JUDGMENT Ravindra Maithani, J. - Challenge in the instant petition, is an order dated 09.12.2005, passed by the respondent no.2, whereby the appointment of the petitioner at a Class IV post has been cancelled. 2. Facts shorn of unnecessary details briefly stated are that the petitioner was initially appointed for 89 days on 24/31 7-1998 on the post of Peon as a stop gap arrangement. After expiry of this period, his service was dispensed with. Subsequently, again he was appointed on the same post on 25.01.1999; in the subsequent appointment, it was stipulated that though the appointment would be temporary in nature, the petitioner shall continue till regularly selected candidate joins. It is the case of the petitioner that his appointment was subsequently cancelled on 01.11.1999, which was challenged by the petitioner in Writ Petition No.12624 of 2000 (for short, "the first petition") before the Allahabad High Court, in which, on 16.03.2000, an interim order was granted. The petitioner continued at the strength of interim order passed in the first petition. The first petition was subsequently transferred to this Court and decided on 30.08.2005. The Court observed that opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the petitioner, before cancellation of his appointment and accordingly the order cancelling his appointment dated 01.11.1999 was quashed. It so happened that thereafter, two notices dated 17.11.2005 and 05.12.2005 were given to the petitioner to reveal the procedure which was adopted in case of his appointment. The petitioner was heard and while observing that neither any advertisement was published nor any interview was called while appointing the petitioner, the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled on 09.12.2005. It is this order, which is impugned in this writ petition. 3. On behalf of the State, counter affidavit has been filed. It is stated that appointment of the petitioner was illegal and it was so made by the then the District Inspector of Schools (the DIOS) Mr. Ramesh Chandra Premi. He was proceeded departmentally and a fine of 32,66,397/- was imposed upon the DIOS; he remained suspended also. 4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition had attained finality. Ramesh Chandra Premi. He was proceeded departmentally and a fine of 32,66,397/- was imposed upon the DIOS; he remained suspended also. 4. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition had attained finality. The earlier order dated 01.11.1999, by which, the appointment of the petitioner was cancelled had already been quashed; the department was not given any liberty to proceed afresh against the petitioner; the department did not assail the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition. Therefore, it is argued that after the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition, the department could not proceed against the petitioner afresh. 5. Reference has been made to a departmental communication, which reveals that based on an opinion of the law department, further proceedings were done, post order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition against the petitioner to argue that instead the department could have sought liberty from this Court, which they did not do and it makes whole procedure bad. 6. Learned senior counsel would submit that if department allows to conduct the way they have done in the instant case, there will be no finality of the judgment passed in this case. 7. The second limb of argument is with regard to the nature of the appointment, learned senior counsel would submit that the impugned order itself indicates that the appointment of the petitioner was irregular. On the strength of it, it is submitted that irregular appointment may be regularised. It is not illegality as per the department itself. 8. On the ground of equity, learned senior counsel would submit that though, at the strength of Court's order, the petitioner continued in service from 1999 to 2005; he is handicapped person; equity lies in his favour; he should be restored to the position, in which, he was placed just before the date preceding 09.12.2005. It is also submitted, that in all, there were 44 appointments made by the DIOS; some of the other candidates have obtained stay orders and it is yet not clear as to what happened in their cases. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 9. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the cases of Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned order deserves to be set aside. 9. In support of his contention, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the principles of law, as laid down in the cases of Ashok Kumar Sonkar Vs. Union of India and others, (2007) 4 SCC 54 and Government of Andhra Pradesh and others Vs. K. Brahmanandam and others, (2008) 5 SCC 241 . 10. In the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar (supra), in para 34 and 35, the Hon'ble Supreme Court summarized the position, which is as hereunder:- "34. It is not a case where appointment was irregular. If an appointment is irregular, the same can be regularized. The court may not take serious note of an irregularity within the meaning of the provisions of the Act. But if an appointment is illegal, it is non est in the eye of the law, which renders the appointment to be a nullity. 35. We have noticed hereinbefore that in making appointment of the appellant, the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and statutory rules were not complied with. The appointment, therefore, was illegal and in that view of the matter, it would be wholly improper for us to invoke our equity jurisdiction." 11. In the case of K. Brahmanandam (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid emphasis on para 16, which is as under:- 16. Appointments made in violation of the mandatory provisions of a statute would be illegal and, thus, void. Illegality cannot be ratified. Illegality cannot be regularized, only an irregularity can be. 12. On the other hand, on behalf of the State, it is submitted that appointment of the petitioner was illegal; it was done despite ban on appointment by the State Government; the DIOS was proceeded departmentally in the matter; actions were taken against him. 13. Learned State counsel would submit that out of 44 such appointments made by the DIOS, the appointments of 33 has already been cancelled and 11 cases are pending in different Courts. It is also submitted that still the Government is seeking information regarding the other cases as to what happened in such matters. Effect of the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition: 14. Facts are not in dispute. Petitioner was initially appointed for 89 days on stopgap arrangement on 24/31-7-1998; the term expired and the services of the petitioner discontinued. Effect of the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition: 14. Facts are not in dispute. Petitioner was initially appointed for 89 days on stopgap arrangement on 24/31-7-1998; the term expired and the services of the petitioner discontinued. The petitioner was subsequently again appointed on temporary basis on 25.01.1999. This appointment was cancelled on 01.11.1999. This order dated 01.11.1999 was challenged by the petitioner in the first petition in which, on 16.03.2000, an interim order was granted and on the strength of it, the petitioner continued in service. The first petition was sent to this High Court from Allahabad High Court by transfer and was decided on 30.08.2005 and while concluding the Court observed as hereunder:- "In the present case, no opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioner and without giving notice; his services have been terminated unanimously. Thus the order impugned dated 01.11.1999 terminating the services of the petitioner is liable to be quashed. According, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 01.11.1999 passed by District Inspector of Schools, Pauri Garhwal, is hereby quashed. No order as to costs." 15. It is true that the Court on 30.08.2005, while deciding the first petition did not give any liberty to the department to proceed afresh against the petitioner. The Court on that date quashed the order dated 01.11.1999 on the ground that it was passed in contravention of the principles of natural justice. This order has definitely attained finality. The department could not have proceeded against the petitioner at the strength of order dated 01.11.1999, to that extent finality is attached to the order dated 30.08.2005, passed by this Court in the first petition. At the strength of order dated 30.08.2005, petitioner cannot say that action which preceded his appointment cannot be examined further. 16. It is true that had such liberty been given by this Court in its order dated 30.08.2005 in the first petition, the things could have been clear. But, if it is not there, it cannot be read that the department cannot proceed against the petitioner and enquire about the mode of his appointment. Therefore, it cannot be said that after the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition, the department could not have proceeded against the petitioner. Irregular Versus Illegal Appointment: 17. But, if it is not there, it cannot be read that the department cannot proceed against the petitioner and enquire about the mode of his appointment. Therefore, it cannot be said that after the order dated 30.08.2005, passed in the first petition, the department could not have proceeded against the petitioner. Irregular Versus Illegal Appointment: 17. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the department itself admits that the appointment of the petitioner was irregular and it is so written in the impugned order. It is true that the impugned order, while cancelling the appointment of the petitioner, termed the appointment as, "irregular", but then, the question is whether merely because a disciplinary authority records in his findings "the nature of appointment", this Court's hands are tied, not to examine it further. The whole issue in fact, hinges around the nature of appointment. Is it illegal or irregular? 18. Learned senior counsel, in fact has been much fair in citing the case laws. In the case of Ashok Kumar Sonkar (supra), in para 35 as quoted hereinabove, the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically held that if while making appointments, the provisions of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and statutory rules are not complied with, such an appointment will be illegal. Similarly, in the case of K. Brahmanandam (supra), in para 16 as quoted above, the Hon'ble Supreme Court categorically stated and observed that appointment made in violation of the mandatory provisions of the statute would be illegal, which cannot be regularized. 19. In fact, this question has categorically came up before the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board Vs. Ranjodh Singh and others, (2007) 2 SCC 491 . In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court quoted with approval from the earlier decided cases that irregular appointments means that it is irregular for want of compliance with one of the elements in the process of selection which does not go to the root of process. 20. The impugned order has been passed after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by way of notice dated 17.11.2005 and 05.12.2005, which are filed along with the writ petition by the petitioner himself. 20. The impugned order has been passed after affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner by way of notice dated 17.11.2005 and 05.12.2005, which are filed along with the writ petition by the petitioner himself. They categorically required the petitioner to answer as to whether any advertisement was made while his appointment was made or any intimation was given to the employment exchange, or any interview was conducted, etc.; the impugned order records that according to petitioner himself, neither any advertisement was published nor he was called for interview; he was merely handed over the appointment letter. This appointment is apparently most illegal appointment. It is in defiance to any rule of public employment, therefore, merely because the impugned order terms the appointment as irregular, it cannot be said that it is a regular appointment. The appointment of the petitioner was illegal, it cannot be rectified. 21. Learned senior counsel would submit that the petitioner is a physically disabled and equity demands that the impugned order be set aside. Equity cannot be individualistic. It is true that a person, who hopes for public employment and takes the recourse of Court, should be heard quickly. This Court has no hesitation in conceding that the system has not responded promptly to the cry of the petitioner. Instant petition was filed in the year 2006. It took this Court, 14 years to decide this petition, but then, as stated, it is a matter of public employment and at the cost of other aspiring candidates, equity cannot be tilted in favour of the petitioner. 22. In view of the above, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed. 23. The writ petition is dismissed.