JUDGMENT A.S.CHANDURKAR,J. - The election of the respondent no.1-returned candidate has been challenged by the petitioners in the present election petition filed under Sec. 81 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short, 'the Act of 1951 ). The challenge is based on the provisions of Sec. 100(1)(b), Sec. 100(1)(d)(i), (ii) and (iv) read with Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951. The petitioners besides seeking a declaration that the election of the returned candidate is void have also claimed a further declaration that the petitioner no.1 be declared duly elected. The returned candidate on being served with the election petition has filed C.A.O. No.754 of 2020 (Exhibit 19) under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, 'the Code ') praying that the pleadings in paragraph 7 alongwith its sub-paragraphs as well as paragraphs 10 to 12 be struck off. The returned candidate has also filed C.A.O. No.11 of 2021 (Exhibit 20) under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code read with Sec. 86 of the Act of 1951 seeking rejection of the election petition for want of cause of action. In addition, the returned candidate has also filed C.A.O. No.549 of 2021 (Exhibit 26) seeking permission to raise additional grounds in support of the application filed below Exhibit 20. 2. The petitioners have opposed the aforesaid applications. Reply to the application preferred under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code has been filed at Exhibit 22. Reply to the application preferred under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code has been filed at Exhibit 23 and an additional reply has also been filed at Exhibit 32. The learned counsel for the parties were heard on the applications as filed by the returned candidate under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. The learned counsel for the parties were heard on the applications as filed by the returned candidate under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. One of the contentions urged on behalf of the returned candidate was that the affidavits filed by the petitioners under Form 25 read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 (for short, 'the Rules of 1961 ) were improper for the reason that the statements made by the petitioners in paragraphs 1 to 21 alongwith Annexures I to IX of the election petition were stated to be true to the knowledge of both the petitioners and were stated also to be true to their information. After finding that any defect in verification or in the affidavits as filed is curable, by order dated 29/10/2021 the election petitioners were granted an opportunity to cure the defects in the affidavits filed under Form 25 within a period of fifteen days from the date of the order. The relevant directions in the order dated 29/10/2021 are as under: "10. ... ... .... In the light of the aforesaid legal position, I am inclined to grant an opportunity to the election petitioners to cure the defects in the affidavits filed under Form 25 by specifying as to which averments in the election petition are true to the knowledge of the election petitioner nos.1 and 2 and which part of the allegations made are true to their information. It is not necessary in this backdrop to probe deeper into the content ion of the election petitioners that all allegations made could be true to the personal knowledge and also to the information as believed to be true since that aspect has not been accepted in R. P. Moidutti (supra). On principles analogous to the doctrine of election, an opportunity is given to the election petitioners to cure the defects in the affidavits filed under Form 25 read with Rule 94-A of the Rules of 1961 as stated above. The same be done within a period of fifteen days from today. The adjudication of Exhibits 19, 20 and 26 would be taken up thereafter." 3. The same be done within a period of fifteen days from today. The adjudication of Exhibits 19, 20 and 26 would be taken up thereafter." 3. In the affidavit filed by both the election petitioners in Form 25 dated 07.07.2019 it has been averred that the statements made in paragraphs 1 to 21 with Annexures I to IX as regards the commission of corrupt practice under Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951 as well as contents of all civil applications including the application for amendment of the election petition and the application for permission to file documents as well as other applications filed till 07.07.2019 were true to the knowledge of both the election petitioners. In the same affidavits it was further stated that this very matter that was true to the knowledge of the election petitioners was also true to their information. Pursuant to the order dated 29/10/2021 fresh affidavits under Form 25 have been filed at Exhibit 31 dated 06.11.2021 by both the election petitioners. In these affidavits it has been stated that the statements made in paragraph 1 to 21 ( 'here excluding 3 to 21 ) with Annexures I to IX ( 'here excluding ') were true to the knowledge of the election petitioners. The statements made in paragraphs 1 to 21 ( 'here excluding paragraphs 1 and 2 ) with Annexures I to IX as regards commission of corrupt practice under Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951 were true to the information. In other words, according to the election petitioners the statements made in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the election petition were true to their knowledge and the statements made in paragraphs 3 to 21 alongwith Annexures I to IX of the election petition about commission of corrupt practice were true to their information. This has been clarified in paragraph 3 of the said affidavits. The election petitioners have then stated that the defects in the existing affidavits were cured in the aforesaid manner. The effect of the affidavits now filed pursuant to the opportunity granted to the election petitioners for curing the defects would have to be taken into consideration. 4. This has been clarified in paragraph 3 of the said affidavits. The election petitioners have then stated that the defects in the existing affidavits were cured in the aforesaid manner. The effect of the affidavits now filed pursuant to the opportunity granted to the election petitioners for curing the defects would have to be taken into consideration. 4. Shri Sunil V. Manohar, learned Senior Advocate for the returned candidate in view of aforesaid submitted that as the contents of paragraph 7(i) Point No.1 to Point No.3 and Point No.5 to Point No.9 in the present election petition being verbatim the averments made in paragraph 7(i) Point No.1 to Point No.9 in Election Petition No.12 of 2019, for reasons assigned in the order dated 26.02.2021 paragraph 7(i) Point Nos.1 and 5 to 9 deserve to be struck off under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code. He sought to rely upon the aforesaid order to the extent the aforesaid similar paragraphs have been directed to be deleted. As regards paragraph 7(i) Point Nos.2, 3 and 4 are concerned, it is submitted that the Court may re-consider deletion of aforesaid paragraphs since there was absence of material facts in those paragraphs. With regard to the amended pleadings the learned Senior Advocate on behalf of the returned candidate submitted that firstly, the paragraphs amended as per application at Exhibit 8 were not supported by a valid affidavit and hence those averments did not warrant consideration. Further, the averments therein did not lead to any ground in the Act of 1951 on the basis of which the election of the returned candidate could be set aside. All relevant information as required in law was furnished by the returned candidate and nothing was concealed in Form 26. Though reference is made in Point No.9A to Annexures VIII and VIIIA with the further averment that such alleged concealment amounted to corrupt practice on the part of the returned candidate, the sources of information from which the election petitioners got knowledge about these proceedings has not been disclosed in the affidavit filed by them vide Form 25. Though reference is made to various Government documents, again the source of information has not been mentioned by the election petitioners. Though reference is made to various Government documents, again the source of information has not been mentioned by the election petitioners. As regards the pleadings in Point 9B it is submitted that the returned candidate in Column 7(B)(ii) of the affidavit in Form 26 had stated that there was no non-agricultural land owned by the returned candidate. The allegation that the properties at Mouza Dhapewada were in non-agricultural use was hardly relevant as that would not be a ground for rejection of the nomination paper. It was not pleaded by the election petitioners that the land in question was not converted for non-agricultural use but was disclosed in the affidavit as such. Further which election petitioner got the information with regard to the documents collectively at Annexure IX was also not disclosed. This was necessary as it was pleaded that such material concealment amounted to a corrupt practice. The pleadings in Point 10, 11 and 12 were vexatious and unnecessary for the reason that the averments therein did not constitute any ground either for rejecting the nomination form or for setting aside the election of the returned candidate. The election petitioners had sought to highlight absence of such details which were not required to be statutorily mentioned in Form 26. Information with regard to the difference amount or disclosing the name of the person whose liability had been incurred or disclosing the sources of repayment for the loans were not required to be mentioned in Form 26. By such pleadings which were vague the election petitioners intended to have a roving enquiry which was not permissible. It was thus submitted that since the pleadings in Point Nos.9A to 12 did not disclose any material fact and further that the source/sources of information from which the election petitioners got knowledge of the said averments were not disclosed in the affidavit in Form 25, said pleadings were liable to be struck off. It was thus submitted that since the pleadings in Point Nos.9A to 12 did not disclose any material fact and further that the source/sources of information from which the election petitioners got knowledge of the said averments were not disclosed in the affidavit in Form 25, said pleadings were liable to be struck off. In support of his submissions the learned Senior Advocate placed reliance on the decisions in V. Narayanaswamy Versus C.P. Thirunavukkarasu [ (2000) 2 SCC 294 ] , State of Bombay Versus Purushottam Jog Naik [ AIR 1952 SC 317 ], Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another Versus Company Law Board and Others [ AIR 1967 SC 295 ], R.P. Moidutty Versus P.T. Kunju Mohammad and Another [ (2000) 1 SCC 481 ] , L.R. Shivaramagowda and Others Versus T.M. Chandrashekar (Dead) By LRs and Others [ (1999) 1 SCC 666 ] , Regu Mahesh Alias Regu Maheswar Rao Versus Rajendra Pratap Bhanj Dev and Another [(2004) 1 SCC 46] , C.P. John Versus Babu M. Palissery and Others [ (2014) 10 SCC 547 ] , Ravinder Singh Versus Janmeja Singh and Others [ (2000) 8 SCC 191 ] , Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and Another Versus Dattaji Raghobaji Meghe and Others [ (1995) 5 SCC 347 ] and Manohar @ Sagar Pundlik Dabrase Versus Election Commission of India, New Delhi and Others [ 2020 (3) Mh.L.J. 72 ] to substantiate his contentions. 5. Shri Satish M. Ukey, learned counsel for the election petitioners opposed the aforesaid submissions and urged that both the applications were liable to be rejected and the election petition ought to be tried on merits. At the outset he submitted that the election petition was filed within the prescribed period of limitation. Similarly, an application for amendment of the election petition raising additional grounds was also filed before expiry of the period of limitation. After such amendment was allowed the same was carried out in the election petition and hence all necessary pleadings and grounds on which the election petitioners have sought relief are now present in the election petition. According to him, the election petition is not liable to be dismissed without trial by relying upon the provisions of Sec. 83 of the Act of 1951. Sec. 83 does not find reference in Sec. 86(1) of the Act of 1951. According to him, the election petition is not liable to be dismissed without trial by relying upon the provisions of Sec. 83 of the Act of 1951. Sec. 83 does not find reference in Sec. 86(1) of the Act of 1951. The application preferred by the returned candidate under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code does not indicate which subclause of that provision is attracted for seeking such dismissal. The cause of action for challenging the election was present and in view of the pleadings and additional grounds raised there was no cause for dismissal of the election petition as prayed for by the returned candidate. He referred to the application for amendment at Exhibit 8 which was filed on 08/07/2019. After referring to the verification and solemn affirmation dated 07.07.2019 it was submitted that the same being a Sunday the said application could not have been filed on that day. It was accordingly filed on the next working day which was 08/07/2019-Monday. He also invited attention to the sequence in which the said affidavits have been notarized to substantiate his contention that all due care had been taken before first signing the amendment application and then swearing the affidavits. Though affidavit in Form 25 had been filed alongwith the election petition, alongwith the amendment application fresh affidavits in relation to the entire election petition were again filed in Form 25. He referred to the removal of Office objections on 10/07/2019 and submitted that thereafter no objection remained in the election petition. In absence of any such objection surviving in the election petition there was no basis for the returned candidate to urge that there were defects in the election petition for seeking its rejection. He submitted that the order dated 21/02/2020 passed on C.A.O. No.1293 of 2019 had become final. Moreover, the returned candidate after filing his written statement also amended the same on 21/03/2020 and therefore it was not now permissible to raise any challenge to the amendment as made in the election petition. If the returned candidate had any doubt as regards the grounds raised in the election petition or after its amendment the same could have been put forward and the election petitioners could have taken steps to satisfy such doubts. If the returned candidate had any doubt as regards the grounds raised in the election petition or after its amendment the same could have been put forward and the election petitioners could have taken steps to satisfy such doubts. He then submitted that the source of information was duly disclosed in Exhibit 8 and he referred to the verification and solemn affirmation clause to highlight that aspect. Since the grounds raised in the election petition were supported by documentary material on record, the source of knowledge was obviously from such documents. It was not necessary to reiterate the same. Both petitioners had taken due responsibility for the averments made in the election petition. As regards the submission made on behalf of the returned candidate that the affidavits having been sworn on 07.07.2019 and they being in support of applications filed till that date for which reason the said affidavits cannot be considered in support of the applications filed on 08/07/2019, it was submitted that the said objection as raised had no substance. Since the applications were duly sworn on 07.07.2019 which was a Sunday and the said applications were filed on the next day it was clear that the affidavits were in support of all applications that were duly prepared and sworn for being filed on 08/07/2019. 6. According to the learned counsel for the election petitioners it was clear on a perusal of Form 26 that it had not been appropriately filled in. Though the information in question was required to be filled in horizontal columns the returned candidate on his own volition submitted Form 26 by providing information in vertical columns. Such unilateral change or amendment in Form 26 was not permissible. This was done with an intention to mislead and confuse the electorate. Since the returned candidate in Column 5(ii) of Form 26 did not disclose the pendency of the criminal revision application it had been pleaded that this amounted to concealment of material information. Similar was the position with regard to nonagricultural use of the properties at Mouza Dhapewada, Tahsil Kalmeshwar, District Nagpur as it was mentioned in Column 7(B)(ii) that there was no non-agricultural land with the returned candidate. The averments as made in Point Nos.10 to 12 were relevant for the reason that it was necessary for the returned candidate to have disclosed such information which the voters had a right to know. The averments as made in Point Nos.10 to 12 were relevant for the reason that it was necessary for the returned candidate to have disclosed such information which the voters had a right to know. A candidate was required to disclose his sources of income especially when the expenses shown were more than the income disclosed. It was further submitted that information was collected by the election petitioners as regards pendency of the criminal revision application against the returned candidate as well as from the concerned website as regards use of properties for non-agricultural use. Details of the personal loan as well as the liabilities were not indicated. All this amounted to concealing material information from the voters. In absence of the sources of income or the sources of repayment of loans being disclosed it was clear that the returned candidate had concealed material information in Form 26. It was the right of the voters to be provided with all relevant information and that was the purpose behind submission of Form 26 on affidavit. Since necessary material facts were pleaded in the context of Point Nos.9A to 12 there would be no reason to strike off those points as urged by the returned candidate. Referring to each paragraph of election petition and especially the grounds raised in paragraph 7 thereof it was submitted that material facts had been disclosed in each paragraph and none of the pleadings were liable to be struck off. The grounds on which it was urged that the nomination form of the returned candidate was liable to be rejected were specifically pleaded. Similarly, the manner in which corrupt practice under Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951 was committed by the returned candidate was also highlighted. Various annexures filed in support of the averments made in the election petition also substantiated the case as pleaded by the election petitioners. On an entire reading of the election petition it was submitted that a complete cause of action had been disclosed and the election petition ought to proceed for trial. He urged that the application under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code at Exhibit 20 and thereafter the application seeking to raise additional grounds had been filed belatedly only with an intention to consume time. The grounds raised were technical in nature which did not warrant acceptance. He urged that the application under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code at Exhibit 20 and thereafter the application seeking to raise additional grounds had been filed belatedly only with an intention to consume time. The grounds raised were technical in nature which did not warrant acceptance. To substantiate his contention that there was no merit in the applications at Exhibits 19, 20 and 26 the learned counsel placed reliance on the decisions in Murarka Radhey Shyam Ram Kumar Versus Roop Singh Rathore and Others [ AIR 1964 SC 1545 ], F.A. Sapa and Others Versus Singora and Others [ (1991) 3 SCC 375 ] , Umesh Challiyill Versus K.P. Rajendran [ (2008) 11 SCC 740 ] , K.K. Ramachandran Master Versus M.V. Sreyamakumar and Others [ (2010) 7 SCC 428 ] , Ponnala Lakshmaiah Versus Kommuri Pratap Reddy and Others [ (2012) 7 SCC 788 ] , G.M. Siddeshwar Versus Prasanna Kumar [ (2013) 4 SCC 776 ] and Lok Prahari through its General Secretary S.N. Shukla Versus Union of India and Others [ (2018) 4 SCC 699 ] . He also invited attention to the pursis filed at Exhibit 30. It was thus submitted in the light of aforesaid that on a complete reading of the election petition there was no ground made out to dismiss the election petition under the provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code. Similarly, none of the pleadings were liable to be struck off under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code. Rejection of the said applications was accordingly sought. After conclusion of the arguments, the learned counsel placed a further pursis on record on 01.12.2021. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and I have perused the election petition alongwith its annexures. On thoughtful consideration, the issues that arise for consideration can be decided with reference to (a) Scope of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code (b) Importance of verification in the context of Sec. 83(1) of the Act of 1951 (c) Analysis of pleadings and findings thereon and (d) Conclusion. (a) Scope of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code 8. (a) Scope of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code 8. While considering the prayer for striking out pleadings under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code, it would be beneficial to refer to the instructive decisions of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court on this subject. Relevance of material facts and full particulars giving rise to cause of action in an election petition is of basic importance. In Hardwari Lal Vs. Kanwal Singh [ AIR 1972 SC 515 ], it has been observed in paragraph 19 as under: "19. The requirements in an election petition as to material facts and the consequences of lack of such allegation of material facts came up for consideration in this Court in the recent decision in Samant N. Balakrishnan V George Fernandes, (1969) 3 SCR 603 = ( AIR 1969 SC 1201 ). In that case reference was made to Ss. 81, 83 and 86 of the Act as the procedure provisions of election petition. Sec. 81 deals with presentation of petitions. Sec. 83 deals with contents of petitions. Sec. 86 deals with trial of petitions. Hidayatullah, C.J. speaking for the Court laid down these propositions. First, Sec. 83 of the Act is mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material facts and then requires the fullest possible particulars. Second, omission of a single material fact, leads to an incomplete cause of action and the statement of claim becomes bad. Third, the function of particulars is to present in full a picture of the cause of action to make the opposite party understand the case he will have to meet. Fourth, material facts and particulars are distinct matters. Material facts will mention statements of fact and particulars will set out the names of persons with the date, time and place. Fifth, material facts will show the ground of corrupt practice and the complete cause of action and the particulars will give the necessary information to present a full picture of the cause of action. Sixth, in stating the material facts it will not do merely to quote words of the Sec. because then the efficacy of the material facts will be lost. The fact which constitutes a corrupt practice must be stated and the fact must be correlated to one of the heads of corrupt practice. Sixth, in stating the material facts it will not do merely to quote words of the Sec. because then the efficacy of the material facts will be lost. The fact which constitutes a corrupt practice must be stated and the fact must be correlated to one of the heads of corrupt practice. Seventh, an election petition without the material facts relating to a corrupt practice is no election petition at all. A petition which merely cites the sections cannot be said to disclose a cause of action where the allegation is the obtaining or procuring of assistance unless the exact type and form of assistance and the person from whom it is sought and the manner in which the assistance is to further the prospects of the election are alleged as statements of facts." In Roop Lal Sathi Vs. Nachhattar Singh Gill [ (1982) 3 SCC 487 ] , it has been held that the words "material facts" are the facts that are necessary to formulate a complete cause of action and the same are to be stated. In paragraph 26 of the said decision it has been observed as under: "26........ Thus, the word 'material ' in material facts under Sec. 83 of the Act means facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action; and if any one 'material ' fact is omitted, the statement or plaint is bad; it is liable to be struck out. The function of 'particulars ' is quite different, the use of particulars is intended to meet a further and quite separate requirement of pleading imposed in fairness and justice to the returned candidate. Their function is to fill in the picture of the election petitioner 's cause of action with information sufficiently detailed to put the returned candidate on his guard as to the case he has to meet and to enable him to prepare for trial in a case where his election is challenged on the ground of any corrupt practice." In Ajay Arjun Singh Vs. Sharadendu Tiwari and Others [ AIR 2016 SC 4087 ] the expressions occurring under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16(1) of the Code have been explained. In paragraph 5 thereof it has been held as under: "5. Before we examine the various questions that arise in this appeal, we think it profitable to examine the scheme of Order VI, Rule 16. In paragraph 5 thereof it has been held as under: "5. Before we examine the various questions that arise in this appeal, we think it profitable to examine the scheme of Order VI, Rule 16. 16. Striking out pleadings - The Court may at any stage of the proceedings order to be struck out or amended any matter in any pleading - (a) which may be unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous or vexatious, or (b) which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of the suit, or (c) which is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. It authorises the Court to order that any matter in any pleading before it be struck out on the grounds specified under clauses (a), (b) and (c). Each one of them is a distinct ground. For example, clause (a) authorises the Court to strike out the pleadings which may be (i) unnecessary, (ii) scandalous, (iii) frivolous, (iv) vexatious. If a pleading or part of it is to be struck out on the ground that it is unnecessary, the test to be applied is whether the allegation contained in that pleading is relevant and essential to grant the relief sought. Allegations which are unconnected with the relief sought in the proceeding fall under this category." Similarly, the principles laid down as to the manner of reading the plaint as a whole without touching the merits of the controversy as laid down in Dahiben Versus Arvindbhai Bhanusali [ (2020) 7 SCC 366 ], Shakti Bhog Food Industries Pvt. Ltd. Versus Central Bank of India and Another [ 2020 (5) Mh.L.J. 1 ] and Mohan Rawale Versus Damodar Tatyaba and Others [ (1994) 2 SCC 392 ] are also required to be kept in mind. In Sushil Kumar Versus Rakesh Kumar [ (2003) 8 SCC 673 ] it was held in paragraph 75 that pleadings in an election petition have to be construed strictly. An election petition is not an action at law or a suit in equity. (b) Importance of verification in the context of Sec. 83(1) 9. The provisions of Sec. 83(1)(c) of the Act of 1951 require an election petition to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code for verification of the pleadings. An election petition is not an action at law or a suit in equity. (b) Importance of verification in the context of Sec. 83(1) 9. The provisions of Sec. 83(1)(c) of the Act of 1951 require an election petition to be signed by the petitioner and verified in the manner laid down in the Code for verification of the pleadings. The proviso thereto states that where an allegation of any corrupt practice is made by the petitioner, the election petition shall be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribed form in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and the particulars thereof. Rule 94A of the Rules of 1961 refers to the form of affidavit to be filed alongwith the election petition as required by the proviso to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 83 of the Act of 1951. Such affidavit has to be in Form 25 and it has to be sworn before the Magistrate of First Class or a Notary or a Commissioner of Oaths. Order VI Rule 15 of the Code prescribes the manner of verification of pleadings. As per the requirement of Order VI Rule 15(2) of the Code the person verifying has to satisfy by reference to the number of paragraphs of the pleading as to what he verifies on his own knowledge and what he verifies upon information received and believed to be true. Under sub-Rule (4), the person verifying the pleading is also required to furnish an affidavit in support of his pleadings. Before proceeding further, reference can be made to the decision in G.M. Siddeshwar (supra) that has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the election petitioners. The question considered therein was whether it was imperative for an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the Code in support of the averments made in the election petition in addition to an affidavit where allegations of corrupt practice have been made against the returned candidate in view of the requirements of the proviso to Sec. 83(1) of the Act of 1951. It was held that there was no requirement of filing any additional affidavit on the plain reading of the provisions of Sec. 83(1)(c) of the Act of 1951. It was held that there was no requirement of filing any additional affidavit on the plain reading of the provisions of Sec. 83(1)(c) of the Act of 1951. While the Act of 1951 requires a verification of the pleadings, the plain language of Sec. 83(1)(c) of the Act of 1951 does not require an affidavit in support of the pleadings in an election petition. A composite affidavit in support of the averments made in the election petition and also with regard to allegations of corrupt practices by the returned candidate would not only be in substantial compliance with the requirements of the Act of 1951 but the same would actually be in full compliance thereof. It was thus held that filing of two affidavits was not warranted by the Act of 1951 especially when a composite affidavit could achieve the desired result. On the aspect of verification by reference to numbered paragraphs of the pleadings as to what has been verified on the basis of own knowledge and what has been verified upon information received and believed to be true, it would be necessary to first refer to the legal position in this regard as laid down by the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in its various decisions that have been referred to by the learned counsel for the parties. "(i) V. Narayanaswamy (supra) '23. ... ... ... A petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required by law to be supported by an affidavit and the election petitioner is obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of corrupt practice. He must state which of the allegations are true to his knowledge and which to his belief on information received and believed by him to be true. It is not the form of the affidavit but its substance that matters. To plead corrupt practice as contemplated by law it has to be specifically alleged that the corrupt practices were committed with the consent of the candidate and that a particular electoral right of a person was affected. It cannot be left to time, chance or conjecture for the court to draw inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning. Where the alleged corrupt practice is open to two equal possible inferences the pleadings of corrupt practice must fail. ' ..... ' ... ... .... It cannot be left to time, chance or conjecture for the court to draw inference by adopting an involved process of reasoning. Where the alleged corrupt practice is open to two equal possible inferences the pleadings of corrupt practice must fail. ' ..... ' ... ... .... Where neither the verification in the petition nor the affidavit gives any indication of the sources of information of the petitioner as to the facts stated in the petition which are not to his knowledge and the petitioner persists that the verification is correct and the affidavit in the form prescribed does not suffer from any defect the allegations of corrupt practices cannot be inquired and tried at all. In such a case the petition has to be rejected on the threshold for non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of law as to pleadings. It is no part of the duty of the court suo motu even to direct furnishing of better particulars when objection is raised by the other side. Where the petition does not disclose any cause of action it has to be rejected. The court, however, cannot dissect the pleadings into several parts and consider whether each one of them discloses a cause of action. The petition has to be considered as a whole. There cannot be a partial rejection of the petition. ' '26. Material facts and material particulars certainly connote two different things. Material facts are those facts which constitute the cause of action. In a petition on the allegation of corrupt practices the cause of action cannot be equated with the cause of action as is normally understood because of the consequences that follow in a petition based on the allegations of corrupt practices. An election petition seeking a challenge to the election of a candidate on the allegation of corrupt practices is a serious matter; if proved, not only does the candidate suffer ignominy, he also suffers disqualification from standing for election for a period that may extend to six years. Reference in this connection may be made to Sec. 8-A of the Act. It was for this purpose that the proviso to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 83 was inserted by Act 40 of 1961 (w.e.f. 20/09/1961) requiring filing of the affidavit in the prescribed form where there are allegations of corrupt practice in the election petition. Reference in this connection may be made to Sec. 8-A of the Act. It was for this purpose that the proviso to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 83 was inserted by Act 40 of 1961 (w.e.f. 20/09/1961) requiring filing of the affidavit in the prescribed form where there are allegations of corrupt practice in the election petition. Filing of the affidavit as required is not a mere formality. By naming a document as an affidavit it does not become an affidavit. To be an affidavit it has to conform not only to the form prescribed in substance but has also to contain particulars as required by the rules. ' (ii) Purushottam Jog Naik (supra) '16. ... ... .... Verification should invariably be modelled on the lines of Order 19, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, whether the Code applies in terms or not. And when the matter deposed to is not based on personal knowledge the sources of information should be clearly disclosed. ' ..... (iii) Barium Chemicals Ltd. and Another (supra) '57. ... ... It is true that in a case of this kind it would be difficult for a petitioner to have personal knowledge in regard to an averment of mala fides, but then where such knowledge is wanting he has to disclose his source of information so that the other side gets a fair chance to verify it and make an effective answer. In such a situation this Court had to observe in 1952 SCR 674 AIR 1952 SC 317 , that as slipshod verifications of affidavits might lead to their rejection, they should be modelled on the lines of O. XIX, R. 3 of the Civil Procedure Code and that where an averment is not based on personal knowledge, the source of information should be clearly deposed. ' ... (iv) Ravinder Singh (supra) '11. ' ... (iv) Ravinder Singh (supra) '11. Sec. 83 of the Act is mandatory in character and requires not only a concise statement of material facts and full particulars of the alleged corrupt practice, so as to present a full and complete picture of the action to be detailed in the election petition but under the proviso to Sec. 83(1) of the Act, the election petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit in which the election petitioner is obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of that corrupt practice. The reason for this insistence is obvious. It is necessary for an election petitioner to make such a charge with full responsibility and to prevent any fishing and roving inquiry and save the returned candidate from being taken by surprise. In the absence of proper affidavit, in the prescribed form, filed in support of the corrupt practice of bribery, the allegation pertaining thereto, could not be put to trial - the defect being of a fatal nature. ' (v) Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat and Another (supra) '16. The election law insists that to unseat a returned candidate, the corrupt practice must be specifically alleged and strictly proved to have been committed by the returned candidate himself or by his election agent or by any other person with the consent of the returned candidate or by his election agent. Suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, whether the allegations are sought to be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence. Since, pleadings play an important role in an election petition, the legislature has provided that the allegations of corrupt practice must be properly alleged and both the material facts and particulars provided in the petition itself so as to disclose a complete cause of action. 17. Sec. 83 of the Act provides that the election petition must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the petitioner relies and further that he must set forth full particulars of the corrupt practice that he alleges including as full a statement as possible of the name of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practices and the date and place of the commission of each of such corrupt practice. This Sec. has been held to be mandatory and requires first a concise statement of material facts and then the full particulars of the alleged corrupt practice, so as to present a full picture of the cause of action. 18. A petition levelling a charge of corrupt practice is required, by law, to be supported by an affidavit and the election petitioner is also obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt practice. This becomes necessary to bind the election petitioner to the charge levelled by him and to prevent any fishing and roving enquiry and to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by a surprise (See: Samant N. Balkrishna V. George Fernandez). ' (vi) Jeet Mohinder Singh (supra) '40. ... ... ... (i) ... ... ... (ii) ... ... ... (iii) ... ... ... (iv) Sec. 83 of the Act requires every election petition to contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the appellant relies. If the election petition alleges commission of corrupt practice at the election, the election petition shall set forth full particulars of any corrupt practice including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice and the date and place of the commission of each such practice. Every election petition must be signed and verified by the appellant in the manner laid down for the verification of pleadings in CPC. An election petition alleging corrupt practice is required to be accompanied by an affidavit in Form 25 read with Rule 94-A of the Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961. Form 25 contemplates the various particulars as to the corrupt practices mentioned in the election petition being verified by the appellant separately under two headings: (i) which of such statements including particulars are true to the appellant 's own knowledge, and (ii) which of the statements including the particulars are true to information of the appellant. It has been held in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat case that the election petitioner is also obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of the corrupt practice so as to bind him to the charge levelled by him and to prevent any fishing or roving enquiry, also to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by surprise." 10. From the aforesaid decisions, it can be seen that (a) the provisions of Sec. 83 of the Act of 1951 are mandatory in nature inasmuch as the election petition ought to contain a concise statement of material facts on which the petitioner relies alongwith full particulars of any corrupt practice alleged including as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties who have alleged to have committed such corrupt practice alongwith the date and place of the commission of each such practice and the election petition is required to be signed and verified by the election petitioner in the manner laid down in the Code for verification of the pleadings. Where an allegation of any corrupt practice is made, the election petition is to be accompanied by affidavits in Form 25 in support of the allegation of such corrupt practice and particulars thereof, (b) a defect in verification and the affidavit is curable and an opportunity is required to be given to the election petitioner to cure such defect before proceeding further with the adjudication of the election petition, (c) when allegation of any corrupt practice is made, the affidavit as required by the proviso to Sec. 83(1) has to be filed. The election petitioner is obliged to disclose his source of information in respect of the commission of the alleged corrupt practice so as to bind him to the charge levelled by him and also to prevent the returned candidate from being taken by surprise (d) the pleadings in an election petition cannot be vague and they have to be strictly construed. 11. Before embarking upon the adjudication of the applications filed under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the Code it would also be necessary to keep mind to the following observations of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in paragraph 26 of its decision in Madiraju Venkata Ramana Raju Vs. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and Others [ (2018) 14 SCC 1 ] : "26. Indeed, if the defendant moves two separate applications at the same time, as in this case, it would be open to the Court in a given case to consider both the applications together or independent of each other. Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy and Others [ (2018) 14 SCC 1 ] : "26. Indeed, if the defendant moves two separate applications at the same time, as in this case, it would be open to the Court in a given case to consider both the applications together or independent of each other. If the Court decides to hear the application under Order VII Rule 11 in the first instance, the Court would be obliged to consider the plaint as filed as a whole. But if the Court decides to proceed with the application under Order VI Rule 16 for striking out the pleadings before consideration of the application under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint, on allowing the former application after striking out the relevant pleadings then the Court must consider the remainder pleadings of the plaint in reference to the postulates of Order VII Rule 11 for determining whether the plaint (after striking out pleadings) deserves to be rejected in limine." Following the latter course, it would be necessary to first take into consideration the application moved by the returned candidate under the provisions of Order VI Rule 16 of the Code. Reference would be made first to the relevant pleadings in the election petition, thereafter the grounds on which the returned candidate seeks those pleadings to be struck off and the consideration of the same. (c) Analysis of pleadings and findings thereon 12. In the light of the aforesaid statements of law, the prayer made in C.A.O. No.754 of 2020 (Exhibit 19) can be taken up for consideration. This would have to be done with reference to the pleadings in the election petition, its annexures alongwith affidavits filed by the election petitioners in Form 25. Paragraphs 1 to 6 in the election petition are the narration of factual aspects. The material pleadings are in paragraph 7. In paragraph 7(i) Point No.1, it has been pleaded as under: "Point No.I: The name at Sr.No.3, Column (4) is Nitin J. Gadkari (Hindu Undivided Family), so a question arises as, who is Nitin J. Gadkari? The name Nitin Jairambapu Gadkari is recorded in the 7/12 extracts (Land Record) of Survey No.264, Mouja Dhapewada(Khurd) Taluka Kalmeshwar, District -Nagpur. The said 7/12 extract dated 10.06.2019 is enclosed herewith (Annexure-II). The name Nitin Jairambapu Gadkari is recorded in the 7/12 extracts (Land Record) of Survey No.264, Mouja Dhapewada(Khurd) Taluka Kalmeshwar, District -Nagpur. The said 7/12 extract dated 10.06.2019 is enclosed herewith (Annexure-II). On the mutation entry no.192, it is observed that towards from Shankar Rangrao Pande has executed Trust Deed regarding the property on 29/10/1958 and also executed a Correction Deed on 01/08/1975 on behalf of Premilabai Jairambapu Gadkari and gave the said property to his nephew (Sinster 's Son) Nitin Jairambapu Gadkari. The Ferfar Patrak (Mutation Entry) is enclosed herewith (Annexure-III). The said mutation entry is implemented on 24/07/1995 in the individual name of the Nitin Jairambapu Gadkari the instant respondent. Now, the question arises that who is HUF? Nitin J. (Jairambapu) Gadkari mentioned in the Affidavit of Nitin Jairam Gadkari. What is the name of Nitin 's father? Jairam or Jairambapu? It is mentioned in the mutation entry that Jairambapu is husband of Premilabai. An application for obtaining Mutation Entry and related documents is submitted to Tahsildar on 20/06/2019 under Right to Information Act, 2005. The copy is enclosed herewith (Annexure-IV). The information is yet not received." According to the returned candidate the aforesaid pleadings besides being scandalous and vexatious, they are intended to embarrass the returned candidate. It is stated that except for raising question as regards who constitutes the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF), the name of the father of the returned candidate and so on these pleadings do not disclose any cause of action even if they are taken at their face value. It is submitted on behalf of the election petitioners that Survey No.264 was owned by the returned candidate as shown in the revenue records which was clear from Annexures-II and III to the election petition. The information furnished by the returned candidate in Form 26 was incorrect. Perusal of paragraph 7(i) Point No.1 indicates that reference is made to mutation entry no.192 by observing that the trust deed was executed by one Shankar Rangrao Pande on 29.10.1958 and thereafter correction deed was executed on 01/08/1975 by one Premilabai Jairambapu Gadkari. This property was then given to the returned candidate and the mutation entry was implemented on 24/07/1995 in the individual name of the returned candidate. This property was then given to the returned candidate and the mutation entry was implemented on 24/07/1995 in the individual name of the returned candidate. It is seen that the entire paragraph merely seeks to raise a question as to who constitutes the HUF, the name of the father of the returned candidate whether it is Jairam or Jairambapu. The election petitioners merely seek answer to these questions and the averments therein are merely in the nature of a roving enquiry sought to be made in that regard. There is no assertion in the said paragraph that any false information was given by the returned candidate in the nomination form. In fact the election petitioners do not appear to be sure of the facts and what they want to allege. They have infact pleaded that information sought by them under the Right to Information Act, 2005 was yet to be received till the filing of the election petition. There is total absence of any material fact in the entire paragraph. Taking the contents of the entire paragraph to be true nothing can be gathered from the same. In absence of any material fact being pleaded therein it is found that the averments in paragraph 7(i) Point No.1 are unnecessary and not indicating any cause of action. The averments in paragraph 7(i) Point No.1 are therefore liable to be struck off being unnecessary. 13. In paragraph 7 (ii) Point No.2, it has been pleaded as under: "Point-2: As per the 7/12 extract (Land Record) Nitin Jairambapu Gadkari is the sole owner of Survey No.264, Mouja Dhapewada (Khurd), Tah. Kalmeshwar, District Nagpur. Hence, the said land cannot be owned by HUF (Hindu Undivided Family). The said HUF column/s is/are false." According to the returned candidate the only assertion found in this paragraph is that as per the 7/12 extract the returned candidate is the sole owner of Survey No.264. Hence the said land cannot be owned by the HUF and the said column indicating otherwise is false. There is no material fact pleaded that when the nomination form was filed the status of the land was not as belonging to the HUF. Hence these pleadings are liable to be struck off. As per the averments in the aforesaid paragraph, according to the election petitioners, the 7/12 extract of Survey No.264 records the name of the returned candidate as the sole owner. Hence these pleadings are liable to be struck off. As per the averments in the aforesaid paragraph, according to the election petitioners, the 7/12 extract of Survey No.264 records the name of the returned candidate as the sole owner. In the affidavit filed by the returned candidate land bearing Survey No.264 has been shown as owned by the HUF as per the information stated in paragraph 7(B)(i) in that affidavit. It is therefore asserted that this information as disclosed in the affidavit is false. It is found that the election petitioners have specifically asserted that while in the 7/12 extract the name of the returned candidate is shown as the sole owner of Survey No.264 Mouza-Dhapewada (Khurd), this land is shown to be owned by the HUF as per paragraph 7(B)(i) of the affidavit. The affidavit forms part of the election petition being its annexure. It is averred by the election petitioners that the said land cannot be owned by the HUF and hence such information as given by the returned candidate in paragraph 7(B) (i) of the affidavit is false. In view of presence of this material fact the pleadings aforesaid cannot be struck of. 14. In paragraph 7 (iii) Point No.3, it has been pleaded as under: "Point No.3: In Sr. No.(i) Column (7 B) it is mentioned that personal agricultural land owned by self Nitin Jairam Gadkari is NIL. It is written in (a) Self of column (9), Business/Occupation-as Agriculture. In source of income of self in (a) of column (9) is also written as agriculture. It is false, since he do not possess agricultural land, his source of income cannot be agriculture." According to the returned candidate the source of income in paragraph 9(a) of the affidavit is shown as agriculture. It has not been stated that as the returned candidate does not own agricultural land, his source of income cannot be agriculture. For earning agricultural income it is urged that a person need not own land. It has also not been pleaded that the returned candidate does not have any agricultural income. As per the election petitioners, the returned candidate had disclosed in his affidavit that he did not own any land personally. However his source of income was shown to be through agriculture. This rendered the information furnished to be false. Hence material facts had been pleaded in the said paragraph. As per the election petitioners, the returned candidate had disclosed in his affidavit that he did not own any land personally. However his source of income was shown to be through agriculture. This rendered the information furnished to be false. Hence material facts had been pleaded in the said paragraph. A plain reading of the aforesaid paragraph indicates that in the affidavit filed by the returned candidate and especially paragraph 7(B)(i), it is stated that the returned candidate individually does not own any agricultural land. Further in paragraph 9(a) while giving the details of profession or occupation, the returned candidate has stated the same to be agriculture and in paragraph 9(A) the details of the source of income is shown as agriculture, etc. There is specific assertion in the aforesaid paragraph that according to the returned candidate he does not own land while his business/occupation is shown as agriculture, the source of income being shown as agriculture is false. Taking the aforesaid statements at their face value, it is found that there are averments indicating that the disclosure made in the affidavit filed along with nomination form with regard to source of income to be agriculture is false. These averments disclose existence of material facts and hence they cannot be struck off as being unnecessary or vexatious. 15. Point No.4 in paragraph 7(iv) of the election petition reads thus: "7. ... ... .... (iv) Point No.4: It can be proved from Point No.2 and HUF column is false. Even though the place of residence in Column (9) (B)(iv) of HUF, is mentioned as 18, House No.45/A 1, Upadhyay Road, Mahal, Nagpur, area 3499.77 sq.metrs., Nitin J. Gadkari. The relation of Nitin Jairam Gadkari with Nitin J. (Jairambapu) Gadkari is not clear. The said HUF column is false, if Nitin Jairam Gadkari is Nitin J. (Jairambapu) Gadkari." The averments in Point No.4 seek to refer to the averments made in Point No.2 in the context of the Hindu Undivided Family of the revenue records. It is urged by the learned Senior Advocate for the returned candidate that in absence of any material pleadings in this paragraph, this point deserves to be struck off. It is urged by the learned Senior Advocate for the returned candidate that in absence of any material pleadings in this paragraph, this point deserves to be struck off. On the other hand, according to the learned counsel for the election petitioners since incorrect information has been furnished in the relevant column and it has been pleaded that the column pertains to Hindu Undivided Family is false, material facts have been pleaded and said paragraph does not deserve to be struck off. It is seen that though Point No.4 refers to Column (9)(B)(iv) in Form 26, the relevant column sought to be referred is Column (7)(B)(iv) pertaining to residential buildings. It is averred that 18, House No.45/A1, Upadhyay Road, Mahal, Nagpur 3499.77 square meters is shown as belonging to HUF, Nitin J. Gadkari. There is no clear or specific assertion made in this Point. It is stated that the HUF column is false if Nitin Jairam Gadkari is Nitin J. (Jairambapu) Gadkari. The averment that the HUF column is false would be a surmise being based on "if". It is not the case that information of some property owned by the HUF has not been disclosed or information that has been disclosed is false. Since no material fact has been pleaded, the averments in paragraph 7(iv) Point No.4 are liable to be struck off. 16. In paragraph 7 (v) Point No.5 it has been stated as under: "Point No.5: In column 7(B), it is mentioned that Smt. Kanchan Nitin Gadkari owns a agricultural land at Dhapewada, Dist. Nagpur. In Kalmeshwar Taluka of Nagpur District, there are to different Revenue Mouja, namely Dhapewada (Khurd) and Dhapewada (Bu.). The agricultural land of Mrs. Kanchan Nitin Gadkari and Shri Nitin J. Gadkari are at Dhapewada (Khurd). The incomplete information about this is misleading information. Hence, it is false." According to the returned candidate the aforesaid pleadings do not give rise to any cause of action. All necessary details as required in the affidavit have been stated and merely because the specific detailed location being Dhapewada (Khurd) or Dhapewada (Bujruk) not being stated does not amount to any violation and it is merely an exercise of hairsplitting by the election petitioners. The land in question has been clearly identified by mentioning its Survey number and location by stating the name of the Tahsil concerned. The land in question has been clearly identified by mentioning its Survey number and location by stating the name of the Tahsil concerned. According to the election petitioners in column 7(B) of the affidavit, it has been stated that the wife of the returned candidate owns agricultural land at Dhapewada, District Nagpur. Since there are two different revenue units by name Dhapewada (Khurd) and Dhapewada (Bujruk), incomplete and misleading information has been given. The returned candidate ought to have clearly mentioned the name of the village (Mouza) where the land was situated. A perusal of paragraph 7(B) of the affidavit and especially the description column indicates that what is to be stated is agriculture land, location (s) and survey number (s). The affidavit indicates that the wife of the returned candidate is shown to be the owner of Khasra Nos. 21/1, 21/2, 51/1 and 51/2 situated at Dhapewada, District Nagpur. The verification to the said affidavit states that the deponent or the spouse or dependent do not have any asset or liability other than those mentioned in items 7 and 8 of the affidavit. On perusal of the description of column in paragraph 7(B) of the affidavit it becomes clear that the Survey number and the location of the lands owned has been disclosed and there is no incomplete information. It is not the averment of the election petitioners that the spouse of the returned candidate does not own any land at Dhapewada and hence the information is incorrect or false. Taking into consideration the observations in Shambhu Prasad Sharma Versus Charandas Mahant and Others [ (2012) 11 SCC 390 ] which decision also arises out of the adjudication of an application under provisions of Order VII Rule 11 of the Code in an election petition, there is substantial and adequate compliance with the information sought in the affidavit that was required to be filed with the nomination form. The objection is more to the form than to the substance. The information furnished cannot be said to be incomplete as the Survey number and location have been mentioned nor misleading as nothing incorrect according to the election petitioners has been mentioned therein. Hence the averments in the aforesaid paragraph do not disclose any material fact. The affidavit in that regard is not asserted to be false but the election petitioners allege furnishing of incomplete information which is misleading. Hence the averments in the aforesaid paragraph do not disclose any material fact. The affidavit in that regard is not asserted to be false but the election petitioners allege furnishing of incomplete information which is misleading. The defect if it could be called one in not giving further details of the location of the lands in question cannot be said to be substantial in character as contemplated by Sec. 36(4) of the Act of 1951 for the nomination paper to be rejected by the Returning Officer. It is thus found that the requisite information as required by the affidavit in the light of the description column of paragraph 7(B) has been furnished by mentioning the Survey number and its location. This paragraph therefore is liable to be struck off. 17. Paragraphs 7 (vi) to (viii) Point 6 to 8 can be considered together since the averments therein relate to the income-tax returns of the returned candidate with an assertion that amounts less than the income of the returned candidate have been shown in the affidavit. The said paragraphs read as under: "Point No.6: Sr.No.1, Column (4), Name (Self) Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari, year 2013-14, the amount shown in Income-tax return Rs.2,66,390.00 (Rupees Two lakh Sixty Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety only). In the year 2013-14, Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari was member of Maharashtra Legislative Council. He was drawing a salary of Rs.75,000.00 (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand only) per month. Therefore, he received an amount of Rs.9,00,000.00 (Rupees Nine Lakh only) for 12 months (or whatever amount which is more than he mentioned in his affidavit). The petitioner no.2 have submitted an application to Pay and Accounts Office. ARP 16 branch, under Right to Information on 13/06/2019 to get the information about the salary and allowance paid to Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari in year 2013-14. Copy enclosed herewith (Annexure-V). Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari has disclosed an amount of Rs.2,66,390.00 (Rupees Two Lakh Sixty Six Thousand Three Hundred Ninety only) while filing income-tax returns, whereas he has received more than Rs.9,00,000.00 (Rupees Nine Lakh only) (or whatever amount but more than he mentioned in his affidavit). It is seen that the amount shown is less than income, meaning thereby that a false amount is shown." "Point No.7: Sr.No.1 Column No.(4) Name (Self) Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari, year 2014-15, the amount shown in Income -tax return Rs.6,01,450.00 (Rs. It is seen that the amount shown is less than income, meaning thereby that a false amount is shown." "Point No.7: Sr.No.1 Column No.(4) Name (Self) Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari, year 2014-15, the amount shown in Income -tax return Rs.6,01,450.00 (Rs. Six lakh One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty only). In 2014-15 Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari was Member of Maharashtra Legislative Council till June end and he received an amount of Rs.2,25,000.00 (Rupees Two Lakh Twenty Five Thousand only) as monthly salary and allowances @ Rs.75,000.00 per month. Thereafter Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari elected as Member of Parliament from Nagpur Loksabha Constituency and became Minister in Central Ministry. According to information he is receiving at least an amount of Rs.1,65,000.00 (Rupees One Lakh Sixty Five Thousand only) (or whatever amount which is more than he mentioned in his affidavit) per month on account of salary and allowances. In the Income-tax returns Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari Rs.6,01,450.00 (Rs. Six Lakh One Thousand Four Hundred Fifty only) whereas he has received more than Rs.17,10,000.00 (Rupees Seventeen Lakh Ten Thousand only) i.e. for nine months Rs.14,85,000.00 + Rs. 2,25,000.00 = Rs.17,10,000.00 . An amount less than income are shown in Affidavit. Hence the affidavit is false." "Point No.8: Sr.No.1, Column (4) Name (Self) Nitin Jairam Gadkari, year 2015-16 the amount shown in Income-tax return Rs.8,07,300.00 (Rupees Eight Lakh Seven Thousand Three Flundred only). In 2016-17 Rs.7,65,730.00 (Rupees Seven Lakh Sixty Five Thousand Seven Flundred Thirty only) is shown. In year 2017-18 an amount of Rs.6,40,700.00 (Rupees Six Lakh Forty Thousand Seven Flundred only) is shown. According to information, Shri Nitin Jairam Gadkari have had receiving an amount of Rs.19,80,000.00 (Rupees Nineteen Lakh Eighty Thousand only) (or whatever amount) as monthly salary and allowance @ Rs.1,65,000.00 (Rupees One Lakh Sixty Five Thousand only). The amount shown in Income-tax returns of years 2015-16, 2016-17, and 2017-18 are less, meaning that the Affidavit is false. In the connection, the petitioner no.2 have submitted an application to the Director, Central Public Information Officer, Loksabha Secretariat, New Delhi on 18.06.2019 under the Right to Information. Copy enclosed (Annexure-VI.)" According to the returned candidate all necessary requirements prescribed by Form 26 Column 4 have been disclosed by the returned candidate. What is required to be disclosed in the affidavit is the total income shown in the income-tax returns and nothing further. Copy enclosed (Annexure-VI.)" According to the returned candidate all necessary requirements prescribed by Form 26 Column 4 have been disclosed by the returned candidate. What is required to be disclosed in the affidavit is the total income shown in the income-tax returns and nothing further. The allegation that income shown by the returned candidate while submitting his incometax returns without an averment that what is reflected in the income-tax return is different from the income disclosed in column no.4 of Form 26 has not been pleaded and hence no material fact giving rise to any cause of action is disclosed. As per the election petitioners since the figures indicating income of the returned candidate in his affidavit were false as pleaded, there were material facts existing giving rise to a triable issue. The returned candidate had suppressed his income in his annual returns. He ought to have disclosed his actual income to the voters. Hence these pleadings were not liable to be struck off. Form 26 Clause 4 requires a candidate to furnish the details of Permanent Account Number (PAN) and status of filing of income-tax returns. The returned candidate has furnished his income-tax returns of the five financial years which information is found in column no.4. However according to the election petitioners, the amounts shown in the income-tax returns is less. The returned candidate earned more income than what was shown in the income-tax returns. On that count it is stated that the figures indicated in the affidavit filed by the returned candidate are false. It is found that the pleadings in the aforesaid paragraphs are based on misconception as to what is required to be stated in Form 26 Point 4 of the affidavit. The only requirement is the mention of the financial year for which the income-tax return has been filed and the total income shown in the income-tax return by the candidate. Even according to the election petitioners this information has been supplied by the returned candidate. It is the assertion of the election petitioners that the figures shown by the returned candidate indicating the income disclosed in the income-tax returns is different than what is disclosed in the affidavit. In other words, it is not pleaded that the information disclosed in the affidavit as regards the income-tax returns as filed is incorrect or false. It is the assertion of the election petitioners that the figures shown by the returned candidate indicating the income disclosed in the income-tax returns is different than what is disclosed in the affidavit. In other words, it is not pleaded that the information disclosed in the affidavit as regards the income-tax returns as filed is incorrect or false. According to the election petitioners the returned candidate earned higher income than what was disclosed in his income-tax returns. These assertions would not take the case of the election petitioners anywhere as Form 26 Point No.4 merely requires disclosure of financial years when the income-tax returns had been filed and the total income of the candidate as shown in those returns. In the absence of any assertion that the information disclosed by the returned candidate in Form 26 Point 4 is not as per the total income shown in the income-tax returns, there is no material fact pleaded by the election petitioners to warrant these pleadings to remain on record. Information sought by the election petitioners as per Annexure-VI, if received is not referred to. The pleadings in the aforesaid paragraphs are therefore unnecessary as the election petitioners have not pleaded that the total income as shown in the income-tax returns filed by the returned candidate is different from what was disclosed in the affidavit. Thus paragraphs 7(vi) Point 6 to 7(viii) Point No.8 are liable to be struck off. 18. Paragraph 7(ix) Point No.9 reads as under: "Point No.9: The property involved in the Crimes mentioned by the Respondent No.4 in Column No.5(ii) or outcome/income/profit etc. which is outcome of those Criminal/Civil-business activities or all other Criminal/Civil activities, which is clearly not shown in any part of the affidavit Form-26 dated 25/03/2019. As well as whatever income of the spouse of the Respondent No.4 regarding the income from turmeric boiler, wherein in the jurisdiction of Kalmeshwar police Station Nagpur (rural) turmeric boiler was blasted and someone died in that incidence the said news item dated 23 may 2018 published in Hindstan times and other news papers. So this is income of boiler industry, boiler may be legal or illegal the income from this criminal or civil business is not shown by the Respondent No.4 in his affidavit Form-26. So this is income of boiler industry, boiler may be legal or illegal the income from this criminal or civil business is not shown by the Respondent No.4 in his affidavit Form-26. News Item of Hinustan Times dated 23/05/2018 is annexed herewith and marked as Annexure-VII." According to the returned candidate the aforesaid averments do not disclose any material fact whatsoever as the same are totally vague. The same do not give any details at all and are based merely on imagination and conjectures of the election petitioners. As per the election petitioners, the averments clearly disclose cause of action as true and correct information as required by law had not been furnished by the returned candidate in his affidavit submitted along with the nomination form. The affidavit dated 25.03.2019 infact gave incorrect information. The objection of the returned candidate to the averments in the aforesaid paragraph is justified. It cannot be gathered on a complete reading of this paragraph as to what in fact the election petitioners desire to urge. The averments "whatever income of the spouse of the returned candidate earned from the turmeric boiler . ..... may be legal or illegal" do not indicate what the election petitioners want to convey. These averments are totally vague and based on conjectures. The paragraph contains mere allegations without any material facts. There are no material facts on the basis of which the election petition could proceed further on these pleadings. On this count the aforesaid paragraph is liable to be deleted. 19. The election petition was permitted to be amended by an order passed on C.A.O. 1293 of 2019 on 21/02/2020. Such permission was granted after noticing the fact that the application for amendment had been filed within the prescribed period of limitation within which the election petition could have been filed. Consequently, Point Nos.4A, 9A to 12 in paragraph 7 of the election petition have been added. There was much debate on the nature of affidavits filed by the election petitioners in Form 25 on 08/07/2019. Consequently, Point Nos.4A, 9A to 12 in paragraph 7 of the election petition have been added. There was much debate on the nature of affidavits filed by the election petitioners in Form 25 on 08/07/2019. These affidavits were affirmed on 07.07.2019 and paragraph (a) and (b) thereof read as under: "(a) that the statements made in all the paragraph no.1 to 21 with Annexure-I to IX of the accompanying election petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of Sec. 123(2) i.e. influence the entire voters and the particulars of such corrupt practice mentioned in paragraph no.1 to 21 with annexure-I to IX of the same petition (including the contents of all the Civil Applications including the application for amendment in the petition filed vide Stamp No.13794/2019 and Civil Application for grant of permission to amend Election Petition and permission to file documents on record of election petition and other applications filled filed till today in the instant Petition and its consequential effect in the Election Petition and in paragraph no.1 to 21 of the Election Petition with Annexure-I to IX of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my knowledge; (b) that the statements made in paragraph no.1 to 21 with Annexure-I to IX of the said petition about the commission of the corrupt practice of Sec. 123(2) i.e. influence the entire voters and the particulars of such corrupt practice given in paragraph no.1 to 21 with annexure-I to IX of the said petition and in paragraph no.1 to 21 with annexure-I to IX of the Schedule annexed thereto are true to my information." It was submitted by the learned Senior Advocate for the returned candidate that as the affirmation was in support of paragraphs 1 to 21 with Annexures I to IX and various applications filed till 07.07.2019, there was no affirmation in support of the amendment application being Civil Application No.1293/2019 as it was filed on 08/07/2019. The affirmation was restricted to the applications filed till 07.07.2019 and the amended pleadings alleging commission of corrupt practice were not supported by any affirmation. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the election petitioners submitted that as 07.07.2019 was a Sunday when the affidavits in Form 25 were sworn, the same could be filed only on 08/07/2019 which was a Monday. The affirmation did support the amended pleadings and hence the same ought to be taken into consideration. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the election petitioners submitted that as 07.07.2019 was a Sunday when the affidavits in Form 25 were sworn, the same could be filed only on 08/07/2019 which was a Monday. The affirmation did support the amended pleadings and hence the same ought to be taken into consideration. The submission on behalf of the returned candidate though appealing, it would have to be considered in the context of the record of the election petition. The affirmation in both the affidavits in Form 25 indicates that it is in support of the entire election petition alongwith its Annexures as well as various applications filed till 07.07.2019. It refers to the application for amendment bearing Stamp No.13794/2019-Civil Application No.1290/2019 at Exhibit-6, another application for amendment and permission to file documents bearing Stamp No.13873/2019-Civil Application No.1293/2019 at Exhibit-8 and other applications filed till 07.07.2019. In the affidavits sworn on 07.07.2019 and filed on 08/07/2019 the words used are "and all other applications filed till today in the instant petition and its consequential effect in the election petition". It is true that the words "applications filed till today" would not cover an application that is filed on the next day. However, as 07.07.2019 was a Sunday and the words "and its consequential effect in the election petition" being used, the intention of the election petitioners of seeking to refer to the application that was sworn on 07.07.2019 and filed on 08/07/2019 will have to be gathered from the record. In that view of the matter, I find that the affidavits sworn on 07.07.2019 by the election petitioners in Form 25 were in support of the application for amendment which could only be filed on 08/07/2019 as 07.07.2019 was a Sunday. It is held that the application at Exhibit-8 is duly supported by the affidavits of the election petitioners in Form 25. 20. On perusal of paragraph 7(ix-A) Point No.9A it can be seen that it has been pleaded in the election petition that the criminal complaint filed by Shri Bhagwandas Shankarlal Rathi was dismissed by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nagpur against which the complainant had filed Criminal Revision Application No.93 of 2019. In Column 5(ii) of Form 26 a reference was made by the returned candidate to the fact that Criminal Revision Application No.93 of 2019 was pending. In Column 5(ii) of Form 26 a reference was made by the returned candidate to the fact that Criminal Revision Application No.93 of 2019 was pending. The election petitioners have filed a copy of the proceedings under Sec. 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 seeking registration of the first information report against the returned candidate and others. As per Annexure-VIIIA, reference is made to members of 'Polysac I Co.S. '. It is further pleaded that the State authorities were not taking action against various influential persons named therein. It is then pleaded that the returned candidate concealed this material information from the voters which amounted to corrupt practice on the part of the returned candidate. The proofs were available in various Government documents and in the election expenditure papers filed by the returned candidate and complaints lodged against him for use of other ways of campaining in election through others like 'Rokde Jewellers '. The returned candidate is alleged to have concealed income from all/any properties which is not shown in the affidavit in Form 26. A complete reading of Point No.9A indicates that it does not refer to any material fact that would give a ground even to contend that the nomination form of the returned candidate was improperly accepted. As per the own showing of the election petitioners the pendency of Criminal Revision Application No.93 of 2019 has been disclosed in Column No.5(ii) of the affidavit in Form 26. The pleadings that the State Authorities were not taking action against some other influential persons are not relevant in the present proceedings. The pleadings with regard to non-mentioning of income or sources of income are also vexatious for the reason that no details whatsoever of what has been concealed so as to furnish a ground to seek rejection of the nomination paper have been given. There is no such requirement prescribed in Form 26 for furnishing these details. Another reason to hold that the pleadings in Point No.9A do not furnish a cause of action to the election petitioners is that despite pleading that the aforesaid acts amounted to corrupt practice on the part of the returned candidate, the source/sources from whom the election petitioners got information with regard to the matters pleaded in Point No.9A have not been disclosed in the affidavit in Form 25. There is no statement with regard to the source of acquisition of information pertaining to Annexures VIII and VIIIA. This is for the reason that according to the election petitioners the contents of the aforesaid paragraphs as well as particulars of corrupt practice are based on the information received by the election petitioners. Hence the pleadings in paragraph 7(ix-A) Point No.9A are liable to be struck off. 21. In paragraph 7(ix-B) Point No.9B it has been pleaded that in Column 7B(ii) of Form 26 with regard to non-agricultural landed properties, the returned candidate in the affidavit had stated that there were no such properties. The properties at Mouza Dhapewada, Tahsil Kalmeshwar, District Nagpur were in non-agricultural use but the returned candidate failed to disclose the same. The election petitioners have referred to information available on internet with regard to Manas Agro Industries and the documents in that regard were annexed as Annexure-IX. It is pleaded that this material concealment amounted to corrupt practice on the part of the returned candidate against the voters. Column 7(B) in Form 26 pertains to details of immovable assets. These details are to be provided under various heads which include Agricultural Lands, Non-Agricultural Lands, Commercial Buildings and Residential Buildings. In details furnished by the returned candidate, agricultural land is shown to be standing in the name of the spouse of the returned candidate and in the name of the Hindu Undivided Family. No non-agricultural land is shown to be standing in the name of the returned candidate, his spouse or the Hindu Undivided Family. According to the election petitioners, the properties at Mouza Dhapewada, Tahsil Kalmeshwar, District Nagpur were in non-agricultural use (legal or illegal) but the returned candidate had failed to disclose the same. What is sought to be contended by the election petitioners is that though the returned candidate has shown agricultural lands standing in the name of his spouse and the Hindu Undivided Family, these lands were in non-agricultural use and this fact has not been disclosed. It is not the case of the election petitioners that non-agricultural land owned either by the returned candidate, his spouse or the Hindu Undivided Family has not been mentioned in Column 7(B) of Form 26. What is not disclosed according to the election petitioners is the legal or illegal use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose. It is not the case of the election petitioners that non-agricultural land owned either by the returned candidate, his spouse or the Hindu Undivided Family has not been mentioned in Column 7(B) of Form 26. What is not disclosed according to the election petitioners is the legal or illegal use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose. These pleadings even if accepted to be fully true and correct would not amount to furnishing incorrect information in Column 7(B) of Form 26. What is required to be detailed is the ownership of agricultural land and non-agricultural land. If the returned candidate has disclosed the ownership of the agricultural land by his spouse and the Hindu Undivided Family and accepting the averments of the election petitioners that these lands were used for non-agricultural purpose, this would not render the information furnished in Form 26 to be incorrect or for that matter suppression of material information. The consequence if any of using agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose would be different but the same has not been prescribed as a ground or reason for rejection of the nomination form. It is found that these pleadings do not furnish any cause of action to the election petitioners to assail the acceptance of the nomination paper submitted by the returned candidate. Even otherwise, according to the election petitioners such material concealment amounted to a corrupt practice on the part of the returned candidate. At the cost of repetition it may be stated that the source of information received by the election petitioners for raising these pleadings to urge that the returned candidate was guilty of committing corrupt practice have not been disclosed in the affidavit filed in Form 25. Hence, for the aforesaid reasons, pleadings in paragraph 7 (ix-B) in Point No. 9-B deserve to be struck off as unnecessary in the absence of any material fact being disclosed therein. 22. In paragraph 7(x) Point No.10, it is pleaded that in Column 7(A)(vi) of Form 26 reference is made to vehicles standing in the name of the returned candidate and his spouse. Though the cost of those vehicles is mentioned, Form 26 does not provide the information from where the returned candidate and his spouse brought the difference amount. This also amounted to concealment of material information. Though the cost of those vehicles is mentioned, Form 26 does not provide the information from where the returned candidate and his spouse brought the difference amount. This also amounted to concealment of material information. Column 7A(vi) of Form 26 requires a candidate to furnish details of the Motor Vehicles, Aircrafts, Yachts, Ships alongwith the details of make, registration number, year of purchase and amount. The returned candidate has furnished details of the motor vehicles owned by him and his spouse. According to the election petitioners the cost of those vehicles as mentioned in Column 7(vi) by the returned candidate and information pertaining to his spouse in that regard when compared with the 'Income Tax Information ' of the returned candidate and his spouse did not indicate as to from where they brought the difference amount. This amounted to concealment of material information. It is seen that in Form 26, the returned candidate has furnished details of the motor vehicles owned by him and his spouse alongwith the details that are required to be furnished. It is not the case of the returned candidate that any information regarding motor vehicles owned either by the returned candidate or his spouse has not been disclosed in the said Form. It is not the requirement of Column 7A(vi) that the returned candidate should explain from where he is alleged to have brought 'the difference amount ' when the cost of the vehicles as mentioned is compared with the income tax information furnished by the returned candidate and his spouse as alleged by the election petitioners. The nomination form is therefore not liable to be rejected on this count that there is no information as to from where the returned candidate brought the difference amount as alleged. In absence of any material fact being pleaded in paragraph 7(x) of the election petition, said pleading is liable to be struck off. It is found that the contents of paragraph 7(x) Point No.10 are vexatious and seek a roving enquiry in the matter. 23. In paragraph 7(xi) Point No.11, it is pleaded that the returned candidate has shown other liability of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) at Rs.2,45,00,000.00 (Rupees Two Crores Forty Five Lakhs) but the returned candidate had not mentioned the name of the party who was concerned with such liability. This also amounted to material concealment of information. 23. In paragraph 7(xi) Point No.11, it is pleaded that the returned candidate has shown other liability of the Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) at Rs.2,45,00,000.00 (Rupees Two Crores Forty Five Lakhs) but the returned candidate had not mentioned the name of the party who was concerned with such liability. This also amounted to material concealment of information. It was also urged on behalf of the election petitioners that the word 'Government ' is missing in Form 26 at Column 8 as submitted by the returned candidate. Column 8 of Form 26 requires a candidate to furnish details of liabilities/dues to public financial institutions and Government. It is seen that all details as required by Column 8 of Form 26 have been mentioned in the said form filled in by the returned candidate. Absence of word 'Government ' in the title of Column 8 can hardly be said to be a substantial defect on the basis of which the nomination form could have been rejected. What is required to be seen is the substance of the objection and the objection should not be one of form. Again, it is not the requirement of Column 8 of Form 26 that the name of the person who has incurred the liability or the name of the person whose liability has to be satisfied is required to be stated. The nomination form on this premise cannot be said to have concealed information which was required under law to be furnished in Column 8 of Form 26. The pleadings that 'the name of the party whose liability is it on HUF ' are also vague not indicating as to what is sought to be meant by the election petitioners. In any event that is not the requirement of which details are to be given in Column 8 of Form 26. These pleadings do not refer to any material fact nor furnish any cause of action. They being vexatious are liable to be struck off. Accordingly, pleadings in paragraph 7(xi) Point No.11 are liable to be struck off. 24. In paragraph 7(xii) Point No.12, it is pleaded that in Column 8(i) of the affidavit in Form 26 the returned candidate had shown a housing loan of Rs.1,00,00,000.00 (Rupees One Crore) without disclosing the sources of repayment. They being vexatious are liable to be struck off. Accordingly, pleadings in paragraph 7(xi) Point No.11 are liable to be struck off. 24. In paragraph 7(xii) Point No.12, it is pleaded that in Column 8(i) of the affidavit in Form 26 the returned candidate had shown a housing loan of Rs.1,00,00,000.00 (Rupees One Crore) without disclosing the sources of repayment. As regards the personal loan mentioned by the returned candidate there are no details provided as from whom he had taken this loan. The loan taken from NNS Bank does not shown the sources of repayment. The information that was required to be given in the said Form in a single row was deliberately given in different rows to mislead the voters. The election petitioners seek to contend that the returned candidate having shown the housing loan amount of Rs.1,00,00,000.00 (Rupees One Crore) had not disclosed his repayment source. Column 8 of Form 26 does not require a candidate to disclose the manner in which the loan availed by him would be repaid. So also, details of the source from whom a personal loan has been taken is also not required to be stated in Column 8 of Form 26. Same is the position with regard to the averments that the returned candidate had taken loan from NNS Bank but had not shown his repayment source. The nomination form of the returned candidate therefore is not liable to be rejected on the ground that the returned candidate despite disclosing the loans availed by him had failed to disclose the source of repayment. These pleadings therefore do not furnish any cause of action in the absence of any material fact to support the case of the election petitioners that the nomination form of the returned candidate was improperly accepted. According to the election petitioners by arranging the columns under various Heads while furnishing details in Form 26, the returned candidate had sought to mislead voters and it also amounted to material concealment of information. It is not the pleading in the election petition that any particular column in Form 26 has deliberately been omitted by the returned candidate while submitting his nomination form or that any particular information as required to be furnished in Form 26 has been withheld by the returned candidate. It is not the pleading in the election petition that any particular column in Form 26 has deliberately been omitted by the returned candidate while submitting his nomination form or that any particular information as required to be furnished in Form 26 has been withheld by the returned candidate. Again it is found that the objection in this regard raised by the election petitioners is more to the form in which details have been furnished by the returned candidate in Form 26 rather than any substantial defect/omission in the said form. It is not even pleaded that such arrangement of the columns in Form 26 amounted to a defect of substantial character as contemplated by Sec. 36(4) of the Act of 1951 warranting rejection of the nomination paper. In Shambhu Prasad Sharma (supra) it has been held that the form of the nomination paper is not sacrosanct. If the format of the nomination paper has been substantially complied with then every departure from the prescribed format cannot be a ground for rejection of the nomination paper. The contents of paragraph 7(xii) Point No.12 do not refer to any material fact on the basis of which the nomination form of the returned candidate was liable to be rejected and the said paragraph is thus liable to be struck off. 25. It would be necessary to state here that through various points pleaded in paragraph 7 of the election petition, the emphasis of the election petitioners is on material concealment of information or furnishing misleading information. There is no pleading in the entire paragraph that any particular information that was required to be furnished in Form 26 has not been furnished. The material concealment of information according to the election petitioners is of matters that are not required to be furnished in Form 26. A nomination form is liable to be rejected if information as required statutorily to be furnished in Form 26 is concealed or not furnished and not on the ground that the candidate has failed to furnish some information which is not required by Form 26 to be so furnished. In other words, a nomination paper cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny from the point of view of information not required to be furnished in Form 26. In other words, a nomination paper cannot be the subject matter of scrutiny from the point of view of information not required to be furnished in Form 26. It is also not the pleading that the nomination form of the returned candidate was liable to be rejected for failure to furnish such information that was required to be furnished by Sec. 33A of the Act of 1951 nor is it the case that there were some columns in Form 26 were kept blank. The election petitioners stressed on the aspect of non-disclosure of information or submission of false information by the returned candidate. However, in the absence of any material fact being pleaded these pleadings do not further the case of the election petitioners. It is also to be noted that according to the affidavit filed by both the election petitioners in Form 25, it was stated that the averments in paragraph 7 were based on information received by them. However, as noted above, according to the election petitioners the assertions in subparagraphs (ix-A) and (ix-B) of paragraph 7 amount to commission of corrupt practice and in absence of the source of information being disclosed by the election petitioners in this regard, this is yet another reason for holding that the pleadings deserve to be struck off. 26. The learned counsel for the election petitioners relied upon the decision in Lok Prahari (supra) to urge that as the returned candidate had failed to disclose information pertaining to his sources of income the same amounted to 'undue influence ' thus constituting corrupt practice under Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951. It was urged that failure on the part of the returned candidate in disclosing his sources of income, sources of repayment of liabilities and failure to furnish details of persons from whom personal loans were taken amounted to material concealment. The facts in Lok Prahari (supra) indicate that writ petition was filed before the Hon 'ble Supreme Court seeking various reliefs. Prayers 1(1), (2) and 2 are relevant for the present purpose and they read thus: "1. The facts in Lok Prahari (supra) indicate that writ petition was filed before the Hon 'ble Supreme Court seeking various reliefs. Prayers 1(1), (2) and 2 are relevant for the present purpose and they read thus: "1. Issue a writ, order or direction, in the nature of mandamus - (1) to Respondents 1 and 2 to make necessary changes in Form 26 prescribed under Rule 4-A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 keeping in view the suggestion in Para 38 of the writ petition; (2) to Respondent 1 to consider suitable amendment in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to provide for rejection of nomination papers of the candidates and disqualification of Mps/MLAs/MLCs deliberately furnishing wrong information about their assets in the affidavit in Form 26 at the time of filing of the nomination; (3) ... .... 2. Declare that non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of self, spouse and dependents by a candidate would amount to undue inference and thereby, corruption and as such election of such a candidate can be declared null and void under Sec. 100(1)(b) of the 1951 RP Act in terms of the judgment in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar." Thereafter, while considering the relief to be granted against Prayers 1(1) and 1(2) it was held in paragraph 68 as under: "In the light of the law declared by this Court in ADR case and PUCL case, we do not see any legal or normative impediment nor has any tenable legal objection has been raised before us by any one of the respondents, for issuance of the direction relating to the changes in Form 26 (declaration by the candidates). On the other hand, the 2 nd respondent in his counter stated: '7. It is submitted that so far as the first prayer in the captioned writ petition is concerned, the information about source(s) of income of candidates, their spouses and dependents will be a step in the direction of enhancing transparency and should form part of the declaration in Col. (9) of Form 26. The Answering Respondent Commission vide its Letter No. 3/4ECI/LET/FUNC/JUD/SDR/Vol.I/2016 dated 7-9-2016 has already requested the Ministry of Law and Justice to consider the proposed amendments made in Column (3) and Column (9) of Form 26 and in total affirmation with the prayer made by the petitioner. (9) of Form 26. The Answering Respondent Commission vide its Letter No. 3/4ECI/LET/FUNC/JUD/SDR/Vol.I/2016 dated 7-9-2016 has already requested the Ministry of Law and Justice to consider the proposed amendments made in Column (3) and Column (9) of Form 26 and in total affirmation with the prayer made by the petitioner. ' Therefore, we are of the opinion that Prayer 1(1) should be granted and is accordingly granted. We direct that Rule 4-A of the Rules and Form 26 appended to the Rules shall be suitably amended, requiring candidates and their associates to declare their sources of income." As regards prayer 2 it was held in paragraphs 79 to 81 as under: "79. We shall now deal with Prayer 2 which seeks a declaration that non-disclosure of assets and sources of income would amount to 'undue inference ' - a corrupt practice under Sec. 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. In this behalf, heavy reliance is placed by the petitioner on a judgment of this Court in Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar. It was a case arrising under the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. A notification was issued by the State Election Commission stipulating that every candidate at an election to any panchayat is required to disclose information, inter alia, whether the candidate was accused in any pending criminal case of any offence punishable with imprisonment for two years or more and in which charges have been framed or cognizance has been taken by a court of law. In an election petition, it was alleged that there were certain criminal cases pending falling in the abovementioned categories but the said information was not disclosed by the returned candidate at the time of filing his nomination. One of the questions before this Court was whether such non-disclosure amounted to 'undue inference ' - a corrupt practice under the Panchayats Act. It may be mentioned that the Panchayats Act simply adopted the definition of a corrupt practice as contained in Sec. 123 of the 1951 RP Act. 80. On an elaborate consideration of various aspects of the matter, this Court in Krishnamoorthy case held as follows: (SCC p.522, para 91) '91. .... While filing the nomination form, if the requisite information, as has been highlighted by us, relating to criminal antecedents, is not given, indubitably, there is an attempt to suppress, effort to misguide and keep the people in dark. .... While filing the nomination form, if the requisite information, as has been highlighted by us, relating to criminal antecedents, is not given, indubitably, there is an attempt to suppress, effort to misguide and keep the people in dark. This attempt undeniably and undisputedly is undue inference and, therefore, amounts to corrupt practice. .... ' 81. For the very same logic as adopted by this Court in Krishnamoorthy, we are also of the opinion that the non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of the candidates and their associates would constitute a corrupt practice falling under heading 'undue inference ' as defined under Sec. 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2." 27. In the light of aforesaid it is clear that the Hon 'ble Supreme Court was pleased to direct suitable amendment to Rule 4-A of the Rules of 1961 and to Form 26 appended thereto which would require candidates and their associates to declare their sources of income. Further, non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of candidates and their associates would constitute a corrupt practice under heading 'undue influence ' under Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951. Pursuant to the aforesaid decision rendered on 16.02.2018, Rule 4A of the Rules of 1961 and Form 26 were not amended till the stage of submission of nomination forms leading to the general elections in April-2019 in the present case. Hence, the nomination form alongwith Form 26 of the returned candidate would have to be judged on the basis of Rule 4-A and Form 26 as they stood at the relevant date. Furnishing of information about source(s) of income of candidates, their spouses and dependents was therefore not required at least till Rule 4-A and Form 26 is suitably amended. Hence on this count also the averments in paragraph 7 of the election petition alleging non-disclosure of sources of income by the returned candidate, his spouse and dependents would not give any cause of action to the election petitioners to urge that the nomination form of the returned candidate was improperly accepted. Hence on this count also the averments in paragraph 7 of the election petition alleging non-disclosure of sources of income by the returned candidate, his spouse and dependents would not give any cause of action to the election petitioners to urge that the nomination form of the returned candidate was improperly accepted. Even proceeding on the premise that non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of candidates and their associates would constitute a corrupt practice under the heading 'undue influence ' under Sec. 123(2) or for that matter under Sec. 100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951 as held in Krishnamoorthy Versus Sivakumar [ AIR 2015 SC 1921 ], the election petitioners in their affidavit in Form 25 dated 06.11.2021 have stated that the contents of paragraph 7 of the election petition are based on information received by them. In paragraph 20 of the election petition it is pleaded as under: "20. This petition is prepared on the basis of documents and information received by the Petitioner. The limit of information is the information supplied by Information Officer as well as information received through various sources." However, the sources of such information have not been disclosed by the election petitioners. Absence of disclosure of sources of information on the basis of which the averments as regards corrupt practice are based therefore does not disclose a complete cause of action and the mandatory requirement in that regard does not stand satisfied. This is in view of the law laid down in Gajanan Krishnaji Bapat, Jeet Mohinder Singh, Ravinder Singh and V. Narayaswamy (supra). 28. The election petitioners have referred in the decision in Kisan Shankar Kathore Versus Arun Dattatraya Sawant [(2014) 14 SCC 164] in paragraph 17 of the election petition. In the said case it was specifically pleaded by the election petitioners that the returned candidate had suppressed information as regards immovable property owned by the wife of the returned candidate. Details of the same were also pleaded which averments were not denied by the returned candidate. Similarly, in the column for furnishing details of motor vehicles the returned candidate had merely mentioned the figure Rs.5,50,000.00 under the column 'self ' without giving any details such as number of the vehicle, the model etc. Details of the same were also pleaded which averments were not denied by the returned candidate. Similarly, in the column for furnishing details of motor vehicles the returned candidate had merely mentioned the figure Rs.5,50,000.00 under the column 'self ' without giving any details such as number of the vehicle, the model etc. In this context, it was held that it was a clear case of non-disclosure of the property owned by the spouse and failure to furnish necessary details in the affidavit alongwith the nomination form. The following observations in paragraph 43 of the aforesaid decision are sufficient to conclude that in the absence of material facts being pleaded in the election petition, the ratio of the aforesaid decision is not attracted in the facts of the present case: "43. ... ... .... The grounds stated in Sec. 36(2) are those which can be examined there and then and on that basis the Returning Officer would be in a position to reject the nomination. Likewise, where the blanks are left in an affidavit, nomination can be rejected there and then. In other cases where detailed enquiry is needed, it would depend upon the outcome thereof, in an election petition, as to whether the nomination was properly accepted or it was a case of improper acceptance. Once it is found that it was a case of improper acceptance, as there was misinformation or suppression of material information, one can state that question of rejection in such a case was only deferred to a later date. ... ... ....." Reference has also been made in the same paragraph to the decision in Krishnamoorthy Versus Sivakumar [ AIR 2015 SC 1921 ] wherein it has been held that disclosure of criminal antecedents of a candidate pertaining to heinous or serious offence or offences relating to corruption or moral turpitude at the time of filing of nomination paper as mandated by law is a categorical imperative. Non-disclosure of pending criminal cases where cognizance has been taken or charges have been framed would amount to 'undue influence' rendering the election to be declared void under Sec. 100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951. Non-disclosure of pending criminal cases where cognizance has been taken or charges have been framed would amount to 'undue influence' rendering the election to be declared void under Sec. 100(1)(b) of the Act of 1951. Reference to the following observations would establish that in the absence of such material facts in the present case, the election petitioners cannot derive any support from the same: "In an election petition, the election petitioner is required to assert about the cases in which the successful candidate is involved as per the rules and how there has been non-disclosure in the affidavit. Once that is established, it would amount to corrupt practice." It is thus found that the aforesaid two decisions referred to in paragraph 17 of the election petition do not take the case of the election petitioners any further. (d) Conclusion 29. In the light of the foregoing discussion, I am satisfied that the application under Order VI Rule 16 of the Code deserves to be partly allowed by directing that the pleadings in paragraph 7 (i), (iv), (iv-a), (v), (vi), (vii), (viii), (ix), (ix-a), (ix-b), (x), (xi) and (xii) are liable to be struck off as they do not indicate any material fact to seek the reliefs sought in the election petition. Further, the pleadings in paragraph 7(iv-A), (ix) and (ix-a) allege commission of corrupt practice by the returned candidate. These pleadings are based on the information received by the election petitioners as per averments in paragraph 20 and the affidavits dated 06.11.2021 at Exhibit 31. However, the source of information from whom the election petitioners got such knowledge has not been disclosed thus resulting in lack of material and complete facts therein. Consequentially, with the deletion of the aforesaid paragraphs the relief sought under Sec. 100(1)(b) read with Sec. 123(2) of the Act of 1951 is not supported by requisite material facts. The election petition would proceed on the basis of the pleadings that remain after striking off the paragraphs mentioned above. 30. As a sequel to the aforesaid discussion, Civil Application (O) No.754/2020 is partly allowed to the extent stated above. Consequently, Civil Application Nos.11/2021 and 549/2021 stand rejected. The election petition shall proceed further in accordance with law.