JUDGMENT : ANOOP CHITKARA, J. 1. “It cannot be, there is no power in Venice Can alter a decree established. ’Twill be recorded for a precedent, And many an error by the same example Will rush into the state. It cannot be.” - Shakespeare, (Portia, in The Merchant of Venice). 2. Given the difference of opinion amongst two Hon’ble Judges of this Court, while deciding the Letters Patent Appeals, Hon’ble the Chief Justice referred both the Intra Court Appeals to this Court as a third Judge and since both the appeals challenge the common judgments, hence are being taken up together. 3. The appellants/petitioners, who were appointed in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges, by limited competitive examination and by promotion respectively, had come up before this Court seeking seniority following the post-based roster, from the date of their appointments, by pushing down the direct recruits below them, because at the time of the appointments of direct recruits, which was prior in time, no posts existed in their category, and thus the appellants were deemed to have been appointed against the higher point of the roster. 4. The petition filed by Mr. S.C. Kainthla was registered as CWP No. 2061 of 2018, and the petition of Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj as CWP No. 2292 of 2018. The pleadings and prayer clauses of both these petitions are almost similar, and the reference is being made to CWP No. 2061 of 2018, filed by Mr. S.C. Kainthla. 4. The petition filed by Mr. S.C. Kainthla was registered as CWP No. 2061 of 2018, and the petition of Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj as CWP No. 2292 of 2018. The pleadings and prayer clauses of both these petitions are almost similar, and the reference is being made to CWP No. 2061 of 2018, filed by Mr. S.C. Kainthla. The prayer clauses, in both the writ petitions, are also almost identical, with minor additions, and read as follows: In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is most humbly prayed that this writ petition may kindly be allowed and this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondents No.1 and 2 to: (i) create the cadre of Civil Judge Senior Division w.e.f. 1.7.1996 in accordance with the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in All India Judges’ Association and Others versus Union of India and Others, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , and I.A. No.334 of 2014 in Writ Petition (Civil) dated 28.4.2016, and to grant consequential benefits to the petitioner; (ii) follow the post-based roster w.e.f. 31.3.2003 by following the report of the Hon’ble Judges Committees and declare the petitioner senior to Respondents No. 3 and 4 (And in CWP No. 2292 of 2018, of Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj senior to respondents 3, 4, & 5), and to grant all consequential benefits to the petitioner, including considering him for elevation as Judge of High court by placing relevant material before the competent authority. (iii) quash the seniority/gradation lists circulated w.e.f. 1.1.2005 onwards particularly gradation list Annexure P-16, circulated on 18.1.2018 showing petitioner junior to respondents No.3 and 4, (And in CWP No. 2292 of 2018, of Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj respondents 3, 4, & 5) as being contrary to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in All India Judges Association Case (supra) and H.P. Judicial Services Rules, 2004. (iv) (In CWP No. 2292 of 2018, of Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj) quash the order dated 31.08.2018 (Annexure P-17) disposing of the representation and allow the representation filed by the petitioner. (iv) (In CWP No. 2292 of 2018, of Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj) quash the order dated 31.08.2018 (Annexure P-17) disposing of the representation and allow the representation filed by the petitioner. (v) Issue any other appropriate writ, order or direction which this Hon’ble Court may deem just and proper in the nature and circumstances of the case; (vi) direct the respondents to produce the entire record of this case before this Hon’ble Court for which act of kindness the petitioner shall as duty bound forever pray. 5. Both the appellant(s) had initially joined as Sub Judges and at that time Himachal Pradesh Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1973, were in force. As per 1973 Rules, the appointment to the cadre of District Judges was based on the 2:1 ratio between the Direct recruits and the Promotees. On 1.2.1984, the appellant, Mr. S.C. Kainthla, was appointed as Sub Judge. On 23.12.2003, he was appointed as Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court, and on 26.12.2006, was promoted to the cadre of District Judges/ Additional District Judges. On 31.12.2019, he superannuated as a District Judge. The appellant Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj was appointed as Sub Judge on 5.12.1988 and was promoted to the cadre of District Judges/ Additional District Judges on 27.10.2009, after qualifying limited competitive examination under 25% quota, and is currently holding the post of District Judge. The private respondents No. 3 to 6 were appointed from the category of direct recruits in the cadre of District Judges/ Additional District Judges. Shri Sushil Kukreja was appointed on 18.5.2004, Shri Virender Singh on 7.12.2006, Shri Chirag Bhanu Singh on 17.9.2007, and Shri Arvind Malhotra on 23.10.2009. 6. Earlier, in 1999, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association and some of its members, including the appellant, filed CWP No. 61 of 1999 before this Court, wherein they assailed the appointments of directly recruited Additional District Judges. During this writ petition's pendency, the Hon'ble Supreme Court issued directions in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 . 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC 119 , vide its directions dated 13.11.1991, had referred the matter regarding pay and conditions of service of the Judicial Officers to a Commission. Given the above directions, on March 21, 1996, the Central Government had constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission headed by Hon’ble Mr. Given the above directions, on March 21, 1996, the Central Government had constituted the First National Judicial Pay Commission headed by Hon’ble Mr. Justice K. Jagannatha Shetty, former Judge of Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Commission presented its report on November 11, 1999, which led to the pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , with the following directions: [28]. As a result of the aforesaid, to recapitulate, we direct that recruitment to the higher judicial service i.e., the cadre of District Judge will be: (1)(a) 50 per cent by promotion from amongst the Civil Judges (senior division) on the basis of principle of meritcum- seniority and passing a suitability test; (b) 25 per cent by promotion strictly on the basis of merit through limited competitive examination of Civil Judges (senior division) having not less than five years qualifying service; and (c) 25 per cent of the posts shall be filled by direct recruitment from amongst the eligible advocates on the basis of the written and viva voce test conducted by respective High Courts. (2) Appropriate rules shall be framed as above by the High Courts as early as possible. [29]. Experience has shown that there has been a constant discontentment amongst the members of the higher judicial service in regard to their seniority in service. For over three decades, large number of cases have been instituted in order to decide the relative seniority from the officers recruited from the two different sources, namely, promotees and direct recruits. As a result of the decision today, there will, in a way, be three ways of recruitment to higher judicial service. The quota for promotion which we have prescribed is 50 percent by following the principle "merit-cum-seniority" 25 percent strictly on merit by limited departmental competitive examination and 25 per cent by direct recruitment. Experience has also shown that the least amount of litigation in the country, where quota system in recruitment exists, in so far as seniority is concerned, is where a roster system is followed. For example, there is, as per the rules of the Central Government, a 40-point roster which has been prescribed which deals with the quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. For example, there is, as per the rules of the Central Government, a 40-point roster which has been prescribed which deals with the quotas for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. Hardly, if ever, there has been a litigation amongst the members of the service after their recruitment as per the quotas, the seniority is fixed by the roster points and irrespective of the fact as to when a person is recruited. When roster system is followed, there is no question of any dispute arising. The 40-point roster has been considered and approved by this Court in R.K. Sabharwal and ors. v. State of Punjab [ 1995(2) SCC 745 ]. One of the methods of avoiding any litigation and bringing about certainty in this regard is by specifying quotas in relation to posts and not in relation to the vacancies. This is the basic principle on the basis of which the 40-point roster works. We direct the High Courts to suitably amend and promulgate seniority rules on the basis of the roster principle as approved by this Court in R.K. Sabharwal's case (supra) as early as possible. We hope that as a result thereof, there would be no further dispute in the fixation of seniority. It is obvious that this system can only apply prospectively except where under the relevant rules seniority is to be determined on the basis of quota and rotational system. The existing relative seniority of the members of the higher judicial service has to be protected but the roster has to be evolved for the future. Appropriate rules and methods will be adopted by the High Courts and approved by the States, wherever necessary by 31st March, 2003.” xxx xxx xxx [40]. Any clarification that may be required in respect of any matter arising out of this decision will be sought only from this Court. The proceedings, if any, for implementation of the directions given in this judgment shall be filed only in this Court and no other Court shall entertain them.” 8. In compliance with the directions in Judges Association case (supra), the old Rules, i.e., “Himachal Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 1973”, were replaced by new Rules, i.e., “Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004,” w.e.f. 20.03.2004, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of 2004’). In compliance with the directions in Judges Association case (supra), the old Rules, i.e., “Himachal Pradesh Judicial Services Rules, 1973”, were replaced by new Rules, i.e., “Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004,” w.e.f. 20.03.2004, (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules of 2004’). Per Rule 5 of the Rules of 2004, the ratio of three categories, i.e., Merit-cum-Seniority; through limited competitive examination; and direct recruitments, was fixed at 2:1:1. 9. After that, on 18.4.2005, the CWP No. 61 of 1999, which was filed by H.P. Judicial Officers Association, assailing the appointments of directly recruited Additional District Judges, was disposed of in the following terms: “As the hearing was in progress, Mr. Rajiv Sharma, learned Senior counsel appearing for respondent No. 2 submitted that his client has issued communication No. HHC/GAZ/10-17/90- Vol-II-1933-35 dated 28th January, 2005, (which is hereby taken on record by us), whereby a gradation list of the members of H.P. Judicial Service, as it stood on 1.1.2005 was circulated. According to Mr. Rajiv Sharma, the petitioners have not challenged the gradation list circulated along with the aforesaid communication. Without going into the disputed question whether in the light of various orders passed by this Court in this case from time to time, the petitioners were or were not required to challenge the aforesaid gradation list, we feel that in the facts and circumstances of this case, if the petitioners are afforded an opportunity of filing objections to the aforesaid gradation list and making representation(s) for suitable placement/replacement of the persons covered therein, and if such objections and representations are considered by respondent No. 2, on their merits and in accordance with law, and disposed of within a reasonable time, the interests of all the parties shall be suitably protected. On this suggestion coming from the Court, Mr. Mattewal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the petitioners are in absolute agreement with this suggestion and that they would withdraw this Writ petition with liberty to submit representation(s) and filing objection to the aforesaid gradation list and request the High Court on its administrative side to consider such objections/representations on their merits and in accordance with law and to order relocation/ re-placement of the persons concerned in the aforesaid gradation list. Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 and Mr. Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 3 and Mr. Shrawan Dogra, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 also have no objection to this course being adopted. Mr. Rajiv Sharma, submits and undertakes before us that if the petitioners indeed file objections and submit representations against the aforesaid gradation list, the High Court on its administrative side shall consider such objection(s)/ representation(s) and dispose them of in accordance with law and on their merits within the shortest possible time, preferably within 2-3 months. Based on the aforesaid agreement between the parties, the Writ petition is disposed of as settled. We pass the following order and issue hereinbelow mentioned directions: - (1). Only in so far as the placement of direct recruited Additional District Judges in the aforesaid gradation list is concerned (and for no other reason or ground), it shall be open to petitioner No. 1 as well as other aggrieved Officers, if any, to file objections or make representations against their alleged improper placement and for seeking rectification/redressal of grievances. Such objections shall be filed and such representations shall be made, if any, latest by 30th April, 2005. (2). The High Court on its administrative side shall receive the aforesaid objections/representations, process the same, examine and consider them on their merits and dispose them of in accordance with law. (3). If in the process of consideration, the High Court feels that anyone whose name has been included in the aforesaid gradation list needs to be displaced to a lower position, an opportunity of being heard shall be afforded to such person but only through the mechanism of a written representation. No such person shall have any right of a personal hearing. (4). The High Court on its administrative side shall take a final decision in the aforesaid matter on its merits and in accordance with law as expeditiously as possible and in any case by 31st July, 2005. (5). If anyone feels aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, it shall be open to such person to approach this Court again on the judicial side. In view of the aforesaid order, no earlier representation filed on the subject by any one shall be entertained. All such earlier representations shall be consigned to records without taking any action thereupon. If anyone feels aggrieved by the decision of the High Court, it shall be open to such person to approach this Court again on the judicial side. In view of the aforesaid order, no earlier representation filed on the subject by any one shall be entertained. All such earlier representations shall be consigned to records without taking any action thereupon. Since this Writ petition is being disposed of as settled in the light of the aforesaid agreement between the parties, we wish to clearly place on record that we have not gone into any question relating to the merits of the controversy between the parties nor have expressed any opinion with regard thereto. All questions and issues are left open. The writ petition is disposed of. All interim orders shall stand vacated.” 10. In terms of the directions mentioned above, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association as well as various other Judicial Officers made representations. Hon’ble High Court constituted a Committee, which recommended the rejection of all the representations. The matter was accordingly placed before the Full Court. Vide meeting held on 22.8.2005, the Full Court accepted the recommendations of the Committee. Resultantly, all the representations, including the one raised by the H.P. Judicial Officers Association, filed on its behalf, and also of its members, were rejected. On 24.8.2005, the High Court informed the representationists about such rejections. 11. In March 2009, H.P. Judicial Officers’ Association along with a few of its members filed W.P. (C) No. 532 of 2009 in the Supreme Court of India for the following reliefs: “(i) that the roster system as approved in R.K. Sabharwal’s case 1995(2) SCC 745 is applicable to the appointments being made in the cadre of District Judges that the direct recruits be held to have only 8 posts in the cadre of 34 posts in view of their 25% quota, whereas the direct recruits at present are holding 11 posts beyond their quota; (ii) that the further direct recruitment be held only when the number of direct recruits is reduced to 8 from the present 11 in the cadre of 34 posts and till then direct recruitment may very kindly be ordered to be stopped; (iii) that any action taken by the respondents during the pendency of this writ petition viz. making appointments of direct recruits pursuant to advertisement Annexure-D, issuing gradation lists etc. making appointments of direct recruits pursuant to advertisement Annexure-D, issuing gradation lists etc. shall be subject to the orders that may be passed by this Hon’ble Court; (iv) quash the advertisement Annexure-D advertising three vacancies for the direct recruits, who are already occupying 3 excess posts in the cadre of District Judges.” 12. In March 2009 itself, the Association, of which the petitioners were members, also filed IA Nos. 234/2009 and 235/2009, in WP (C) No. 1022 of 1989, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, regarding the High Court making direct recruitments more than the quota and not following the roster point. However, both applications came to be rejected by the Hon’ble Supreme Court vide its order dated 26.3.2009, in the following terms: - “In both these applications, the Association of Judicial Officers pray that there should be a roster system in the matter of seniority if there is any violation of the roster system, the applicant would be at liberty to take any appropriate steps. We do not wish to interfere with the applications. I.A.s are disposed of accordingly.” 13. On 4.12.2009, the petitioners withdrew the Writ Petition (Civil) No. 532 of 2009, and Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the following order: “Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to move the High Court. Permission Granted. Writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn.” 14. After that, the petitioners moved the High Court on the Administrative side, by filing representations. In the year 2010, the High Court constituted a committee of its three Hon'ble Judges to examine the representations. On 30.3.2010, the committee submitted its report doubting the vacancy-based roster's correctness, that the High Court had been following. 15. After that, the petitioners moved the High Court on the Administrative side, by filing representations. In the year 2010, the High Court constituted a committee of its three Hon'ble Judges to examine the representations. On 30.3.2010, the committee submitted its report doubting the vacancy-based roster's correctness, that the High Court had been following. 15. Prior to the submission of report by the aforementioned Committee, on 8.3.2010, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association consisting of the officers belonging to the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior and Junior Division), filed a writ petition in this Court (CWP No. 696/2010), seeking stay on the new appointments of Direct recruits above their quota, praying therein the following relief: “(i) that the roster system as approved in R.K. Sabharwal’s case 1995(2) SCC 745 is applicable to the appointments being made in the cadre of District Judges and the direct recruits be held to have only 8 posts in the cadre of 34 posts in view of their 25% quota, whereas the direct recruits at present are holding 11 posts beyond their quota; (ii) that the further direct recruitment be held only when the number of direct recruits is reduced below 8 from the present 11 in the cadre of 34 posts and till then, the direct recruitment may very kindly be ordered to be stopped; (iii) that any action taken by the respondents during the pendency of this writ petition viz. making appointments of direct recruits pursuant to advertisement Annexure P-4 and any other advertisement which may be issued in future, issuing gradation lists, confirming direct recruits appointed in excess of their quota etc. shall be subject to the orders that may be passed in this petition by this Hon’ble Court; (iv) quash the advertisement Annexure P-4 advertising three vacancies for the direct recruits, who are already occupying 3 excess posts in the cadre of District Judges, beyond their quota of 8 posts; (v) restrain the respondents no. 1 to 3 from initiating any process this year from making any further direct recruitment in excess of their quota of 25%; (vi) direct the respondents no. 1 to 3 from initiating any process this year from making any further direct recruitment in excess of their quota of 25%; (vi) direct the respondents no. 1 to 3 to follow the roster system of R.K. Sabharwal’s case, 1995(2) SCC 745 as approved by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judge’s Association Case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 and as contained in Rules 5 & 13 of the new Rules of 2004 Annexure P-2 (colly) while making the direct recruitment.” 16. The petitioner annexed the copy of the minutes of the meeting of Hon’ble Judges Committee, held on 30.3.2010, as Annexure P-9. The points referred to it were concerning the vacancies/anticipated vacancies for the post of District Judges/Additional District Judges during 2010-2011 and the feeder channels from which these have to be filled in. The Committee observed as follows: “However, after coming into force of the extant Rules, we have been following the vacancy based roster, that is to say that we have been rotating the vacancies in the ratio of 2:1:1, amongst the promotees, Officers selected by Limited Competitive Examination and direct recruits from amongst the practicing Advocates, correctness of which is doubtful. We did not have many eligible Officers for Limited Competitive Examination, when the Rules came into force. Therefore, a Resolution was passed by the Full Court on 30th March, 2006, whereby the posts meant for appointment on the basis of Limited Competitive Examination were resolved to be filled by way of promotion from amongst the eligible Judicial Officers in the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division). One of such Officers, namely Shri S.L. Sharma, was appointed against the quota meant for appointment by Limited Competitive Examination. One post, on the basis of Limited Competitive Examination (actually held) has been filled recently by appointing Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj. Now six posts are required to be filled through this Limited Competitive Examination, as per the aforesaid Post Based 34-Point Roster. Right now there are 12 direct recruits from amongst the practicing Lawyers, as against their quota of 8 only. The strength of the District Judges/ Additional District Judges from this quota is required to be reduced to 8, in view of the abovesaid Post Based Roster. This can be done gradually, by filling up the posts vacated by direct recruits, through promotion or on the basis of Limited Competitive Examination. The strength of the District Judges/ Additional District Judges from this quota is required to be reduced to 8, in view of the abovesaid Post Based Roster. This can be done gradually, by filling up the posts vacated by direct recruits, through promotion or on the basis of Limited Competitive Examination. Since the direct recruits are already in excess of their quota, we propose that no vacancy for direct recruitment be advertised this year and also till the number of the direct recruits holding the posts falls below their number, i.e. 8, as per the cadre strength at present.” 17. Vide order dated 20.4.2010, passed in All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2010) 15 SCC 170 , Hon’ble Supreme Court, w.e.f. 1.1.2011 reduced the quota of limited competitive examination from 25% to 10%, simultaneously increasing the quota of promotion from 50% to 65%. 18. On 9.7.2010, Mr. S.C. Kainthla made a representation (Annexure-E) to the High Court, seeking re-fixation of his seniority based on the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Brij Mohan Lal versus Union of India & Others (T.C. No. 23 of 2001, SLP 7870/2001, SLP No. 10645/2001 and T.P.No.407-410/2001), which stood decided on 6.5.2002) and B.S. Mathur & Another versus Union of India & Others reported in AIR 2009, SC, 137, and Uma Dutt Sharma versus State of Himachal Pradesh reported in latest HLJ, 2009 (H.P.), 1268. 19. Vide communication dated 8.9.2010, (Annexure-F), the Registrar, High Court of Himachal Pradesh, conveyed to Shri S.C. Kainthla about the dismissal of his representation. 20. On 15.12.2014, the appellants, along with two other officers, filed an IA No. 334 of 2014 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking implementation of its judgment passed in All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002) 4 SCC 247 . 21. On 15.9.2015, Division Bench of this Court, passed the following order in CMP No.9561 of 2015, filed in CWP No. 696 of 2010, “We are of the considered view that in the event of the petition being allowed, rights of Judicial Officers, who already stand appointed against the post of District Judges/Additional District Judges, by way of direct recruitment quota, w.e.f. 2002, are likely to be affected. As such, they are absolutely necessary parties. As such, they are absolutely necessary parties. We direct the petitioners implead all such persons as party respondents, within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, petition shall automatically stand dismissed for non prosecution without any further reference to this Court. Application stands disposed of.” 22. On 28.4.2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the following directions, in IA No. 334/2014, “In this application, the applicant has come forward with two distinct prayers. The first prayer is for a direction to the respondents to create cadres of Civil Judge (Junior Division) and Civil Judge (Senior Division) with effect from 1.7.1996. It is pointed out to us that the Himachal Pradesh Judicial Officers (Pay, Allowances and Conditions of Service) Act, 2003 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2003’) and Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules of 2004’) have already come into force. Section 1(3) of the Act of 2003 states that the Act should be deemed to have come into force on 1st day of July, 1996. Section 3 of the Act of 2003 reads as under: - “3. Salaries. -Notwithstanding anything contained in any rules made under any other law for the time being in force, regulating the pay, allowances and other conditions of service, or any order or judgment passed by any Court, the Judicial Officers in the State shall be paid the pay scales as specified in the Schedule and the rates of allowances and other conditions of service of such Officers shall be such as may be prescribed.” Section 4 of the Act of 2003 further provides, as under: - “4. (1) Subject to the provisions of section 3, the State Government may by notification in the official Gazette, make rule with retrospective effect regulating the pay, allowances and conditions of service of the Judicial Officers.” The cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) was constituted from 20th March, 2004. As per Rule 3 of the Rules of 2004 the following categorization in the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) and Civil Judge (Junior Division) has been formulated. However, sub-Rule (2) of Rule 1 of the Rules of 2004 states that the Rules shall come into force from the date of publication in the Official Gazette and the Gazette Publication was on 20th March, 2004. However, sub-Rule (2) of Rule 1 of the Rules of 2004 states that the Rules shall come into force from the date of publication in the Official Gazette and the Gazette Publication was on 20th March, 2004. In the light of the said prescription made in the Rules after the categorization was made under Rule 3(3), the grievance of the applicant has now surfaced. The grievance of the applicant, as rightly pointed out by Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel, based on their prescription contained in Section 3 of the Act of 2003 read along with Section 4, even if the categorization came to be made under the Rules of 2004, the same should have been given effect to retrospectively, in consonance with the specific provisions contained in the above referred Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 2003. We are fully convinced of the said submission so made by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the applicant(s). In such circumstances, the prescription under sub-Rule (2) of Rule 1 of the Rules of 2004 and the Gazette Publication dated 20.3.2004 cannot supersede the specific provision contained in Sections 3 and 4 of the Act of 2003, more so, when the Act of 2003 was deemed to have come into force with effect from 1st day of July,1996. In this context, it will be absolutely necessary to note what this Court has directed in paragraph 38 of the judgment rendered in All India Judges’ Association and Others v. Union of India and Others reported in (2002) 4 SCC 247 . the said paragraph reads as under: - “38. We are aware that it will become necessary for service and other rules to be amended so as to implement this judgment. Firstly, with regard to the pay scales, the Shetty Commission has approved the pay scales with effect from 1-1-1996 but has directed the same to be paid with effect from 1-7-1996. However, it will take some time for the States to make necessary financial arrangements for the implementation of the revised pay scales as approved by this Court with effect from 1-7- 1996. The arrears of salary between 1-7-1996 to 30-6- 2002, will either be paid in cash or the States may make the payment by crediting the same in the provident fund account of the respective judicial officers. The arrears of salary between 1-7-1996 to 30-6- 2002, will either be paid in cash or the States may make the payment by crediting the same in the provident fund account of the respective judicial officers. Furthermore, the payment by creditor otherwise should be spread over between the years 1-7-1996 to 30-6-2002 so as to minimize the income tax liability which may be payable thereon. In calculating the arrears, the Government will, of course, take into account the interim relief which had been granted and drawn by the judicial officers. The amount to be credited in the provident fund account would also be after deducting the income tax payable.” Therefore, even applying the same the applicant is entitled for the direction asked for. In the said circumstances, the first prayer of the petitioner merits acceptance and the same is granted and the respondents are directed to create cadre of Civil Judge (Junior Division and Civil Judge (Senior Division), as prescribed under the Rules of 2004, and give effect to the same on and from 1.7.1996 with all consequential benefits accrued to those officers who hold the respective cadre post as from that day. The second prayer of the petitioner is for direction to the respondents to follow “post based roster” in appointments to the cadre of District Judges with effect from 31.3.2003. The said prayer is again based on the statement of law as propounded in paragraph 49 of the above referred to decision rendered in all India Judges’ Association and others (supra). While stating as to in what manner the 40-point roster is to be determined, this Court directed that appropriate Rules and methods should be adopted by the High Courts and approved by the States wherever necessary by 31.3.2003. When this application was moved, initially on behalf of the High Court, learned Standing Counsel took notice and submitted that in the High Court a Committee has been constituted which is deliberating on this issue, and, therefore, he will be above to report to this Court in a week’s time. It is now pointed out by Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel for the applicant(s) that the 34-point roster has been drawn by the High Court based on the cadre strength providing for different points applicable to the promotees by way of limited competitive examination as well as for direct recruits in the entry level District/Additional District and Sessions Judge. It is now pointed out by Mr. Patil, learned senior counsel for the applicant(s) that the 34-point roster has been drawn by the High Court based on the cadre strength providing for different points applicable to the promotees by way of limited competitive examination as well as for direct recruits in the entry level District/Additional District and Sessions Judge. It is also brought to our notice that appropriate Rules have also been drawn by the High Court which has been notified by the State Government on 16th March, 2004. The Rules have been captioned as “Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004”. Rule 13, which specifies as to how seniority list is to be worked out is to the following effect: - “RULE-13 Seniority-(1) Where Officers are recruited to a cadre by promotion and direct recruitment seniority shall be regulated by the roster maintained for such recruitment. Officer appointed against higher point of roster shall rank senior to the Officers appointed against a lower point: Provided that no person appointed to a cadre by direct recruitment shall, for the purpose of fixation of his seniority claim any particular place in seniority unconnected with the date of his actual appointment. (2) Where more than one Officers are promoted to cadre at the same time inter-se seniority of persons so promoted shall be determined by their inter-se seniority in the lower cadre. (3) Where direct recruitment is made to a cadre, the inter-se seniority of person so recruited shall be in the order in which their names are arranged in the select list. (3) Where direct recruitment is made to a cadre, the inter-se seniority of person so recruited shall be in the order in which their names are arranged in the select list. (4) Every year in the month of January seniority list of Officers in all cadres, shall be prepared and published by the High Court and the lists so published shall be issued for the purpose of making promotions to the next higher cadres.” As far as the method of recruitment for the purpose of Entry Level District Judge is concerned, Explanation II, reads as under: - “Appointment to the cadre of the District Judges from categories (a), (b) and (c) shall be in accordance with 40-point roster to be maintained by the High Court in this behalf.” Inasmuch as, 34-point roster having been drawn by the High Court and the relevant rules relating to seniority, namely, Rule- 13 has also come into effect, the only other question to be decided is as to how it should be implemented as from 31.3.2003, as directed by us in the judgment referred to above. While drawing the 34-point roster, the High Court has mentioned that the same would be followed after 31.3.2010. Having regard to the specific direction of this Court in the judgment referred to above in paragraph 23, we are of the view that it is required to ascertain as to how the 34-point roster for the three different channels are to be worked out. The High Court is, therefore, directed to apply Rule-13 which prescribes as to how seniority to be drawn by applying the said Rules, ascertain the roster point for the three different categories of promotees and direct recruits and carry out the said exercise from 31.3.2003. We, however, direct the High Court to place the said report after carrying out the said exercise, to pass further orders. We only direct the High Court to carry out the said exercise within a period of two months. List on 14.7.2016. We make it clear and reiterate that we only want the outcome of such exercise to be placed before this Court before passing further orders as to its implementation.” 23. We only direct the High Court to carry out the said exercise within a period of two months. List on 14.7.2016. We make it clear and reiterate that we only want the outcome of such exercise to be placed before this Court before passing further orders as to its implementation.” 23. On 14.7.2016, Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the following order: “Since, it is reported that identical prayer is subject matter of consideration in Civil Writ Petition No. 696 of 2010 titled H.P. Judicial Service Officers Association v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, we are of the view that the parties should be relegated to work out their remedy in the said writ petition and await the outcome of the said writ petition. Adjourned. The applicant is permitted to move the High Court for expeditious hearing of the writ petition.” 24. On 21.10.2016, a Division Bench of this Court, passed the following orders: CMP No. 8626 of 2016 By medium of this application the applicants-petitioners have prayed for recalling/modification of the order dated 15.9.2015 passed in CMP No.9561 of 2015 with the further prayer seeking permission to withdraw CMP No.10908 of 2015, which has been filed by the applicants-petitioners in compliance to the aforesaid order. 2. This Court on 15.9.2015, passed the following orders in CMP No. 9561 of 2015: - “CMP No. 9561 of 2015 We are of the considered view that in the event of the petition being allowed, rights of Judicial Officers, who already stand appointed against the post of District Judges/Additional District Judges, by way of direct recruitment quota, w.e.f. 2002, are likely to be affected. As such, they are absolutely necessary parties. We direct the petitioners implead all such persons as party respondents, within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, petition shall automatically stand dismissed for non prosecution without any further reference to this Court. Application stands disposed of.” 3. The applicants have sought recalling of this order on the ground that as per the existing pleadings in the writ petition their plea is restricted to the extent of advertisement (Annexure P-4) and therefore the impleadment of all the Judicial Officers, who have been subsequently recruited w.e.f. 2002 onwards are not at all necessary and their appointments can always be made subject to the outcome of the writ petition. 4. 4. To say the least, the application is totally misconceived as the order passed on 15.9.2015, was passed after hearing the petitioners and it was then this Court felt that impleadment of all the Judicial Officers recruited w.e.f. 2002 was necessary and accordingly directed their impleadment. 5. Undoubtedly, the petitioners are the dominus litis of the case, however, when this Court has intervened and directed the petitioners to implead necessary parties such status of dominus litis ceases and comes to an end and the petitioners have no option but to obey the directions so passed. 6. If the petitioners were at all aggrieved by the order, the only course open to them was to assail the same and having failed to do so, they cannot seek recall of the order that too on an application (CMP No. 9561 of 2015) that has already been disposed of. The application is clearly misconceived and is accordingly dismissed. CMP No. 10908 of 2015 7. By medium of this application, the applicants petitioners have sought impleadment of the direct recruits District Judges/Additional District Judges, as mentioned in Para-2 of the application. Evidently, this application has been preferred in compliance to the order passed by this Court on 15.9.2015. During the course of hearing, the learned counsel for the petitioners has stated that his clients have no claim against respondents No. 1 and 6. His statement is taken on record and accordingly their names are deleted from the array of the parties. The petition is accordingly allowed and the proposed respondents as mentioned in para-2 of the application, save and except proposed respondents No. 1 and 6, are ordered to be brought on record and shall figure as respondents No. 4 to 11. The application is accordingly allowed, subject to all just exceptions and the defence which the newly added respondents may now take in their respective replies. 8. In view of the impleadment of the parties, learned counsel for the petitioners seeks time to obtain instructions as to whether the petitioners in light of the subsequent developments would like to amend the petition. List on 28.10.2016.” 25. On 4.11.2016, the Association withdrew CWP No.696/2010, which was pending in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, without getting any liberty to reagitate the matter, and the order (Annexure R-2/B) reads as follows: “On instructions, Sh. List on 28.10.2016.” 25. On 4.11.2016, the Association withdrew CWP No.696/2010, which was pending in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, without getting any liberty to reagitate the matter, and the order (Annexure R-2/B) reads as follows: “On instructions, Sh. Naresh K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners states that he may be unconditionally permitted to withdraw the instant petition. 2. The respondents have opposed this request on the ground that certain rights have accrued in their favour, in view of the orders passed by this Court from time to time. 3. However, without going into these contentions, the petitioners are permitted to withdraw the present petition. 4. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed as withdrawn, along with pending application(s) if any.” 26. On 25.4.2017, Hon’ble Supreme Court issued further directions, in I.A. No. 334/2014, which read as follows: “Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we request the High Court to submit the report through the counsel by second week of July, 2017. Needless to emphasis, the report of the Committee shall be in consonance with the principal judgments i.e. All India Judges’ Association and others vs. Union of India and Others (2002) 4 SCC 247 and All India Judges’ Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others (2010) 15 SCC 170 . We are sure that the High Court shall analyze the judgments and submit the report which will be in accord with both the judgments. When we say in accord with the judgments, the High Court will appreciate both the verdicts in letter and spirit.” 27. After that, the 2nd respondent-High Court constituted a committee of two Judges. In Sep 2017, the Judges Committee submitted its report. On 21.9.2017, the Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh approved the Judges Committee report in its Full Court meeting. The extract of Full Court’s resolution dated 21.9.2017 reads as follows: “Extract of the Hon'ble Full Court resolution dated 21.9.2017, arising out of order dated 28.4.2016, passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in I.A.No.334 of 2014 in WP(C)No.1022 of 1989. Below at 'A' is the Report drawn by a Committee comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, JJ. Below at 'A' is the Report drawn by a Committee comprising of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, JJ. The Report is in compliance with the directions issued vide order dated 28.4.2016, by the Hon'ble Apex in IA No.334 of 2014, in pending Civil Writ Petition 1022 of 1989, titled All India Judges Association and others v. Union of India and others, also the Committee has considered the objections filed by the Direct Recruits, who were given an opportunity of being personally heard. The Direct Recruits had relied upon a Five-Judge Bench judgment, rendered by the Apex Court, in Direct Recruit Class- II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, reported (1990) 2 SCC 715 . In the said verdict, it has been propounded by the Apex Court that where the Quota Rule has been breached and appointments have been made to the vacancies, in excess of quotas only from one source, but where the appointments have been made after following the prescribed procedure, enshrined in the Rules framed for appointments, the appointees be not pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date and where the Rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule. The Committee has in its Report not gone into the merits of the aforesaid submissions made on the basis of the said judgment. It was solitary dealing within the domain and purview of the directions dated 12.8.2016/4.10.2016 issued by the Apex Court in IA No.334 of 2014, during pendency of Civil Writ Petition 1022 of 1989, titled All India Judges Association and others v. Union of India and other, besides within the limited reference made therein by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India; vide order (supra).” 28. On 9.10.2017, Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the following order in IA No. 334/2014, “It is submitted by Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the respondent that he would like to file an application on behalf of the direct recruits whose seniority position is affected. As this juncture, Mr. Dushyant Dave and Mr. On 9.10.2017, Hon’ble Supreme Court passed the following order in IA No. 334/2014, “It is submitted by Mr. P.S. Patwalia, learned senior counsel for the respondent that he would like to file an application on behalf of the direct recruits whose seniority position is affected. As this juncture, Mr. Dushyant Dave and Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned senior counsel appearing for the applicant-promotees submit that the view taken by the High Court is in consonance with the decision in All India Judges’ Association and ors. vs. Union of India and others (2002) 4 SCC 247 and (2010) 15 SCC 170 . Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the High Court shall file a comprehensive affidavit with regard to the decision taken by the High Court, and also indicate whether the decision taken by the High Court is in consonance with the judgment rendered by this Court in All India Judges’ Association’s case (supra). As we understand, the issue is whether the seniority position, as claimed by the parties, has been fully covered by the earlier decision rendered by this Court and anything else remains to be done. Additionally, it will be open to the parties to assist us if there is any order passed by this Court in connection with this case or any other case. Let the matter be listed on 6.11.2017 at 2.00 P.M. A copy of the report submitted by the High Court to the Registry of this Court be handed over to the learned counsel for the parties.” 29. After that, the present respondents 3 to 6 filed application in Hon’ble Supreme Court to be impleaded as a party. On 8.11.2017, Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the said application. 30. Vide order dated 13.3.2018, Hon’ble Supreme Court closed I.A. No. 334/2014, by holding as follows: “The issue raised in I.A. No. 334 of 2014 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989, as it appears to us from the materials on record, relates to the disputes inter se between the individuals/groups, which, in our considered view, would not be appropriate for determination by this Court in an I.A. (No.334 of 2014) filed in W.P.(C) No. 1022/1989 (All India Judges Association & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). We, therefore, decline to entertain the I.A. any further leaving the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law.” 31. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). We, therefore, decline to entertain the I.A. any further leaving the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law.” 31. On 20.3.2018, Shri S.C. Kainthla, again represented to the High Court, seeking fixation of seniority in accordance with the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in All India Judges’ Association’s case read with order passed by Hon’ble Apex Court in IA No. 334 of 2014 titled S.L. Sharma & Others versus High Court of Himachal Pradesh. However, on August 31, 2018, the High Court conveyed to Mr. Kainthla about dismissal of his representation on the ground that no further action is required, which reads as follows: “With reference to your representation dated 20.3.2018 on the subject cited above, I have been directed to inform that the same has been considered and disposed of' with the observation that no other and further action is required. However, if so advised, it is open to you to take recourse to the remedies, in terms of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.” 32. After that, on 4.9.2018 the petitioner/appellant Shri S.C. Kainthla filed CWP No. 2061 of 2018, in this Court. Similarly, on 22.9.2018, the petitioner/appellant Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj filed CWP No. 2292 of 2018 in this Court, seeking identical reliefs (supra). In a nutshell, in the writ petitions, it was pleaded as follows: (a). As on 31.3.2003, there were 30 sanctioned posts in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges. The Promotee officers were posted on 18 posts, whereas directly recruited officers were posted on 10 posts, and 2 posts were lying vacant. At that time, neither of the two petitioners had been appointed in the cadre of District Judges. The prayer is that after the notification of the Rules of 2004, framed in the light of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's pronouncement in the Judges Association case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , the forty-point roster had to be applied w.e.f. 1.4.2003. However, following the Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions, the holders of the posts' status and position as of 31.3.2003 were to be protected. As such, the new roster had to come into force w.e.f. 1.4.2003. The petitioners explain that because of the ratio of 2:1:1, directly appointed recruits would only be posted against the 4th point. However, following the Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions, the holders of the posts' status and position as of 31.3.2003 were to be protected. As such, the new roster had to come into force w.e.f. 1.4.2003. The petitioners explain that because of the ratio of 2:1:1, directly appointed recruits would only be posted against the 4th point. In contrast, the first two points would go to the Judicial officers appointed by way of merit-cum-seniority, and the third point would go to the limited competitive examination. Such prayer is based on Rule 5 of the Rules of 2004, which prescribes the method of recruitment. (b). Per the Rules of 2004, out of 30 posts, 16 posts would go to promotees, 7 to limited competitive examination, and 7 to direct recruits. In contrast, 18 promotees had been posted against 16, whereas 10 direct recruits were posted against 7. Thus, 2 promotees and 3 direct recruits were in excess. From April 1, 2003, the Hon’ble High Court was under an obligation to make appointments following the post-based roster. Thus, no new appointments could be made against the categories of Promotions and Direct recruitments, because the incumbents who were posted from the category of Direct recruits, were already in excess of the roster points. However, given the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, the seniority position as on March 31, 2003 could not have been disturbed, but it was impermissible to fill in the vacancies in violation of the Rules of 2004, and especially when no such posts existed per roster points mentioned in Rule 5. (c). Although the appointments by way of promotion had already exceeded by two, despite that two more promotions were made on 5.9.2003, taking the total appointments by way of promotion to twenty. Firstly, the High Court had to rationalize posts as per 2:1:1, but instead the High Court promoted two more Judicial Officers. This was not permissible as per the Rules of 2004, which in turn were framed in compliance with the directions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Judges’ Association case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 . After these appointments, all the thirty posts were filled, of which twenty were by way of promotion, and ten were by way of direct recruits, whereas no vacancy was filled through limited competitive examination. Thus, four promotees and three direct recruits were in excess. After these appointments, all the thirty posts were filled, of which twenty were by way of promotion, and ten were by way of direct recruits, whereas no vacancy was filled through limited competitive examination. Thus, four promotees and three direct recruits were in excess. Although there was no vacancy for direct recruits in 2004, still the 3rd respondent, namely, Shri Sushil Kukreja, was appointed by direct recruitment. After that, one more post in the District Judges cadre was increased, and the number of total posts increased to thirtyone. Thus, the promotees' quota was sixteen; limited competitive examination increased to eight, and direct recruitments were seven. The Government of Himachal Pradesh created one more post of Director, Judicial Academy, w.e.f. 22.9.2005, in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges, and thus, the total number of posts increased to thirty-two. Given the posts, as per Rule 5 of the Rules of 2004, in the ratio of 2:1:1, i.e., sixteen posts had to be filled in by way of promotion, eight through Limited Competitive Examination, and the remaining eight from the direct recruits. As of 2.7.2005, two direct recruits were in excess. As on 31.7.2005, due to incumbents' retirement/elevation, all of whom were from the category of promotees, out of sixteen promotees, none was in excess. However, on 22.6.2005 and 2.7.2005, two posts were filled through promotions, and according to the petitioner, these were in excess as per Rule 5 of the Rules of 2004. In the year 2006, two more posts were created in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges, and the total number of posts increased to thirty-four. The petitioners plead that on 7.12.2006, Shri Virender Singh, 4th respondent, was appointed against the direct recruit, whereas no such vacancy existed per the Rules of 2004. Similarly, on 17.9.2007, Shri Chirag Bhanu Singh, 5th respondent, was appointed without any vacancy. In 2009, Shri Arvind Malhotra, the 6th respondent, was also appointed against the direct recruit, whereas there was no such vacancy under the Rules of 2004. (d). On 4.9.2009, the H.P Judicial Officers Association passed a resolution, seeking enforcement of post-based roster following the Judges Association case. In 2010, the second respondent-High Court of Himachal Pradesh, constituted a Committee of three Hon'ble Judges to examine the matter. (d). On 4.9.2009, the H.P Judicial Officers Association passed a resolution, seeking enforcement of post-based roster following the Judges Association case. In 2010, the second respondent-High Court of Himachal Pradesh, constituted a Committee of three Hon'ble Judges to examine the matter. Vide its report (Annexure P-9 supra) submitted on 30.3.2010, the Committee pointed out that the High Court, was following the 'vacancy-based roster' even after the commencement of the Rules of 2004. (e). Pursuant to the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court given on 25.4.2017, the High Court had constituted a Committee of two Hon’ble Judges of the Court, which submitted a report, Annexure P-12. (f). In compliance with the orders dated October 9, 2017, passed in IA No.334 of 2014, the second respondent filed an affidavit through its Additional Registrar. The petitioner has annexed the copy of the said affidavit as Annexure P-14. Sub-clause ‘B’ of the affidavit reads as follows: “(B). That in compliance thereof a Committee of Hon’ble Judges which already stood constituted by High Court of Himachal Pradesh for the purpose of deliberating on the issue and submitting its report, prepared a report as directed by this Hon'ble Court, which stands filed before this Hon'ble Court on 21.09.2017. Said report was placed before the Hon'ble Full Court of High Court of Himachal Pradesh on 21.09.2017. 4. That the report has been prepared by the Hon'ble Committee strictly in conformity with the directions issued by this Hon'ble Court from time to time in I.A. No. 334/2014, more specifically, the directions dated 28.04.2016 and 25.04.2017. Further, the report has been prepared in consonance with the principal judgments i.e. All India Judges' Association and others vs. Union of India and others (2002) 4 SCC 247 and All India Judges' Association and others vs. Union of India and others (2010) 15 SCC 170 , as directed by this Hon'ble Court. 5. That even though the parties, more particularly, the direct recruits had relied upon the judgment rendered by the five Hon'ble Judges' Bench of this Hon'ble Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association vs. State of Maharashtra 1990 (2) SCC 715 and other judgments also, however, the said judgments were not considered by the Committee as it was beyond its competence and purview to go into such questions especially in light of the aforesaid directions of this Hon'ble Court. It is further pertinent to mention that the respective stands taken by the parties including the High Court before the Committee is also duly reflected in the report of the Hon'ble Committee. A resolution which was passed by Hon'ble Full Court on 21.09.2017 in this regard is appended herewith as Annexures P1/A (Page No. 8-9), Contents whereof may kindly be read as part and parcel of this affidavit.” (g). The Hon’ble High Court was bound to implement the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Judges Association’s case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , and by not following the ‘post-based roster’ w.e.f. 1.4.2003, the second respondent flagrantly violated the mandatory directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India issued under Articles 141 and 142 of the Constitution of India. 33. The 1st respondent, i.e., State of Himachal Pradesh, in its reply stated that the Registry of the High Court, maintains the roster, and it is the Public Service Commission, which conducts the selection process. Neither the State has any role to play nor any cause of action arose against it. 34. The reply filed by 2nd respondent, i.e., Hon’ble High Court of HP., is in the following terms: (a). In the judgment passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh v. State of Punjab and Others, in Civil Appeal Nos.5518-5523 of 2017, decided on 3.10.2018, Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the direct recruits/ promotees holding the posts within their quota under the unamended rules, cannot be treated in excess and were not required to be adjusted against the vacancies arising in future. The High Court's second preliminary objection is that the petitioners and their association have agitated the same matter again and again, more particularly in CWP No. 696 of 2010. The stand is that vide order dated 4.11.2016 (Annexure R-2/C), the association had withdrawn the said petition unconditionally. After that, on 13.3.2018, Hon'ble Supreme Court, disposed of the application (IA No.334 of 2014), leaving the parties to resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law. (b). It would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the reply of the High Court, in CWP No. 2061 of 2018, which reads as follows: 3. That the writ petition primarily relies on the report of the Hon'ble Committee of Hon'ble Judges at annexure P-12. (b). It would be appropriate to extract the relevant portion of the reply of the High Court, in CWP No. 2061 of 2018, which reads as follows: 3. That the writ petition primarily relies on the report of the Hon'ble Committee of Hon'ble Judges at annexure P-12. Following is submitted in this regard: - (a) Hon'ble Apex Court vide order dated 28.4.2016 passed in IA 334/2014 directed the respondent to work out and present before it, 34 point roster by applying Rule-13 of HP Judicial Service Rules (which determines seniority) for three different channels, by ascertaining the roster points, for the three categories i.e. promotees, appointee by limited competition & direct recruits w.e.f. 31.03.2003. Relevant para of the order dated 28.04.2016 is reproduced hereunder for ready convenience of the Hon'ble Court:- “Having regard to the specific direction of this Court in the judgment referred to above in paragraph 23, we are of the view that it is required to ascertain as to how the 34 point roster for the three different channels are to be worked out. The High Court is, therefore, directed to apply Rule-13 which prescribes as to how seniority to be drawn by applying the said Rules, ascertain the roster point for the three different categories of promotees and direct recruits and carry out the said exercise from 31.3.2003. We, however, direct the High Court to place the said Report after carrying out the said exercise, to pass further orders. We only direct the High Court to carry out the said exercise within a period of two months. List on 14.7.2016. We make it clear and reiterate that we only want the outcome of such exercise to be placed before this Court before passing further orders as to its implementation." (b) In compliance to the above order, the replying respondent carried out the exercise as directed by the Hon'ble Apex Court. The exercise culminated in the report at annexure P-12. (c) While disposing of IA 334/2014, no direction was given by the Hon'ble Court in respect to the implementation of report/exercise undertaken at annexure P-12. No order in fact was passed in respect of annexure P-12. Thus no benefit can be derived by the petitioner merely on the basis of report at annexure P-12. Writ petition claiming seniority over direct recruits, relying on the report at annexure P-12 is thus not maintainable. 4. No order in fact was passed in respect of annexure P-12. Thus no benefit can be derived by the petitioner merely on the basis of report at annexure P-12. Writ petition claiming seniority over direct recruits, relying on the report at annexure P-12 is thus not maintainable. 4. That even otherwise the report at annexure P-12 has not been clearly appreciated by the petitioner. The report of the Committee clearly states the following: - (a) In chapter 2B of this report, the Hon'ble Committee, notices the contentions raised by the direct recruits (i) that their posts were advertised against clear cut vacancies and therefore it would not be fair to treat their initial appointment as ad-hoc. (ii) that they were appointed as regular incumbents and their services were confirmed after completion of probation period and by putting the events anti-clock wise, their settled seniority should not be disturbed by treating their confirmed service as ad-hoc. (b) After noticing the above contentions of the direct recruits, the Hon'ble Committee observed in para 5-7 of the report as under: - “5...In its order Hon'ble Supreme Court has made it clear that it only wants the outcome of such exercise to be placed before it before passing further orders as to its implementation. 6. It indicates that Hon'ble Supreme Court is not oblivious of the fact that there may be officers who would be adversely affected on account of exercise being undertaken by the High Court in compliance to order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and obviously keeping in view the said eventuality, Hon'ble Supreme Court has directed the High Court to place the outcome of exercise before it before passing further orders with respect to its implementation. 7. Definitely representationist direct recruit officers shall have opportunity and right to advance their case before the Hon'ble Supreme Court before passing order as to implementation of exercise..." (c) The above observations of the Hon'ble Committee make it apparent that Committee did not give its view and did not decide any issue of seniority in respect of the respective contentions between the three categories and it only complied with the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court and carried out the exercise as per the mandate given to it. There was no decision of the Hon'ble Committee that seniority presently assigned to the judicial officers required to be changed. There was no decision of the Hon'ble Committee that seniority presently assigned to the judicial officers required to be changed. (d) The report of the Hon'ble Committee was also placed before the Hon'ble Full Court. While considering the report, Hon'ble Full Court vide its resolution dated 21.9.2017, observed as under:- ".......The Direct Recruits had relied upon a five judge bench judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, reported 1990 (2) SCC 715 . In the said verdict, it has been propounded by the Apex Court that where the quota rule has been breached and appointments have been made to the vacancies, in excess of quotas only from one source, but where the appointments have been made after following the prescribed procedure, enshrined in the rules framed for the appointments, the appointees be not pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date and where the rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule. The Committee has in its report not gone into the merits of the aforesaid submissions made on the basis of the said judgment. It was solitary dealing within the domain and purview of the direction dated 12.8.2016/4.10.2016 issued by the Apex Court in IA No. 334 of 2014, during pendency of civil writ petition 1022 of 1989, titled All India Judges Association and others v. Union of India and other, besides within the limited reference made therein by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vide order (supra)." (e) A perusal of the above also makes it clear that neither the Hon'ble committee nor the Hon'ble Full Court had taken any affirmative view or adjudicated respective contentions of the affected categories in respect of changing their assigned seniority. (f) While placing Committee's report before Hon'ble Apex Court, resolution passed by the Hon'ble Full Court was also appended along with the affidavit dated 1.11.2017 filed by replying respondent. (f) While placing Committee's report before Hon'ble Apex Court, resolution passed by the Hon'ble Full Court was also appended along with the affidavit dated 1.11.2017 filed by replying respondent. Para 5 of the affidavit enclosed with the writ petition at Annexure P-14, stated that respective contentions of the affected parties in respect of seniority were not considered by the Hon'ble Committee as it was beyond its competence in view of specific mandate assigned to it under the orders of Hon'ble Apex Court passed in IA 334/2014. (g) IA 334/2014 was finally listed on 13.03.2018 when the Hon'ble Apex Court declined to entertain it any further leaving the parties to resort the remedies as may be available to them in law. No order was passed in respect to its implementation. (h) It is humbly submitted that Hon'ble Apex Court had directed to place before it the outcome of exercise before passing further orders with reference to such exercise. Since the Hon'ble Apex Court did not take any view regarding implementation of the report filed by the replying respondent in I.A. 334/2014, therefore, no advantage can be taken by the petitioner on the basis of the exercise in applying post based roster w.e.f. 31.03.2003. 5. It is humbly submitted that the contentions of the petitioner run contrary to recent pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled as Hon'ble Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh Vs. State of Punjab and others Civil Appeal Nos 5518-5523 of 2017 decided on 3.10.2018, wherein, it has been held that the direct recruits/promotees holding the posts within their quota under the unamended rules cannot be treated in excess and are not required to be adjusted against the vacancies arising in future. The out of turn quota (limited competitive examination) will also be available only for the additional posts coming up and will not be available from day one. All the grounds raised in the petition run contrary to the above directions. Writ petition is thus devoid of any merits and is thus liable to be dismissed. 6. xxx xxx 7. xxx xxx 8. That the petition suffers from delay and laches. Petitioner was promoted to the cadre of District/Additional District Judge on adhoc basis as Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court on 12.12.2003 (sic). Thereafter petitioner was promoted as such on regular basis on 12.09.2007 (sic). 6. xxx xxx 7. xxx xxx 8. That the petition suffers from delay and laches. Petitioner was promoted to the cadre of District/Additional District Judge on adhoc basis as Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court on 12.12.2003 (sic). Thereafter petitioner was promoted as such on regular basis on 12.09.2007 (sic). As per gradation/seniority lists issued by the replying respondent as it stood on 01.01.2005 & onwards, the petitioner was placed below respondent No.3 and 4 and other promotees respectively. Representation dated 07/09.07.2010 filed by petitioner for grant of seniority over direct recruits by taking into consideration his ad hoc service w.e.f. 23.12.2003 as Presiding Officer Fast Track Court was considered and rejected on 3.8.2010 being without merit. The decision was conveyed to the petitioner vide letter dated 08/09.09.2010. No challenge was laid to this decision. The petitioner has also not challenged the recruitments/promotions allegedly made in excess, since the petitioner is also himself the beneficiary of alleged excess promotion, therefore, without challenging the alleged excess recruitments/promotions in time, petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge his seniority years later. Copies of representation dated 07/09.07.2010 and letter dated 08/09.09.2010 are annexed as Annexure R-2/E and R-2/F. (c). The High Court submitted that it had carried out the exercise vide Annexure P- 12, as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions, and specifically denied that the petitioners have wrongly been shown below respondents No.3 to 5, and stated that the officers' seniority had been fixed following law and rules, based on the respective dates of their appointments in the cadre. Thus, the seniority list was prepared based on the dates of appointments in the respective cadre. The petitioners never challenged the filling up of vacancies. The writ petitions suffered from delay and laches because the petitioner Shri S.C. Kainthla was promoted to the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges on Adhoc basis, as Presiding Officer, Fast Track Court on 23.12.2003. After that Shri S.C.Kainthla was promoted to the cadre of District Judge. The petitioner Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj was promoted to the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges on 27.10.2009. Although the seniority list was issued on 1.1.2010, whereby they were placed below respondents No.3 to 5; however, they did not challenge such seniority list. (d). After that Shri S.C.Kainthla was promoted to the cadre of District Judge. The petitioner Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj was promoted to the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges on 27.10.2009. Although the seniority list was issued on 1.1.2010, whereby they were placed below respondents No.3 to 5; however, they did not challenge such seniority list. (d). On merits, the High Court contended that no fault could be found in the assigned seniority and pointed out that before the year 2009, no posts were advertised through limited competitive examination. For the first time, on 21.10.2009, the posts from the limited competitive examination were advertised. However, after 31.3.2010, given the resolution of Hon'ble Committee dated 30.3.2010, the High Court took a conscious decision and applied 'post-based roster'. After that, all posts were filled in strictly, by following the 'post-based roster.' Thus, in a nutshell, the High Court responds that up to 31.3.2010, the High Court followed the 'vacancy-based roster,' and after that, the appointments were based on the 'postbased roster.' 35. The 3rd to 6th respondents, filed a common reply, in the following terms: (a). Private respondents took preliminary objections that the writ petitions were not maintainable and barred in law because of the specific provisions of Order 23 Rule 1, Order 2 Rule 2 (3) as well as Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the principles thereof as applicable to the Writ proceedings. It was also not maintainable as the petition suffers from the vice of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi. The petitioners repeatedly indulged in forum shopping and thus were not entitled to invoke this Hon'ble High Court's extraordinary Writ Jurisdiction. The respondents further submitted that the petitioners were members of the H.P. Judicial Service Officers Association. (b). It would be appropriate to reproduce Para 1 of the preliminary objections, mentioned in the reply filed by respondents 3 to 6, which reads as follows: “(a) That the H.P Judicial Service Officers Association and several other members thereof in a representative capacity filed WP(C ) 532 of 2009 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court in October, 2009. The said writ petition was filed through its then President Shri J.K. Sharma. A copy of the writ petition is annexed hereto as Annexure R3/A (without Annexures). The said writ petition was filed through its then President Shri J.K. Sharma. A copy of the writ petition is annexed hereto as Annexure R3/A (without Annexures). Perusal of the reliefs claimed therein will show that in law and in effect they encamp the same relief the same reliefs as enumerated in the present writ petition under reply. (b) That fearing that the Hon’ble Apex Court was not inclined to grant relief, the aforesaid writ petition annexure R3/A was withdrawn on 4.12.2009 by the said Association with specific liberty reserved in its favour to move this Hon’ble High Court instead. The copy of the order dated 4.12.2009 passed by Hon’ble Apex Court permitting the withdrawal of the aforesaid petition is appended hereto as annexure R3/B (without its annexures). (c) That consequent to the withdrawal of the aforementioned petition from the Hon’ble Apex Court, the Association then elected to file CWP 696 of 2010 in this Hon’ble High Court on 8.3.2010. A copy whereof is appended hereto as Annexure R3/C (without its annexure). A comparative perusal of the writ petition filed before the Apex Court annexure R3/B and CWP 696 (Annexure R3/C) filed in this High Court will show that in content as well as in the reliefs claimed the said two petitions are absolutely identical and there is no substantial variation.” (c). The Association had not impleaded the direct recruits as parties, with malafide intention, whereas all officers promoted after 1.4.2005 were necessary parties. On 4.11.2016, the Association had withdrawn CWP No.696 of 2010 unconditionally. It is averred that the petitions are hopelessly barred by delay, laches, the petitioners’ conduct, and acquiescence. The petitioner Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj was appointed in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges in the year 2009. In contrast, the second petition has been filed on 22.9.2018, i.e., after a gap of 9 years. (d). On merits, the private respondents plead that it is settled law that the seniority has to be reckoned from the date when the vacancy is allocable, which gives rise to a specific quota, even as per the Rota Quota. In any step-up, the seniority has to be reckoned from the date of vacancy applicable/allocable to the quota claimed by the petitioner. It can never be relegated back as is being wrongly claimed by the petitioners. In any step-up, the seniority has to be reckoned from the date of vacancy applicable/allocable to the quota claimed by the petitioner. It can never be relegated back as is being wrongly claimed by the petitioners. The recruitment process of the third respondent commenced in August/September 2003, under the Rules of 1973, i.e., the old rules. In its resolution dated 18.3.2004, the Hon'ble Full Court had recommended his case for appointment as Additional District and Sessions Judge to the Government of Himachal Pradesh for notification. Thus, following the settled legal position, he shall be deemed to have been recruited in the cadre in August/September 2003, before the notification of the Rules of 2004 on 20.03.2004. (e). The roster had to be prospective in its application and could not be retrospective. For these reasons, the Hon'ble High Court made the roster first time in the year 2010 and not before that. Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj was appointed in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges on 27.10.2009, the slot for limited competitive examination was available for the first time in 2009, under which Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj was appointed on 27.10.2009. As such, he has no right to claim seniority before that, and there is no violation of the directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, or any injustice caused to them. The private respondents concluded that the petitioners were fence-sitters and hence not entitled to any reliefs. 36. Ld. Single Bench of this Court heard both the writ petitions together and, vide Judgment dated 1.5.2019, dismissed the same. The concluding portion of the judgment reads as follows: (72). The cause of action, if any, arose to the petitioners on the dates when respondents No. 3 and 4 came to be appointed i.e. on 18.5.2004 and 7.12.2006 and having failed to assail their appointments and assignment of the seniority within time frame as provided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy’s case [ AIR 1974 SC 2271 ], they are not entitled to any relief(s) as claimed. (73). Since the writ petitions are being disposed of on the ground of delay and laches, acquiescence and also the clubbing of various causes of action, other preliminary objections raised by respondents N. 3 to 6 and merits of the case need not to be gone into…. 37. (73). Since the writ petitions are being disposed of on the ground of delay and laches, acquiescence and also the clubbing of various causes of action, other preliminary objections raised by respondents N. 3 to 6 and merits of the case need not to be gone into…. 37. Challenging the writ petitions' dismissal, the appellants filed Intra Court Appeals under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent constituting the High Court of Judicature at Lahore, the 21st March 1919, as extended to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. 38. The Letters Patent Appeals were posted for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court. However, vide judgments dated 11.03.2020, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary dismissed the LPAs, whereas, Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur allowed the same in entirety, including on its merits. Given the dissenting judgments, the Division Bench directed the Registry to put up the matter before Hon'ble the Chief Justice for further orders. 39. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Central Government imposed a complete lockdown in the entire country w.e.f. 25 Mar 2020. After the Government gave some relaxations, the Courts' working also partially started through video conference, and the Hon'ble Chief Justice assigned the case to the third Judge, the present Court. 40. When this Court took up the matter for final hearing through video conference, the private respondents No. 3 to 6, under the affidavit of Shri Chirag Bhanu Singh, the 5th respondent, filed an application (CMP No. 5772 of 2020), stating that given Clause 26 of the Letters Patent, the Ld. Judges were supposed to state the point(s) upon which they had differed, and only after that, the case shall then be heard on that point by one or more of the other Judges, and the point shall be decided according to the opinion of the majority of the Judges who have heard the case, including those who first heard it. The applicants sought a declaration that the reference to the third Judge was incomplete in the absence of stating the points of difference. The applicants sought a declaration that the reference to the third Judge was incomplete in the absence of stating the points of difference. The applicants further wanted this Court to return the reference for framing a proper reference on the points of difference between the divergent views, and in the alternative refer the matter to Hon'ble the Chief Justice to pass necessary orders in terms of Rule 5 of Appellate Side Rules for the High Court of Himachal Pradesh for constituting a full bench to hear the matter. 41. Admittedly, after pronouncing dissenting verdicts, Ld. Division Bench could not state the points of difference in terms of clause 26 of Letters Patent. Apparently, it was because the Division Bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur pronounced their dissenting judgments on 11th March 2020, the last working day of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, when he reached the age of superannuation. Given above, the Hon’ble Division Bench probably could not get time to state the points of difference. Accordingly, Ld. Division Bench directed that the matter be put up before Hon’ble the Chief Justice for further orders. Thus, the Division Bench never requested Hon’ble the Chief Justice to constitute a new division bench for the purpose of culling out the points of difference. 42. Vide order dated 26.10.2020, passed in CMP 5772 of 2020, the present Court decided the said application, and the relevant portion of the reasoning reads as follows: [58]. Now, culling out the points of a difference does not require analysis and forming an opinion on the matter's merits. Hypothetically, even if this job was to be done by a new division bench, this Court can also do the same. In the Application filed under S. 26 of Letters Patent, even the applicant has thrown light on some points of difference. The Doctrine of necessity would empower this Court to cull out the points of difference so that the matter does not linger on, and at least the Courts pronounce the final verdict, before the loss caused to the petitioners become irreversible. Given above, I proceed to cull out and state the points of difference from the dissenting verdicts in the Letters Patent Appeals, of equally divided bench of two Judges. 43. Given above, I proceed to cull out and state the points of difference from the dissenting verdicts in the Letters Patent Appeals, of equally divided bench of two Judges. 43. Vide order dated 26.10.2020, passed in CMP 5772 of 2020, the present Court culled out the following points of difference: “Whether the High Court can ignore the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , merely on the principles of delay, laches, and acquiescence?” “Whether, similar to the judgment authored by Hon’ble Justice Sureshwar Thakur, following the principles of remand laid down in Roma Sonkar v. Madhya Pradesh State Public Service Commission and another, Civil Appeal Nos. 7400- 7401/2018, decided on 31.7.2018, the judgment authored by Hon’ble Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary was also a decision on the merits or not?” This Court further observed in the following terms, “[63]. Another question that ponders over is the similarity of foundational facts the general points, and as such, the hearing on preliminary submissions required touching the foundational facts? Thus, was Hon’ble Justice Sureshwar Thakur justified in deciding the matter of merits? To the contrary, as reflected from the order sheets and judgments authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Tarlok Chauhan and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, in the absence of arguments addressed and heard on merits, would it be appropriate and justiciable for this Court to give his opinion or decide the entire matter on merits? And if such an eventuality arises, whether to return the case to Hon’ble Chief Justice of High Court to assign the same to this Court or to constitute a new bench, for listing the entire matter on merits? Furthermore, whether these questions state the point of difference or not or might fall in the scope of points of difference culled out by me, following clause 26 of Letters Patent, and as stated above, it is left open for the parties to argue this aspect at the time of the hearing. Similarly, an occasion would not arise to discuss and return a finding on Rule 5 of High Court Appellate Rules for sending a reference to Hon’ble Chief Justice for the full bench constitution.” 44. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 26.10.2020, passed in CMP 5772 of 2020, the 2nd respondent High Court of Himachal Pradesh filed two identical review petitions. Similarly, an occasion would not arise to discuss and return a finding on Rule 5 of High Court Appellate Rules for sending a reference to Hon’ble Chief Justice for the full bench constitution.” 44. Feeling aggrieved by the order dated 26.10.2020, passed in CMP 5772 of 2020, the 2nd respondent High Court of Himachal Pradesh filed two identical review petitions. During the pendency of the review petitions, High Court also filed identical applications (CMP No.14233 & 14235/2020 in RP No.73 & 74/2020) pointing out some points of difference. Vide order dated 3.3.2021, this Court dismissed both the review petitions. However, from the application, this Court accepted point no. (d) as an additional point of difference, and observed that this point (d) shall also be considered in terms of Para 63 of the order dated 26.10.2020. The said point is extracted as under: “Whether in view of the fact that the Hon’ble Single Judge who heard the disputed questions only on preliminary objections without hearing the arguments on the merits of the case and accepting two out of the several preliminary objections raised before him and also not deciding all the preliminary objections raised and argued and dismissing the writ petition without going into the merits of the case and on appeal again without arguments being heard and addressing by the counsels of both side on merits but only on the preliminary submissions could any of the Judges of the Division Bench decide the case on merits and allow the writ petition without findings on merits by the Single Judge or hearing the case on merits by the Division Bench.” 45. The private respondents 3 to 6 jointly challenged the aforementioned order dated October 26, 2020, passed in CMP 5772 of 2020, before Division Bench, by filing Letters Patent Appeals. Ld. Counsel stated that on 4.3.2021, a Special Principal Division Bench of this Court has reserved the judgment in the said LPA. This Court is informed that vide judgement dated 22.3.2021, passed in LPA Nos. 82 and 83 of 2020, Ld. Special Principal Division Bench dismissed the same being not maintainable. 46. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and perused the records, as well as the Judicial precedents cited by Ld. Counsel representing appellants, and the respondents Nos. 2 to 6. 47. Mr. Shrawan Dogra and Mr. R.K. Bawa, Ld. Sr. 82 and 83 of 2020, Ld. Special Principal Division Bench dismissed the same being not maintainable. 46. I have heard Ld. Counsel for the parties and perused the records, as well as the Judicial precedents cited by Ld. Counsel representing appellants, and the respondents Nos. 2 to 6. 47. Mr. Shrawan Dogra and Mr. R.K. Bawa, Ld. Sr. Advocates appearing for the appellants, argued as follows: (a). The entire Lis revolves around the inaction on the part of the High Court in not implementing the directions passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in All India Judges' Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 . At the time of appointment of the private respondents 3 to 6, no post existed for the category of "Direct Recruits". Per the mandate of Judges' Association case, (supra), wherein direction was to follow post-based roster as already held in R. K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745 . Based on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's above directions, the appellants claim seniority from the date of their appointments. The 2nd respondent, i.e., the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, was under an obligation to comply with the directions issued under Articles 141 & 142 to follow the post-based roster w.e.f. 31.3.2003. Having failed to do so till 30th March 2010, Hon'ble High Court should have applied the principle of push down and redrawn the seniority list in light of the directions passed in the Judges' Associations case (supra). On the failure of Hon'ble High Court in implementing the mandatory directions, the appellants have knocked on this Court's doors. (b). In compliance with the above timebound directions, the High Court of HP amended the Rules in 2004, incorporating the ratio of 2:1:1 for all the three sources of recruitment, i.e., by way of the promotion 50%; limited competitive examination 25%; and direct recruitment 25%. However, per the Hon’ble Supreme Court's directions of 2010, the quota of 25% of the limited competitive examination was reduced from 25% to 10%, and allocation by way of promotion was increased from 50% to 65%. The High Courts were required to follow the new rules framed per Judges Association’s case (supra). Almost all High Courts throughout the country had followed it meticulously, except the High Court of H.P., which flagrantly violated its own rules till 2010. The High Courts were required to follow the new rules framed per Judges Association’s case (supra). Almost all High Courts throughout the country had followed it meticulously, except the High Court of H.P., which flagrantly violated its own rules till 2010. However, when Judges Committee of High Court of HP took a severe note in its report dated 30 Mar 2010, the 2nd respondent, i.e., High Court of HP, started implementing it w.e.f. 31 Mar 2010. The stand of the High Court of HP not to follow the post-based roster from 31 Mar 2003 but from 31 Mar 2010 violates the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India issued in Judges Association’s case (supra); which amounts to a statement of the law of the land. None can interpret or undermine the highest Court’s mandate and the said directions constitute the foundational facts. (c). Although, the appellants are not challenging the appointments of the private respondents, yet their induction was in violation of the law declared by the Apex Court, whereby not only the source is identified, but the procedure is also prescribed. Based on such directions, this Court had framed the Rules of 2004, and Rule 5 thereof, explicitly mentions about the post-based roster. Despite the Hon'ble Supreme Court's orders, the 2nd respondent did not make appointments following the postbased roster but illegally applied the vacancy-based roster. In 2004, 2006, 2007 & 2009, per Rule 5 of the Rules of 2004, no post was available for direct recruitments because the number of incumbents already appointed under direct recruitment was more than their quota. Despite this, High Court initiated the appointment process under ‘Direct appointments’; thus, such selections dehors the Rules of 2004. The directions given in Judges’ Associations case (supra) were binding on the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, and it was contemptuous for the High Court to implement the directions from 2010, i.e., much after 31.3.2003. (d). Appellants' Counsel further prayed for the application of the "Doctrine of Push Down." They stated that the crux of the matter is that the direct recruits exceeded their quota. Resultantly, the seniority list is not as per the Rules of 2004. In service matters, when this type of situation occurs, a person, who is unduly holding a post, which he is legally not entitled to hold, there are principles of push down. Resultantly, the seniority list is not as per the Rules of 2004. In service matters, when this type of situation occurs, a person, who is unduly holding a post, which he is legally not entitled to hold, there are principles of push down. The effect of this principle would be that the institution does not throw them out. They are kept in the side corner, waiting for their turn. They are also protected, and they wait for their due turn. The appellants' prayer and the consequent grant acceding to such a prayer would ultimately give relief to the appellants and do justice to the private respondents. The push-down principle should be applied. In the absence of the posts available under the respective category, the persons appointed under the said category will slide down to the place from the date of appointment of the person whose slot they had usurped. Seniority is a connotation of ranking persons based on some known principles of service. The corollary is that the persons who are appointed or promoted would be ranked in seniority as per roster point. The law declared by the Apex Court about such appointments is that they will have to wait in queue till the time their turn comes to an appropriate position, as per the post-based roster. The petitioners claim that the High Court of HP be directed to prepare a new seniority list strictly following the directions of All India Judges' Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , and the private respondents be slid down in the seniority list on the date of availability of such post against the category of 'Direct Recruitment' by applying the principle of "Push Down." (e). On delay, laches, and acquiescence, Ld. Sr. Advocates argued that the nature of the controversy is non-implementation/non-compliance of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and none can impose any rider for its dilution, negation, or non-implementation. The Rules of 2004 came into force w.e.f. 20.3.2004. The writ petition filed in 1999 had no bearing because at that time Rules of 1973 were in force, whereas by the time, High Court decided the writ petition in the year 2005, the directions given in All India Judges' Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 had already come in force. There can neither be a waiver nor any estoppel against the law. There can neither be a waiver nor any estoppel against the law. On 4.9.2009, H.P. Judicial Officers Association passed a resolution and decided to seek enforcement of post-based roster, following Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions, in Judges Associations (supra). Delay will neither make such directions redundant nor entitle the High Court to implement it only w.e.f. 31-03-2010 and not w.e.f. 31-03- 2003. The Institution is unfair to the Appellants because it was the Institution who had to implement the directions issued in Judges Associations case (supra), by giving what fell from such mandatory directions. The petitioners did not agitate the matter further on the judicial side on the assumption that the respondents will do justice to them without forcing them to approach the Court of law. In the year 2009, a representation filed by one of the Appellants was kept pending for quite a long time, and after that, it was rejected mechanically, without assigning any reason. After that, the Appellants moved IA No.334 of 2014 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Irrespective of the Appellants' conduct, or the failure to challenge the representation's rejection, the Hon'ble Supreme Court's direction, which is the law of the land, can neither be ignored nor be slept over. Any delay by the High Court in not following the Supreme Court’s decision in the Judges Associations case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , will not give it a right to not follow the same, on the ground of delay and laches or to make it redundant. The Appellants had legitimate expectations that a Constitutional body like High Court would comply with the directions. (f). The second limb of this argument is that there was no delay on the part of the appellants because the cause of action will accrue when High Court implements the judgment and finalizes the seniority list, which has not been done till date. High Court is yet to enforce the directions given in the case of All India Judges’ Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , in letter and spirit. The cause of action to raise the dispute will arise not before implementing the judgment but would arise after its implementation. (g). On the points of difference, whether arguments were addressed on merits of the case or not, Ld. Sr. The cause of action to raise the dispute will arise not before implementing the judgment but would arise after its implementation. (g). On the points of difference, whether arguments were addressed on merits of the case or not, Ld. Sr. Counsel contended that the entire matter is deemed to have been argued and heard on its merits because the foundational facts intermingled with the preliminary facts, which revolve around implementation of Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions passed in the case of Judges' Association (supra). Preliminary objections are always taken up first because the opposing party's contention is to hear these preliminary objections before entering the field of merits, and the Courts do not touch the case's merits, and preliminary objections are decided. However, it is not a general rule. In the present matter, while deciding preliminary objections, Hon'ble Judges had to refer to the foundational facts, which are so intermixed with the remaining facts that the arguments covered the entire merits. Ld. Sr. Advocate read para 5 to 31 of the judgment passed by learned Single Judge and Para 47 of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary's judgment to indicate merits' discussions. Ld. Counsel advanced their contentions by stating that none of the Hon'ble Judges could have decided the preliminary issues without considering foundational facts, which cover the entire facts. Thus, the arguments addressed on the preliminary issues also cover all the points, and nothing survives to be discussed on merits. 48. Mr. Nand Lal Thakur, Ld. Additional Advocate General representing the 1st respondent, i.e., State of Himachal Pradesh, contended that the State is not the contesting party. The dispute is between the incumbents and the Hon’ble High Court. Mr. Thakur further stated that the State of Himachal Pradesh had not violated any direction issued in the Judges Association case (supra). The appointment process is based upon the roster maintained by the Registry of the 2nd respondent i.e., Hon’ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh; and the Public Service Commission follows it. Thus, the State has no role to play in the matter, and no cause of action arises against it. 49. Mr. Kapil Dev Sood. Ld. Sr. Advocate appearing for the 2nd respondent High Court of Himachal Pradesh handed over the written submissions. His arguments are as follows: (a). Thus, the State has no role to play in the matter, and no cause of action arises against it. 49. Mr. Kapil Dev Sood. Ld. Sr. Advocate appearing for the 2nd respondent High Court of Himachal Pradesh handed over the written submissions. His arguments are as follows: (a). There was no adjudication on merits of the cases either by the Hon'ble Single Judge or by the two Hon'ble Judges constituted to hear the Letters Patent Appeals. He drew attention to the reply filed in the Writ Petition of Shri S.C. Kainthla. The High Court's stand is that as per judgment of 2002 of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in All India Judges case (supra), the State Government in consultation with the High Court framed the H.P. Judicial Services Rules, 2004 vide notification dated 20.3.2004. After that, the matter regarding amendment in Rules, 2004 qua experience (under rule 5 Col.4(1) (a) and 4(1) (b), was under consideration and the State Government vide notification dated 08.11.2005 amended the said Rules, 2004. The Regulations regarding filling up the vacancies in the cadre mentioned above were framed on 21.09.2004 (by promotion), 19.05.2005 (by limited competitive examination), and 24.08.2005 (by direct recruitment). After framing the Rules described above, 2004 and Regulations, 2005, the High Court processed the matter for filling up the vacancies in the ratio of 50:25:25 as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court's direction in its judgment of 2002 (supra). However, to fill up the vacancies of the quota of Limited Competitive examination, the matter regarding reckoning of service of five years in the cadre of Civil Judge (Senior Division) was under consideration and vide Hon'ble Full Court Resolution dated 30.06.2006 it was resolved that for determining the eligibility for promotion against the 25% quota, only the service of 'Five Years' rendered in the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division) in the past service shall be counted and that services rendered as Sub Judge, even though concurrently functioning as Additional Chief Judicial Magistrates shall not be counted and reckoned. (b). As per the Full Court resolution mentioned above, only five judicial officers were found eligible against the 25% quota of the limited competitive examination. It was resolved that the said five judicial officers only be considered for promotion against the said quota. (b). As per the Full Court resolution mentioned above, only five judicial officers were found eligible against the 25% quota of the limited competitive examination. It was resolved that the said five judicial officers only be considered for promotion against the said quota. Since there were five vacancies and only five judicial officers were found eligible, not many eligible officers could be put to the test against five vacancies. In the interest of the administration of justice, the large number of vacancies could not have been kept vacant for a long time for want of eligible judicial officers against 25% quota; therefore, the Hon'ble Full Court in its meeting held on 30.03.2006 took a conscious decision and decided to fill up the said vacancies by promotion, limited competitive examination, and direct recruitment, i.e., three by promotion, one by limited competitive examination and one by the direct recruitment. After the above decision, as per the list given in the note of learned Registrar General dated 06.01.2006, the Judicial Officer at Sr. No.1, namely Shri S.C. Kainthla, was to become eligible in June 2006. Two judicial officers at Sr. No.2 and 3 of the said list were to become eligible against the 25% quota in July 2007 and December 2007, respectively. The rest of the judicial officers were to become eligible from the year 2008-2009 onwards. Therefore, in the absence of a sufficient number of eligible judicial officers, the vacancies under 25% quota, i.e., limited competitive examination, could not have been filled up by conducting the said test before 2009. (c). As soon as many Judicial officers became eligible against the said quota in the year 2008-2009, the High Court of H.P. advertised one existing and two future vacancies on 30.03.2009 to be filled up by way of limited competitive examination. After that, by way of corrigendum, one future vacancy against 10% of future vacancies was withdrawn as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court's direction. Out of 15 Judicial Officers, only one Judicial Officer, namely Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj, could qualify for the said test, and accordingly, he was appointed against the said quota. After that, by way of corrigendum, one future vacancy against 10% of future vacancies was withdrawn as per the Hon'ble Supreme Court's direction. Out of 15 Judicial Officers, only one Judicial Officer, namely Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj, could qualify for the said test, and accordingly, he was appointed against the said quota. Further, the Hon'ble Committee constituted in the year 2009 to scrutinize the roster, the total strength of DJ/ADJ, and the post occupied by each category that is 50% by promotion, 25% by limited competitive examination, and 25% by direct recruitment, after examination of entire record/seniority, recommended that there is no need to reopen the seniority under the H.P. Higher Judicial Service Rules, 1973 which stands settled. In the meeting of the said committee held on 10.09.2009, it was also observed that till 2009 no limited competitive exam was held. However, the officers belonging to the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division) did not, in any manner, suffer because the quota of limited directed recruitment was given to the promotees based on seniority. The recommendations described above/decisions of the Hon'ble Committees and Hon'ble Full Courts would show that till 2009, the post-based roster could not have been maintained strictly in the absence of a sufficient number of eligible judicial officers under 25% quota meant for limited competitive examination. Therefore, it is wrong to say by the petitioners that the High Court has not implemented the said 2002 judgment. Mr. Kapil Dev Sood Ld. Sr. Advocate emphatically relied upon the Judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of Punjab, AIR 2018 SC 5284 , (paras 9, 10, 11, 20, 29, 30, 31, 33, 39 & 40). 50. Mr. Rakeshwar Lal Sood, and Mr. Bipin Chander Negi, Ld. Sr. Advocates, representing 3rd & 4th respondents, i.e., Shri Sushil Kukreja & Shri Virender Singh, and representing 5th & 6th respondents, i.e., Shri Chirag Bhanu Singh & Shri Arvind Malhotra, respectively, contended in the following terms: (a). Ld. Counsel referred to para 40 of All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , which stipulates that any clarification that may be required in respect of any matter arising out of this decision would be sought only from the Supreme Court. Ld. Counsel referred to para 40 of All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , which stipulates that any clarification that may be required in respect of any matter arising out of this decision would be sought only from the Supreme Court. The proceedings, if any, for implementation of the directions given in this judgment shall be filed exclusively in Supreme Court, and no other Court shall entertain them. Thus, the Apex Court categorically excluded High Court, and as such, the writ petition would not lie. On March 13, 2018, the Apex Court observed in IA 334 of 2014, filed in W.P.(C) No. 1022/1989, All India Judges Association v. Union of India, that it appears from the materials on record, that the disputes relate to inter se the individuals/groups, which, in Supreme Court’s considered view, would not be appropriate for determination by Supreme Court in an I.A. Thus, the Hon’ble Supreme Court declined to entertain the I.A. any further, leaving the parties to resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law. If the Apex Court believed that its orders were yet not enforced, it would have implemented it. But it did not happen. What the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not done cannot be done by anyone else. It is the principle of law. The prayer not allowed is the relief declined. Given Para 40 (supra), the remedy available in law, if any, was only before Supreme Court and not before High Court, and when the Hon’ble Supreme Court passes an order, its compliance cannot be done by invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. (b). This Court would not be concerned with the judgment passed by Ld. Single Judge because the matter is referred only due to the dissenting judgments of Division Bench that had heard the Letters Patent Appeals. Even otherwise, the judgment passed by Ld. Single Judge got merged with the judgment of the Division Bench. Per the scope of clause 26 of the Letters Patent coupled with the pronouncement of Full Bench of Lahore High Court, in case titled Royal Calcutta Turf Club v. Lala Kishan Chand Manchanda, AIR 1943 Lahore 84, this Court can only give an opinion on the points of difference and is precluded from deciding the entire matter. Per the scope of clause 26 of the Letters Patent coupled with the pronouncement of Full Bench of Lahore High Court, in case titled Royal Calcutta Turf Club v. Lala Kishan Chand Manchanda, AIR 1943 Lahore 84, this Court can only give an opinion on the points of difference and is precluded from deciding the entire matter. Unlike S. 392 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, clause 26 of the Letters Patent does not give any similar powers to the third judge. Ld. Sr. Advocates further submitted that as per Clause 26 of Letters Patent, being the third Judge, this Court is not an Appellate Court but a Referee Court. (c). The appellants' arguments that the High Court had been sleeping over the matter and for this reason, it was a continuous cause of action, and till the time it is implemented, the petitions would have rights to approach the Court, are misconceived. Had there been any violation of the roster system, then the applicants were at liberty to have taken appropriate steps. Based on a compromise, CWP 61 of 1999 was disposed of vide order dated 18.4.2005. They did not challenge the rejection of the representations made pursuant to order dated 18.4.2005, until 2009, when they filed WP (C) No. 532 of 2009, before the Apex Court, which they withdrew and filed CWP 696 of 2010 before this Court, which they withdrew without any liberty reserved to re-agitate. Ld. Counsel further argued that the reasoning in the dissenting judgment of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur that seniority was in a state of flux is unsupported, and except in the concluding portion of the decision, where his Lordship sets aside the judgment of Ld. Single Judge, Ld. dissenting Judge did not discuss the reasons for taking a different view from the reasoning of Hon'ble Single Judge, on the points of delay, laches, and waiver, etc. (d). By placing reliance upon Sahara’s case, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , on page 517, Ld. Counsel contended that the appellants did not file any contempt petition, more so when the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of their Writ and IAs. Thus, appellants’ rights might be existing, but the relief is lost. (e). (d). By placing reliance upon Sahara’s case, (2014) 8 SCC 470 , on page 517, Ld. Counsel contended that the appellants did not file any contempt petition, more so when the Hon’ble Supreme Court was seized of their Writ and IAs. Thus, appellants’ rights might be existing, but the relief is lost. (e). The decision of Roma Sonkar’s case, (supra), nowhere lays down a general rule that even if the Single Judge, as in the present case, did not hear the case on merits, still the Division Bench should hear the same on merits, and proceed to decide on the merits. (f). The petitioners unconditionally withdrew CWP No. 696 of 2010. The unconditional withdrawal leads to an adjudication of the appellants' right and ends with the decision's culmination. In the absence of the Court reserving any liberty to re-agitate, the continuity of cause of action finishes, even if at all there was any such continuity. The unconditional withdrawal operates as res judicata against the appellants. On this point, no arguments were addressed because arguments were confined to the preliminary submissions of delay, laches, acquiescence alone, and nothing else. (g). The petitioners could not claim any benefit on the strength of the interlocutory orders passed in IA. Given the dismissal of IAs, such interlocutory orders will cease to survive after the original proceeding came to an end. (h). Ld. Senior Advocates vehemently argued that there could not be a decision without inviting arguments. All along, it is the case of seniority, and the judgment of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur also discussed seniority, although no arguments were advanced. Reliance on R.K. Sabharwal (supra) is misplaced, and it amounts to touching the merits in the absence of any arguments. The Hon'ble Judges, who constituted the Committee, categorically concluded and recorded that they did not even consider the direct recruits' objections. It was for Hon'ble Supreme Court to accept or reject this report. Ld. Counsel placed reliance upon B.S. Jag Jeevan Kumar v. High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana & Andhra Pradesh, 2017 SCC Online Hyderabad 709, and submitted that the most fundamental Rule relating to seniority is that a person cannot get seniority from a date anterior to the date of his appointment to the service, and he cannot get seniority over a person appointed years earlier to them merely based on the roster. Based on the roster point, the appellants cannot steal a march by pushing down the private respondents. Ld. Counsel drew the attention of this Court to (2008) 8 SCC, 648, paras 5 and 7; (2013) 9 SCC 659 , paras 81 and 83; 2013 (137) DRJ 523 paras 19, 20; (2019) 16 SCC 28 para 27.5; and (2020) 5 SCC, 689, paras 28, 44. 51. In rebuttal, Mr. Shrawan Dogra and Mr. R.K. Bawa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants contended as follows: (a). Paragraph 40 of Judges' Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , is only concerning the clarifications or to clear doubts about its implementation. So far as the petitioners are concerned, they have clarity and have no doubts or confusion concerning the implementation of the directions, i.e., the post-based roster has to be followed from 31.3.2003 and not 31.3.2010. In case, High Court needed any clarification, then per para 40, it should have gone to the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Para 40 stares at the respondents and not at the appellants. Hon'ble High Court being an impartial umpire, should have acted reasonably to all categories and implemented the directions in letter and spirit. The non-compliance of the Hon'ble Supreme Court's judgment by the High Court itself will not be rendered infructuous or inapplicable by any efflux of time. (b). Given the peculiar history of the case, Clause 26 of the Letters Patent is to be read with the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court, wherein vide order dated 14.2.2021, immediately upon the delivery of the judgment of this Court, the entire matter will be transferred to the Hon’ble Supreme Court on March 30, 2021. Thus, the third Judge has to give an independent decision, which would be impartial. In this situation, the matter will go to the Apex Court, with three opinions for consideration. (c). On merits, as per Clause 26, when two judges differ in their opinions, then the third Judge would give his independent opinion, and the decision will be that of the majority. Thus, the objection of private respondents is fallacious. In this particular case, purposive interpretation is to be given to Clause 26 of Letters Patent. The third judge's role in this given situation is like an extension of the Division Bench. At times, opinions may be different in a concurring judgment, but the decision is one. Thus, the objection of private respondents is fallacious. In this particular case, purposive interpretation is to be given to Clause 26 of Letters Patent. The third judge's role in this given situation is like an extension of the Division Bench. At times, opinions may be different in a concurring judgment, but the decision is one. The decision consists of opinions, and it is the opinion of a Judge, which leads to a decision. The third judge's role in an LPA is similar to the third judge's role in CrPC and CPC. (d). Till date, the High Court has not clarified as to whether it has complied with the judgment or not. The limitation is not a straitjacket formula. It depends on the circumstances of the case. Rules have been framed, but they have not been implemented. Seniority has not been finally settled. The gradation lists are not conclusive proof of seniority. Based on such lists, it cannot be said that seniority has been finally and conclusively settled. The tentative lists are published, and objections are invited. Only after those objections are decided, the seniority is settled. Ld. Sr. Counsel have also referred to a Division bench judgment of this Court passed in LPA 74 of 2017, in Rajinder Sharma v. High Court of Himachal Pradesh. Appellants submit that there is no willful delay in approaching the Hon’ble court, and instead, appellants brought this fact to the notice of the Hon’ble Court to comply with the judgment in letter and spirit as a whole. So, the petition is maintainable and does not suffer from delay and laches etc. (e). If the High Court has any difficulty in implementing the judgment, it should approach the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The appellants want seniority from the date of their respective appointments, when admittedly based on the roster, such posts existed, and thus slide down or push down the private respondents by placing below the appellants, because at the time of their appointments no posts were existing. For the intervening period, the recruitment of the private respondents be treated on an Adhoc basis. An appointment can only be made against an available post in a particular category. If a post for direct recruits was not available in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, no appointment could have been made. For the intervening period, the recruitment of the private respondents be treated on an Adhoc basis. An appointment can only be made against an available post in a particular category. If a post for direct recruits was not available in 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, no appointment could have been made. Now, it is settled law that if some illegal appointments have been made without the post's availability, then the appointee would be a deemed usurper of the office. Rota quota has to be maintained, and thus, the appellants, whose posts the private respondents had usurped, should be given seniority. In 2010, the Hon'ble Judges Committee of this Court observed that High Court was wrong in continuing the ‘vacancy-based roster’ instead of the ‘postbased roster’, and accordingly, w.e.f. 31.03.2010, the High Court started following the post-based roster. The dispute is the erroneous appointments made w.e.f. 31-03-2003 to 30-03-2010. Seniority would be relevant only amongst the eligible persons, and that is the settled law. A person is said to be eligible only if he is appointed following the law, and otherwise, it dehors the rules. For a person who is not appointed correctly, there is no question of fixing his seniority. Irregular appointments dehors the rules. The High Court should not have advertised the post for direct recruitment, the explanations offered are afterthoughts, and the institution should have been neutral. DISCUSSIONS, ANALYSIS, AND REASONING: 52. The appellants' grievance is that instead of following the "post-based roster" directed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the Judges' Association case (supra), the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, 2nd respondent, continued to pursue "vacancybased roster" up to 31.3.2010. At the time of the appointments of respondents 3 to 6, the quota for direct recruits as per roster points of Rule 5 of The Rules of 2004, did not exist because it was already exhausted. Thus, the appointments of respondents 3 to 6 were more than the quota earmarked for direct recruits, and their appointments dehors the Rules of 2004. Such an arrangement would not confer any right. Consequently, they cannot claim their seniority due to the reasons that the appointment had exceeded their quota. The mandate of Hon'ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , stares at the respondents. 53. Such an arrangement would not confer any right. Consequently, they cannot claim their seniority due to the reasons that the appointment had exceeded their quota. The mandate of Hon'ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , stares at the respondents. 53. Shri S.C. Kainthla was promoted on merit-cum-seniority under 50% quota of the feeder category of Civil Judge (Senior Division); Mr. Rajeev Bhardwaj promoted through limited departmental competitive examination under 25% quota belongs to the category of limited competitive examination(s) conducted from amongst the cadre of Civil Judges (Sr. Division); and the respondents 3 to 6 belong to the category of direct recruits under 25% quota i.e., from the eligible Advocates' envisaged stream. 54. Rule 5 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 prescribes the method of recruitment, qualification, and age limit for the aspirants, as drawn from various categories/streams, and reads as follows: “5. Method of recruitment, qualification and age limit: - In respect of each category of posts specified in column (2) of the table below, the method of recruitment and minimum qualification, age limit etc. shall be as specified in the corresponding entries in columns (3) and (4) thereof. Sr.No. Cadre Method of recruitment Qualification, Age limit & experience etc. 1. District Judge/ Addl. District Judge a) 50% (now 65 %) by way of promotion amongst the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) on the basis of principle of merit-cum-seniority and passing a suitability test as may be prescribed and conducted by the High Court in accordance with the regulations. Minimum service of five years including the service rendered in the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior Division). (b) 25% (now 10%) by promotion from amongst Civil Judges (Sr. Divn.) on the basis of merit through limited competive examination as may be prescribed and conducted by the High Court in accordance with the regulations. (c) 25% by direct recruitment from amongst eligible Advocates on the basis of examination written as well as oral (viva voce) test as may be prescribed and conducted by the High Court in accordance with the regulations. The following shall be the eligibility criteria including qualifications, age limit and experience etc.- (i) Citizen of India. (ii) Holder of a degree in Law as recognized by the Bar Council of India. The following shall be the eligibility criteria including qualifications, age limit and experience etc.- (i) Citizen of India. (ii) Holder of a degree in Law as recognized by the Bar Council of India. (iii) Practising Advocate at the Bar for a minimum period of seven years as on the last date fixed for receipt of the applications. (iv) Must have attained the age of 35 (thirty five) years and must not have attained the age of 45 (forty five) years in the case of General Category candidates and 48 years in the case of candidates belonging to Scheduled Castes/ Scheduled Tribes and other Backward Classes as on the last date prescribed for receipt of applications. Note: For the purpose of this clause, in computing the period during which a person has been an Advocate there shall be included any period during which he has held a judicial office. Explanation:-I: Judicial Office includes any other office as may be prescribed being equivalent to a Judicial office, by the High Court in regulations made for this purpose. Explanation II: Appointments to the cadre of the District Judges/Addl. District Judges from categories (a), (b) and (c) shall be in accordance with post-based 34-point roster to be maintained by the High Court in this behalf. Note 1: Reservation in direct recruitment shall be as per Model Roster for cadre strength up to 31 posts. Note 2: In case the cadre strength is changed, the corresponding changes shall be made in the post-based roster. Note 3: The appointment already made shall not be affected on account of introduction of new roster. Explanation-III: The candidates who are employed in any Government department or in any other Organization are required to submit their application(s) through their respective employer(s). 55. Rule 13 of Himachal Pradesh Judicial Service Rules, 2004 reads as follows: Seniority Rule13 (1) Where officer are recruited to a cadre by promotion and direct recruitment, seniority shall be regulated by the roster maintained for such recruitment. Officer appointed against higher point of roster shall rank senior to the officer appointed a lower point. Provided that no person appointed to a cadre by direct recruitment shall for the purpose of fixation of his seniority claim any particular place in seniority unconnected with the date of his actual appointment. Officer appointed against higher point of roster shall rank senior to the officer appointed a lower point. Provided that no person appointed to a cadre by direct recruitment shall for the purpose of fixation of his seniority claim any particular place in seniority unconnected with the date of his actual appointment. (2) Where more than one Officers are promoted to cadre at the same time inter-se seniority of persons so promoted shall be determined by their inter-se seniority in the lower cadre. (3) Where direct recruitment is made to a cadre, the interse seniority of persons so recruited shall be in the order in which their names are arranged in the select list. (4) Every year in the month of January seniority list of Officers in all cadres shall be prepared and published by the High Court and the lists so published shall be issued for the purpose of making promotions to the next higher cadres. 56. Point of difference culled out by this Court, reads as follows: Whether, similar to the judgment authored by Hon’ble Justice Sureshwar Thakur, following the principles of remand laid down in Roma Sonkar v. Madhya Pradesh State Public Service Commission and another, Civil Appeal Nos. 7400- 7401/2018, decided on 31.7.2018, the judgment authored by Hon’ble Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary was also a decision on the merits or not? 57. In Roma Sonkar v. Madhya Pradesh State Public Service Commission, (2018) 17 SCC 106, the Division Bench of the High Court was not quite happy with the learned Single Judge's order moulding the relief and consequently remitted it to Single Judge. When the issue came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Court held that the Single Judge and the Division Bench exercise the same jurisdiction. To avoid inconvenience to the litigants, another tier of screening by the Division Bench is provided in terms of the High Court's power, but that does not mean that the Single Judge is subordinate to the Division Bench. Being a writ proceeding, the Division Bench was called upon, in the Intra Court Appeal, primarily to consider the correctness or otherwise of the Single Judge's view. Hence, per Hon’ble Supreme Court’s opinion, the Division Bench needed to consider the appeal(s) on merits by deciding on the correctness of the learned Single Judge's judgment, instead or remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge. 58. Hence, per Hon’ble Supreme Court’s opinion, the Division Bench needed to consider the appeal(s) on merits by deciding on the correctness of the learned Single Judge's judgment, instead or remitting the matter to the learned Single Judge. 58. To understand the factual position that whether the arguments before Hon’ble Single Bench as well as before Hon’ble Division Bench were heard only on the preliminary submissions/objections, or were also heard on merits, it would be appropriate to extract the relevant orders passed by Hon’ble Single Judge in CWP No. 2061/2018 and CWP No. 2292/2018, which read as follows: (a). Order dated 28.2.2019 reads as follows, “Arguments of the respondents on preliminary submissions/objections concluded. List for rebuttal arguments of the petitioner(s) on 01.03.2019.” (b). Order dated 05.03.2019 reads as follows, “Arguments on behalf of petitioner on preliminary submissions in CWP No. 2061 of 2018 concluded. Now to come up for arguments on behalf of petitioner in CWP No. 2292 of 2018, on preliminary submissions as also rebuttal arguments, on 07.03.2019.” (c). Order dated 12.3.2019 reads as follows, “The petitioners have concluded their arguments. Now to come up for rebuttal arguments on preliminary objections of the respondents on 15.3.2019.” (d). Order dated 18.3.2019, vide which the judgement reserved reads as follows, “Arguments heard. Judgement reserved on preliminary objections raised by the respondents regarding the maintainability of both these petitions.” (e). Judgment dated 1.5.2019, pronounced by Hon’ble single Judge in CWP No. 2061/2018 and CWP No. 2292/2018, relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: [3]. Before arguments on the merits of the case could be heard, the learned counsel for the respondents questioned the very maintainability of these petitions by raising various preliminary objections like delay and laches, the petition being barred by provisions contained in Order 23 Rule 1, Order 2 Rule 2 (3) and Section 11 CPC and the petitioners being guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi etc. [73]. Since the writ petitions are being disposed of on the ground of delay and laches, acquiescence and also the clubbing of various causes of action, other preliminary objections raised by respondents N. 3 to 6 and merits of the case need not to be gone into. 59. In LPAs 33 & 39 of 2019, regarding the extent of arguments addressed and heard, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary stated in the judgment in the following terms, [8]. 59. In LPAs 33 & 39 of 2019, regarding the extent of arguments addressed and heard, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary stated in the judgment in the following terms, [8]. As pointed out at the very outset, since both the writ petitions have been dismissed on the grounds of delay and laches, acquiescences and also bad on account of clubbing of various causes of action, therefore, the arguments heard only qua this part of the case as learned Single Judge has not touched the merits of the case and in case the findings recorded by learned Single Judge are not ultimately found to be legally and factually sustainable on analyzing the arguments to be addressed by the parties on both sides, we may proceed further to hear this matter on merits also because the Apex Court in Roma Sonkar vs. Madhya Pradesh State Public Service Commission & anr., Civil Appeal Nos. 7400-7401/2018, decided on 31.7.2018 has deprecated the practice of remanding of case to Single Judge while holding that the Single Judge is not subordinate to the Division Bench. Also that the Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal if sets aside the judgment of the Single Judge should not remand the same to learned Single Judge and rather decide on merits itself. Mr. R.L.Sood, learned Sr. Advocate has, however, addressed the arguments in support of the remaining undecided preliminary objections also as permission to do so was granted by vide order dated 9.8.2019 passed in CMP No. 7630 of 2019 and CMP No. 7632 of 2019 filed in these appeals. xxx xxx xxx [68]. Though respondents No. 3 to 6 were permitted to make submissions on all the remaining preliminary objections such as res judicata, conduct, behaviour of the petitioners and forum shopping and forum hunting, however, when both the writ petitions have been held to be barred by delay and laches and the petitioners on account of their acts, deeds and conduct have been held to be guilty of acquiescences, hence not entitled to the relief claimed in the writ petition, further discussion on the submissions made by Mr. R.L.Sood, learned arguing counsel on their behalf would amount to overload this judgment unnecessarily as even no useful purpose is also likely to be served thereby. 60. R.L.Sood, learned arguing counsel on their behalf would amount to overload this judgment unnecessarily as even no useful purpose is also likely to be served thereby. 60. A perusal of the above orders passed by the Hon’ble Judges of this Court establishes that arguments were made only to the preliminary submissions and were confined to ‘Delay and laches,’ and ‘Acquiescence,’ bar contained in Order 23 Rule 1, Order 2 Rule 2 (3) and Section 11 CPC, the petitioners being guilty of suppressio veri and suggestio falsi, conduct, forum shopping, and forum hunting, clubbing of various causes of action. Apparently, no arguments were addressed and heard on merits. Roma Sonkar (supra) did not confront a situation when arguments were confined to preliminary submissions and were not heard on merits. Thus, unlike the judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur, the judgment written by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary was not a decision on the merits of the case, and it confined only to delay and laches, and acquiescence. Based on the analysis mentioned above, in my opinion the arguments were heard on the preliminary issues but not on merits. 61. The point of difference mentioned by 2nd respondent, i.e., High Court of HP, reads as follows- “Whether in view of the fact that the Hon’ble Single Judge who heard the disputed questions only on preliminary objections without hearing the arguments on the merits of the case and accepting two out of the several preliminary objections raised before him and also not deciding all the preliminary objections raised and argued and dismissing the writ petition without going into the merits of the case and on appeal again without arguments being heard and addressing by the counsels of both side on merits but only on the preliminary submissions could any of the Judges of the Division Bench decide the case on merits and allow the writ petition without findings on merits by the Single Judge or hearing the case on merits by the Division Bench?” 62. The main contention of Mr. Shrawan Dogra and Mr. Raman Kumar Bawa, Ld. Sr. Advocates representing the appellants/petitioners is that the entire matter is deemed to have been argued and heard on its merits because the foundational facts intermingled with the preliminary facts, which are implementing Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions passed in Judges' Association case, (supra). The main contention of Mr. Shrawan Dogra and Mr. Raman Kumar Bawa, Ld. Sr. Advocates representing the appellants/petitioners is that the entire matter is deemed to have been argued and heard on its merits because the foundational facts intermingled with the preliminary facts, which are implementing Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions passed in Judges' Association case, (supra). In the present matter, while deciding preliminary objections, Hon'ble Judges had to refer to the foundational facts, which are so intermixed with the remaining facts that the arguments covered the entire merits. Thus, the arguments addressed on the preliminary issues also cover all the points, and nothing survived to be discussed on merits. 63. A glimpse of foundational facts to adjudicate the preliminary issue does not imply that such glance was sufficient to cover all arguments on the case's entire merits. Paras 5 to 31 of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Single Judge and para 47 of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary's judgment deals only with the facts. Had reference been made on merits, the Hon’ble Judges would have referred to so many more aspects. The reference in these two judgments on merits of the case is so narrow that it is comparable to a bird's eye view of not the entire landscape but only of a horizon. Thus, the foundational facts did not encompass the fundamental facts required to be addressed for adjudication on merits. 64. A perusal of the order sheets reproduced hereinbefore while answering the first point of difference establishes that arguments were confined to preliminary submissions/objections. The fact of restricting the arguments only on preliminary submissions/objections before Hon'ble Single Bench restrains the third Judge from touching those points on which the parties did not address any arguments before Hon'ble Single Bench and Hon'ble Division Bench. This Court refrains itself from discussing those points from the dissenting judgment passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Singh Thakur, on which the parties had not argued on merits. Thus, this Court answers the point proposed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh (2nd respondent) in light of these observations. Given above, in my opinion, neither Hon’ble Single Judge nor the Hon’ble Division Bench had heard the arguments on entire merits. During the hearing of the matter before me, Ld. Counsel did not address the arguments on each and every aspect of the entire merits of the case. Given above, in my opinion, neither Hon’ble Single Judge nor the Hon’ble Division Bench had heard the arguments on entire merits. During the hearing of the matter before me, Ld. Counsel did not address the arguments on each and every aspect of the entire merits of the case. Consequently, my opinion on this aspect is contrary to the findings recorded by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Singh Thakur. 65. The next point of difference culled out by this Court is: “Whether the High Court can ignore the directions of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , merely on the principles of delay, laches, and acquiescence?” 66. It would be appropriate to extract the discussions and reasoning of Hon’ble Single Judge in CWP No. 2061/2018 and CWP No. 2292/2018, on delay, laches, and acquiescence, etc., which reads as follows: [33]. In the sequence of events, as narrated above, it is clearly established on record that at the time when the petitioners sought to agitate the matter, it was only a stale or dead issue and it was more than settled that the issue of limitation or delay and laches has been considered with reference to the original cause of action and not with reference to the date on which an order is passed in compliance with a court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a representation issued without examining the merits, nor a decision given in compliance with such direction, will extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches. [34]. The petitioners are guilty since they have acquiesced in accepting the appointment of the private respondents from the date and day they came to be appointed and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions. The petitioners lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions. Secondly, because of acquiescence and waiver on the part of the petitioners, no relief can be granted to them as this would prejudicially affect rights of the private respondents. [35]. In such circumstances, there is no question why the Court should come to the rescue of such persons, when they themselves are guilty of acquiescence and waiver. [36]. Secondly, because of acquiescence and waiver on the part of the petitioners, no relief can be granted to them as this would prejudicially affect rights of the private respondents. [35]. In such circumstances, there is no question why the Court should come to the rescue of such persons, when they themselves are guilty of acquiescence and waiver. [36]. It is more than settled that there has to be an element of repose and a stale claim, more particularly to the one related to seniority and promotion, cannot be resuscitated. [37]. It is also beyond any cavil or doubt that the remedy under article 226 of the Constitution of India is a discretionary one. For sufficient or cogent reasons, the court may, in a given case, refuse to exercise its jurisdiction; delay and laches being one of them. While considering the question of delay and laches on the part of the petitioner, the court must also consider the effect thereof. [38]. As regards the service matters, more particularly, pertaining to seniority and promotion, the delay is to be strictly construed or else it would amount to unsettling the settled matters after a lapse of time. A person aggrieved by an order of promotion should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It has been further held that it is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle matters. [39]. Normally, delay itself may not defeat the party’s claim or relief unless the position of the opposite party has been irretrievably altered or would be put to undue hardship. [39]. Normally, delay itself may not defeat the party’s claim or relief unless the position of the opposite party has been irretrievably altered or would be put to undue hardship. Delay is not absolute impediment to exercise judicial discretion and rendering of substantial justice and such matters lie in the exclusive discretion of the Court, which discretion obviously has to be exercised fairly and justly. The underlying principle behind dismissal of petition on the ground of delay and laches is to discourage agitation of stale claim and has to be construed from the perspective of the opposite party being prejudiced especially when the delay effects others’ ripened rights, which may have attained finality. Each case will have to be decided on its own facts and merits. There may be cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, as observed above, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court. [40]. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime. [41]. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and the laches. The Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (Refer: Shiba Shankar Mohapatra and others vs. State of Orissa and others, (2010) 12 SCC 471 ). Xxx xxx xxx [46]. As observed above, the claim of the petitioners along with H.P. Judicial Officers’ Association came to be rejected by the Full Court vide its meeting on 22.8.2005 and such rejection was duly communicated to the association and the said rejection has not been assailed till date. xxx xxx xxx [48]. Xxx xxx xxx [46]. As observed above, the claim of the petitioners along with H.P. Judicial Officers’ Association came to be rejected by the Full Court vide its meeting on 22.8.2005 and such rejection was duly communicated to the association and the said rejection has not been assailed till date. xxx xxx xxx [48]. In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii)any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. [49]. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy afterwards to be asserted. In such cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.” (Refer U.P. Jal Nigam vs. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 para 12). [50]. It is by now settled principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and nonsuited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity “delay defeats equities”. [51]. If a party having a right stand by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. [52]. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. [52]. Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the Court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party looses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. These principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-existent. (Refer: Prabhakar vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and another, 2015 (15) SCC 1 ) [53]. The Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malcom Lawrence Cecil D’Souza vs. Union of India and others, AIR 1975 SC 1269 held that “although security of service cannot be used as a shield against administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirements of contentment and efficiency in public services is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible, to ensure that matters like one's position in the seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be reopened after lapse of many years at the instance of a party who has during the intervening period chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.” [54]. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to result in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time.” [54]. Thus, what appears to be more settled is that once seniority has been fixed and it remains in existence for a reasonable time, any challenge to the same should not be entertained. xxxx xxxxx xxxx [57]. This Court sees no reason to interfere with stale or dead claim presented in these writ petitions relating to seniority at this distance of time in view of the observations made in P.S. Sadasivaswamy’s case, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has guided that the matter of promotion and seniority should be agitated without delay and at least within six months or one year from the date of accrual of cause of action. The approach of the petitioners is found inordinately belated. [58]. Thus, it would be prudent for this Court not to interfere and create multiple complications of seniority etc. and upset the settled rights of others in the cadre. The petitions as against the rights of the private respondents suffers from inordinate delay and un-explained laches. [59]. This however not to suggest that law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not binding on this Court, but the manner in which the petitioners are now seeking its implementation/enforcement cannot be countenanced and the same now has to be enforced without disturbing seniority position of the direct recruits. xxx xxx xxx [66]. That apart, even the interim orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court will not enthuse a fresh lease of life or furnish a fresh cause of action to the petitioners to agitate a claim that was otherwise clearly a dead and stale claim. xxx xxx xxx [72]. The cause of action, if any, arose to the petitioners on the dates when respondents No. 3 and 4 came to be appointed i.e. on 18.5.2004 and 7.12.2006 and having failed to assail their appointments and assignment of the seniority within time frame as provided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.S. Sadasivaswamy’s case, they are not entitled to any relief(s) as claimed. 67. Similarly, it would also be appropriate to extract the discussions and reasoning of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, upholding the Judgment of Ld. 67. Similarly, it would also be appropriate to extract the discussions and reasoning of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, upholding the Judgment of Ld. Single Judge, in LPA 33 & 39 of 2019, on delay, laches, and acquiescence, etc., which read as follows: [57]. In the case in hand, the challenge on the ground of delay and laches to the writ petition is not only on behalf of respondent No. 2, the High Court but also the private respondents No. 3 to 6. [46]. The ratio of the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Himachal Pradesh & ors. vs. Rajesh Chander Sood (2016) 10 SCC 77 , is that in service matters, delay and laches or limitation may not thwart the claim so long as it may be, however, if such claim if allowed does not have any adverse repercussions on the settled third party rights. The present is a case where the seniority list of 2005 and also 2018 (Annexures P-2 & P-16, respectively) have been sought to be quashed. In case such relief is granted at such a belated stage, it will certainly amount to unsettle the seniority of the officers in the cadre settled long back which is not legally permissible. The arguments that S.C. Kainthla, petitioner in CWP No. 2061 of 2018 was inducted to the cadre in the year 2006 whereas Rajeev Bhardwaj in CWP No. 2292 of 2018 in the year 2009 and as such the cause of action accrued to them from the said date(s) is again without any help to the writ petitioners as they wake up from deep slumber for the first time only in the year 2014 when I.A. No. 334 of 2014 was filed in the Apex Court and thereafter when these writ petitions in the year 2018 in this Court. xxx xxx xxx [51]. The crux of the case law so cited, therefore, is that there should be no delay to challenge the seniority. The seniority fixed long ago should not be disturbed. [52]. No doubt in the case in hand, the subordinate Judicial Officers, including the member of the then H.P. Higher Judicial Service raked up the issue of excess quota of direct category candidates in the Higher Judicial Service and inter se seniority, however, either unsuccessfully or without taking such dispute to its logical end. In a case titled Rabindranath Bose & ors. In a case titled Rabindranath Bose & ors. vs. The Union of India & ors., (1970) 1 SCC 84 , where the dispute of seniority was brought to Court after about 15 years, it has been held by the Apex Court that petitioners are not entitled to the relief sought without there being any reasonable explanation as to why they approached the Court after such an inordinate delay…... xxx xxx xxx [66]. In view of what has been said hereinabove, it is held that the petitioners have laid stale claims in the writ petitions which certainly are barred by delay and laches. Therefore, allowing the writ petitions would certainly amount to unsettle the seniority position long back. The seniority lists w.e.f. 2005 onwards cannot also be quashed at this stage. Learned Single Judge, therefore, has not committed any illegality or irregularity while arriving at a conclusion that the claims laid by the petitioners in the writ petition being stale and also barred by delay and laches and also time barred cannot be accepted nor the settled seniority position can be unsettled at this belated stage. [67]. The present is rather a case where the petitioners on account of their acts, deeds and conduct as well as acquiescences are not entitled to the relief sought in the writ petition. Learned Single Judge has also rightly held that the writ petitions are bad on account of clubbing of multiple causes of action for the reason that when no relief has been claimed against respondents No. 5 & 6 who were appointed to the cadre on 27.9.2007 and 23.10.2009, respectively, their inclusion in the writ petitions is obviously for an oblique purpose and extraneous consideration to show that the writ petitions have been filed within a reasonable time. It is, however, not so for the reasons in detail recorded hereinabove. 68. An eleven judge bench of Supreme Court of India in Golak Nath v. State of Punjab, AIR 1967 SC 1643 , declared, [50]. “…Article 141 says that the law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts… The expression "declared" is wider than the words "found or made". To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. To declare is to announce opinion. Indeed, the latter involves the process, while the former expresses result. Interpretation, ascertainment and evolution are parts of the process, while that interpreted, ascertained or evolved is declared as law. The law declared by the Supreme Court is the law of the land. If so, we do not see any acceptable reason why it, in declaring the law in supersession of the law declared by it earlier, could not restrict the operation of the law as declared to future and save the transactions, whether statutory or otherwise that were effected on the basis of the earlier law. To deny this power to the Supreme Court on the basis of some outmoded theory that the Court only finds law but does not make it is to make ineffective the powerful instrument of justice placed in the hands of the highest judiciary of this country.” 69. Before proceedings further, it would be appropriate to refer to the law on the binding precedents. A three-judge bench of Supreme Court of India in Union of India v. Dhanwanti Devi, (1996) 6 SCC 44 , at page 51-52 declared, [9]. “…It is only the principle laid down in the judgment that is binding law under Article 141 of the Constitution. A deliberate judicial decision arrived at after hearing an argument on a question which arises in the case or is put in issue may constitute a precedent, no matter for what reason, and the precedent by long recognition may mature into rule of stare decisis. It is the rule deductible from the application of law to the facts and circumstances of the case which constitutes its ratio decidendi.” 70. Binding nature and importance of doctrine of precedent has been explained by a Constitutional bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Chandra Prakash & others v. State of U.P., (2002) 4 SCC 234 , in the following terms, [22]. “…The doctrine of binding precedent is of utmost importance in the administration of our judicial system. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court...” 71. Regarding the preliminary objection relating to ‘acquiescence’ and ‘Respondent judicata’, reference to the following facts would be relevant: 72. It promotes certainty and consistency in judicial decisions. Judicial consistency promotes confidence in the system, therefore, there is this need for consistency in the enunciation of legal principles in the decisions of this Court...” 71. Regarding the preliminary objection relating to ‘acquiescence’ and ‘Respondent judicata’, reference to the following facts would be relevant: 72. In 1999, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association and some of its members, including the appellants had filed CWP No. 61/1999, wherein they had assailed the recruitments of directly recruited Additional District Judges. It shows that even when 1973 Rules were in force, the Judicial Officers, other than those directly recruited as Additional District Judges, were aggrieved and had raised a dispute. 73. On 18.4.2005, a Division Bench of High Court of Himachal Pradesh disposed of CWP No. 61 of 1999, filed by H.P. Judicial Officers Association, and the said order has already been reproduced in the beginning. A reading of the order reveals that the petitioners had not challenged the gradation list dated 28.01.2005. The Bench believed that petitioners be allowed to file objections to the aforesaid gradation list and make a representation(s) for suitable placement/replacement of the persons covered therein. If the 2nd respondent-High Court considers such objections on their merits, following the law and is disposed of within a reasonable time, all the parties' interests shall be suitably protected. The petitioners agreed with this suggestion with the liberty to submit representation(s) and filing objection to the aforesaid gradation list and request the High Court on its administrative side to consider such objections/representations on their merits and per law and to order relocation/ replacement of the persons concerned in the aforesaid gradation list. Based on this agreement between the parties, the Writ petition was disposed of as settled. Parties were permitted to file objections or make representations by April 30, 2005, against alleged improper placement and for seeking rectification/redressal of grievances qua the placement of directly recruited Additional District Judges in the aforesaid gradation list. On its administrative side, the High Court was directed to decide the representations on their merits and in accordance with law by July 31, 2005. Liberty was reserved to the aggrieved to approach this Court again on the judicial side. Thus, the petitioners were not reluctant to represent. On its administrative side, the High Court was directed to decide the representations on their merits and in accordance with law by July 31, 2005. Liberty was reserved to the aggrieved to approach this Court again on the judicial side. Thus, the petitioners were not reluctant to represent. Given above, in my considered opinion, the petitioners neither acquiesced such rights nor let the 2nd respondent act in a manner inconsistent with the pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Associations (supra), and the consequent Rules of 2004, which had accrued rights in their favour. Thus, in my opinion, it would be wrong to say that the petitioners had no right to complain against the alleged wrongs. Given above, the doctrine of acquiescence does not come into play, qua this consensual closure. 74. On 8.3.2010, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association consisting of the officers belonging to the cadre of Civil Judges (Senior and Junior Division), filed a writ petition in this Court (CWP No. 696/2010), seeking stay on the new appointments of Direct recruits above their quota, with almost identical prayers made in the present petitions. 75. On 4.11.2016, the association withdrew CWP No. 696/2010, which was pending in the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, without seeking any liberty to reagitate the matter, and the order (Annexure R-2/B) reads as follows: “On instructions, Sh. Naresh K. Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioners states that he may be unconditionally permitted to withdraw the instant petition. 2. The respondents have opposed this request on the ground that certain rights have accrued in their favour, in view of the orders passed by this Court from time to time. 3. However, without going into these contentions, the petitioners are permitted to withdraw the present petition. 4. Accordingly, the petition is dismissed as withdrawn, along with pending application(s) if any.” 76. Ld. Sr. Counsel representing private respondents no. 3 to 6 have strenuously argued that despite prayer for unconditional withdrawal, the Division Bench of this Court did not give such liberty and dismissed the writ petition as withdrawn. Referring to the prayer clauses of CWP No. 696 of 2010 and the present petition, Ld. Counsel states that this petition is barred by principles of res judicata. 77. Ld. Sr. Referring to the prayer clauses of CWP No. 696 of 2010 and the present petition, Ld. Counsel states that this petition is barred by principles of res judicata. 77. Ld. Sr. Counsel representing the private respondents, also referred to the order of Hon’ble Supreme Court passed on 13.3.2018, in I.A. No. 334/2014, with observations that “We, therefore, decline to entertain the I.A. any further leaving the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law.” The contention is that the limited liberty was “to resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law”, and because of the unconditional withdrawal of CWP No. 696 of 2010, the appellants are left with no remedy. Assumingly, they might have a right but they do not have any remedy. 78. To understand the scope of order dated 13.3.2018 of Hon’ble Supreme Court, in I.A. No. 334/2014, it would be appropriate to extract the same, and it reads as follows: “The issue raised in I.A. No. 334 of 2014 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989, as it appears to us from the materials on record, relates to the disputes inter se between the individuals/groups, which, in our considered view, would not be appropriate for determination by this Court in an I.A. (No.334 of 2014) filed in W.P.(C) No. 1022/1989 (All India Judges Association & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). We, therefore, decline to entertain the I.A. any further leaving the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law.” 79. Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that it would not be appropriate for determination by this Court in an I.A. filed in W.P.(C) No. 1022/1989. After such observations, Hon’ble Supreme Court permitted the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law. Thus, despite the silence of the words remedies ‘before High Court,’ it implies that this Court has been permitted and has the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to hear the writ petitions and consequent LPAs. Given the aforesaid order of Hon’ble Supreme Court, dated 13.3.2018, passed in I.A. No. 334/2014, the order of this Court dated 4.11.2016, dismissing CWP No. 696 of 2010, without express liberty, is inconsequential. 80. Given the aforesaid order of Hon’ble Supreme Court, dated 13.3.2018, passed in I.A. No. 334/2014, the order of this Court dated 4.11.2016, dismissing CWP No. 696 of 2010, without express liberty, is inconsequential. 80. In Power Control Appliances v. Sumeet Machines Private Limited, 1994 (2) SCC 448 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, [26] Acquiescence is sitting by, when another is invading the rights and spending money on it. It is a course of conduct inconsistent with the claim for exclusive rights in a trade mark, trade name etc. It implies positive acts; not merely silence or inaction such as is involved in laches. In Harcourt v. White Sr. John Romilly said; "it is important to distinguish mere negligence and acquiescence." Therefore, acquiescence is one facet of delay. If the plaintiff stood by knowingly and let the defendants build up an important trade until it had become necessary to crush it, then the plaintiffs would be stopped by their acquiescence. If the acquiescence in the infringement amounts to consent, it will be a complete defence as was laid down in Mouson (J. G.) and Co. v. Boehm. The acquiescence must be such as to lead to the inference of a licence sufficient to create a new right in the defendant as was laid down in Rodgers v. Nowill. [27] The law of acquiescence is stated by Cotton, L. J. in Pro tor v. Bannis as under: "It is necessary that the person who alleges this lying by should have been acting in ignorance of the title of the other man, and that the other man should have known that ignorance and not mentioned his own title. "in the same case Bowen, L. J. said: "In order to make out such acquiescence it is necessary to establish that the plaintiff stood by and knowingly allowed the defendants to proceed and to expend money in ignorance of the fact that he had rights and means to assert such rights." xxx xxx xxx [29] This is the legal position. Again in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edn., Vol. 24 at paragraph 943 it is stated thus: "943. Acquiescence. An injunction may be refused on the ground of the plaintiffs acquiescence in the defendant's infringement of his right. Again in Halsbury's Laws of England, Fourth Edn., Vol. 24 at paragraph 943 it is stated thus: "943. Acquiescence. An injunction may be refused on the ground of the plaintiffs acquiescence in the defendant's infringement of his right. The principles on which the court will refuse interlocutory or final relief on this ground are the same, but a stronger case is required to support a refusal to grant final relief at the hearing. [patching v. Dubbins, Child v. Douglas, Johnson v. Wyatt, Tamer v. Mirfleld; Hogg v. Scott, Price v. Bala and Fesfiniog Rly. Co.] The reason is that at the hearing of the cause it is the court's duty to decide upon the rights of the parties, and the dismissal of the action on the ground of acquiescence amounts to a decision that a right which once existed is absolutely and for ever lost: Johnson v. Wyatt at 25; and see Gordon v. Cheltenham and Great Western Union Rly. Co. per Lord Langdale MR." 81. In Chairman, U P Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, (2006) 11 SCC 464 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[12] The statement of law has also been summarized in Halsbury's Laws of England, Para 911, pg. 395 as follows: "In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. " [13] In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents has acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches. " [13] In view of the statement of law as summarized above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents has acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or while away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the Court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussion on the financial management of the Nigam. Why the Court should come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence?” 82. In Krishan Dev v. Ram Piari, AIR 1964 HP 34 , this High Court held as follows, “[16] …There is not an iota of evidence, on record, that the predecessors-in-interest of the respondent, or she herself, had acquiesced in the construction of the structures, put up by the petitioner. The word "acquiescence" is used in two senses; sometimes it is used to denote conduct which is evidence of an intention by a party, conducting himself, to abandon an equitable right; sometimes to denote conduct from which another party would be justified in inferring such an intention: vide Murarilal v. Balkisan AIR 1926 Nag 416....” 83. The word "acquiescence" is used in two senses; sometimes it is used to denote conduct which is evidence of an intention by a party, conducting himself, to abandon an equitable right; sometimes to denote conduct from which another party would be justified in inferring such an intention: vide Murarilal v. Balkisan AIR 1926 Nag 416....” 83. Given above, the preliminary objection of the private respondents that the writ petition was not maintainable and barred in law because of the specific provisions of Order 23 Rule 1, Order 2 Rule 2 (3) as well as Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure or the principles thereof as applicable to the Writ proceedings, or by Acquiescence, in my opinion, the preliminary objections are not made out and consequently, the petitions are maintainable. It is primarily because of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s directions in Judges Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , coupled with the nature of orders (supra), passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court and by this Court, in various applications and petitions. 84. Regarding the preliminary objection relating to ‘delay and laches’, reference to the following facts would be relevant: 85. The appointments of the petitioners and respondents 3 to 6, in the cadre of District Judges/Additional District Judges were made on the following dates and quotas: 23.12.2003/26.12.2006 S.C. Kainthla a) 50% (now 65 %) by way of promotion amongst the Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) on the basis of principle of merit-cum-seniority 18.5.2004 Sushil Kukreja (R-3) c) 25% by direct recruitment from amongst eligible Advocates 7.12.2006 Virender Singh (R-4) c) 25% by direct recruitment from amongst eligible Advocates 17.9.2007 Chirag Bhanu Singh (R-5) c) 25% by direct recruitment from amongst eligible Advocates 23.10.2009 Arvind Malhotra (R-6) c) 25% by direct recruitment from amongst eligible Advocates 27.10.2009 Rajeev Bhardwaj b) 25% (now 10%) by promotion from amongst Civil Judges (Sr. Divn.) on the basis of merit through limited competition examination 86. With effect from 31.3.2003, in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , Hon’ble Supreme Court created a new category vide which 25% (w.e.f. 1.1.2011 reduced to 10%), seats to the cadre of District Judges were to be filled based on merit through a limited competitive examination of Civil Judges (Senior Division) having not less than five years qualifying service. Hon’ble Supreme Court also emphasized the framing of appropriate rules, which were to be adopted by the High Courts and approved by the States, wherever necessary by 31st March 2003. 87. With effect from March 20, 2004, the Rules of 2004, came into force. Per Rule 5 of the Rules of 2004, the ratio of three categories, i.e., Merit-cum-Seniority; through limited competitive examination; and direct recruitments, was fixed at 2:1:1. 88. Pursuant to order dated 18.4.2005, passed by this Court, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association as well as various other Judicial Officers represented to the High Court. A Committee of Hon’ble Judges constituted by High Court recommended the rejection of all the representations, and the Full Court, vide its meeting held on 22.8.2005, accepted the recommendations. Thus, on 24.8.2005, the High Court informed the representationists about such rejections. 89. The respondents' emphasis has been on the silence of the petitioners' from 24.8.2005 to March 2009. In my considered opinion, because of the directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court in All India Judges Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , the High Court on the administrative side had acted promptly by framing new rules and notifying it on 20.03.2004. Given the mandate of the highest Court of the land, Judicial Officers were justified in waiting for the High Court to start following the rules in letter and spirit, or in case of any difficulty to seek Hon'ble Supreme Court's clarification per Para 40 of the judgment. When a person, whose job is the delivery of Justice, legitimately waits for implementation of Justice from a Constitutional body, then to term such wait as delay would be adding insult to the injury, more so in the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case. 90. In March 2009, the H.P. Judicial Officers’ Association, along with a few of its members, filed W.P. (C) No. 532 of 2009 in the Supreme Court of India, with almost similar reliefs, as they are claiming in this petition. Such prayer is already extracted above. 91. In March 2009 itself, the Association, of which the petitioners were members, also filed IA Nos. 234/2009 and 235/2009, in WP (C) No. 1022 of 1989, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, regarding the High Court making direct recruitments more than the quota and not following the roster point. Such prayer is already extracted above. 91. In March 2009 itself, the Association, of which the petitioners were members, also filed IA Nos. 234/2009 and 235/2009, in WP (C) No. 1022 of 1989, before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, regarding the High Court making direct recruitments more than the quota and not following the roster point. However, vide order dated 26.3.2009, Hon’ble Supreme Court rejected both applications by observing that if there is any violation of the roster system, the applicants would be at liberty to take any appropriate steps. After that, on 4.12.2009, the petitioners withdrew the WP (C) No. 532 of 2009. Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that “Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to move the High Court. Permission Granted. The writ petition is dismissed as withdrawn.” Thus, once the Hon’ble Supreme Court had given liberty to move High Court, even if the delay is assumed, still it stands condoned by orders of the highest Court of the land. 92. After that, the petitioners moved the Administrative side of the High Court by filing representations. On 30.3.2010, a committee of three Hon'ble Judges of the High Court submitted its report doubting the correctness of the ‘vacancy-based roster’ and suggested following the ‘post-based roster’. 93. On 8.3.2010, the H.P. Judicial Officers Association filed a writ petition in this Court (CWP No. 696/2010), seeking stay on Direct recruits' new appointments above their quota, praying therein the almost identical relief, as has been sought in these petitions. 94. On 30.3.2010, Hon’ble Judges Committee observed that despite coming into force of the Rules of 2004, High Court had been following the ‘vacancy-based roster’, that is to say, that High Court had been rotating the vacancies in the ratio of 2:1:1, amongst the promotees, Officers selected by Limited Competitive Examination and direct recruits from amongst the practicing Advocates, the correctness of which even as per the report of the Committee, was doubtful. 95. On 9.7.2010, Mr. S.C. Kainthla represented to the High Court, seeking refixation of his seniority. However, the same was rejected on 8.9.2010. 96. On 15.12.2014, the appellants, along with two other officers, filed an IA No. 334 of 2014 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking implementation of its judgment passed in All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002) 4 SCC 247 . 97. S.C. Kainthla represented to the High Court, seeking refixation of his seniority. However, the same was rejected on 8.9.2010. 96. On 15.12.2014, the appellants, along with two other officers, filed an IA No. 334 of 2014 in the Hon’ble Supreme Court seeking implementation of its judgment passed in All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002) 4 SCC 247 . 97. On 28.4.2016, in IA No. 334/2014, Hon'ble Supreme Court held that, “In as much as, 34-point roster having been drawn by the High Court and the relevant rules relating to seniority, namely, Rule-13 has also come into effect, the only other question to be decided is as to how it should be implemented as from 31.3.2003, as directed by us in the judgment referred to above. While drawing the 34-point roster, the High Court has mentioned that the same would be followed after 31.3.2010. Having regard to the specific direction of this Court in the judgment referred to above in paragraph 23, we are of the view that it is required to ascertain as to how the 34-point roster for the three different channels are to be worked out. The High Court is, therefore, directed to apply Rule-13 which prescribes as to how seniority to be drawn by applying the said Rules, ascertain the roster point for the three different categories of promotees and direct recruits and carry out the said exercise from 31.3.2003. We, however, direct the High Court to place the said report after carrying out the said exercise, to pass further orders. We only direct the High Court to carry out the said exercise within a period of two months. while drawing the 34-point roster, the High Court has mentioned that the same would be followed after 31.3.2010. Regarding the specific direction of this Court in the judgment referred to above in paragraph 23, we are of the view that it is required to ascertain how the 34- point roster for the three different channels is to be worked out. Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the High Court to apply Rule-13 which prescribes how seniority to be drawn by applying the said Rules, ascertain the roster point for the three different categories of promotees and direct recruits and carry out the said exercise from 31.3.2003.” 98. Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the High Court to apply Rule-13 which prescribes how seniority to be drawn by applying the said Rules, ascertain the roster point for the three different categories of promotees and direct recruits and carry out the said exercise from 31.3.2003.” 98. On 14.7.2016, IA No. 334/2014, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as follows, “Since, it is reported that identical prayer is subject matter of consideration in Civil Writ Petition No. 696 of 2010 titled H.P. Judicial Service Officers Association v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, before the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, we are of the view that the parties should be relegated to work out their remedy in the said writ petition and await the outcome of the said writ petition. Adjourned. The applicant is permitted to move the High Court for expeditious hearing of the writ petition.” 99. On 4.11.2016, the petitioners sought permission for unconditional withdrawal of CWP No. 696/2010. However, without reserving any liberty, the Division Bench of this Court dismissed CWP No. 696/2010 as withdrawn. 100. On 25.4.2017, in I.A. No. 334/2014, Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that, “Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we request the High Court to submit the report through the counsel by second week of July, 2017. Needless to emphasis, the report of the Committee shall be in consonance with the principal judgments i.e. All India Judges’ Association and others vs. Union of India and Others (2002) 4 SCC 247 and All India Judges’ Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others (2010) 15 SCC 170 . We are sure that the High Court shall analyze the judgments and submit the report which will be in accord with both the judgments. When we say in accord with the judgments, the High Court will appreciate both the verdicts in letter and spirit.” 101. After that, the High Court constituted a committee of two Judges, which in September 2017, submitted its report. On 21.9.2017, the Full Court approved it, with specific observations, especially concerning the applicability of the Constitutional Bench judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 , observing that as per the report, the Committee did not go into the merits of the said judgment. 102. On 21.9.2017, the Full Court approved it, with specific observations, especially concerning the applicability of the Constitutional Bench judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 , observing that as per the report, the Committee did not go into the merits of the said judgment. 102. On 13.3.2018, Hon’ble Supreme Court closed I.A. No. 334/2014, by holding that “The issue raised in I.A. No. 334 of 2014 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989, as it appears to us from the materials on record, relates to the disputes inter se between the individuals/groups, which, in our considered view, would not be appropriate for determination by this Court in an I.A. (No.334 of 2014) filed in W.P. (C) No. 1022/1989 (All India Judges Association & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.). We, therefore, decline to entertain the I.A. any further leaving the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law.” 103. The emphasis of Ld. Senior Counsel for the private respondents is on the words used in order dated 13.3.2018, in I.A. No. 334 of 2014 (supra), “leaving the parties to have resort to such remedies as may be available to them in law.” Ld. Counsel, without conceding on delay, laches, acquiescence, res judicata, argued that because of Para 40 of the All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , the only remedy available to the petitioners was to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Given the stipulations of Para 40, this Court has no authority to adjudicate this matter. 104. In Shipping Corporation of India Limited v. Machado Brothers, (2004) 11 SCC 168 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court holds that no interlocutory order will survive after the original proceeding comes to an end. Hon'ble Supreme Court took a similar view in Kavita Trehan (Mrs.) and another v. Balsara Hygiene Products Ltd. ( 1994 (5) SCC 380 ), and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, (2010) 9 SCC 437 . 105. In the present case, the reference to the interim orders have been made only to find out that whether the petitioners were continuously approaching the Courts for grant of benefits following the directions in the case of Judges Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 or not. 105. In the present case, the reference to the interim orders have been made only to find out that whether the petitioners were continuously approaching the Courts for grant of benefits following the directions in the case of Judges Association, (2002) 4 SCC 247 or not. Thus, there is no need to find out the law's application laid down in these precedents in the present case. 106. On 20.3.2018, Shri S.C. Kainthla, again represented to the High Court, seeking fixation of seniority following the judgment of Supreme Court of India in All India Judges' Association's case read with the order passed by Hon'ble Supreme Court in IA No. 334 of 2014 titled S.L. Sharma & Others versus High Court of Himachal Pradesh. However, on August 31, 2018, the High Court conveyed to Mr. Kainthla in the following terms, "With reference to your representation dated 20.3.2018 on the subject cited above, I have been directed to inform that the same has been considered and disposed of' with the observation that no other and further action is required. However, if so advised, it is open to you to take recourse to the remedies, in terms of the orders passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India." 107. After that, on 4.9.2018 and 22.9.2018, respectively, the petitioners/appellants filed the present writ petitions in this Court. 108. In Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 471 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, [18]. The question of entertaining the petition disputing the long standing seniority filed at a belated stage is no more res integra. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Ramchandra Shanker Deodhar & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1974 AIR(SC) 259, considered the effect of delay in challenging the promotion and seniority list and held that any claim for seniority at a belated stage should be rejected inasmuch as it seeks to disturb the vested rights of other persons regarding seniority, rank and promotion which have accrued to them during the intervening period. A party should approach the Court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. A party should approach the Court just after accrual of the cause of complaint. While deciding the said case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgments, particularly in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, 1970 AIR(SC) 898, wherein it has been observed that the principle, on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on the ground of laches or delay, is that the rights, which have accrued to others by reason of delay in filing the writ petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay. The Court further observed as under: - "A party claiming fundamental rights must move the Court before others' rights come out into existence. The action of the Courts cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge by reason of delay on the part of person moving the court." [19]. This Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar case, also placed reliance upon its earlier judgment of the Constitution Bench in R.N. Bose v. Union of India & Ors., 1970 AIR(SC) 470, wherein it has been observed as under:- "It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be defeated after the number of years." [20]. In R.S. Makashi v. I.M. Menon & Ors., 1982 AIR(SC) 101, this Court considered all aspects of limitation, delay and laches in filing the writ petition in respect of inter se seniority of the employees. The Court referred to its earlier judgment in State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. v. Bhailal Bhai etc., 1964 AIR(SC) 1006, wherein it has been observed that the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a Civil Court must be brought, may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking the remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution can be measured. The Court observed as under: - "We must administer justice in accordance with law and principle of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. The Court observed as under: - "We must administer justice in accordance with law and principle of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set-aside after the lapse of a number of years..... The petitioners have not furnished any valid explanation whatever for the inordinate delay on their part in approaching the Court with the challenge against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of 1968... We would accordingly hold that the challenge raised by the petitioners against the seniority principles laid down in the Government Resolution of March 2, 1968 ought to have been rejected by the High Court on the ground of delay and laches and the writ petition, in so far as it related to the prayer for quashing the said Government resolution, should have been dismissed." [21]. The issue of challenging the seniority list, which continued to be in existence for a long time, was again considered by this Court in K.R. Mudgal & Ors. v. R.P. Singh & Ors., 1986 AIR(SC) 2086. The Court held as under: - "A government servant who is appointed to any post ordinarily should at least after a period of 3-4 years of his appointment be allowed to attend to the duties attached to his post peacefully and without any sense of insecurity......... Satisfactory service conditions postulate that there shall be no sense of uncertainty amongst the Government servants created by writ petitions filed after several years as in this case. It is essential that any one who feels aggrieved by the seniority assigned to him, should approach the Court as early as possible otherwise in addition to creation of sense of insecurity in the mind of Government servants, there shall also be administrative complication and difficulties.... In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches." [22]. In these circumstances we consider that the High Court was wrong in rejecting the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents to the writ petition on the ground of laches." [22]. While deciding K.R. Mudgal case, this Court placed reliance upon its earlier judgment in Malcom Lawrance Cecil D Souza v. Union of India & Ors., 1975 AIR(SC) 1269, wherein it had been observed as under:- "Although security of service cannot be used as a shield against the administrative action for lapse of a public servant, by and large one of the essential requirement of contentment and efficiency in public service is a feeling of security. It is difficult no doubt to guarantee such security in all its varied aspects, it should at least be possible to ensure that matters like one's position in a seniority list after having been settled for once should not be liable to be re-opened after lapse of many years in the instance of a party who has itself intervening party chosen to keep quiet. Raking up old matters like seniority after a long time is likely to resort in administrative complications and difficulties. It would, therefore, appear to be in the interest of smoothness and efficiency of service that such matters should be given a quietus after lapse of some time." [23]. In B.S. Bajwa v. State of Punjab & Ors., 1999 AIR(SC) 1510, this Court while deciding the similar issue re-iterated the same view, observing as under:- "It is well settled that in service matters, the question of seniority should not be re-opened in such situations after the lapse of reasonable period because that results in disturbing the settled position which is not justifiable. There was inordinate delay in the present case for making such a grievance. This along was sufficient to decline interference under Article 226 and to reject the writ petition". [24]. In Dayaram Asanand v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1984 AIR(SC) 850, while re-iterating the similar view this Court held that in absence of satisfactory explanation for inordinate delay of 8-9 years in questioning under Article 226 of the Constitution, the validity of the seniority and promotion assigned to other employee could not be entertained. [25]. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu,1975 AIR(SC) 2271, this Court considered the case where the petition was filed after lapse of 14 years challenging the promotion. [25]. In P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu,1975 AIR(SC) 2271, this Court considered the case where the petition was filed after lapse of 14 years challenging the promotion. However, this Court held that aggrieved person must approach the Court expeditiously for relief and it is not permissible to put forward stale claim. The Court observed as under: - "A person aggrieved by an order promoting a junior over his head should approach the Court at least within 6 months or at the most a year of such promotion." The Court further observed that it was not that there was any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor was it that there could never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after certain length of time. It would be a sound and wise exercise of jurisdiction for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extra ordinary powers under Article 226 in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who standby and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claim and try to unsettle settled matters. [26]. A similar view has been re-iterated by this Court in Smt. Sudama Devi vs. Commissioner & Ors., 1983 2 SCC 1 ; State of U.P. vs. Raj Bahadur Singh & Anr., 1998 8 SCC 685 ; and Northern Indian Glass Industries vs. Jaswant Singh & Ors., 2003 1 SCC 335 . [27]. In Dinkar Anna Patil & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra, 1999 AIR(SC) 152, this Court held that delay and laches in challenging the seniority is always fatal, but in case the party satisfies the Court regarding delay, the case may be considered. [28]. In K.A. Abdul Majeed vs. State of Kerala & Ors., 2001 6 SCC 292 , this Court held that seniority assigned to any employee could not be challenged after a lapse of seven years on the ground that his initial appointment had been irregular, though even on merit it was found that seniority of the petitioner therein had correctly been fixed. [29]. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. [29]. It is settled law that fence-sitters cannot be allowed to raise the dispute or challenge the validity of the order after its conclusion. No party can claim the relief as a matter of right as one of the grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the Court is guilty of delay and the laches. The Court exercising public law jurisdiction does not encourage agitation of stale claims where the right of third parties crystallises in the interregnum. (vide Aflatoon & Ors. vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi & Ors., 1974 AIR(SC) 2077; State of Mysore vs. V.K. Kangan & Ors., 1975 AIR(SC) 2190; Municipal Council, Ahmednagar & Anr. vs Shah Hyder Beig & Ors., 2000 AIR(SC) 671; Inder Jit Gupta vs. Union of India & Ors., 2001 6 SCC 637 ; Shiv Dass vs. Union of India & Ors., 2007 AIR(SC) 1330; Regional Manager, A.P.SRTC vs. N. Satyanarayana & Ors., 2008 1 SCC 210 ; and City and Industrial Development Corporation vs. Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors., 2009 1 SCC 168 . [30]. Thus, in view of the above, the settled legal proposition that emerges is that once the seniority had been fixed and it remains in existence for a reasonable period, any challenge to the same should not be entertained. In K.R. Mudgal (supra), this Court has laid down, in crystal clear words that a seniority list which remains in existence for 3 to 4 years unchallenged, should not be disturbed. Thus, 3-4 years is a reasonable period for challenging the seniority and in case someone agitates the issue of seniority beyond this period, he has to explain the delay and laches in approaching the adjudicatory forum, by furnishing satisfactory explanation. 109. In my considered opinion, due to the following reasons, the ratio of Shiba Shankar Mohapatra v. State of Orissa, (2010) 12 SCC 471 , would not be applicable in the facts and circumstances peculiar to the present case: (a). Petitioners did not claim seniority at a belated stage, and whatever slight delay existed, there is a satisfactory explanation for such delay, and the petitioners cannot be termed as fence-sitters; (b). Petitioner(s), especially Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj, did approach the Court just after the accrual of the cause; i.e., well within a reasonable time of the appointment(s); (c). Petitioners did not claim seniority at a belated stage, and whatever slight delay existed, there is a satisfactory explanation for such delay, and the petitioners cannot be termed as fence-sitters; (b). Petitioner(s), especially Shri Rajeev Bhardwaj, did approach the Court just after the accrual of the cause; i.e., well within a reasonable time of the appointment(s); (c). Whether indefeasible rights were accrued to respondents 3 to 6, and that if accrued, such should not be allowed to be disturbed, and innocent parties should not be harmed, are questions to be heard on merits on seniority position, in the light of the liberties granted to the petitioners by Hon’ble Supreme Court; (d). The Courts' action cannot harm innocent parties if their rights emerge because of delay of the person moving the Court, which in this case, (per Para 40 of All India Judges Association v. UOI, (2002) 4 SCC 247 ), was upon the 2nd respondent, i.e., the High Court and not on the petitioners. (e). What protection a recruit is entitled to, who without any fault at his end, when appointed, no such posts existed on roster points, and the rights that might have crystallized in the interregnum, are also the questions which, in peculiar facts of this case, could have been answered after hearing the parties on merits. 110. Delay, according to ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’, 6th Edition, 1994, is defined as, “to retard; obstruct; put off; postpone; defer; procrastinate; prolong the time of or before; hinder; interpose obstacles; as, when it is said that a conveyance was made to “hinder and delay creditors”. The term does not necessarily, though it may, imply dishonesty or involve moral wrong.” As per ‘The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary’, Encyclopedic Edition, 1988 (Vol. 1), delay is defined as, “to cause to be late; to hinder the progress of; to postpone; to fail to make haste”. Delay as a noun is defined as an unexpected lapse of time. The ‘Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’ 6th Edition, 2007 (Vol. 1), defines delay as, “Put off to a later time; postpone, defer a thing; impede the progress of, make late, hinder.” The ‘Penguin English Dictionary’, 2nd Edition, 2003, defines delay as, “to leave the doing of something to a later time; to postpone something; to fail to act or move immediately.” 111. 1), defines delay as, “Put off to a later time; postpone, defer a thing; impede the progress of, make late, hinder.” The ‘Penguin English Dictionary’, 2nd Edition, 2003, defines delay as, “to leave the doing of something to a later time; to postpone something; to fail to act or move immediately.” 111. Per ‘Black’s Law Dictionary’, 6th Edition, 1994, “Doctrine of laches” is based upon maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity”. “The neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time under circumstances permitting diligence, to do what in law, should have been done.” “Neglect or omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to adverse party.” As per ‘The New Lexicon Webster’s Dictionary’, Encyclopedic Edition, 1988 (Vol. 1), laches is defined as, “neglect in carrying out a legal duty; undue delay in claiming privilege or asserting a right; culpable negligence”. According to ‘Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’, 6th Edition, 2007 (Vol. 1), laches is defined as, “slackness, remissness, negligence. Also, an act or habit of neglect”. “Delay in asserting a right, claiming a privilege, or making application for redress such as to bar its being granted. Also, negligence in the performance of a legal duty; culpable negligence.” The ‘Penguin English Dictionary’, 2nd Edition, 2003, defined laches as, “in law, negligence in carrying out a legal duty or unreasonable delay in making a legal claim.” 112. In Rabindra Nath Bose v. Union of India, 1970 (1) SCC 84 , a Constitutional bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[33] We are not anxious to throw out petitions on this ground, but we must administer justice in accordance with law and principles of equity, justice and good conscience. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. It would be unjust to deprive the respondents of the rights which have accrued to them. Each person ought to be entitled to sit back and consider that his appointment and promotion effected a long time ago would not be set aside after the lapse of a number of years. It was on the ground that this Court in Jaisinghani's case, 1967-2 SCR 703 = ( AIR 1967 SC 1427 ) observed that Class II officers who have been appointed permanently as Assistant Commissioners. In that case, the Court was only considering the challenge to appointments and promotions made after 1950. In this case we are asked to consider the validity of appointments and promotions made during the periods of 1945 to 1950. If there was adequate reason in that case to leave out Class II officers, who had been appointed permanently Assistant Commissioners, there is much more reason in this case that the officers who are now permanent Assistant Commissioners of Income-tax and who were appointed and promoted to their original posts during 1945 to 1950, should be left alone.” 113. In Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, 1974 (1) SCC 317 , Constitutional bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[10] The first preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents was that the petitioners were guilty of gross laches and delay in filing the petition. The divisional cadres of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars were created as far back as 1st November, 1956 by the Government Resolution of that date, and the procedure for making promotion to the posts of Deputy Collector on the basis of divisional select lists, which was a necessary consequence of the creation of the divisional cadre of Mamlatdars/Tehsildars, had been in operation for a long number of years, at any rate from 7th April, 1961, and the Rules of 30th July, 1959 were also given effect to since the date of their enactment and yet the petitioner did not file the petition until 14th July, 1969. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Art. 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C. J., in Tilockchand Motichand v. H. B. Munshi, (1969) 2 SCR 824 = ( AIR 1970 SC 898 ) "is one discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit....It will all depend on what the breach of the Fundamental Right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose." Here the petitioners were informed by the Commissioner, Aurangabad Division, by his letter dated 18th October, 1960 and also by the then Secretary of the Revenue Department in January 1961 that the rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector in the reorganised State of Bombay had not yet been unified, and that the petitioners continued to be governed by the rules of Ex- Hyderabad State and the Rules of 30th July, 1959 had no application to them. The petitioners were, therefore, justified in proceeding on the assumption that there were no unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector and the promotions that were being made by the State Government were only provisional, to be regularised when unified rules of recruitment were made. It was only when the petition in Kapoor's case was decided by the Bombay High Court that the petitioners came to know that it was the case of the State Government in that petition - and that case was accepted by the Bombay High Court - that the Rules of 30th July, 1959 were the unified rules of recruitment to the posts of Deputy Collector applicable throughout the reorganised State of Bombay. The petitioners thereafter did not lose any time in filing the present petition. Moreover, what is challenged in the petition is the validity of the procedure for making promotions to the posts of Deputy Collector - whether it is violative of the equal opportunity clause - and since this procedure is not a thing of the past, but is still being followed by the State Government, it is but desirable that its constitutionality should be adjudged when the question has come before the Court at the instance of parties properly aggrieved by it. It may also be noted that the principle on which the Court proceeds in refusing relief to the petitioner on ground of laches or delay is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay....” 114. In Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Limited v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[13] The rule which says that the Court may not enquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its on facts. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose. The principle on which the relief to the party on the grounds of laches or delay is denied is that the rights which have accrued to others by reason of the delay in filing the petition should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay. The real test to determine delay in such cases is that the petitioner should come to the writ Court before a parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributable to any laches or negligence. The test is not to physical running of time. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches…” 115. In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 , Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, “[4] The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. Where the circumstances justifying the conduct exists, the illegality which is manifest cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches…” 115. In Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 , Hon'ble Supreme Court holds, “[4] The principles underlying continuing wrongs and recurring/ successive wrongs have been applied to service law disputes. A continuing wrong refers to a single wrongful act which causes a continuing injury. Recurring/successive wrongs are those which occur periodically, each wrong giving rise to a distinct and separate cause of action. This Court in Balakrishna S.P. Waghmare v. Shree Dhyaneshwar Maharaj Sansthan, explained the concept of continuing wrong (in the context of Section 23 of Limitation Act, 1908 corresponding to section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963): “31. It is the very essence of a continuing wrong that it is an act which creates a continuing source of injury and renders the doer of the act responsible and liable for the continuance of the said injury. If the wrongful act causes an injury which is complete, there is no continuing wrong even though the damage resulting from the act may continue. If, however, a wrongful act is of such a character that the injury caused by it itself continues, then the act constitutes a continuing wrong. In this connection, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the injury caused by the wrongful act and what may be described as the effect of the said injury.” [5] In M.R. Gupta v. Union of India, the appellant approached the High Court in 1989 with a grievance in regard to his initial pay fixation with effect from 1.8.1978. The claim was rejected as it was raised after 11 years. This Court applied the principles of continuing wrong and recurring wrongs and reversed the decision. This Court held: “5. The appellant’s grievance that his pay fixation was not in accordance with the rules, was the assertion of a continuing wrong against him which gave rise to a recurring cause of action each time he was paid a salary which was not computed in accordance with the rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh cause of action arises every month when he is paid his monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellants claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant s claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of difference in the pay which has become time barred would not be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly, any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as, promotion etc., would also be subject to the defence of laches etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1.8.1978 without taking into account any other consequential relief which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation. It is to this limited extent of proper pay fixation, the application cannot be treated as time barred....” [6] In Shiv Dass v. Union of India, 2007 9 SCC 274 , this Court held: “8. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction. 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.... 10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook delay in filing the petition.... If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years.” [7] To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or refixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 116. In so far as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 116. In Royal Orchid Hotels Limited v. G Jayarama Reddy, (2011) 10 SCC 608 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[25] Although, the Framers of the Constitution have not prescribed any period of limitation for filing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and the power conferred upon the High Court to issue to any person or authority including any Government, directions, orders or writs including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo-warranto and certiorari is not hedged with any condition or constraint, in last 61 years the superior Courts have evolved several rules of self-imposed restraint including the one that the High Court may not enquire into belated or stale claim and deny relief to the petitioner if he is found guilty of laches. The principle underlying this rule is that the one who is not vigilant and does not seek intervention of the Court within reasonable time from the date of accrual of cause of action or alleged violation of constitutional, legal or other right is not entitled to relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. Another reason for the High Court's refusal to entertain belated claim is that during the intervening period rights of third parties may have crystallized and it will be inequitable to disturb those rights at the instance of a person who has approached the Court after long lapse of time and there is no cogent explanation for the delay. We may hasten to add that no hard and fast rule can be laid down and no straightjacket formula can be evolved for deciding the question of delay/laches and each case has to be decided on its own facts.” 117. In Shankara Co-Op Housing Society Ltd v. M Prabhakar, (2011) 5 SCC 607 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[54] The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. In Shankara Co-Op Housing Society Ltd v. M Prabhakar, (2011) 5 SCC 607 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[54] The relevant considerations, in determining whether delay or laches should be put against a person who approaches the writ court under Article 226 of the Constitution is now well settled. They are: (1) there is no inviolable rule of law that whenever there is a delay, the court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition; it is a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and each case must be dealt with on its own facts. (2) The principle on which the court refuses relief on the ground of laches or delay is that the rights accrued to others by the delay in filing the petition should not be disturbed, unless there is a reasonable explanation for the delay, because court should not harm innocent parties if their rights had emerged by the delay on the part of the petitioners. (3) The satisfactory way of explaining delay in making an application under Article 226 is for the petitioner to show that he had been seeking relief elsewhere in a manner provided by law. If he runs after a remedy not provided in the Statute or the statutory rules, it is not desirable for the High Court to condone the delay. It is immaterial what the petitioner chooses to believe in regard to the remedy. (4) No hard and fast rule, can be laid down in this regard. Every case shall have to be decided on its own facts. (5) That representations would not be adequate explanation to take care of the delay.” 118. In Tukaram Kana Joshi v. M I D C, (2013) 1 SCC 353 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[12] The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. [13] The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party's defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N., 1974 AIR(SC) 2271; State of M.P. &Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal &Ors., 1987 AIR(SC) 251; and Tridip Kumar Dingal&Ors. v. State of West Bengal &Ors., 2009 1 SCC 768 ;)” 119. In Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[37] Let us examine the matter from another aspect, viz. laches and delays and acquiescence. [38] It is now a well recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. In Prabhakar v. Joint Director Sericulture Department, (2015) 15 SCC 1 , Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[37] Let us examine the matter from another aspect, viz. laches and delays and acquiescence. [38] It is now a well recognised principle of jurisprudence that a right not exercised for a long time is non-existent. Even when there is no limitation period prescribed by any statute relating to certain proceedings, in such cases Courts have coined the doctrine of laches and delays as well as doctrine of acquiescence and non-suited the litigants who approached the Court belatedly without any justifiable explanation for bringing the action after unreasonable delay. Doctrine of laches is in fact an application of maxim of equity "delay defeats equities". [39] This principle is applied in those cases where discretionary orders of the Court are claimed, such as specific performance, permanent or temporary injunction, appointment of receiver etc. These principles are also applied in the writ petitions filed Under Articles 32 and 226 of Constitution of India. In such cases, Courts can still refuse relief where the delay on the Petitioner's part has prejudiced the Respondent even though the Petitioner might have come to Court within the period prescribed by the Limitation Act. [40] Likewise, if a party having a right stand by and sees another acting in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress he cannot afterwards complain. This principle is based on the doctrine of acquiescence implying that in such a case party who did not make any objection acquiesced into the alleged wrongful act of the other party and, therefore, has no right to complain against that alleged wrong. [41] Thus, in those cases where period of limitation is prescribed within which the action is to be brought before the Court, if the action is not brought within that prescribed period the aggrieved party looses remedy and cannot enforce his legal right after the period of limitation is over. Likewise, in other cases even where no limitation is prescribed, but for a long period the aggrieved party does not approach the machinery provided under the law for redressal of his grievance, it can be presumed that relief can be denied on the ground of unexplained delay and laches and/or on the presumption that such person has waived his right or acquiesced into the act of other. As mentioned above, these principles as part of equity are based on principles relatable to sound public policy that if a person does not exercise his right for a long time then such a right is non-existent.” 120. In Dr. Akshya Bisoi v. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, 2018 (3) SCC 391 , a three Judge bench of Hon’ble Supreme Court holds, “[19] The Court is confronted in the present case with a situation in which recruitment to the post of Additional Professor was carried out in 2005. That was well over 12 years ago. The petitioners have instituted these proceedings under Article 32 in November 2017 to question the order of ranking made by the Selection Committee on 12 September 2005. There is no cogent explanation for this belated recourse to legal remedies. The petitioners cannot legitimately explain the delay on their part merely by contending that they were representing to the First respondent to remedy their grievances. The petitioners may have believed in good faith that the AIIMS administration would pay heed to their grievances. They had a sympathetic ear of the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare. But twelve years is too long a period, by any means, to not seek recourse to judicial remedies. As the narration of facts would indicate, the Governing Body had on 14 April 2012 decided to maintain the order of merit in terms of which the Fourth respondent was ranked first, above the two petitioners. Even thereafter, a three member committee was constituted by the Governing Body in October 2012 and a decision was once again taken on 19 July 2013 to maintain the order of seniority. This was reiterated on 12 May 2014 and 22 June 2016. The petitioners were thus aware of the consistent position which was adopted by the First respondent. The delay on their part in seeking recourse to their legal remedies must weigh against them. At this stage it would be manifestly unfair to unsettle the inter se seniority between the three Professors in the CTVS department by reopening the recommendation made by the Selection Committee in 2005. [20] In holding that an unexpected delay on the part of the petitioners would disentitle them to relief, we place reliance on a judgment of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, 2013 12 SCC 179 . [20] In holding that an unexpected delay on the part of the petitioners would disentitle them to relief, we place reliance on a judgment of this Court in State of Uttaranchal v Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari, 2013 12 SCC 179 . The learned Chief Justice, after adverting to the settled position of law in that regard, observed thus: "27. We are absolutely conscious that in the case at hand the seniority has not been disturbed in the promotional cadre and no promotions may be unsettled. The respondents chose to sleep like Rip Van Winkle and got up from their slumber at their own leisure, for some reason which is fathomable to them only. But such fathoming of reasons by oneself is not countenanced in law. Anyone who sleeps over his right is bound to suffer." (Id at page 185) "28. Remaining oblivious to the factum of delay and laches and granting relief is contrary to all settled principles and even would not remotely attract the concept of discretion. We may hasten to add that the same may not be applicable in all circumstances where certain categories of fundamental rights are infringed. But, a stale claim of getting promotional benefits definitely should not have been entertained by the Tribunal and accepted by the High Court." (Id at page 186) There has to be an element of repose and a stale claim cannot be resuscitated.” 121. In Shamsher Singh Kanwar v. Union of India, 1973 (2) ILR 1016, a Full Bench of this Court held as follows, “[23] It is now settled law that a petition for mandamus may be defeated by laches. Application for the writ should be made within a reasonable time after the alleged default or neglect of duty, and if not reasonably made, the delay may afford sufficient cause for its denial, particularly when the delay has been prejudicial to the rights of the Respondent, la determining what constitutes such unreasonable delay as will justify refusal of the writ, regard must be had to the facts and circumstances of each particular case to the character of relief demanded, and to the detriment, prejudice or injury, if any, to the Respondent, or other interested person, or to the public from the delay 30 Am. Jur. p. 65-66 para 312, See United States ex. rel. Jur. p. 65-66 para 312, See United States ex. rel. Aranl v. Lane, 249 US 367, 03 Led 650, Chapman v. Douglas County, 107 US 348, 27 Led 378. [24] While laches is an equity doctrine, it is also frequently applied to quo-warranto proceedings. The Court in quo-wananto will exercise its discretion to consider all the circumstances of the case, and if on a full view of these circumstances it appears clear that the public welfare not only would not be promoted, but that the reverse would be the result, and by reason of the lapse of time harm rather than good would result to the public interest the court will apply the doctrine of laches 44 Am. Jur. p. 132 para 63.” 122. In Reserve Bank of India v. A B Tools (P) Ltd, 2015 (2) Shim. L.C. 1197, a Division Bench of this Court holds, “[44] The underlying principle of this Section is that the plaintiff is not bound to launch an endless succession of suits each day wrong persists. He can wait and include in the action all damages sustained by a reason of the wrong down to the date of filing of the suit. The criteria for application of Section 22 [of the Limitation Act] is not whether the right or its corresponding obligation is a continuing one, but whether the wrong is a continuing one.” 123. In Manohar Lal v. H P Vidhan Sabha, 2017 (1) Shim. L.C. 358, a Division Bench of this Court held as follows, “[7] Normally, delay itself may not defeat the party's claim or relief unless the position of the opposite party has been irretrievably altered or would be put to undue hardship. Delay is not absolute impediment to exercise judicial discretion and rendering of substantial justice and such matters lie in the exclusive discretion of the Court, which discretion obviously has to be exercised fairly and justly. The underlying principle behind dismissal of petition on the ground of delay and laches is to discourage agitation of stale claim and has to be construed from the perspective of the opposite party being prejudiced especially when the delay effects others' ripened rights, which may have attained finality. Each case will have to be decided on its own facts and merits. Each case will have to be decided on its own facts and merits. There may be cases where the demand of justice is so compelling that the Court would be inclined to interfere inspite of delay. Ultimately, as observed above, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court. [8] However, as regards the service matters, more particularly, pertaining to seniority and promotion, the delay is to be strictly construed or else it would amount to unsettling the settled matters after a lapse of time. A person aggrieved by an order of promotion should approach the Court at least within six months or at the most a year of such promotion. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226 nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter after the passage of a certain length of time. But it would be a sound and wise exercise of discretion for the Courts to refuse to exercise their extraordinary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the case of persons who do not approach it expeditiously for relief and who stand by and allow things to happen and then approach the Court to put forward stale claims and try to unsettle matters. The petitioner's petition should, therefore, have been dismissed in limine. Entertaining such petitions is a waste of time of the Court. It clogs the work of the Court and impedes the work of the Court in considering legitimate grievances as also its normal work. Refer: P.S. Sadasivaswamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu, 1974 AIR(SC) 2271.” 124. In my opinion, the petitioners were continuously claiming the rights, which per them had accrued from the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Judges’ Association case (2002) 4 SCC 247 , and their pursuit to claim the benefits from such rights was relentless. 125. The Constitution of India does not prescribe the lifespan or any sunset clause in the law declared by the Supreme Court of India, whose directions are statements of law without any eclipse or expiry date. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions (supra) would not become redundant and have to be either fully satisfied or distinguished or overruled. The vertical precedents bind all Courts that fall in its jurisdiction. The Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions (supra) would not become redundant and have to be either fully satisfied or distinguished or overruled. The vertical precedents bind all Courts that fall in its jurisdiction. Adherence to the reasoning and obeying the verdict is obligatory, and it also strengthens the bond between the Courts. Bryan A. Garner et. al, The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 155 (Ist ed. 2016), observed as follows, “Vertical precedents are absolutely binding. Not all horizontal precedents have the same value or carry the same weight. Various circumstances may strengthen or weaken the force of a horizontal precedent, including the court’s expertise, the novelty of the issue, the extent of the analysis, and the degree to which the decision has been followed by later courts.” 126. It was for the Hon’ble High Court to follow the directions of All India Judges’ Association case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 in letter and spirit. It was not for the petitioners, who at the concerned time, were not even appointed in the cadre of District Judges, to approach the Court in anticipation that the High Court will fail to comply with the directions. 127. Rephrasing in nutshell, the substantive prayers are for the implementation of the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in All India Judges’ Association and others v. Union of India and others, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , and order passed in I.A. No.334 of 2014, dated 28.4.2016, with the following relief; (a). Follow the post-based roster w.e.f. 31.3.2003; (b). Comply with the report of the Hon’ble Judges Committees, (submitted by the Committee of two judges of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh and approved by its full Court meeting held on 21st Sep 2017); (c). Quash the seniority/gradation lists circulated w.e.f. 1.1.2005 onwards particularly gradation list Annexure P-16 circulated on 18.1.2018. 128. A reference to the above discussions points out that neither the Hon'ble Single Judge nor the Division Bench had heard arguments on any of these prayers. The appellants' grievance is that although the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh corrected its mistake and w.e.f. 31.3.2010, applied the post-based roster but did not push down respondents 3 to 6 in the seniority list. However, the parties could not address any arguments on this issue. 129. The appellants' grievance is that although the Hon'ble High Court of Himachal Pradesh corrected its mistake and w.e.f. 31.3.2010, applied the post-based roster but did not push down respondents 3 to 6 in the seniority list. However, the parties could not address any arguments on this issue. 129. The scope of Rule 13 (1) of the Rules of 2004; which states that where Officers are recruited to a cadre by promotion and direct recruitment; the seniority shall be regulated by the roster maintained for such recruitment. Officer appointed against a higher point of the roster shall rank senior to the Officers appointed against a lower point, which can only be answered once the parties get an opportunity to argue on merits. 130. Similarly, in Himachal Pradesh, the rules stood amended before the direct recruits were given appointments. In contrast, the rules remained unamended in Punjab and Haryana. Thus, the application of the pronouncement of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of Punjab, AIR 2018 SC 5284 , in the facts and circumstances of the present case, might need arguments on merits. 131. Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 28.4.2016 passed in IA 334/2014, directed the respondent to work out and present before it, 34-point roster by applying Rule-13 of HP Judicial Service Rules (which determines seniority) for three different channels, by ascertaining the roster points, for the three categories, i.e., promotees, limited competitive examination, & direct recruits, w.e.f. 31.03.2003. In the light of the directions of Hon'ble Supreme Court, which stipulates that "We make it clear and reiterate that we only want the outcome of such exercise to be placed before this Court before passing further orders as to its implementation," what is the legal status of the report might also need hearing on merits. 132. The report of the Hon'ble Committee made in Sep 2017 was placed before the Hon'ble Full Court, which vide its resolution dated 21.9.2017, had observed as follows, “...The Direct Recruits had relied upon a five judge bench judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, reported 1990 (2) SCC 715 . The report of the Hon'ble Committee made in Sep 2017 was placed before the Hon'ble Full Court, which vide its resolution dated 21.9.2017, had observed as follows, “...The Direct Recruits had relied upon a five judge bench judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, reported 1990 (2) SCC 715 . In the said verdict, it has been propounded by the Apex Court that where the quota rule has been breached and appointments have been made to the vacancies, in excess of quotas only from one source, but where the appointments have been made after following the prescribed procedure, enshrined in the rules framed for the appointments, the appointees be not pushed down below the appointees from the other source inducted in the service at a later date and where the rules permit the authorities to relax the provisions relating to the quota, ordinarily a presumption should be raised that there was such relaxation when there is a deviation from the quota rule. The Committee has in its report not gone into the merits of the aforesaid submissions made on the basis of the said judgment. It was solitary dealing within the domain and purview of the direction dated 12.8.2016/4.10.2016 issued by the Apex Court in IA No. 334 of 2014, during pendency of civil writ petition 1022 of 1989, titled All India Judges Association and others v. Union of India and other, besides within the limited reference made therein by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, vide order (supra)." Its perusal makes it clear that neither the Hon'ble committee nor the Hon'ble Full Court had taken any affirmative view or adjudicated respective contentions of the affected categories in respect of changing their assigned seniority. However, in this aspect, parties have the rights to put forth their submissions and rival contentions, probably need arguments on the merits of the case. 133. The stand of the 2nd respondent, High Court is that Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 28.4.2016 passed in IA 334/2014 directed the respondent to work out and present before it, 34-point roster by applying Rule-13 of the Rules of 2004, for three different channels, by ascertaining the roster points, for the promotees, appointee by limited competitive examination & direct recruits w.e.f. 31.03.2003, and the same was complied with vide report Annexure P-12. However, the petitioner cannot claim any benefit based on the report because the Hon'ble Supreme Court, instead of issuing any directions for its implementation, wanted the outcome of such exercise to be placed before it before passing further orders as to its implementation. Moreover, the Committee did not give its view and did not decide any seniority issue in respect of the respective contentions between the three categories. Thus, the petitioners cannot claim any such relief even from this Court. Hence, the debatable question, in my opinion, would be that could High Court fix a cutoff date of 31.3.2010, justifying its action in following the 'vacancy-based roster, whereas, after that, the appointments were based on the 'post-based roster.' These are complex questions, which might require a detailed hearing, and in its absence, this Court refrains from expressing any opinion. 134. The contention of the High Court is that the posts for direct recruitments were advertised against vacancies, whereas before 2009, no posts were advertised through limited competitive examination. Therefore, it would not be fair to treat their initial appointment as ad-hoc because the appointments were on a regular basis, which was confirmed after completion of the probation period. Thus, by putting the events anticlockwise, their settled seniority should not be disturbed by treating their confirmed service as ad-hoc. However, to resolve this issue as well, addressing of arguments by all the interested parties might be required. 135. The private respondents’ stand that the slot for limited competitive examination was available for the first time in 2009; in contrast, the roster had to be prospective in its application and could not be retrospective; and the seniority has to be reckoned from the date of vacancy and can never be relegated back, might also require a hearing of all the parties to the Lis and in its absence this Court is restrained to form its opinion. 136. 136. The Judicial precedents cited by the parties, including Direct Recruit Class-II Engineering Officers Association v. State of Maharashtra, (1990) 2 SCC 715 ; R.K. Sabharwal v. State of Punjab, (1995) 2 SCC 745 ; Srikant Roy v. State of Jharkhand, (2017) 1 SCC 457 ; Punjab and Haryana High Court v. State of Punjab, (2019) 12 SCC 496 ; B.S. Jag Jeevan Kumar v. High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana & Andhra Pradesh, 2017 SCC Online Hyderabad 709, deal with merits of the case, and as such, do not require a detailed reference. 137. The points mentioned above, and so many other issues, which the parties might have raised, were not heard on merits because the arguments were confined only to the preliminary objections. Thus, before any verdict can come, there must be a decision on the legal issues. “Because the law of the case is a rule of practice – one “based upon sound policy that when an issue is once litigated and decided, that should be the end of the matter” -[United States v. United States Smelting Ref. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198 (1950)].– it isn’t a general bar to the relitigation of issues that arise during the life of a case. A ruling qualifies as the law of the case only if it meets two conditions: there must be a decision on a particular legal issue, and that decision must be final.”- Bryan A. Garner et. al, The Law of Judicial Precedent, at 27 (Ist ed. 2016). 138. Ld. Counsel representing the private respondents drew attention to full bench of Lahore High Court on clause 26 of Letters Patent, in case titled Royal Calcutta Turf Club v. Lala Kishan Chand Manchanda, AIR 1943 Lahore 84, wherein the reference was answered as follows, “[16] My answer, therefore, to the first question referred to the Full Bench is that the third or referee Judge should return his finding on the point of difference to the referring Bench for it to pronounce the decision of the appeal…” 139. The said decision is not applicable in the peculiar factual background of this case, when this Court had culled out the points of difference because one of the Hon’ble Judges had superannuated on the date of pronouncement of the dissenting decisions. 140. The said decision is not applicable in the peculiar factual background of this case, when this Court had culled out the points of difference because one of the Hon’ble Judges had superannuated on the date of pronouncement of the dissenting decisions. 140. The foundational facts relate to complying with the Hon'ble Supreme Court's directions in the case of Judges Association case, (2002) 4 SCC 247 , and this Court cannot even blink to dilute, modify, or in any manner circumvent the same. However, the arguments have to be addressed and heard on the merits of the case, which never happened. In my considered opinion, the petition did not suffer from delay, laches, acquiescence, and other preliminary objections. My view on this point is similar to the view taken by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Singh Thakur. The writs, once issued, have to be executed and would neither eclipse nor expire and can only be overruled. However, such execution has to be in the touchstone of service jurisprudence by hearing the parties and referring to the settled pronouncements, including that of larger and equal bench strengths, which in my opinion is still pending. Thus, similar to the verdicts pronounced by Hon'ble Single Judge and Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary, who upheld the judgment of Ld. Single Judge that arguments were not heard on merits, I am also of the considered opinion that arguments were not heard on merits; however, in both these judgments, Hon’ble Judges had dismissed the petitions/appeals on preliminary issues, whereas in my opinion, the preliminary objections, i.e., delay, laches, acquiescence, etc., do not hit the petitions. 141. Given above, on preliminary objections, my opinion is similar to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur's decision and contrary to Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dharam Chand Chaudhary's decision, which consequently becomes a minority view. Consequently, all the preliminary objections pointed out by respondents 2 to 6 stand dismissed. Further, in my opinion, no arguments were heard on merits; as such, the Judgment passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur, to the extent it had decided the matter on merits, becomes a minority view. Consequently, both the LPAs 33 of 2019 and 39 of 2019 are partly allowed, and are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Further, in my opinion, no arguments were heard on merits; as such, the Judgment passed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sureshwar Thakur, to the extent it had decided the matter on merits, becomes a minority view. Consequently, both the LPAs 33 of 2019 and 39 of 2019 are partly allowed, and are disposed of in the aforesaid terms. Resultantly, both the petitions, i.e., CWP 2061 of 2018 & CWP 2292 of 2018, need to be heard and decided on merits, for which the Registry to put up the matter on the administrative side for seeking appropriate orders from Hon'ble the Chief Justice.