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2021 DIGILAW 177 (KER)

K. A. ANOOP @ ANOOP @ ANU v. UNION OF INDIA

2021-02-23

K.VINOD CHANDRAN, M.R.ANITHA

body2021
JUDGMENT : Vinod Chandran, J. By the impugned order, the Special Court for Trial of NIA Cases, Ernakulam rejected the bail application filed by the appellant, who is accused No.9 in Crime No.465 of Kalamassery Police Station. In fact, twice earlier the bail applications of the very same accused were rejected by the Special Court, which orders were affirmed by this Court in Annexures-1 and 2. 2. The learned Counsel for the appellant compels us to consider the prayer again on two counts, one the appellant having not raised a ground, by inadvertence, at both the earlier instances. Then, the learned Counsel would contend that there is change in circumstance insofar as the earlier confession made by one of the accused having been retracted from. It is also submitted that though another co-accused has now succumbed to the pressure of the NIA and made a confession statement, as produced at Annexure-3, there is no allegation raised against the appellant. As to the ground inadvertently omitted at the earlier instance, the learned Counsel points out that Section 43-D(5) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 ['UA(P)A' for brevity] came into the statute only with effect from 31.12.2008, prior to which the offences are alleged to have been committed and the crime registered. Reliance is placed on the decision in Hitendra Vishnu Thakur & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others [ (1994) 4 SCC 602 ] to contend that there could be no retrospective effect given to the said provision. Reliance is also placed on the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Crl.A.No.98 of 2021 dated 01.02.2021 [Union of India v. K.A.Najeeb] which refused to interfere with the grant of bail by this Court in another case investigated by the NIA. The appellant has been incarcerated for more than five years, is the plea pressed. 3. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur considered the effect of the amendment made to Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 specifically to Section 20. Clause (b) of Section 20(4) stood amended with effect from 22nd May, 1993 and clause (bb) was newly introduced. The appellant has been incarcerated for more than five years, is the plea pressed. 3. Hitendra Vishnu Thakur considered the effect of the amendment made to Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985 specifically to Section 20. Clause (b) of Section 20(4) stood amended with effect from 22nd May, 1993 and clause (bb) was newly introduced. As per the amendment, the period for grant of statutory bail was reduced from 'one year' specified under clause (b) to 180 days' and a provision at clause (bb) was inserted enabling the Designated Court to extend the period of detention beyond 180 days upto one year on the report of the Public Prosecutor indicating the progress of the investigation and the specific reasons for detention. The ambit and scope of an Amending Act and its retrospective operation were culled out in the following manner in paragraph 25: "(i) A statute which affects substantive rights is presumed to be prospective in operation, unless made retrospective, either expressly or by necessary intendment, whereas a Statute which merely affects procedure, unless such a construction is textually impossible is presumed to be retrospective in its application, should not be given an extended meaning, and should be strictly confined to its clearly defined limits. (ii) Law relating to forum and limitation is procedural in nature, whereas law relating to right of action and right of appeal, even though remedial, is substantive in nature. (iii) Every litigant has a vested right in substantive law, but no such right exists in procedural law. (iv) A procedural Statute should not generally speaking be applied retrospectively, where the result would be to create new disabilities or obligations, or to impose new duties in respect of transactions already accomplished. (v) A Statute which not only changes the procedure but also creates a new rights and liabilities, shall be construed to be prospective in operation, unless otherwise provided, either expressly or by necessary implication." 4. The amendment of 1993 was held to be retrospective since it was procedural in nature since it regulated the period of compulsory detention and the procedure for grant of bail. It was held that it applies only to cases which were pending investigation as on 22.05.1993 (the date on which the amendment came into force) and in which challan had not till then been filed in Court. It was held that it applies only to cases which were pending investigation as on 22.05.1993 (the date on which the amendment came into force) and in which challan had not till then been filed in Court. Here too the proviso regulates the procedure of granting bail and is retrospective and applies to all cases where investigation is pending and there is no final report submitted. The learned Counsel then points out that there the accused was conferred a benefit by curtailing the period within which the statutory bail should be granted and here, the provision visits the accused with a disadvantage in so far as making the grant of bail more onerous. 5. We are unable to accept the above contention. In the cited case the consideration was not solely of the provision which curtailed the period within which a final report has to be filed, failing which bail inures as a right. There was a provision introduced enabling an application before Court for enlarging the time to complete investigation and seek further detention of the accused for satisfactory reasons proffered before Court. The ground raised that making the enlargement retrospective would visit the accused with an unfair disadvantage, was negatived holding that the amendment neither intended a benefit to the accused or a disadvantage to the prosecution. Here too there cannot be said to be any substantial right of the accused taken away in altering the manner in which the grant of bail is to be considered by Courts. 6. In the present case, the trial has not commenced only because the co-accused are undergoing trial in another case before the XLVIII Additional City Civil & Sessions Judge, City Civil Court, Bangaluru, which is a Special Court for trial of CBI cases. As per the earlier query made by this Court, the learned Sessions Judge has communicated vide letter dated 19.11.2019, the details to the Registrar Judicial of the Karnataka High Court which was forwarded to the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court by letter dated 19.11.2019. The said Special Court has been assigned with the exclusive trial of nine serial bomb blast cases. The learned Judge has detailed the difficulty in taking 313 Statements from all the accused, putting to each of them the incriminating circumstances from more than 5000 pages of prosecution evidence recorded in each case. The said Special Court has been assigned with the exclusive trial of nine serial bomb blast cases. The learned Judge has detailed the difficulty in taking 313 Statements from all the accused, putting to each of them the incriminating circumstances from more than 5000 pages of prosecution evidence recorded in each case. The difficulty is compounded for reason of the accused not being conversant in English or Kannada which requires translation of the questions and recording of the answers in the vernacular language of the accused and re-translation to English. The learned Prosecutor appearing for the respondent submits that even now the process is not over. The final report has been filed in the instant crime registered, after the NIA took over the case in 2010. Hence even before the final report was filed and when the investigation was ongoing the amendment was brought into the Act and the provision squarely applies. 7. That apart even if Section 43-D(5) is not applicable to the above case, in granting bail, especially in cases where there is a serious offence alleged, it has to be made in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. When exercising discretion to grant bail, there should also be reasons given for prima facie concluding that the accused is entitled to be so released on bail. We specifically refer to the decision in State of U.P. v. Amarmani Tripathi [ (2005) 8 SCC 21 ] from which paragraphs 18, 19 and 22 are extracted hereunder: "18. It is well settled that the matters to be considered in an application for bail are (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the charge; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail [see Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi [ (2001) 4 SCC 280 ] and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [ (1978) 1 SCC 118 ]. While a vague allegation that the accused may tamper with the evidence or witnesses may not be a ground to refuse bail, if the accused is of such character that his mere presence at large would intimidate the witnesses or if there is material to show that he will use his liberty to subvert justice or tamper with the evidence, then bail will be refused. We may also refer to the following principles relating to grant or refusal of bail stated in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [ (2004) 7 SCC 528 ]: (SCC pp. 535-36, para 11) “11. The law in regard to grant or refusal of bail is very well settled. The court granting bail should exercise its discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Though at the stage of granting bail a detailed examination of evidence and elaborate documentation of the merit of the case need not be undertaken, there is a need to indicate in such orders reasons for prima facie concluding why bail was being granted particularly where the accused is charged of having committed a serious offence. Any order devoid of such reasons would suffer from non-application of mind. It is also necessary for the court granting bail to consider among other circumstances, the following factors also before granting bail; they are: (a) The nature of accusation and the severity of punishment in case of conviction and the nature of supporting evidence. (b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witness or apprehension of threat to the complainant. (c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in support of the charge. (See Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh [ (2002) 3 SCC 598 ] and Puran v. Rambilas [ (2001) 6 SCC 338 ]”. 19. This Court also in specific terms held that: (SCC pp. 536-37, para 14) “[T}he condition laid down under Section 437(1)(i) is sine qua non for granting bail even under Section 439 of the Code. In the impugned order it is noticed that the High Court has given the period of incarceration already undergone by the accused and the unlikelihood of trial concluding in the near future as grounds sufficient to enlarge the accused on bail, in spite of the fact that the accused stands charged of offences punishable with life imprisonment or even death penalty. In such cases, in our opinion, the mere fact that the accused has undergone certain period of incarceration (three years in this case) by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail, nor the fact that the trial is not likely to be concluded in the near future either by itself or coupled with the period of incarceration would be sufficient for enlarging the appellant on bail when the gravity of the offence alleged is severe and there are allegations of tampering with the witnesses by the accused during the period he was on bail.” xxx xxx xxx 22. While a detailed examination of the evidence is to be avoided while considering the question of bail, to ensure that there is no prejudging and no prejudice, a brief examination to be satisfied about the existence or otherwise of a prima facie case is necessary. An examination of the material in this case, set out above, keeping in view the aforesaid principles, disclose prima facie, the existence of a conspiracy to which Amarmani and Madhumani were parties. The contentions of the respondents that the confessional statement of Rohit Chaturvedi is inadmissible in evidence and that that should be excluded from consideration, for the purpose of bail is untenable. This Court had negatived a somewhat similar contention in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar [(2004) 7 SCC 526] thus: (SCC p.538, para 19) “19. The next argument of learned counsel for the respondent is that prima facie the prosecution has failed to produce any material to implicate the respondent in the crime of conspiracy. In this regard he submitted that most of the witnesses have already turned hostile. The only other evidence available to the prosecution to connect the respondent with the crime is an alleged confession of the co-accused which according to the learned counsel was inadmissible in evidence. Therefore, he contends that the High Court was justified in granting bail since the prosecution has failed to establish even a prima facie case against the respondent. From the High Court order we do not find this as a ground for granting bail. Be that as it may, we think that this argument is too premature for us to accept. Therefore, he contends that the High Court was justified in granting bail since the prosecution has failed to establish even a prima facie case against the respondent. From the High Court order we do not find this as a ground for granting bail. Be that as it may, we think that this argument is too premature for us to accept. The admissibility or otherwise of the confessional statement and the effect of the evidence already adduced by the prosecution and the merit of the evidence that may be adduced hereinafter including that of the witnesses sought to be recalled are all matters to be considered at the stage of the trial.” 8. We also refer to NIA v. Zahoor Ahmad Shaj Watali [ (2019) 5 SCC 1 ]. In paragraph 23 of the said decision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the scope and ambit of sub-section (5) of Section 43-D of the UA(P)A and similar provisions under the TADA, Maharashtra Control of Organized Crime Act, 1999 and Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985. The special enactments referred, required the Court, while granting bail "to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is 'not guilty' of the alleged offence". In the UA(P)A, the restriction is insofar as refusing bail if, in the opinion of the Court, there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accusation against the accused person is prima facie true. Observing that there is a degree of difference as to the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court, it was emphasized that "By its very nature, the expression 'prima facie true' would mean that the materials/evidence collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated offence". It was held that the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is 'prima facie true' as compared to the opinion of the accused being 'not guilty' of the offence alleged. However, this does not detract from the essential requirements as laid down in Amarmani Tripathi, which was followed in Zahoor Ahmad Shaj Watali. 9. However, this does not detract from the essential requirements as laid down in Amarmani Tripathi, which was followed in Zahoor Ahmad Shaj Watali. 9. The rigour definitely would be still lighter and the degree of satisfaction to be recorded will be a tad lesser, when considering the application for bail under Section 437. The discretion of the Court is wider and mitigating circumstances of the standing of the accused in the society, his antecedents, nature and gravity of the offence, absence of the possibility of absconding, the probable punishment and so on and so forth are also enabled to be taken into consideration. Hence, even if subsection (5) of Section 43-D is not invoked, the Court has a duty to consider whether there are compelling grounds to grant bail, for which the eight aspects noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court has to be definitely looked at. 10. The learned Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the accused has been imprisoned for the last five years and many of the co-accused are on bail. The learned Prosecutor submitted that the co-accused were released on bail prior to the case being taken over by the NIA in 2010. The charge-sheet was filed by the NIA under the UA(P)A. The accused was absconding right from 2005 when the original crime was registered and was living abroad. The accused could be apprehended only in the year 2016, after nine years from the registration of the crime by the local Police. 11. This Court twice, by Annexure 1 and 2, had found that prima facie there is reasonable ground to believe the accusations as true. There can be no different view taken by this Court at this instance, especially when Section 43-D(5) of the UA(PA) is applicable. Yet again, in Annexure-1 this Court looked at the confession statement of the 7th accused which implicated the accused even at the stage of the conspiracy. The release of the co-accused at an earlier stage was also considered and found to be not a circumstance on facts, to grant bail to the applicant. It was also noticed that four other cases are pending against the accused. The prayer was again considered and rejected in Annexure-2. 12. The release of the co-accused at an earlier stage was also considered and found to be not a circumstance on facts, to grant bail to the applicant. It was also noticed that four other cases are pending against the accused. The prayer was again considered and rejected in Annexure-2. 12. The allegation against the accused in the case pending before the Special Court are of offences under Sections 120B r/w 121A, 364, 323, 506 Part II, 435 r/w. Section 34 of the IPC, Section 4 of Prevention of Destruction of Public Property Act, 1984 and Section 16(i) (b) and 18 of UA(P)A. The accused, said to be members of a political party, in retaliation of their leader being kept in custody in the State of Tamil Nadu, hijacked a bus belonging to the Tamil Nadu State Transport Corporation ['TNSTC' for brevity] and set it on fire after allowing the passengers, driver and conductor to alight from the bus. The leader of the political party is still in custody and is undergoing trial before the Special Court, Bangaluru for the nine bomb blast cases, which were perpetrated in the State of Tamil Nadu. Many of the persons who participated in the act of committing arson as alleged in the present case, have been apprehended later in the bomb blast cases and are also undergoing trial at Bangaluru. 13. The learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the confession recorded from one of the accused which led to the implication of the appellant has been retracted, but nothing is produced to prove the same. The appellant's submission is that the said accused has not been arrayed as an approver till date and it can be presumed that he does not intend to stand by the confession. We are not impressed with the argument, since the trial has not yet commenced. The further submission is that there is nothing in Annexure-3, the confession of A4, to link the appellant with the crime. We have gone through Annexure-3 Statement wherein it is specifically stated that the appellant-Anoop was one of the persons who was available at the KSRTC Bus Stand at Ernakulam when the said accused along with some others reached the bus stand to board the TNSTC Bus with a can of petrol. We have gone through Annexure-3 Statement wherein it is specifically stated that the appellant-Anoop was one of the persons who was available at the KSRTC Bus Stand at Ernakulam when the said accused along with some others reached the bus stand to board the TNSTC Bus with a can of petrol. The commission of arson is specifically spoken of and it has also been stated that the appellant was one of the three persons who followed the bus in three bikes; on which those who had boarded the bus at Ernakulam fled from the scene. 14. We do not find any change in circumstance by reason of Annexure-3, compelling enough to release the appellant on bail. On the contrary it reiterates the involvement of the appellant. We also take note of the submission of the Prosecutor appearing for the NIA that the appellant is also accused in two murder cases and there is every chance of himself absconding, if released on bail. It is also submitted that since the bomb blast cases are continuing, there is always threat of such acts being perpetrated again if the appellant; who had actively participated in the earlier retaliatory incident of arson; on conspiracy hatched. 15. We also find no identity with K.A.Najeeb, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court was considering the application for cancellation of bail granted by the High Court. There, the accused/applicant was absconding and the trial against the co-accused had been completed after splitting up the case. The co-accused were sentenced for rigorous imprisonment between 2 to 8 years. The absconding accused was arrested later and he was in police custody for five years. The High Court had specifically noticed the fact that even if the accused is found guilty, he could not be awarded larger sentence than that has been awarded to the co-accused, none of whom were granted sentence exceeding eight years. In this case, no such circumstance arise and as per Section 16 of the UA(P)A, the sentence of imprisonment would range from 5 years upto life. Considering the totality of circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellant is not entitled to be released on bail and we reject the appeal.