JUDGMENT 1. Heard Shri D. A. Sonawane, learned counsel appointed under the Legal Aid Scheme to appear on behalf of the appellant, and Shri M. J. Khan learned A.P.P. for respondent/State. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 27/10/2016 made by the Special Judge and Additional Sessions Judge (Link Court), Mehkar in Special POCSO Case No. 2/2015 convicting inter alia the appellant for the offense under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO) and Section 11 of the Prohibition of Child Marriage Act, 2006 (the Act of 2006). The appellant has been sentenced to life imprisonment and fined for the other offenses for which he has been convicted. 3. The records indicate that along with the appellant, eight other accused persons were also tried for various offenses. However, some of them have been acquitted and only a few of them have been convicted for certain minor offenses. In this appeal, however, we are only concerned with the conviction and sentencing of the appellant as aforesaid. 4. The prosecution version is that the victim (name withheld) was, at the time of the commission of the offense, a minor (about 14 years). She was the daughter of the appellant- Prakash. The appellant was alleged to have repeatedly raped her, as a result of which she conceived twice and had to be aborted. She was then married off while still a minor to one Santosh. Soon after the marriage, her mother-in-law discovered that she was pregnant [ 4 1/2 months gone.] Thereafter, the victim with the help of her mother-inlaw complained against the appellant and his brother repeatedly raped her over a period of about 18 months in the past. 5. The Special Court, based on the evidence on record, acquitted the appellant 's brother for want of conclusive evidence. Some of the co-accused were convicted for the offense under the Act of 2006 and fined. However, the Special Court found that the appellant was guilty of offenses under Section 376 of the IPC, Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and Section 11 of the Act of 2006 and sentenced him inter alia to life imprisonment. Hence, the present appeal. 6. However, the Special Court found that the appellant was guilty of offenses under Section 376 of the IPC, Section 6 of the POCSO Act, and Section 11 of the Act of 2006 and sentenced him inter alia to life imprisonment. Hence, the present appeal. 6. Shri Sonawane, learned counsel appointed under the Legal Aid Scheme to appear on behalf of the appellant raised the following grounds in support of this appeal. (a) that there was no credible evidence on record to establish the correct age of the victim and therefore, the prosecution under POCSO was quite incompetent. He submitted that the birth certificate or record of birth from Panchayat though available were suppressed by the prosecution. He submitted that the ossification test indicated that the age of the victim was between 17 and 19 years. He submitted that based on all such evidence on record, the Special Court erred in concluding that the victim was hardly 14 years of age at the time of the alleged offense. He submitted that the impugned judgment and order is therefore vitiated and deserves to be set aside on this ground itself. (b) The victim, in this case, has not at all supported the prosecution version. Though she was declared hostile, her testimony was not shaken in the cross-examination. He submitted that the victim had clearly and categorically exonerated the appellant and even proceeded to state that her complaint was on account of pressure exerted by her mother-in-law, who was aggrieved by non-payment of dowry by the appellant. Shri Sonawane submitted that in such circumstances, it would be extremely unsafe to convict the appellant and sentence him to life imprisonment. (c) The victim admitted that she knew her husband- Santosh even before the marriage and further she had a sexual relationship with him even before marriage. This aspect was completely ignored by the learned Sessions Judge. He submitted that no DNA fingerprinting exercise was undertaken by the prosecution to rule out the possibility of Santosh being the father of the child born. Shri Sonawane submitted that this is a serious lacuna in the prosecution's case, on account of which the appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the charges falsely leveled against him. 7. Shri Khan, learned A.P.P. defended the impugned judgment and order based on reasoning reflected therein. Shri Sonawane submitted that this is a serious lacuna in the prosecution's case, on account of which the appellant is entitled to be acquitted of the charges falsely leveled against him. 7. Shri Khan, learned A.P.P. defended the impugned judgment and order based on reasoning reflected therein. He submitted that in this case, there is overwhelming evidence to establish that the victim was hardly 14 years old at the time of the offense. He referred to the oral as well as documentary evidence on record establishing this fact. He also relied on Rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rule, 2007 and the decision of Hon 'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo Vs. State of Maharashtra [ (2013) 14 SCC 637 ]. He also relied on yet another decision of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Anup Singh [ (2015) 7 SCC 773 ] . Based on all these, he submitted that there was no error in the appellant being prosecuted and convicted under POCSO. 8. Shri Khan, then points out that forensic evidence on record by way of DNA fingerprinting had conclusively determined that the appellant was the natural father of the child born to the victim. He relied extensively on the medical/scientific literature that such tests are conclusive and accurate to the extent of 99% and based upon the same submits that the appellant was quite correctly convicted in this matter. 9. Shri Khan, submitted that the evidence of hostile witness cannot be rejected or discarded in its entirety. He submitted that in this case there is both oral as well as documentary evidence which establishes beyond reasonable doubt the commission of offenses by the appellant and therefore, there is no case made out to interfere with the impugned judgment and order on the ground urged by Shri Sonawane or even otherwise. 10. We now proceed to decide the issues that arise for determination in this appeal. 11. The first question for determination in this matter concerns the age of the victim because if it is established that the victim was not less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then, it is possible to say that provision of the POCSO were incorrectly invoked against the appellant. 12. 11. The first question for determination in this matter concerns the age of the victim because if it is established that the victim was not less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, then, it is possible to say that provision of the POCSO were incorrectly invoked against the appellant. 12. The victim, who deposed in this matter as PW1 turned hostile and even went to the extent of denying that her birth date was 30/07/2000, even though the documentary evidence produced by other prosecution witnesses suggested that this was indeed her birth date. She however admitted that she studied in Pandit Nehru School up to the 7th standard. 13. The prosecution examined Kaduba Mundhe (PW3), headmaster of Pandit Nehru Vidyalaya, who deposed that the victim took admission in his school in the 5th standard on 10.08.2012. After she was educated in some other school up to 5th standard. He refers to details of such previous school at Sr. No. 8309 in the register maintained at the time of admission of the student. He deposed that such register is referred to as "Dakhla Kharij ". He even brought the original register with him but was permitted to place a true copy of the entry on record, which was marked as Exh.98. This entry had recorded that the victim's birth date was 30/07/2000. He admitted that he had issued the birth certificate at Exh.95 under his seal and signature which had also stated that the birth date of the victim was 30/07/2000. 14. Kaduba (PW3) was extensively cross-examined and we agree with the learned Special Judge that such cross-examination hardly made any dent in his clear and cogent testimony. He further admitted that the birth date recorded by him was based on leaving certificate issued by the previous school i.e. Smt. Prabhavati Kaku Shingane Vidyalalya, Savkhed-Nagre. The prosecution, therefore, applied for leave to examine the headmaster of this earlier school and such permission was granted by the Special Judge in terms of the provision of Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure(CrPC). 15. Shri Anantkumar (PW21), headmaster of the Smt. Prabhavati Kaku Shingane Vidyalaya, Savkhed-Nagre deposed in this matter and stated that the birth date recorded even in his school against entry no. 425 in the register "Dakhal Kharij " maintained by the school was 30/07/2000. 15. Shri Anantkumar (PW21), headmaster of the Smt. Prabhavati Kaku Shingane Vidyalaya, Savkhed-Nagre deposed in this matter and stated that the birth date recorded even in his school against entry no. 425 in the register "Dakhal Kharij " maintained by the school was 30/07/2000. He had brought the original register to the Court but was permitted to place a true copy of the entry no. 425 from the said register and the same was marked as Exh.174. 16. Anantkumar (PW21) deposed that the victim was earlier in Zilla Parishad Primary School that had issued the original leaving school certificate. He produced the original school leaving certificate issued by Zilla Parishad Primary School and the same was admitted in evidence and marked as Exh.175. Even in this leaving certificate, the birth date of the victim was shown as 30/07/2000. Anantkumar (PW21) admitted that he did not quote the birth certificate of the victim from village Panchayat. However, based on this, there was no case made out to disbelieve the testimony of Anantkumar (PW21) or for that matter the prosecution 's version that the victim 's birth date was indeed 30/07/2000. 17. The deposition of Kaduba (PW3) and Anantkumar (PW21) coupled with the documentary evidence produced by them establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the victim 's birth date was indeed 30/07/2000 and consequently, she was less than 18 years of age on the date or dates on which the offenses were perpetrated on her. Not much credence can be given to the evidence of the victim when she simply denies her birth date as 30/07/2000 and offers no alternative date. 18. As a matter of abundant caution, the prosecution examined Dr. Sahebrao Manwar (PW20), medical officer at Civil Hospital, Buldhana. He deposed that X-ray plates of the victim bearing common no. 1061 have been referred to him for his opinion on 10.11.2014 and on examination of these plates, he opined that the biological age of the victim is between 17 to 19 years. His report at Exh.167, which was also admitted in the evidence. In crossexamination, he explained that the margin of error in such matters can extend up to 2 years on either side. 19. According to us, based on the testimony of Dr. Sahebrao (PW20), this is not a fit case to extend any benefit of the doubt to the appellant and to nullify the prosecution under POCSO. In crossexamination, he explained that the margin of error in such matters can extend up to 2 years on either side. 19. According to us, based on the testimony of Dr. Sahebrao (PW20), this is not a fit case to extend any benefit of the doubt to the appellant and to nullify the prosecution under POCSO. As noted earlier, the evidence of two headmasters is quite clear. Their evidence is backed by entries in the school registers maintained in the regular course. These entries, which related to no less than three schools, clearly establish that the victim 's birth date was consistently recorded as 30/07/2000. This, coupled with medical evidence, according to us establishes beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was indeed less than 18 years of age on the date or dates on which the offenses were perpetrated on her. 20. Shri Khan refers to Rule 12(3) of the Rules of 2007 which reads as follows:- "12(3). In every case concerning a child or juvenile in conflict with law, the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee by seeking evidence by obtaining - (a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available; and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat; (b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion will be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasons to be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefit to the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower side within the margin of one year. and, while passing orders in such case shall, after taking into consideration such evidence as may be available, or the medical opinion, as the case may be, record a finding in respect of his age and either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the conclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile in conflict with law. " 21. In the case of Mahadeo (supra), the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that the aforesaid rule is applicable in determining the age of the victim of rape. Further, this being the statutory rule, the same, will have to be followed by the Courts for ascertaining the age of the victim of rape. The decision in Mahadeo (supra) was followed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the latter decision of Anup Singh (supra). 22. Thus, following the two decisions of the Hon 'ble Supreme Court, credence will have to be given to the entries in schools register maintained in the regular course, particularly having regard to consistency of such entries even though such entries concern almost three schools. Assuming that slight ambiguity is created by the ossification report, such ambiguity is by no means sufficient in the present case to dislodge the clear and cogent evidence of the headmasters and the entries in the school registers. This is more so having regard to the provision of Rule 12(3) of the above-referred Rules and the decision of Hon 'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo (supra) and Anup Singh (supra). 23. Upon cumulative consideration of the aforesaid oral as well as documentary evidence and applying the legal position as explained by the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mahadeo (supra) and Anup Singh (supra), we have no hesitation in upholding the findings recorded by the learned Special Judge that the victim, in this case, was less than 18 years old on the date or dates on which the offenses were perpetrated on her. Thus, there was no error in prosecuting the appellant under the POCSO Act. 24. The next issue that falls for determination is whether the prosecution, in this case, has succeeded in establishing that the appellant i.e. father of the victim was also the putative father of the minor child born to the victim. Because, if this aspect is established, then, conviction under Section 376 of the IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO should normally follow, unless the appellant raises and makes good and some plausible defense. 25. True, in this case, the appellant relied on the circumstance that the victim has turned hostile. Initially, the victim cooperated with the investigation and stated how she was repeatedly raped by her father i.e. the appellant and her uncle. She also stated how she had to undergo two abortions before she was married off to Santosh. In her testimony before the Court, however, she admitted to a few such matters but later on turned hostile and began to deny almost everything. She claimed that it was her mother-in-law, who prevailed upon her to file a complaint and make allegations against her father and uncle simply because her family members were not given any dowry which her mother-in-law was demanding. 26. The position in law is by now quite settled that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be rejected in its entirety. In the case of Himanshu @ Chintu Vs. State of NCT of Delhi [ (2011) 2 SCC 36 ] , the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has explained that the evidence of hostile witness remains admissible and it is always open to the Court to rely upon the dependable part of such evidence, particularly where the same is corroborated by some other reliable evidence on record. 27. In this case, there is no doubt that the victim delivered a child at the Civil Hospital, Buldhana, and custody of this child was given to a Trust. The appellant and his brother had however raised a defense that the victim 's husband- Santosh was the father of the child and that they had nothing to do with the paternity of this child. 28. The prosecution examined Dr. Anil (PW13), medical officer of Civil Hospital, Buldhana, who medically examined the appellant and opined that he was capable of having sexual intercourse. His report is to be found at Exh. 131. 28. The prosecution examined Dr. Anil (PW13), medical officer of Civil Hospital, Buldhana, who medically examined the appellant and opined that he was capable of having sexual intercourse. His report is to be found at Exh. 131. This Doctor also deposed of collecting a sample for DNA profiling in a DNA kit. He deposed to the collection procedure, sealing, etc. and there was no serious challenge to this part of the evidence of Dr. Anil (PW13). This witness also deposed that sample and identification form was submitted to Deputy Director, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Nagpur for DNA profiling. The prosecution also examined Bhagwan (PW15), a police constable, who was involved in the process of collecting the samples and handing over them to the Forensic Laboratory. He also deposed about how the samples were collected in his presence and thereafter, sealed in his presence. 29. The prosecution also examined Dr. Kalpa (PW17), who was working as a medical officer in Government Hospital, Buldana on 23.04.2015. She deposed about collecting blood samples of the victim and her baby daughter, as requested by the police. She deposed about sealing and depositing these samples along with the identification form and present them to the Deputy Director, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, Nagpur. Independently, the victim in her evidence also admitted that blood samples were taken from her and her daughter by this Doctor. 30. PSI Sadar- Investigating Officer also deposed to the collection procedure and purity of the process. Based upon all this evidence, we are satisfied that the sample for DNA profiling of the appellant, victim, and child was properly collected, sealed, and sent to the Forensic Laboratory for testing. There is no evidence on record to suggest or even create any doubt about any tampering or error in this process. 31. Shri M. P. Bhale, Assistant Chemical Analyzer, Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, State of Maharashtra, Nagpur submitted the two reports that were admitted in evidence as Exh.189 and 190. Shri Sonawane did contend that in the absence of examination of Shri Bhale as a witness, the two reports should not have been admitted in the evidence. However, from the record, we find that no such objection was raised at the time of admission of such two reports. Shri Sonawane did contend that in the absence of examination of Shri Bhale as a witness, the two reports should not have been admitted in the evidence. However, from the record, we find that no such objection was raised at the time of admission of such two reports. Besides, we are satisfied that such reports could not have been excluded from evidence on account of non-examination of Shri Bhale having regard to the provision of Section 293 of the CrPC. 32. Section 293 of the Criminal Procedure Code reads as follows:- "293. Reports of certain Government scientific experts. (1) Any document purporting to be a report under the hand of a Government scientific expert to whom this section applies, upon any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under this Code. (2) The Court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any such expert as to the subject- matter of his report. (3) Where any such expert is summoned by a Court and he is unable to attend personally, he may, unless the Court has expressly directed him to appear personally, depute any responsible officer working with him to attend the Court, if such officer is conversant with the facts of the case and can satisfactorily depose in Court on his behalf (4) This section applies to the following Government scientific experts, namely:- (a) any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government; (b) the Chief Inspector of- Explosives; (c) the Director of the Finger Print Bureau; (d) the Director, Haffkeine Institute, Bombay; (e) the Director 1 , Deputy Director or Assistant Director] of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a State Forensic Science Laboratory; (f) the Serologist to the Government. " 33. The DNA profiling reports at Exh. 189 and 190 are the reports under the hand of Government Scientific Expert, as referred to sub-Section 4 of Section 293 of the CrPC and they refer to a matter duly submitted to him for examination and analyses and are in the course of proceedings under this Code. Therefore, there was no error on the part of the Special Court in admitting the DNA profiling reports at Exh. 189 and 190 in evidence. Therefore, there was no error on the part of the Special Court in admitting the DNA profiling reports at Exh. 189 and 190 in evidence. The non-examination of Shri Bhale as a witness, therefore, does not detract from the evidentiary value of the two reports. Besides, as was pointed out earlier, there was no objection whatsoever raised by or on behalf of the appellant to the admission of these two reports in the evidence in the course of the Trial. 34. The two examination reports at Exh. 189 and 190, clearly indicate that the sealed container having blood in vials bearing the names of the victim and his daughter, and the appellant were received with their seal intact by the laboratory. The DNA extracted from the blood samples of the victim, her baby, the appellant, and his brother was typed 15 STC LOCI and gender-specific Amelogenin locus using PCR Amplification technique. Finally, the reports of the DNA testing concluded that the appellant and the victim girl were biological parents of the baby daughter. The appellant 's brother was held not to be the father of this baby daughter. 35. Shri Khan, learned A.P.P produced on record medical/scientific literature to submit that reports of DNA testing are conclusive to the extent of 99%. He submitted that there were no reasons or circumstances to exclude this scientific evidence from consideration. Based on scientific and medical evidence, he submitted that there can be no doubt that the appellant was indeed the father of the child (daughter) born to the victim. 36. On the evaluation of evidence on record, we agree with Shri Khan as well as learned Special Judge that medical/scientific evidence by way of DNA testing deserves to be accepted in the facts of the present case. As noted earlier, there were no flaws in the process of collection of samples and their dispatch to the laboratory. There are not even any allegations or suggestions about tampering or purity of this process. There are no circumstances to doubt the validity of the testing process. 37. In Shamim Anwar Khan Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2015) SCC Online Bom 6045: (2015) 3 AIR Bom R (Cri) 51], it is held that DNA test being an exact science can be considered as conclusive. 38. In Mukesh and another Vs. There are no circumstances to doubt the validity of the testing process. 37. In Shamim Anwar Khan Vs. State of Maharashtra [(2015) SCC Online Bom 6045: (2015) 3 AIR Bom R (Cri) 51], it is held that DNA test being an exact science can be considered as conclusive. 38. In Mukesh and another Vs. State of NCT of Delhi and others [ (2017) 6 SCC 1 ] , the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that DNA report deserves to be accepted unless it is established that the sampling was improper. There is no evidence of tampering of samples or any flaws in the sampling process, hence, the test report deserves to be accepted. The Hon 'ble Supreme Court too observed that DNA analysis is 100% accurate and is now a predominant forensic technique for identifying criminals. DNA is the genetic blueprint for life and is virtually contained in every cell. No two persons, except identical twins, have ever had identical DNA. DNA technology as a part of Forensic Science and scientific discipline not only guides investigation but also supplies the Court accurate information about the tending features of identification of criminals. The recent advancement in modern biological research has revolutionized Forensic Science resulting in radical help in the administration of justice. In our country also like several other developed and developing countries, DNA evidence is being increasingly relied upon by courts. 39. In this case, though, some slight ambiguity is created on the issue of paternity by the deposition of the victim that she had a sexual relationship with her husband- Santosh even before their marriage, such slight ambiguity, is by no means sufficient to overthrow the DNA profiling evidence, which is stated to be conclusive in such matters. Ultimately, we cannot forget that the victim, in this case, was a minor and the perpetrator was her father. She had no support from her mother. She had initially alleged that both the father and uncle has continuously raped her. There was evidence of at least two abortions and there is medical evidence, which supports this version of the prosecution. In such unfortunate circumstances, not much can be read into the circumstance that the victim turned hostile in the course of her deposition and sought to deny almost everything. Though the witness may at times lie, the scientific evidence will not. In such unfortunate circumstances, not much can be read into the circumstance that the victim turned hostile in the course of her deposition and sought to deny almost everything. Though the witness may at times lie, the scientific evidence will not. The scientific evidence in the form of DNA profiling is accurate to the extent of 99% in terms of literature produced by Shri Khan for appreciation of this Court. In Mukesh (supra), the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that accuracy to the extent of 100% and unless any serious dent is made to the sampling process, the DNA test report is to be accepted. Therefore, based upon the statement of the victim about she allegedly having a sexual relationship with her husband before their marriage, the evidentiary value of the DNA report cannot be displaced or such report cannot be simply discarded. 40. In such matters, the Court must have regard to the physical and psychological condition of the rape victim and deep emotional crises into which she must have been pushed particularly when the perpetrator of such crime is alleged to have been her father and she had no one to rely upon and support from no other quarters was forthcoming. 41. Shri Sonawane, did attempt to urge that the appellant must be given the benefit of doubt because of the victim 's statement that she had a sexual relationship with her husband before her marriage. Based on this statement of the victim, who turned hostile in the course of evidence, Shri Sonawane urged that the husband Santosh being the father of the child born to the victim cannot be ruled out. 42. We have considered the aforesaid submission of Shri Sonanwane but, we find ourselves unable to accept the same. In this case, the DNA report is quite conclusive and militates completely against the suggestion that Santosh could be the father of the child born to the victim, who was less than 18 years of age. There is other corroborative evidence on record, which also points out the guilt of the appellant. Therefore, in this case, there is no warrant to invoke the doctrine of benefit of the doubt. 43. In State of Karnataka Vs. There is other corroborative evidence on record, which also points out the guilt of the appellant. Therefore, in this case, there is no warrant to invoke the doctrine of benefit of the doubt. 43. In State of Karnataka Vs. J. Jayalalitha [ (2017) 6 SCC 263 ] , the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that cherished principle or golden thread of proof beyond reasonable doubt which runs through the web of our law should not be stretched morbidly to embrace every hunch, hesitancy, and degree of doubt. The excessive solicitude reflected in the attitude that a thousand guilty man may go but one innocent martyr shall not suffer is a false dilemma. Only reasonable doubt belongs to the accused. Otherwise, any practicable system of justice will then break down and will lose credibility with the community. The evil of acquitting a guilty person light-heartedly goes much beyond the simple fact that just one guilty person has gone unpunished. If unmerited acquittals become general, they tend to lead to a cynical disregard to the law, and this, in turn, leads to public demand for a harsher legal presumption against indicted "persons " and more severe punishment of those who are found guilty. 44. In Collector of Customs, Madras Vs. D. Bhoormul [ (1974) 2 SCC 544 ] , the Hon 'ble Supreme Court has held that in all human affairs, absolute certainty is a myth, and-as Prof. Brett felicitously puts it all exactness is a fake. El Dorado of absolute proof being unattainable, the law accepts for it, probability as a working substitute in this work-a-day world. The law does not require the prosecution to prove the impossible. All that it requires is the establishment of such a degree of probability that a prudent man may, on its basis, believe in the existence of the fact in issue. Thus, legal proof is not necessarily perfect proof.; often it is nothing more than a prudent man's estimate as to the probabilities of the case. 45. In Ashok Deb Vs. State of Ashok Debbarma @ Achak Debbarma vs State Of Tripura [ (2014) 4 SCC 747 ] , the Hon 'ble Supreme Court held that in our criminal justice system, for recording guilt of the accused, the prosecution does not need to prove the case with absolute or mathematical certainty, but only beyond a reasonable doubt. In Ashok Deb Vs. State of Ashok Debbarma @ Achak Debbarma vs State Of Tripura [ (2014) 4 SCC 747 ] , the Hon 'ble Supreme Court held that in our criminal justice system, for recording guilt of the accused, the prosecution does not need to prove the case with absolute or mathematical certainty, but only beyond a reasonable doubt. Criminal Courts, while examining whether any doubt is beyond a reasonable doubt, may carry in their mind, some "residual doubt ", even though the Courts are convinced of the accused person's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 46. Having regard to the aforesaid legal principles, we feel that the contention of Shri Sonawane based on the doctrine of benefit of the doubt will have to be rejected in the light of evidence on record including, the evidence that the victim was less than 18 years of age when she was continuously raped by her father and the DNA evidence that establishes without doubt that the appellant was indeed the father of the child (daughter) born to the victim. Circumstance, that the appellant was the father of the victim, makes the matter worst because the appellant, who was duty-bound to protect his daughter has himself perpetrated such offense on her, virtually wreaking her life. 47. In the case of Bhanu Valve Vs. State [(2010) SCC Online Bom. 1044] the Division Bench of this Court speaking through Justice Oka (as His Lordship then was) held that for the very serious offense of rape committed by the father against his own minor daughter, who had no protection of her mother, it was impossible for the Court to show any leniency. This decision of the Division Bench was confirmed by the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in Bhanu Valve Vs. State [ (2011) 14 SCC 596 ] . Incidentally, even in this matter, the Division Bench relied upon the DNA report to conclude that father of the victim was indeed the biological father of the child born to her. 48. In State of Rajasthan vs Om Prakash [ (2002) 5 SCC 745 ] , the Hon 'ble High Court has observed that Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. 48. In State of Rajasthan vs Om Prakash [ (2002) 5 SCC 745 ] , the Hon 'ble High Court has observed that Child rape cases are cases of perverse lust for sex where even innocent children are not spared in pursuit of sexual pleasure. There cannot be anything more obscene than this. It is a crime against humanity. Many such cases are not even brought to light because of the social stigma attached thereto. According to some surveys, there has been a steep rise in child rape cases. Children need special care and protection. In such cases, responsibility on the shoulders of the courts is more onerous to provide proper legal protection to these children. Their physical and mental immobility call for such protection. Children are the natural resource of our country. They are the country's future. The hope of tomorrow rests on them. In our country, a girl child is in a very vulnerable position and one of the modes of her exploitation is rape besides other modes of sexual abuse. These factors point towards a different approach required to be adopted. 49. In the context of rape by a father on his daughter, the Hon 'ble Supreme Court in State of H. P. Vs. Asha Ram [ (2005) 13 SCC 766 ] has held that there can never be more graver and heinous crime than the father being charged of raping his own daughter. He not only delicts the law but it is a betrayal of trust. The father is the fortress and refuge of his daughter in whom the daughter trusts. Charged of raping his own daughter under his refuge and fortress is worst than the gamekeeper becoming a poacher and treasury guard becoming a robber. 50. The Hon 'ble Supreme Court, in the above case further held that a a crime may be grave but the nature of the crime may not be so grave. Similarly, a crime may not be so grave but the nature of the crime may be very grave. Ordinarily, the offence of rape is grave by its nature. More so, when the perpetrator of the crime is the father against his own daughter it is more graver and the rarest of rare, which warrants a strong deterrent judicial hand. Similarly, a crime may not be so grave but the nature of the crime may be very grave. Ordinarily, the offence of rape is grave by its nature. More so, when the perpetrator of the crime is the father against his own daughter it is more graver and the rarest of rare, which warrants a strong deterrent judicial hand. Even in ordinary criminal terminology a rape is a crime more heinous than murder as it destroys the very soul of hapless woman. This is more so when the perpetrator of the grave crime is the father of the victim girl. Father is a fortress, refuge and the trustee of his daughter. 51. Thus, upon cumulative consideration of all the above facts and circumstances duly proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and further having regard to the legal position in such matters, we have no hesitation in confirming the conviction of the appellant in this case and dismissing this appeal. Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal. There shall be no order as to costs. 52. Shri D. A. Sonawane, learned counsel appointed under the Legal Aid Scheme to appear on behalf of the appellant has assisted the cause of the appellant very ably and fairly. Though we may not have agreed with his contentions, that does not detract from his Advocacy. We thank him for the able assistance rendered by him in this matter. His fees shall abide by the Rules framed in this regard.