would be relevant. As noted, as per this Rule till attestation of a direct recruit the seniority will proceed on the basis of merit in the recruitment test. After attestation, the inter se seniority would be determined on the basis of aggregate of the score in the test held on completion of basic training. Plain reading of this Rule therefore would be that upon completion of the training the inter se seniority will be judged on the basis of aggregate of the marks scored by the recruits. The petitioners have not disputed the stand of the department that the private respondents had scored higher marks in such test than the petitioners. That being the position, even on merits no error can be found in the department assigning higher seniority to the private respondents. [15] In the result, the appeals are allowed. Impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge is set aside. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.