JUDGMENT N.J. Jamadar, J. - This appeal is directed against the judgment and award dated 12th October, 2007 passed by the learned Member, MACT, Mumbai (Tribunal) in MACP No. 288 of 1996 whereby the claim of the appellant came to be partly allowed by awarding compensation of Rs. 3 lakhs inclusive of compensation awarded under section 140 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (MV Act, 1988), along with interest at the rate of 7% p.a. from 1st January, 2006 rill realization. 2. The background facts leading to this appeal can be stated, in brief, as under:- a] The appellant/applicant was working as a Loader (Hamal) with Ruby Tempo Transport Services. On 11th May, 1995 the applicant, along with two more loaders, was traveling in a tempo bearing No. MH-04-C-1498, loaded with powder. The said tempo was owned by opponent No. 1 and insured with opponent No. 2-insurer. The tempo was proceeding towards Goregaon. Asif was at the wheel of the said tempo. The applicant and other two loaders were sitting in the cabin. The driver drove the vehicle in an extremely rash and negligent manner, despite caution by the applicant and other loaders. Eventually, on Western Express High Way near Vikhroli Link road, Jogeshwari (E), the driver rammed the tempo into another stationary tempo bearing No. MXU-4139, from behind. The said stationary tempo was loaded with acid. The impact was such that the acid from the said tempo spilled over the applicant, and the applicant sustained severe burn injuries, resulting in loss of 100% vision in the right eye and 90% vision in the left eye. Accident was reported to police and crime was registered against the driver of the offending tempo. b] The applicant suffered 47% overall disability. Due to loss of vision in both the eyes, the applicant, however, suffered 100% functional disability. The applicant claimed that he was drawing monthly salary of Rs. 1,050/- and was also paid daily allowance (bhatta) of Rs. 25/-. The applicant thus approached the Tribunal with a claim of Rs. 4 lakhs, under section 166 of MV Act, 1988. c] The opponent No. 1 did not appear despite service of notice. Hence, the application proceeded ex parte against opponent No. 1. Opponent No. 2 insurer resisted the application by fling written statement. 25/-. The applicant thus approached the Tribunal with a claim of Rs. 4 lakhs, under section 166 of MV Act, 1988. c] The opponent No. 1 did not appear despite service of notice. Hence, the application proceeded ex parte against opponent No. 1. Opponent No. 2 insurer resisted the application by fling written statement. In addition to the denial of the mode and manner of accident, the negligence attributed to the driver of the offending vehicle, the age, occupation and income of the applicant and the injuries sustained in the accident, a defence of the breach of conditions of insurance was taken on the count that the driver of the vehicle was not having an effective driving license at the time of the accident. d] The learned Member, Tribunal, after appraisal of the evidence of the applicant Yadunath Naikade (PW.1) and documents tendered for his perusal was persuaded to allow the application holding, inter alia, that the accident occurred due to negligence on the part of the driver of the offending vehicle in which the applicant was travelling as a loader and the opponent No. 2 failed to lead evidence and establish that there was breach of conditions of insurance. The Tribunal recorded a finding that the applicant had sustained 100% loss of vision in the right eye and 90% loss of vision in the left eye. Opining that the applicant thus suffered 100% functional disability, the learned Member awarded compensation under the following heads: a) Pain and suffering - 75,000/- b) Medical bills - 5,000/- c) Special diet and conveyance - 5,000/- d) Loss of eye sight of right eye 100% and loss of eye sight of left eye 90% - 1,00,000/- e) Loss of income - 1,00,000/- f) Shortening of life due to injuries - 15,000/- Total: - 3,00,000/- 3. As regards the interest on the aforesaid amount, the learned Member was of the view that since the opponent No. 2 came to be impleaded as a party-opponent in the year 2002 and the notice could be served on the opponent No. 2 on 8th September, 2006, only, it was proper to award interest at the rate of 7% p.a from 1st January, 2006. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation as well as the award of interest from 1st January, 2006, instead of date of the application, the applicant has preferred this appeal. 4. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation as well as the award of interest from 1st January, 2006, instead of date of the application, the applicant has preferred this appeal. 5. I have heard Mr. T.J. Mendon, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. Poonam Mittal, learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 at length. With the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties, I have also perused the material on record, including the deposition of the applicant Yadunath Naikade (PW.1) and the documents tendered for the perusal of the Tribunal. 6. Mr. Mendon, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Member of the Tribunal failed to assess the compensation in accordance with well recognized principles of determination of compensation in personal injury claims. The compensation ought to have been awarded under various pecuniary and non-pecuniary heads of damages. Secondly, the Tribunal was in error in scaling down the income of the applicant, from Rs. 1,050/- p.m along with daily allowance of Rs. 25/-, to Rs. 900/- p.m., on the premise that there was no proof in respect of the said claim. Thirdly, the Tribunal ought to have determined compensation taking into account future prospects especially in view of the fact that the applicant was only 20 years of age. In the backdrop of the age of the applicant, the Tribunal ought to have determined loss of earnings on account of 100% functional disability by applying appropriate multiplier. Lastly, there was no justifable reason not to award interest from the date of the application, urged Mr. Mendon. 7. Per contra, the learned counsel for respondent No. 2 insurer would urge that the claim of the applicant that he had suffered 100% functional disability cannot be said to have been proved. In the absence thereof, according to Ms. Mittal, learned counsel for respondent No. 2, even the compensation awarded under the impugned award is on a higher side. Inviting the attention of the Court to the manner in which the applicant fared in the cross examination, an endevour was made to draw home the point that 100% functional disability has not at all been proved. In the circumstances of the case, since delay in proceeding with the application was squarely attributable to the applicant, the Tribunal was justifed in awarding interest from 1st January, 2006, submitted Ms. Mittal. 8. In the circumstances of the case, since delay in proceeding with the application was squarely attributable to the applicant, the Tribunal was justifed in awarding interest from 1st January, 2006, submitted Ms. Mittal. 8. The aforesaid submissions now fall for consideration. 9. To begin with the determination of the amount of compensation is governed by the test of "just compensation". In an injury claim, the quantum of compensation can be said to be just if, to the extent possible, it restores the claimant to the position before he sustained injury, in full and adequate measure. The determination of compensation, however, cannot be an exercise influenced by subjectivity and guesswork. Thus, the heads under which compensation is to be awarded in a case of personal injury claim, are required to be adhered to. This assumes significance for the reason that the claimant deserves compensation not only for the physical injury but also the resultant inability to lead life to the fullest and enjoy the usual amenities and pleasures of life. Award of compensation under the recognized heads of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages minimizes the element of subjectivity and also ensures that the claimant gets just compensation in contradistinction to either a meager amount or a bonanza. 10. In the case of R.D. Hattangadi vs. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd and Others 1995 ACJ 366 . the broad categories of the heads under which the compensation is payable to the victim of vehicular accident were enunciated as under: Broadly speaking while fixing an amount of compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the damages have to be assessed separately as pecuniary damages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actually incurred and which are capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may include expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damages are concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental and physical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for the loss of amenities of life which may include a variety of matters i.e. on account of injury the claimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation of life, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of the person concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life. 11. In the case of Raj Kumar vs. Ajay Kumar and Another 2011 ACJ 1 . the Supreme Court further elucidated the heads under which compensation is payable and the necessity of determination of compensation depending upon the nature of the disability. The observations in paragraph 5 are instructive and hence extracted below: 5] The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following : Pecuniary damages (Special Damages) : (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure; (ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising : (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General Damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity). In routine personal injury cases, compensation will be awarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only in serious cases of injury, where there is specifc medical evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, that compensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii) (b), (iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss of expectation of life. Assessment of pecuniary damages under item (i) and under item (ii)(a) do not pose much diffculty as they involve reimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable from the evidence. Award under the head of future medical expenses - item (iii) -- depends upon specifc medical evidence regarding need for further treatment and cost thereof. Assessment of non-pecuniary damages - items (iv), (v) and (vi) - involves determination of lump sum amounts with reference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effect thereof on the future life of the claimant. Decision of this Court and High Courts contain necessary guidelines for award under these heads, if necessary. What usually poses some diffculty is the assessment of the loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability - item (ii)(a). We are concerned with that assessment in this case. 12. In the case at hand, as indicated above, the learned Member of the Tribunal did not adhere to the aforesaid mandate in the matter of determination of the compensation under the well recognized heads. Instead the compensation was awarded on a generalized premise. Had the Tribunal kept the aforesaid prescription in view, it would have arrived at a just decision as regards the just compensation. 13. The Tribunal proceeded on the premise that the claimant suffered 100% functional disability. This assessment of the Tribunal appears to be impeccable. Though an endevour was made on behalf of the respondent to draw home the point that the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that the applicant suffered 100% functional disability is not borne out by record, yet, the context of the matter cannot be lost sight of. The applicant was working as a Loader. There is evidence to indicate that the applicant suffered 100% loss of vision in the right eye and 90% loss of vision in the left eye. The loss of vision in both eyes, in the backdrop of the nature of the avocation of the applicant, can only lead to 100% functional disability. It is true that Dr. Shah who had issued the certifcate (Exhibit 17) was not examined by the applicant. However, the Tribunal on the basis of almost un controverted material that the applicant suffered 100% loss of vision in the right eye and 90% in the left eye, arrived at a justifable conclusion that the applicant suffered 100% functional disability. It is true that Dr. Shah who had issued the certifcate (Exhibit 17) was not examined by the applicant. However, the Tribunal on the basis of almost un controverted material that the applicant suffered 100% loss of vision in the right eye and 90% in the left eye, arrived at a justifable conclusion that the applicant suffered 100% functional disability. I do not fnd any reason to take a different view of the matter. 14. This propels me to the pivotal question of determination of loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability as that constitutes the principal head of the pecuniary damages. The learned Member of the Tribunal was persuaded not to believe the claim of the applicant that the was drawing a monthly salary of Rs. 1,050/- plus Rs. 25/- daily allowance(bhatta), in the absence of evidence in respect of the said claim. Nonetheless as the applicant was then 20 year old boy, with capacity to work, the income of the applicant was assessed as Rs. 900/- p.m. 15. Indeed the applicant could not place on record the documents to substantiate the said claim. However, the Tribunal lost sight of the nature of the jurisdiction exercised under section 166 of the M.V.Act, 1988. Indisputably, the applicant suffered accident while working as a loader. In the backdrop of the nature of avocation, it was too harsh on the part of the Tribunal to expect the applicant to substantiate the said claim by placing documents of unimpeachable value. While assessing the claim of a claimant, who claimed to have been engaged in menial work in an unorganized sector, and also come from poor strata of the society, it may not be appropriate to appreciate the claim of such claimant with initial distrust. In any event, in the backdrop of the nature of avocation, a salary of Rs. 1,050/- p.m which the applicant claimed to draw, at the given point of time, was neither unreasonable nor inconceivable. Refusal to take into account claim of the applicant that he was also getting daily allowance of Rs. 25/-, in my view, was also not proper. Even if it is assumed that applicant worked for minimum 20 days in a month, excluding holidays and absence, monthly income of the applicant would be Rs.1,550/- a little over Rs.50/- per day. I am, therefore, persuaded to assess monthly income of the applicant at Rs. 1,550/-. 25/-, in my view, was also not proper. Even if it is assumed that applicant worked for minimum 20 days in a month, excluding holidays and absence, monthly income of the applicant would be Rs.1,550/- a little over Rs.50/- per day. I am, therefore, persuaded to assess monthly income of the applicant at Rs. 1,550/-. 16. Mr. Mendon was justifed in advancing a submission that the Tribunal ought to have taken into account future prospects while awarding compensation under the head of loss of future earnings. The controversy is set at rest by a three Judge Bench judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Jagdish vs. Mohan and Others 2018 ACJ 1011 . The Supreme Court after adverting to the constitution Bench judgment in the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Pranay Sethi and Others 2017 ACJ 2700 added 40% of the established income of the claimant, in an injury claim. The observations in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the judgment in the case of Jagdish (supra) are instructive and hence extracted below: 10] In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi, 2017 ACJ 2700 (SC), this Court has held that the beneft of future prospects should not be confned only to those who have a permanent job and would extend to self-employed individuals. In the case of a self-employed person, an addition of 40 per cent of the established income should be made where the age of the victim at the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in the present case, the appellant would be entitled to an enhancement of Rs. 2400/- towards loss of future prospects. 11] In making the computation in the present case, the court must be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered a serious disability in which he has suffered a loss of the use of both his hands. For a person engaged in manual activities, it requires no stretch of imagination to understand that a loss of hands is a complete Civil Appeal No. 7750 of 2012, decided on 1 November 2012 deprivation of the ability to earn. Nothing at least in the facts of this case can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Nothing at least in the facts of this case can restore lost hands. But the measure of compensation must reflect a genuine attempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Our yardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as to lead one to question whether our law values human life. If it does, as it must, it must provide a realistic recompense for the pain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards of compensation are not laws doles. In a discourse of rights, they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversations about law must shift from a paternalistic subordination of the individual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsic to human dignity. 17. The applicant was 20 years old. Hence, on the aforesaid touchstone, a sum of Rs. 620/- per month is required to be added towards the loss of future prospects. Thus, computed the multiplicand would be (1,550 + 620 = 2,170 x 12) Rs. 26,040/-. Since the applicant was 20 years old, the appropriate multiplier would be 18. Therefore, towards the loss of future income, the applicant would be entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,68,720/-. 18. In addition, under the head of pecuniary damages, it may be just and proper to award Rs. 25,000/- towards expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food and miscellaneous expenditure. 19. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 75,000/- towards pain and suffering. As the applicant lost vision of both eyes, that too on account of acid spilled over the applicant, award of Rs. 75,000/-towards pain and suffering appears to be justifable. Indisputably, on account of loss of vision, the applicant lost many amenities and joys of life. A sum of Rs. 25,000/- towards loss of amenities of life may be reasonable and conservative. Towards loss of expectation of life also, it may be appropriate to award Rs. 25,000/-. 20. Resultantly, the applicant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 6,18,720/-. 21. Mr. Mendon, learned counsel for the applicant would urge that the Tribunal committed an error in not awarding interest from the date of application. Towards loss of expectation of life also, it may be appropriate to award Rs. 25,000/-. 20. Resultantly, the applicant is entitled to a sum of Rs. 6,18,720/-. 21. Mr. Mendon, learned counsel for the applicant would urge that the Tribunal committed an error in not awarding interest from the date of application. Reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr (Mrs) K.R. Tandon vs. Om Prakash and Another 1999 ACJ 1299 wherein, in the facts of the said case, the Supreme Court observed that there was no justifcation not to award interest from the date of the application. 22. Section 171 of the M.V. Act, 1988, provides that where any Claims Tribunal allows a claim for compensation made under the said Act, such Tribunal may direct that in addition to the amount of compensation simple interest shall also be paid at such rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as it may specify in this behalf. The Tribunal is vested with the discretion as regards the rate of interest as well as the date from which the compensation shall carry interest. However, such date shall not precede the date of application. 23. In the case at hand, the Tribunal awarded interest from 1st January, 2006 for the reason that respondent No. 2 insurer came to be impleaded as party respondent to the application by way of amendment in the year 2002 and the notice of the application was served on the respondent on 8th September, 2006. The learned Member of the Tribunal was justifed in not awarding interest from the date of the application. However, it could not have advanced the date to 1st January, 2006. The proper course would have been to award interest from the date of impleadment of respondent No. 2/insurer as a party opponent to the application. It would, therefore, be expedient to direct that the aforesaid amount shall carry interest at the rate of 7% p.a. from 1st January, 2002 instead of 1st January, 2006. 24. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Hence, the following order: ORDER 1] The appeal stands allowed. 2] The impugned award stands modifed as under: (i) The respondents No. 1 and 2, opponent party and insurer, shall jointly and severally pay the sum of Rs. 24. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal deserves to be allowed. Hence, the following order: ORDER 1] The appeal stands allowed. 2] The impugned award stands modifed as under: (i) The respondents No. 1 and 2, opponent party and insurer, shall jointly and severally pay the sum of Rs. 6,18,720/- (Rupees Six Lakh Eighteen Thousand Seven Hundred Twenty only) inclusive of compensation under section 140 of the M.V. Act, 1988, along with interest at the rate of 7% p.a. from 1st January, 2002 till realization of the said amount. 3] The amount already deposited by respondents or either of them, in terms of the impugned award, shall be deducted from the aforesaid amount. 4] The applicant shall pay defcit Court fees, if any, before the Tribunal. 5] In the circumstances, the parties shall bear their respective costs. 6] Award be drawn accordingly.