JUDGMENT : The plaintiff is before this Court challenging the reversing judgment in the suit O..No.168 of 2000 on the file of the District Munsif, Chengalpattu. The suit was decreed and in Appeal A.S.No.29 of 2007, the Lower Appellate Court (Principal Sub-Court, Chengalpattu) has reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Aggrieved by which, this Second Appeal has been instituted. Plaintiff's Case: 2. The case of the appellant, as plaintiff, is that they are the owners of a larger extent of land which has been described as the 'A' Schedule property comprised in Gramanatham New S.No.260/32, (Old S.No.109/A) measuring : East to west On the South 28.2 metres On the North 31.6 metres North to South On the East 42.4 metres On the West 43.2 metres together with superstructures and tress. The suit is filed in respect of a portion of the A Schedule property which has been described as the B Schedule property measuring East to West 25 feet North to South 25 feet Bounded On the East Thiruvanchavadi Street On the West A Schedule On the North A Schedule On the East Thiruvanchavadi Street On the South A Schedule (The 'A' Schedule property is not described with its boundaries). 3. It is the case of the appellant that the appellant trust has been in existence for over 100 years. For the sake of better management, the trust was registered vide a trust deed dated 25.11.1996. 4. The appellant would contend that they have been carrying on pious work with the income that they derive from out of the rent received from tenants in the trust property and through donations. The patta in respect of 'A' Schedule property stood in the name of the appellant trust, the Chatram (building) had become so dilapidated that the appellant had decided to pull down the existing building and put up a new construction thereupon. 5. The first respondent herein were running a tea stall in a portion of the 'A' schedule property and in the month of June 2000, he had trespassed into the 'B' Schedule property and started putting up construction. The appellant had successfully prevented this attempt but however on 29.06.2000, the first respondent had given out that he would put up a construction in the property and hence the suit. Original Written Statement of the first defendant: 6. The appellant had successfully prevented this attempt but however on 29.06.2000, the first respondent had given out that he would put up a construction in the property and hence the suit. Original Written Statement of the first defendant: 6. The first respondent herein filed a written statement denying the various allegations contained in the plaint. They have taken out a defense questioning the locus standi of the plaintiff's trust in filing the suit. 7. The case of the first respondent was that the 'B' Schedule property was a Gramanatham and for three generations, the first respondent and his ancestors/predecessors in interest have been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the property in which they had put up their dwelling house. It is the categoric case of the first respondent that the "B" Schedule property is not a part of the "A" Schedule Property. 8. He would also contend that during his lifetime his father, Murugesa Naicker, had re-constructed the dwelling house upon the 'B' Schedule property. The first respondent's father had died intestate and besides the first respondent he had four daughters and one son. All of them were born in the 'B' Schedule property. The first respondent would contend that they have also perfected tilted by adverse possession on account of their long uninterrupted and continuous possession. He would further contend that considering the fact that the title of the plaintiff to the 'B' Schedule property was being questioned, the suit for injunction without seeking the relief for declaration was not maintainable. On this ground the first respondent sought to have the suit dismissed. Meanwhile the appellant had impleaded the second respondent herein as the second defendant in the suit. Additional Written Statement: 9. In the additional written statement filed after the impleadment of the second defendant, the first respondent had in addition taken out a plea that the very cause of action for filing the suit i.e., the alleged trespass in the month of June 2000 and the threat allegedly given on 29.06.2000, is nothing but a figment of the appellant's fertile imagination. Trial Court: 10. The learned District Munsif, Chengalpattu had framed the following issues originally: "1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for permanent injunction; 2. What are the other relief to which the plaintiff is entitled to." 11. Thereafter the issues were recast and are set out hereinbelow: 1. Trial Court: 10. The learned District Munsif, Chengalpattu had framed the following issues originally: "1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for permanent injunction; 2. What are the other relief to which the plaintiff is entitled to." 11. Thereafter the issues were recast and are set out hereinbelow: 1. Whether the suit is maintainable; 2. Whether the suit A & B Schedule is separate property as contended by defendant it is b schedule is part & parcel of A schedule; 3. Whether the plaintiff is in possession of suit property; 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief as prayed for; 5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief as prayed for; 6. To what other relief the parties are entitled to." 12. During the Trial, the plaintiff had examined their Vice-President as P.W.1 and had marked Exs.A1 to A14. On the side of the defendants, the first respondent herein examined himself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B1 to B11. That apart, he had also examined an independent witness as D.W.2. The Learned District Munsif decreed the suit holding that the appellant/plaintiff by marking Exs.A1 to A14 and by cross examining D.W.1 has clearly established that they are entitled to the decree as prayed for. 13. Aggrieved by the said judgement and decree, the first respondent herein had filed A.S.No.29 of 2007 on the file of the Principal Sub Judge, Chengalpattu. The Learned Subordinate Judge on a re-appreciation of the evidence on record allowed the Appeal and held that the plaintiff trust was different from the choultry/chatram and the plaintiff had not let in any evidence to prove their claim for possession without seeking the relief of declaration or without identifying the suit properly with a proper description. It is against this reversing judgment and decree that the present Second Appeal has been filed. Question of Law 14. The Second Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law on 01.10.2009: 1. Whether the registration of the society takes away the title of the members of the Viswakarma community and whether the reason given by Lower Appellate Court that the plaintiff lacks locus to institute the suit does not affect fundamental principles of law and justice. 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court is justified in ignoring Ex.A2 natham patta in preference to the unsubstantiated and interested testimony of the first appellant." Submission: 15. Mr. 2. Whether the Lower Appellate Court is justified in ignoring Ex.A2 natham patta in preference to the unsubstantiated and interested testimony of the first appellant." Submission: 15. Mr. V. Raghavachari, learned counsel arguing on behalf of the appellant would prima facie rest his case on the fact that the plaintiff trust is in existence for over 100 years and owned the 'A' Schedule property of which the 'B' Schedule is a portion. He would also contend that the first defendant had also accepted their tenancy under the appellant in respect of a portion of the 'A' Schedule property. 16. He would further submit that the appellant has proved title through Exs.A1 to A14. He would also draw the attention of the Court to the deposition of D.W.1, wherein he has admitted that there is no document in respect of 'B' Schedule property standing in the names of his grandfather, father or in the first defendant's name. 17. He would further submit that the Trial Court after considering the documents and the evidence had correctly come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is entitled to the reliefs claimed by him. Mr. Raghavachari would seek to explain the lie of the land on the basis of a sketch which has not been marked as evidence nor forms part of the plaint. 18. He would submit that the Appellate Court has clearly not comprehended the right of the plaintiff which is evident from the fact that the Appellate Court would hold that the plaintiff trust created under the deed Ex.A1 was a different trust and not the Chatram. 19. He would argue that the Appellate Court despite observing that the first respondent herein has not proved their projected case that they are in possession of the 'B' Schedule property for the past three generations by producing documents like tax receipt, ration card, voter's list, etc. and rightly coming to the conclusion that the first defendant was not in lawful possession of the suit property however erred in allowing the appeal. 20. The learned counsel would also draw the attention of the Court to Ex.A2 which is the patta that is granted to the Viswakarma (Kammalar) Chatram. and rightly coming to the conclusion that the first defendant was not in lawful possession of the suit property however erred in allowing the appeal. 20. The learned counsel would also draw the attention of the Court to Ex.A2 which is the patta that is granted to the Viswakarma (Kammalar) Chatram. He would therefore contend that despite such overwhelming evidence to prove title of the plaintiff to the entire 'A' Schedule property, the Lower Appellate Court has reversed the judgment only on the ground that the plaintiff trust and the trust under which the first defendant was a tenant are two different entities. 21. Per contra, Ms. Nilophar, learned counsel arguing on behalf of the first respondent would draw the attention of the Court to the contents of the plaint of, particularly, the relief claimed which was an injunction from putting up any kind of construction over the 'B' Schedule property. She would therefore contend that the appellant has recognized the first respondent's possession of the property. The plaintiff in paragraph No. 4 of the plaint had admitted that the first defendant had entered possession as they were trying to put up construction. There is nothing to show that the possession was given back to the plaintiff even according to their own averments. She would further argue that the 'B' Schedule is not a vacant site as contended by the plaintiff but contains the dwelling house of the first respondent. 22. She would contend that the first defendant had raised very serious defense in as much as he has denied the title of the plaintiff to the suit property however no steps have been taken to include the relief of declaration and on this ground the suit ought to have been dismissed. 23. She would contend that Exs.A4 to A10 filed by the appellant to prove title/possession does not relate to the 'B' Schedule property and Exs.A11 to A14 are documents that have come into existence after the filing of the suit. The suit property being a vacant site, the appellant out to have sought a relief of declaration. 24. Heard the counsel and perused the records. Discussion: 25. The Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on the ground that the plaintiff's trust and entity which owns the Chatram are two different entities. The suit property being a vacant site, the appellant out to have sought a relief of declaration. 24. Heard the counsel and perused the records. Discussion: 25. The Appellate Court has reversed the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on the ground that the plaintiff's trust and entity which owns the Chatram are two different entities. In order to analyse this finding, it would be necessary to go through the recitals contained in the document in question, viz; the Trust Deed which has been marked as Ex.A1. The signatories of the deed have been termed as founder trustees. This clearly presupposes that it is these founder Trustees who have formed the appellant Trust and therefore the contention that the Trust is in existence for over 100 years stands rebutted. The following recitals in paragraph No.2 of Ex.A1, when translated into the English language from the vernacular would read as follows: The Kammalar Community called as Thiruporur Vishwakarma owned a Choultry (Chatram). Out of the income from the Choultry and from donations received from the community people and others the community has been doing religious charitable work during the Shri Muthukumar Bhamotsavam. This activity has been going on for over 100 year. However, in order to ensure that this trust would continue this work in a better way, it was decided to create a Trust Deed and accordingly the Trust Deed was also executed. Under the Trust Deed, the Trust was called the Viswakarma (Kammalar) Chatram Trust." 26. Therefore, a reading of the above would indicate that some of the religious activity relating to the Shri Muthukumar Bhamotsavam was being done by the Kammalar Community also called the Thiruporur Viswakarma Community which owned the Choultry. 27. However under the Trust Deed, the Trust was called Vishwakarma (Kammalar) Chatram Trust, Thiruporur. Therefore there is clear distinction between the community and the Trust. 28. A perusal of Ex.A2 would confirm this distinction as the patta which was obtained in the year 1995 would show the owner as the Vishwakarma Kammalar Chatram and not the Viswakarma (Kammalar) Chatram Trust, Thiruporur which the appellant claims was in existence for over 100 years. The Trust deed was entered into on 25.11.1996. Therefore, the findings of the Appellate Court in this regard appears to be in order. The locus of the appellant to file the suit has not been proved. 29. The Trust deed was entered into on 25.11.1996. Therefore, the findings of the Appellate Court in this regard appears to be in order. The locus of the appellant to file the suit has not been proved. 29. The appellant Trust claims to be in possession of the suit for over 100 years when the Trust itself was formed just 4 years prior to the filing of the suit this claim cannot be countenanced. The name of the owner given in Ex.A2 does not match the name of the appellant trust hence Question of Law No.1 is answered against the appellant. 30. The first defendant has in very clear terms stated that the 'B' Schedule property is not a part of the 'A' Schedule property and that he and his predecessors have been in occupation of the same for over three generations. Despite the first respondent asserting title through adverse possession and thereby creating a cloud on the plaintiffs title, the plaintiff has not sought to amend the plaint to include the relief of declaration. Even as per their own pleadings, they are not in possession of the 'B' Schedule property. Therefore, the suit filed for a bare injunction in respect of a vacant site as pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff without seeking declaration is not maintainable. In the judgment reported in " (2008) 4 SCC 594 ", Anathula Sudhakar vs. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by Lrs. and Others, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has set out certain general principles as to when a suit for bare injunction alone would lie and when additional reliefs of declaration and recovery of possession documents were required. The learned Judges summarised the position in paragraph No.21 as follows : "21.(a) Where a cloud is raised over the plaintiff's title and he does not have possession, a suit for declaration and possession, with or without a consequential injunction, is the remedy. Where the plaintiff's title is not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is out of possession, he has to sue for possession with a consequential injunction. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. Where there is merely an interference with the plaintiff's lawful possession or threat of dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an injunction simpliciter. (b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is concerned only with possession, normally the issue of title will not be directly and substantially in issue. The prayer for injunction will be decided with reference to the finding on possession. But in cases where de jure possession has to be established on the basis of title to the property, as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of title may directly and substantially arise for consideration, as without a finding thereon, it will not be possible to decide the issue of possession." (emphasis is mine) 31. The plaintiff has filed Exs.A4 to A14 to prove their title to the 'B' Schedule property. Exs.A4 to A10 does not contain the door number and does not indicate that it relates to the suit properties. Further they are all documents just prior to the filing of the suit. Exs.A11 to A14 are documents filed much after the filing of the suit which cannot be looked out. Ex.A2 patta does not stand in the name of the Plaintiff Trust but stands in the name of Viswakarma Kammalar Chatram. 32. The cross examination of P.W.1 would also lend credence to the claim of the defendants have been in possession of the 'B' Schedule property for a considerable period of time. In response to a question as to whether the first defendant's father had been residing in the 'B' Schedule property for over 50 years, the witness has not responded with the answer that he has never been in possession but has stated that he is not aware of the fact. This answer is incongruous especially when the appellant has come forward with a case that they are in possession of the property for over 100 years. The witness had deposed that they are in possession of the document, on the strength of which they had obtained Ex.A2 patta. However, this document has not been produced for the scrutiny of the Court and therefore the best evidence in the possession of the plaintiff has not been produced before the Court. The witness had deposed that they are in possession of the document, on the strength of which they had obtained Ex.A2 patta. However, this document has not been produced for the scrutiny of the Court and therefore the best evidence in the possession of the plaintiff has not been produced before the Court. Ex.A2 has been procured only in the year 1995 and that too only in the name of Viswakarma Kammalar Chatram, this despite the fact that the appellant would claim that they are in possession and ownership of the property for over 100 years. It is further seen that in the year 1994 much prior to the disputes had arisen between the parties, the first respondent had executed a Mortgage Deed in respect of 'B' Schedule property in favour of one T.S. Narayana swami. The description of the property given therein would indicate that the plaintiff's trust has properties on the East and South alone. The Northern boundary is shown as property of one Indrani and others. 33. The appellant as the plaintiff has not proved their right to the suit property and that they are in possession of the suit property. Therefore the Lower Appellate Court was correct in ignoring Ex.A2 patta. Question of Law No.2 is also answered. 34. In the light of the above, no exception can be taken to the well considered judgment of the Lower Appellate Court and the Second Appeal is accordingly dismissed. No costs.