JUDGMENT Kalyan Rai Surana, J. - Heard Mr. P.K. Roy, learned counsel for the appellant, who has made his submissions for admission of the appeal under Order XLI, Rule 11 CPC. 2. By this appeal under section 100 CPC, the appellant has assailed the first appellate judgment and decree dated 10.09.2018, passed by the learned District Judge, Karimganj in Title Appeal No. 5/2012, by which the appeal was allowed by decreeing the suit and thereby reversing the judgment and decree dated 23.08.2004, passed by the Court of learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Karimganj (as it was then), in T.S. No. 103/1983. The appellant herein was arrayed as the defendant in the suit. 3. The predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had filed a suit for confirmation of possession upon partition of the 'saham' land on the basis of title acquired through land holding right. In the plaint, it was projected that vide registered sale deed dated 08.04.1981, the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents and the appellant had purchased the suit land from S.K. Hasoi @ Hasoi Ali, who was holding jote right and accordingly, he because owner of 50% (eight anna) of that land. It was further projected that the appellant did not partition the suit land and did not give the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents his share, as such, the suit was instituted. 4. The appellant- defendant had contested the suit by filing written statement, wherein apart from taking usual defence, it was denied that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had received possession of the suit land or that he had been enjoying the suit land jointly with the appellant or that he was entitled to 50% share in the land. The appellant claimed that he had purchased the suit land and paid the sale consideration of Rs.3,000/- through one Kamini Kumar Debnath, who had appeared before the SubRegistrar's office and had the sale deed executed and registered in favour of the appellant. It was projected that the appellant was a government employee and could not appear before the Sub- Registrar's Office for execution and registration of the sale deed and did not obtain copy from the said office. It was projected that the appellant was a government employee and could not appear before the Sub- Registrar's Office for execution and registration of the sale deed and did not obtain copy from the said office. On receipt of the summons of the suit, he had made enquiry and came to know that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents in collusion with Dhirendra Kumar Das, a deed writer and without letting him know anything, had the sale deed registered in his name in collusion with the vendor. It is claimed that the possession of the suit land was handed over to the appellant through Kamini Kumar Debnath. It was pleaded that as the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents did not have possession, prayer for injunction had been refused by the learned trial Court. It was claimed that the appellant had come to know about the insertion of the name of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents on 25.03.1983, as such, his name was required to be struck- off from the sale deed and to amend the deed. Accordingly, the appellant had preferred a counter-claim for declaration of sole jote right and possessor of the suit land, for striking out the name of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents from registered deed no. 3900 dated 09.04.1981, with further prayed that if the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents failed to amend the sale deed within the period stipulated by the Court, the appellant be allowed to do so through Court and the appellant had also prayed for cost. 5. It would be relevant to mention herein that from the appellate judgment it appears that the suit was decreed in favour of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents on 04.2.1999 and the aggrieved appellant had preferred T.A. 6/1999, and learned Civil Judge, Karimganj had remanded the matter back to the learned trial Court by framing additional issues, viz., issue nos. 7 and 8. Thereafter, the suit was decided afresh. 6. After remand, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues for trial, viz., (i) Is there any cause of action for the suit? (2) Is the suit bad for defect of parties? (3) Is the suit barred by limitation? (4) Has the plaintiff right, title, interest over the suit land? Thereafter, the suit was decided afresh. 6. After remand, the learned trial Court had framed the following issues for trial, viz., (i) Is there any cause of action for the suit? (2) Is the suit bad for defect of parties? (3) Is the suit barred by limitation? (4) Has the plaintiff right, title, interest over the suit land? (5) Whether the defendant alone purchased the suit land and whether the kabala was collusively made in favour of the plaintiff? (6) To what relief is the plaintiff entitled? (7) Whether defendant's counter-claim is properly valued and stamped? (8) Whether the defendant is entitled to get a decree on counter-claim? 7. On a perusal of the copy of judgment passed by the learned trial Court, as enclosed to the memo of appeal, it appears that the same does not contain the appendix giving details of witnesses examined and documents exhibited. However, from the discussions made by the learned trial Court, it is gathered that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had examined himself as PW-1 and one Ramendra Mohan Goswami, employee of Karimganj Sub- Registry. The predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had exhibited the following documents, viz., (1) letter written by Kshitish Ch. Deb Nath, (ii) certified copy of sale deed no. 3900/1981 (compared with original volume no. 2481 of Karimganj SubRegistry) and that the appellant had examined himself as DW-1 and did not exhibit any document. 8. The learned trial Court took up issue no.5 first. Based on the admission of PW-1, it was held to be proved that at the time of registration of Ext.1, the PW-1 was not present. It was held that there was no talk between the PW-1 and the vendor to purchase the suit land and it was presumed that the vendor did not know the alleged sale in favour of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents. It was held that Ext.1 was not proved in accordance with law as the said document was not written in the presence of PW-1. It was held that Ext.1 was not proved in accordance with law as the said document was not written in the presence of PW-1. It was also held that the PW-1 had no personal acquaintance with Kamini Kumar Deb Nath, the attesting witness of Ext.2 and accordingly, the learned trial Court held that there was no possibility that the PW-1 had paid 50% of the sale consideration to the vendor and that it was held that it was admitted in the plaint that the appellant had paid 50% of the sale consideration and, as such, it was held that the entire sale consideration was paid by the appellant. Accordingly, the issue no. 4 was decided in the affirmative. In view of discussions on issue no.5, the issue no. 4 was decided in the negative by holding that the predecessorin- interest of the respondents was not the purchaser of the suit land and he cannot claim right, title, interest over the suit land. In respect of issue no.2, it was held that there was no evidence that essential parties had not been impleaded and issue was answered in the negative. In respect of issue no.1, it was held that there was no cause of action. In respect of issue no.3, it was held that as there was no cause of action, it became redundant to calculate the limitation. In respect of issue no.6, it was held that in view of decision on issue nos. 1, 4 and 5, the suit was liable to be dismissed. The counter-claim was valued at Rs.50/- and Court fees of Rs.5.50 was paid and for declaratory relief, Court fees of Rs.22/- was paid, and on said facts, in respect of issue no.7, it was held that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents did not have possession over the suit land and the counter-claim was not for recovery of possession of suit land, as such, it was held that the contention of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents was not sustainable and the issue was answered in the affirmative. It was held in respect of issue no. 8 that the counter-claim filed on 21.01.1984 was within three years from 09.04.1981 and, as such, it was held that the counter-claim was not barred. It was held in respect of issue no. 8 that the counter-claim filed on 21.01.1984 was within three years from 09.04.1981 and, as such, it was held that the counter-claim was not barred. In respect of issue no.8, it was held that in the absence of the vendor, rectification of sale deed cannot be allowed, however, in light of the decision on issue no.5, it was held that the appellant was the sole purchaser of the suit land. Accordingly, the suit was decreed by holding that the appellant being the sole purchaser, had the right, title, interest and possession over the suit land and the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents did not have any right, title and interest therein. 9. The learned first appellate Court had observed that during argument, the learned counsel for both sides had not placed any argument in respect of issue nos. 2 and 7 and, as such, those issues were taken as abandoned and accordingly, formulated the following four points of determination, viz., (a) Whether the sale deed in question and evidence on record show that the predecessor in interest of the present appellants and the respondent/defendant had become joint owners, thereby, of the property purchased? (b) Whether after demise of the appellant on 12.11.2014, the present respondent/defendant can be said to have become the owners of the suit property in view of the plea of the appellants/the erstwhile plaintiff that the said plaintiff had purchased the suit land along with the respondent/husband jointly? (c) Whether the learned trial Court was correct in its decision qua the issue numbers (iv), (v), (vi) and (viii)? (d) Whether the suit instituted by the predecessor in interest of the appellants was liable to be decreed in his favour? 10. The learned first appellate Court had held that accepted Ext.2 as evidence of sale of suit land as it was proved by calling the original registration volume book from the Karimganj Sub- Registry. Referring to the contents of Ext.2, it was stated that it contained narration that both the vendees had paid consideration of Rs.3,000/- and the land was transferred to the vendees would become its owner with their progeny being entitled to inherit the said property after their death. Referring to the contents of Ext.2, it was stated that it contained narration that both the vendees had paid consideration of Rs.3,000/- and the land was transferred to the vendees would become its owner with their progeny being entitled to inherit the said property after their death. It was held that in the year 1981, when the sale deed was registered, the vendees were not required to be present before the office of the Sub- Registrar at the time of registration. 11. Referring to the observations made by the learned trial Court that there was no discussion between the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents and the vendor and, as such, it was concluded that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had not paid sale consideration and in this regard, it was observed by the learned first appellate Court that the learned trial Court had overlooked the fact that an agreement for sale- purchase of land is not an indispensable precursor to execution of sale deed and that it is not the requirement of law that the prospective vendee must personally negotiate with the prospective vendor for sale- purchase of land and accordingly, it was held that the admission made by the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents was not sufficient for the conclusion that part of the sale consideration was not paid by the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents. The finding by the learned trial Court that Ext.1 was not duly proved was approved by the learned first appellate Court. As regards the finding by the learned trial Court that there was no statement in the plaint that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had paid any sale consideration to the vendor and that evidence of paying 50% sale consideration was held to be at variance with pleadings was not found acceptable to the learned first appellate Court on the ground that under section 54 of Transfer of Property Act, to constitute a sale, price constitutes an essential ingredient of transaction of sale and therefore, as it was averred in para-2 of the plaint that the vendor had sold the suit property to him was held to essentially mean that consideration was paid either by the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents personally or on his behalf to the vendor. In respect of the finding by the learned trial Court, accepting that the entire sale consideration of Rs.3,000/- was paid by the appellant, it was held that in returning such finding, the provision of Sections 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act was overlooked as evidence of proof of terms contrary to the written document was not permissible. It was further held that the allegation that at the instance of an agent of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents, the name of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents was incorporated could not be adjudicated in the absence of the vendor. By referring to the case of Vidyadhar Vs. Manikrao, (1999) AIR SC 1441, it was held that even if whole of the sale consideration was not paid, sale of property by registered sale deed in respect of property having value of more than Rs.100/- would still be complete. Therefore, having held that the sale deed remained valid, and that the interest of the predecessor- ininterest of the respondents subsists along with the appellant, the finding on issue no.5 was not upheld and was set aside. 12. The learned first appellate Court then examined whether by virtue of Ext.2, the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents and the appellant had become tenants- incommon or joint tenants and after elaborately dealing with the ingredients of the two positions, it was concluded that by virtue of Ext.2, the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents and the appellant had become joint tenants in respect of the property sold. Thereafter, the learned first appellate Court had examined as to whether after the demise of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents, the property in dispute had passed on to the respondents and in this regard, it was held that there was joint tenancy and after the death of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents and his share had passed on to the respondents. The point of determination no. (a) and (b) were accordingly, answered. 13. In respect of issue no. The point of determination no. (a) and (b) were accordingly, answered. 13. In respect of issue no. 7 as framed by the learned trial Court, the learned first appellate Court had discussed on the cause of action and it was held that correction of the sale deed could not have been made in the absence of the vendor, as such, it was held that there was no cause of action for the counter-claim against the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents, but it was against the vendor, who was not a party in the suit and, as such, it was held that the decision of the learned trial Court on the said issue was not proper and was set aside. Thus, in view of discussions made, the learned first appellate Court had held that the decision of the learned trial Court qua issue nos. 6 (sic. should have been 5) and 6 was not correct and it was held that on the basis of evidence available on record, the predecessorin- interest of the respondents had been able to prove that he had right, title and interest over the suit land and that he was entitled to a preliminary decree of partition and the point of determination no. (c) and (d) was answered accordingly. As a result, the appeal was allowed with contest without cost and it was decreed that the respondents through their predecessor- in- interest had become the owners of half of the suit land and that they are entitled to partition of the same against the appellant. The aggrieved appellants- defendants have preferred this appeal. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant has pressed all the substantial questions of law as formulated in the memo of appeal. The learned counsel for the appellant has meticulously referred to the enclosures to the memo of appeal. It has been urged that in first appeal preferred by the respondents, appropriate Court fees had not been paid for assailing the decree passed in the counter-claim. Hence, it is submitted that the finding returned by the learned trial Court could not have been set aside and reversed. It has been urged that in first appeal preferred by the respondents, appropriate Court fees had not been paid for assailing the decree passed in the counter-claim. Hence, it is submitted that the finding returned by the learned trial Court could not have been set aside and reversed. It is submitted that the reversal of the decree passed by the learned trial Court was not sustainable because there was no proof that sale consideration was paid by the predecessorin- interest of the respondents and, as such, it is submitted that reliance on the provisions of section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act was not sustainable. It is submitted that the learned first appellate Court had held that by virtue of Ext.2, both the parties had become joint owner/ joint tenant by operation of law with right of survivorship upon death of the joint owner/ joint tenant by operation of law, as such, the learned first appellate Court had committed gross error in rejecting the alternative plea of the appellant regarding right of survivorship on the ground that the joint tenancy got transformed into tenancy in common upon filing of the suit of partition by the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents, in absence of transfer of factional interest. It is also submitted that the learned Court failed to appreciate Ext.1 while reversing decision of the learned trial Court on issue no.5. It is submitted that the decision of the learned first appellate Court to the effect that there was no cause of action for counter-claim was not sustainable because it was the case of the appellant that by virtue of the sale deed (Ext.2), he alone had acquired right, title and interest over the suit land. It is also submitted that there was non- compliance of the provisions of Order XLI Rule 31 CPC by the learned first appellate Court. Thus, apart from the said six points, no other point was urged. 15. As regards the projection that appropriate Court fees had not been paid for assailing the decree passed in the counter-claim. This is an issue of fact and could have been taken up by the appellant when the first appeal was being heard. Therefore, when the said plea was abandoned in course of proceeding of the first appeal, the non- payment of Court fees in appeal, even if correct, shall not constitute substantial question of law. This is an issue of fact and could have been taken up by the appellant when the first appeal was being heard. Therefore, when the said plea was abandoned in course of proceeding of the first appeal, the non- payment of Court fees in appeal, even if correct, shall not constitute substantial question of law. Plea of non- payment of sale consideration by the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents: 16. In connection with the said plea, it would be relevant to examine the said plea in light of section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act and Sections 91, 92 and 102 of the Evidence Act. Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that sale is a transfer of ownership in exchange for a price paid or promised or part paid and part performed. In this case, the vendor has not come forward to claim that he was not paid the sale consideration, as such, there is no difficulty to presume that sale consideration was paid to the vendor. In light of the provisions of Section 54 of the Transfer or property Act, it is found that the learned first appellate Court had correctly appreciated that it is not necessary that the predecessor- in- interest was required to be physically present and physically tender sale consideration to the vendor. The preponderance of probability tilts in favour of presumption that the appellant had paid the sale consideration falling in the share of the predecessor- ininterest as his agent. Therefore, the Court is of the considered opinion that even assuming that the appellant had paid the entire sale consideration, it would not evaporate the title over the suit land that had already been vested upon the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents. 17. Let us assume that the version of the appellant is correct to the effect that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents did not make payment of the sale consideration and he had paid the entire sale consideration. 17. Let us assume that the version of the appellant is correct to the effect that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents did not make payment of the sale consideration and he had paid the entire sale consideration. In such a situation the question whether non- payment of any sale consideration by one co-vendee would be sufficient to evaporate his right, title and interest which had already been transferred to him by a valid sale deed must be answered in the negative as it would merely give a right to the co-vendee who had paid the sale consideration on behalf of the other to claim money. 18. The plea of the appellant was that he had purchased the suit land and that the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents had connived with others and had fraudulently got his name entered in the sale deed. In this connection, although under proviso (1) to Section 92 of the Evidence Act, any fact may be proved which would invalidate any document, or which would entitle any person to any decree or order relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due execution, want of capacity in any contracting party, want or failure of consideration, or mistake of fact or law. However, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Bai Hira Devi & Ors. Vs. Official Assignee of Bombay, (1958) AIR SC 448, wherein it had held that Sections 91 and 92 in effect supplement each other and it was held that Section 91 would be frustrated without the aid of Section 91 and it was clarified that the two sections, however, differ in some material particulars, Section 91 applies to all documents, whether they purport to dispose of rights or not, whereas Section 92 applies to documents which can be described as dispositive. Section 91 applies to documents, which are both bilateral and unilateral, unlike and that Section 92 the application of which is confined only to bilateral documents. The appellant could not prove that the sale deed (Ext.2) is a bilateral document. Therefore, if the plea of the appellant is accepted, then also, it would provide him a right to claim money on account of payment made by him, if any. The appellant could not prove that the sale deed (Ext.2) is a bilateral document. Therefore, if the plea of the appellant is accepted, then also, it would provide him a right to claim money on account of payment made by him, if any. The learned counsel for the appellant has not shown any provision of law or any authority on the point that a person who had paid sale consideration would become title holder and not the person in whose name the sale deed was executed and registered. 19. The plea of the appellants is that as the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents did not pay any sale consideration, the appellant was the sole vendee of Ext.2 is a plea which is found to be hit by the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, 1872, by which it is provided that "when the terms of a contract, or of a grant, or of any other disposition of property, have been reduced to the form of a document, and in all cases in which any matter is required by law to be reduced to the form of a document, no evidence shall be given in proof of the terms of such contract, grant or other disposition of property, or of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary evidence of its contents in cases in which secondary evidence is admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained." 20. In the sale deed (Ext.2), although the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents and the appellant are the vendee, but the said document is a unilateral document. Thus, section 92 of Evidence Act would not apply in connection with the said document, as such, the said sale deed (Ext.2) remains a valid document. Therefore, notwithstanding whether or not any evidence contrary to the terms of Ext.2 could have been led, in this case, the parties to the suit had not examined the vendor of the sale deed (Ext.2), the author of the sale deed to prove whether the vendee intended to execute and register the sale deed (Ext.2) only in favour of the appellant and not jointly to the appellant and the predecessor- in- interest of the respondent. Therefore, in light of section 102 of the Evidence Act, it is seen that the appellant would not succeed if no evidence is tendered on either side. 21. Therefore, in light of section 102 of the Evidence Act, it is seen that the appellant would not succeed if no evidence is tendered on either side. 21. Thus, when in light of Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, title of the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents cannot extinguished and Section 91 of the Evidence Act creates a bar for other evidence to be brought on record for the terms of contract except the document itself, the Court is of the considered opinion that the plea of non- payment of sale consideration by the predecessor- in- interest of the respondents would not obliterate his title. Thus, the plea earnestly and forcefully urged by the learned counsel for the appellant fails and the said plea is answered accordingly. 22. In view of the discussions above, the decision by the learned first appellate Court on point of determination no. (a) cannot be faulted with and accordingly, the decision of the learned trial Court on issue no. 5 found to be rightly interfered with by the learned first appellate Court. This is not a case where any interpretation of Ext.2 document is in question, as such, no substantial question of law arises for examination by this Court in second appeal. 23. In connection with point of determination no. (b), the learned first appellate Court had examined the nature of tenancy which was created by virtue of the sale deed (Ext.2) and it was held that the status of joint tenancy was created and not tenancy- incommon. It was strenuously urged by the learned senior counsel for the appellant to project that by virtue of Ext.2, the status of tenancy- in- common was created. From the materials available on record, it is seen that the appellant has not been able to show that by virtue of sale deed (Ext.2), the nature of tenancy was tenancy in common and moreover, pleading to that effect was not introduced in the written statement filed by the appellant before the learned trial Court. Therefore, the plea that the predecessor- in- in- interest of the respondents was a tenant- in- common with the appellant and that upon his death the tenancy devolved on the appellant alone cannot be examined as a substantial question of law in the absence of pleadings. 24. Therefore, the plea that the predecessor- in- in- interest of the respondents was a tenant- in- common with the appellant and that upon his death the tenancy devolved on the appellant alone cannot be examined as a substantial question of law in the absence of pleadings. 24. Therefore, in light of the decision rendered by the learned first appellate Court on point of determination no. (a) and (b), the decision of the learned first appellate Court on point of determination no. (c) and (d) also cannot be faulted with. 25. It is seen that in this present case the appellant could not demonstrate that the learned first appellate Court had incorrectly appreciated the pleadings and evidence on record. It has been held by this Court in the case of Lal Mohan Nath V. Monorama Sarma,2008 1 GLR 371that a mere question of law cannot be regarded as a substantial question of law and thus, a mere error of law or fact cannot form the basis for challenge of a decree in second appeal. This is not found to be a case where the appreciation of Ext.2 sale deed could be successfully demonstrated to be incorrect. The learned first appellate Court had examined the whole evidence on record and assigned cogent reasons for reversing the decree passed by the learned trial Court. Therefore, Upon consideration of the materials available on record, the Court does not find that any question of law, far less substantial question of law, can be said to have been raised for determination in the present appeal, as such, this appeal fails and is dismissed. The judgment and decree dated 10.09.2018, passed by the learned District Judge, Karimganj in Title Appeal No. 5/2012 thereby reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Court is hereby affirmed. However, there shall be no order as to cost. 26. Let the decree of dismissal of the appeal without cost be prepared. 27. The Registry shall return the LCR and as per the provisions of Order XLI Rule 11(3) CPC, the Registry shall also notify the dismissal of this appeal to the Court of the learned District Judge, Karimganj in connection with Title Appeal No. 5/2012, disposed of vide judgment and decree dated 10.09.2018.