ORDER : This writ petition has been filed challenging the impugned order passed by the second respondent under Section 87 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') through proceedings dated 11.07.2017. 2. One Sheela Devi and Jeyachitra, against whom, criminal cases were pending for the illegalities committed by them in a ration shop, were reinstated into service by the proceedings of the President of Pullampadi Primary Agricultural Cooperative Society. Hence, enquiry/investigation was ordered by the Registrar and a report was submitted by the Enquiry Officer. Pursuant to the report submitted by the Enquiry Officer, surcharge proceedings were initiated under Section 87 of the Act against the President and two others for recovery of a sum of Rs.59,420/-, which was determined as the loss suffered by the Society. The petitioner, who was the Secretary incharge also was made to face the proceedings. 3. The second respondent, by order dated 11.07.2017, directed a sum of Rs.59,420/- to be recovered along with interest at 13.75% from the petitioner and two others and they were jointly and severally made liable. Aggrieved by the same, the present writ petition has been filed before this Court. 4. The learned counsel for the petitioner primarily raised two grounds. The first ground that was raised by the petitioner is that the order passed in the surcharge proceedings is violative of principles of natural justice, since the petitioner was not furnished with the report that was given by the Enquiry Officer under Section 82 of the Act. The next ground that was pressed into service by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there was no deliberate or wilful negligence on the part of the petitioner and the same is evident from the findings of the second respondent and therefore, the proceedings of the second respondent is liable to be interfered with by this Court. 5. The learned counsel in order to substantiate his submission, relied upon the judgment of this Court in K.Ajay Kumar Gosh and others v. Tribunal for Cooperative Cases reported in (2009) 4 MLJ 992 and S.Selvaraj and others v. the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and another reported in (2018) 3 LW 22 . 6. 5. The learned counsel in order to substantiate his submission, relied upon the judgment of this Court in K.Ajay Kumar Gosh and others v. Tribunal for Cooperative Cases reported in (2009) 4 MLJ 992 and S.Selvaraj and others v. the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies and another reported in (2018) 3 LW 22 . 6. Per contra, the learned Government appearing on behalf of the respondents questioned the very maintainability of this writ petition on the ground that there is an effective and alternative remedy available to the petitioner under section 152 of the Act and therefore, the petitioner has to necessarily work out his remedy in the appeal before the concerned authority. The learned Government Advocate further submitted that there is a categorical finding given by the second respondent to the effect that there was a wilful negligence on the part of the petitioner in not having properly advised the President due to which two persons, against whom criminal cases were pending, were taken back into service. The learned Government Advocate further submitted that the petitioner was given sufficient opportunity by the second respondent and for the first time, the petitioner has come up with a plea that he was not furnished with the report given by the Enquiry Officer under Section 82 of the Act. Therefore, the learned Government Advocate urged this Court to dismiss this writ petition. 7. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. 8. A careful reading of the impugned order passed by the second respondent shows that the main allegation has been made only against the President of the Society, who is said to have completely disregarded the circulars and instructions given by the Registrar and had reinstated the employees against whom there are pending criminal cases. Insofar as the petitioner is concerned, it must be noted that the petitioner was only an incharge Secretary of the concerned Society and he was not a full time Secretary in the Society. Keeping this in mind, it will be very relevant to extract the finding of the second respondent in the impugned order insofar as the petitioner is concerned. 9. Keeping this in mind, it will be very relevant to extract the finding of the second respondent in the impugned order insofar as the petitioner is concerned. 9. The only issue that arises for consideration is as to whether the above finding rendered by this second respondent satisfies the requirement of Section 87 of the Act and as to whether the liability can be mulcted even as against the petitioner. 10. In order to impose the liability under Section 87 of the Act, there must be an actionable wrong either by commission or omission in a deliberate and reprehensible manner with reckless callousness and with supine indifference without taking due care and caution expected of a reasonable and prudent man. In the absence of the same, the employees cannot be mulcted with the loss caused to the Society. This ratio can be deduced from the judgments cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner, which has been referred supra. 11. In the present case, the petitioner was an in-charge Secretary. The only ground that has been put against the petitioner is that the President was mismanaging the Society and therefore, the petitioner as the Secretary should have properly advised the President and ensured that the President managed the Society in a proper manner. Even if the finding rendered by the second respondent is taken as it is, it does not satisfy the requirements of Section 87 of the Act and at the best, it can only be held to be negligence on the part of the petitioner. By no stretch, it can be held to be deliberate and reprehensible. This finding gets further corroborated by the fact that the petitioner was not a full time Secretary and he was only acting as in-charge Secretary. 12. In view of the above finding, it is not necessary for this Court to take up the other issues raised in the present writ petition. The impugned order passed by the second respondent is liable to be interfered on this ground alone. 13. In view of the above discussion, this Court has absolutely no hesitation to interfere with the impugned order passed by the second respondent in proceedings in Na.Ka.2235/2016/VeSeSa dated 11.07.2017 and the same is hereby quashed insofar as the petitioner is concerned. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner retired from service with effect from 31.03.2019. In view of the above discussion, this Court has absolutely no hesitation to interfere with the impugned order passed by the second respondent in proceedings in Na.Ka.2235/2016/VeSeSa dated 11.07.2017 and the same is hereby quashed insofar as the petitioner is concerned. It is brought to the notice of this Court that the petitioner retired from service with effect from 31.03.2019. If any of the benefits have been withheld due to the proceedings of the second respondent, the same shall be released to the petitioner within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 14. In the result, this writ petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.