JUDGMENT 1. By way of the present writ petition, petitioners have raised a grievance that the respondents have not reserved any post for divorcée category, whereas, at least 2% seats ought to have been earmarked for divorcée as per the notification dated 21.05.2018. 2. The precise facts needed for the present purposes are, that the respondent No.2- Rajasthan Subordinate and Ministerial Service Selection Board, issued an advertisement dated 21.05.2018 for filling up 485 posts of Librarian Grade III, out of which 2 posts were earmarked for Widows. 3. Point No.4 of special notes of the advertisement aforesaid is as under: 4- efgykvksa gsrq vkjf{kr n'kkZ, x, inksa esa fu;ekuqlkj 8 izfr'kr in fo/kok ,oa 2 izfr'kr ifjR;Drk ¼fookg fofNUu efgyk½ efgykvksa ds fy, vkjf{kr gSA ;fn i;kZIr fo/kok vH;FkhZ miyC/k ugha gksrh gS rks fo/kok ds fy;s vkjf{kr in dks mlh Js.kh dh ifjR;Drk ¼fookg&fofNUu efgyk½ ls Hkjk tk;sxkA blh izdkj ;fn i;kZIr ifjR;Drk vH;FkhZ miyC/k ugha gksrh gS rks buds fy;s vkjf{kr in dks mlh Js.kh dh fo/kok efgyk ls Hkjk tk;sxkA ;fn fo/kok ,oa ifjR;Drk nksuksa gh i;kZIr la[;k esa miyC/k ugha gksrh gS rks buds fy;s vkjf{kr in dks mlh Js.kh dh lkekU; efgyk ls Hkjk tk;sxkA fo/kok vkosnd gksus dh fLFkfr esa l{ke izkf/kdkjh }kjk tkjh ifr dh e`R;q dk izek.k&i= ,oa ifjR;Drk efgyk ¼fookg fofNUu efgyk½ dks fookg foPNsn dk izek.k izLrqr djuk gksxkA 4. Inviting Court's attention towards aforesaid Point No.4 of special notes of the advertisement, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the respondents were required to earmark atleast 2% posts for divorcée as against which, they have reserved only 2 posts in the category of divorcée and thus, allocation of seats deserves to be quashed. 5. Mr. Vinit Sanadhya, appearing for the respondent- Selection Board, at the outset raised a preliminary objection that the petition suffers from delay and laches. In order to substantiate this argument, she highlighted that after issuance of the advertisement, the corrigendum/supplementary advertisement was issued on 01.11.2019; the petitioners appeared in the written examination on 19.09.2020; the result of written examination was declared on 11.11.2020 and even the final result had been declared on 25.03.2021, whereas the petitioner has preferred the writ petition as late as on 26.08.2021. 6. 6. Having informed the Court about the requisite dates, he argued that even after the declaration of final result in March, 2021, the petitioner did not take up her remedies and the present writ petition has been filed, when the final select list has already been issued. 7. Mr. Sanadhya relied upon the judgment passed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Ashok Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in AIR 2016 SC 5069 , particularly para No.11, 12 and 15 as under: "11. The appellants participated in the fresh process of selection. If the appellants were aggrieved by the decision to hold a fresh process, they did not espouse their remedy. Instead, they participated in the fresh process of selection and it was only upon being unsuccessful that they challenged the result in the writ petition. This was clearly not open to the appellants. The principle of estoppel would operate. 12. The law on the subject has been crystalized in several decisions of this Court. In Chandra Prakash Tiwari v. Shakuntala Shukla, this Court laid down the principle that when a candidate appears at an examination without objection and is subsequently found to be not successful, a challenge to the process is precluded. The question of entertaining a petition challenging an examination would not arise where a candidate has appeared and participated. He or she cannot subsequently turn around and contend that the process was unfair or that there was a lacuna therein, merely because the result is not palatable. In Union of India v. S. Vinodh Kumar, this Court held that: "18. It is also well settled that those candidates who had taken part in the selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein were not entitled to question the same... (See also Munindra Kumar v. Rajiv Govil and Rashmi Mishra v. M.P. Public Service Commission)." The same view was reiterated in Amlan Jyoti Borroah (supra) where it was held to be well settled that candidates who have taken part in a selection process knowing fully well the procedure laid down therein are not entitled to question it upon being declared to be unsuccessful. In Manish Kumar Shah v. State of Bihar, the same principle was reiterated in the following observations : "16. In Manish Kumar Shah v. State of Bihar, the same principle was reiterated in the following observations : "16. We also agree with the High Court that after having taken part in the process of selection knowing fully well that more than 19% marks have been earmarked for viva voce test, the Petitioner is not entitled to challenge the criteria or process of selection. Surely, if the Petitioner's name had appeared in the merit list, he would not have even dreamed of challenging the selection. The Petitioner invoked jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India only after he found that his name does not figure in the merit list prepared by the Commission. This conduct of the Petitioner clearly disentitles him from questioning the selection and the High Court did not commit any error by refusing to entertain the writ petition. Reference in this connection may be made to the Judgments in Madan Lal v. State of J. and K. MANU/ SC/0208/1995: (1995) 3 SCC 486 , Marripati Nagaraja v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. MANU/SC/8040/2007 : (2007) 11 SCC 522 , Dhananjay Malik and Ors. v. State of Uttaranchal and Ors. MANU/SC/7287/2008 : (2008) 4 SCC 171 , Amlan Jyoti Borooah v. State of Assam MANU/SC/0077/2009 : (2009) 3 SCC 227 and K.A. Nagamani v. Indian Airlines and Ors. (supra)." In Vijendra Kumar Verma v. Public Service Commission, candidates who had participated in the selection process were aware that they were required to possess certain specific qualifications in computer operations. The appellants had appeared in the selection process and after participating in the interview sought to challenge the selection process as being without jurisdiction. This was held to be impermissible. In Ramesh Chandra Shah v. Anil Joshi, candidates who were competing for the post of Physiotherapist in the State of Uttrakhand participated in a written examination held in pursuance of an advertisement. This Court held that if they had cleared the test, the respondents would not have raised any objection to the selection process or to the methodology adopted. Having taken a chance of selection, it was held that the respondents were disentitled to seek relief under Article 226 and would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that: "18. Having taken a chance of selection, it was held that the respondents were disentitled to seek relief under Article 226 and would be deemed to have waived their right to challenge the advertisement or the procedure of selection. This Court held that: "18. It is settled law that a person who consciously takes part in the process of selection cannot, thereafter, turn around and question the method of selection and its outcome." In Chandigarh Administration v. Jasmine Kaur, it was held that a candidate who takes a calculated risk or chance by subjecting himself or herself to the selection process cannot turn around and complain that the process of selection was unfair after knowing of his or her non-selection. In Pradeep Kumar Rai v. Dinesh Kumar Pandey, this Court held that : "Moreover, we would concur with the Division Bench on one more point that the appellants had participated in the process of interview and not challenged it till the results were declared. There was a gap of almost four months between the interview and declaration of result. However, the appellants did not challenge it at that time. This, it appears that only when the appellants found themselves to be unsuccessful, they challenged the interview. This cannot be allowed. The candidates cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time. Either the candidates should not have participated in the interview and challenged the procedure or they should have challenged immediately after the interviews were conducted." This principle has been reiterated in a recent judgment in Madras Institute of Development v. S.K. Shiva Subaramanyam. 15. In this view of the matter, the Division Bench cannot held to be in error in coming to the conclusion that it was not open to the appellants after participating in the selection process to question the result, once they were declared to be unsuccessful. During the course of the hearing, this Court is informed that four out of six candidates, who were ultimately selected figured both in the first process of selection as well as in the subsequent selection. One candidate is stated to have retired." 8. In rejoinder, Mr. Kailash Jangid, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners had made a number of representations before the respondents and they were hopeful of redressal of their grievance. One candidate is stated to have retired." 8. In rejoinder, Mr. Kailash Jangid, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the petitioners had made a number of representations before the respondents and they were hopeful of redressal of their grievance. He pointed out that the cut off of divorcée category had been declared for the persons called for document verification and petitioner was called therein and when the final selection list was issued and she found that only two candidates of widow category have been selected, they immediately preferred the writ petition for redressal of their grievance. 9. Mr. Jangid, learned counsel explaining the purported delay submitted that despite being a divorcée, the petitioner was called for document verification and thus, she was under bona fide impression that the respondents would accord appointment to her. She did not have an occasion to challenge the action of the respondents in not providing reservation to the divorcée candidates, until the final select list was issued and if considered from that date (25.03.2021) the writ petition cannot be said to be belated. 10. In response to above stand, Mr. Sanadhya, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that in the original advertisement, so also in the revised advertisement, 2 seats for Widow category candidates alone was notified and since in absence of eligible candidates in Widow category, the respondent-Board was required to give appointment to divorcée candidate, three times the number of post advertised (6 candidates) on merit from the group of widow and divorcée were called for document verification. The petitioner who was in those 6 candidates, was called for document verification. But, when 2 candidates of widow category were available to the respondent, petitioner could not be accorded appointment. This is why even petitioner's earlier writ petition being SBCWP No.7426/2021 was dismissed by this Court. 11. Mr. Sanadhya, further argued that the petitioner's basic grievance is for not providing reservation to divorcée category candidates and the cause of action accrued to her immediately on issuance of the first advertisement on 21.05.2018. 12. Heard and perused the record. 13. The writ petition does not appear to be suffering from inordinate delay, if the time is counted from the declaration of result and filling up of the posts in widow quota. 12. Heard and perused the record. 13. The writ petition does not appear to be suffering from inordinate delay, if the time is counted from the declaration of result and filling up of the posts in widow quota. But, the question/issue in the present case is slightly different; the cause for which the petitioners have approached is having no nexus or relation with the declaration of the result. Hence, the delay has to be reckoned from the date, when cause accrued to the petitioners. 14. Petitioners' basic grievance is about the reservation of seats for divorcée or the number of seats allocated for the divorcée category; hence, the cause of action had accrued to the petitioners at the first instance, when the advertisement came to be issued on 21.05.2018. It is noteworthy that the advertisement which was issued in May, 2018 itself reflected no seat for divorcée and thus, if the petitioners had any grievance or concern in relation to lesser number of seats earmarked for such category, they ought to have taken up their remedies, at the first available opportunity. 15. The petitioners participated in the selection process and staked their claims for no seat earmarked for divorcée category. They have sprung into action only after remaining unsuccessful. 16. In the opinion of this Court, the petition in hand, suffers from acquiescence, more than the laches. No indulgence as prayed for by the petitioners can be granted and if the same is done at this juncture, it would adversely affect the rights of the already selected candidates and the entire exercise of allocation of seats in each category and preparation of result will have to be redone. 17. For the reasons indicated hereinabove, this Court refuses to entertain the writ petition on merit and pronounce upon the issue raised. 18. Writ petition, thus, fails. 19. Stay application also stands disposed of accordingly.