Judgment Mr. Sureshwar Thakur, J. :-The accused-petitioners herein, are facing a notice ofaccusation for an offence constituted under Section 138 of the NegotiableInstruments Act. In the afore drawn complaint after the recording ofpreliminary evidence, by the learned Magistrate concerned, the accusedwere served with summons, and, thereafter, it is averred on affidavitappended with the petition, that they caused their regular appearancesbefore the learned trial Magistrate concerned. 2.Moreover, the complainant’s evidence is yet to open, or, is tocommence before the learned Magistrate concerned. However, during thependency of complaint bearing No.NACT/87/2019, titled as ‘Dr. OmParkash versus Dharampal’ dated 06.05.2019, the complainant instituted anapplication, under Section 143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881,seeking a direction being made, upon, the accused to pay interimcompensation to him. The learned trial Judge made an affirmative orderthereon, and, the order pronounced on 17.08.2021 has been challengedbefore this Court. 3.Though a reading of the hereinafter extracted provisions of143-A, of the Negotiable Instruments Act, unravels that though it vests adiscretion in the learned trial Magistrate to, during the pendency of theapposite complaint, before him, to make a direction, upon the accused topay interim compensation, to the complainant, in the quantum carriedtherein. “143A – Power to direct interim compensation- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence underSection 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interimcompensation to the complainant- (a) in a summary trial or summon case, where the drawer pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing charges. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under sub-section (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial years, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the complainant. (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a find under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).” 3.Moreover, even though, in case there is a verdict of dismissalpronounced by the learned Magistrate concerned, upon the complaintconcerned, thereupon though there is a statutory mandate cast upon theCourt concerned, to direct the complainant to repay the amount of interimcompensation, to the accused, in the manner contemplated in Sub-Section 4of Section 143-A, of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 4.Be that as it may, the aforemade provisions are not mandatoryin nature rather are directory in nature, given the occurrence therein of theword “may”, and, hence the discretion vested in the trial Magistrate is not tobe exercised capriciously and arbitrarily. The exercise of discretion by thelearned trial Magistrate, has to be done in a thoughtful and sagaciousmanner. The apposite order has to be grooved in sound, and, worthyreasoning, inasmuch as, the Court being constrained to, on account ofdeliberate delays, being made by the accused, in the further progressesbeing made qua the trial, of the complaint concerned, inasmuch as, despiteopportunities being granted to him, to adduce his defence evidence ratherhis intentionally prolonging, the termination or conclusion of the complaintapposite, or/and, upon, his repeatedly seeking, on frivolous grounds, hisexemptions from personal appearances. The afore parameters and grounds,may groove well merited reasons rather for the learned trial Magistrateconcerned, to proceed to use his discretion, as vested in him under Section143-A of the Negotiable Instruments Act. A reading of the impugned orderdoes not disclose, that any of the afore parameters either become pleadednor obviously they ever existed on the records of the learned trial Magistrateconcerned nor are elaborated in the impugned order. Therefore the exerciseof discretion, by the learned trial Magistrate, without the afore parameters,existing before him, cannot become construed to be well founded nor is wellgrooved in merit worthy reasons. Contrarily, when none of the parametersbecame either pleaded nor ever existed, thereupon, the learned trialMagistrate concerned, became precluded to exercise the statutory discretion,in a capricious and arbitrary manner, as, he has proceeded to do so. 5.There is merit in the petition. The same is allowed, and, theimpugned order is quashed, and, set aside.