JUDGMENT : The contempt petitioner is a cooperative bank limited. One Jinu Augustine had availed several loans from the above cooperative bank. There were two other transactions, in which Jinu Augustine along with one Aji Sebastian and one Varkey had also entered into loan transactions. Since default was committed by the subscribers, separate A.R.Cs were filed as ARC.Nos.1349 of 2010, 1343 of 2010, 362 of 2011, 1348 of 2010, 1345 of 2010 and 1342 of 2010 respectively. Awards were passed in favour of the cooperative society as against Jinu Augustine separately in few cases and in combination with Aji Sebastian in A.R.C.No.362 of 2011 and with Varkey in A.R.C.No.1348 of 2010. In execution of the award, E.P.Nos.11/2014, 7/2014, 14/2014, 15/2014, 9/2014, 8/2014 and 10/2014 were filed before the Munsiffs court, Muvattupuzha. In A.R.C.No.1345 of 2010 in E.P.No. 8 of 2014, the execution proceeding was dismissed and applications for condonation of delay and for restoration were filed. Those applications were allowed. In all other execution proceedings, warrants were issued in execution of the award after finding that the judgment debtors had sufficient means to discharge the decree debt. Challenging the order condoning delay, O.P.No.2062 of 2018 was filed by the concerned judgment debtors. Challenging the warrants issued in all other cases, the above CRPs were filed. 2. When the above CRPs came up for hearing along with the OP, this Court noticed that the dispute related to payment of money and in the light of the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there was a chance of settlement if some concessions are allowed, parties were relegated for mediation. After mediation, it was reported that the matter was settled and a mediation settlement agreement signed by both parties covering all the CRPs and OPs was filed. It was agreed that the amount covered by three loans mentioned in the settlement would be paid on or before 25.03.2019. It was also agreed that the balance amount in other execution petitions would be paid on 30.06.2019. It was inter alia agreed that, if the judgment debtor fails to pay the amount as agreed, Bank will be free to proceed with the execution petitions. It was also agreed that the concessions given at the time of settlement would stand waived and the decree holder will be entitled to proceed with the executions ignoring the settlement arrived at. It was inter alia agreed that, if the judgment debtor fails to pay the amount as agreed, Bank will be free to proceed with the execution petitions. It was also agreed that the concessions given at the time of settlement would stand waived and the decree holder will be entitled to proceed with the executions ignoring the settlement arrived at. In other words, it was agreed that, in case of default, the decree holder will be entitled to execute the award as such, giving a go-bye to the settlement arrived at. It seems from the settlement that the total amount due from the judgment debtors was Rs.98,79,396/-. It also seems that, several concessions were given by the cooperative bank. An order was passed by this Court on 19.03.2019, recording the settlement. It was ordered that the parties were bound by the settlement and in case of default, parties would be entitled to execute the settlement in accordance with the terms of the settlement. It was also further directed that the parties were bound by the terms of the award and it will form part of the order. All the revisions and OP were accordingly disposed of. 3. Subsequently, in March 2020, these contempt petitions were filed by the cooperative bank contending that the judgment debtors have violated the terms of the settlement and the amount as agreed was not paid by them. It was stated that, the entire amount remains due and by committing wilful breach of the terms of the settlement, which was accepted by this Court, the judgment debtors have committed contempt of court. 4. Notices were issued to the respondents in the contempt cases to appear and show cause why contempt proceedings shall not be initiated against them. In reply to it, the respondent/judgment debtor has filed a detailed counter in contempt case No.1579 of 2020. An adoption memo was filed in all other contempt cases adopting the contentions set up in the above counter affidavit. The respondents were given time to pay the amount as agreed, but they failed to make payment. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/ respondents. 6. An adoption memo was filed in all other contempt cases adopting the contentions set up in the above counter affidavit. The respondents were given time to pay the amount as agreed, but they failed to make payment. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/ respondents. 6. The specific contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner was that, after having undertaken to settle the dispute and to make payments in accordance with the settlement, which was approved by the Court, the judgment debtors/respondent violated the terms of settlement and thereby, they committed contempt of court. It was submitted that, judgment debtors were liable to be prosecuted and liable to be punished for wilful disobedience of the order of this Court. It was contended that, they were liable to be punished in accordance with the provisions of the contempt of court Act. Per contra, relying on the counter affidavit, learned counsel for the respondents contended that, the judgment debtors could not pay the money due to financial difficulties. It was contended that, after having entered into a settlement and this Court having adopted the settlement and disposed of the CRPs accordingly, the relief available to the contempt petitioners was only to enforce the settlement as such. Relying on the various terms in the settlement, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that, this Court had noted that the parties have entered into a settlement and in case of failure to remit the amount, the decree holder was entitled to enforce only the settlement accepted by this Court. It was contended that the contempt of court proceeding was not envisaged in the memorandum of settlement. It was further contended that the parties were not bound by anything more or anything less than the memorandum of settlement and the judgment/order passed by this Court. There was no scope for filing a contempt of court petition by stretching and interpreting the orders of this Court, to suit the convenience of the petitioner, it was argued. 7. It was further contended that the parties were not bound by anything more or anything less than the memorandum of settlement and the judgment/order passed by this Court. There was no scope for filing a contempt of court petition by stretching and interpreting the orders of this Court, to suit the convenience of the petitioner, it was argued. 7. To substantiate the contention of the learned counsel for the judgment debtors/respondents, learned counsel relied on the decision of this court in Valsala kumari Devi v. Srinivas I.A.S (2018(4) KLT S.N.35(C.No.38)) wherein it was held that, in a contempt proceeding, the sole aspect that was to be identified was, whether there was any wilful contumacious act on the part of the respondent, so as to undermine the prestige and dignity of this Court. The learned counsel further relied on the decision of the Madras High Court in Rajendran K.B.v. Registrar General, Chennai and Others (2018 KHC 3046), wherein, it was held that, civil contempt can be invoked only when there was civil disobedience to the order of the court. Though it was held that mens rea was not a necessary component, the Court dealing with contempt issue can embark upon a limited enquiry. 8. To counter the above argument, learned counsel for the petitioner relied on a catena of decisions. Learned counsel relied on the decision of the Delhi High Court in Indo-Keniyan Industrial Enterprises v. M/s.Metal Forgings (P) Limited (1986 CRI.L.J.1592). It was held that, when the tenant had given an undertaking before the court, wherein, he had undertaken to vacate the premises by specified date, which resulted in a compromise decree, it was an undertaking given to the court and not to the party. It was held that the breach of that condition constitutes a civil contempt. The learned counsel further relied on the decision reported in Kaushaliya v. Jodha Ram and Ors. ( 2020(1) KHC 496 ) wherein the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the question of a settlement. It was a case wherein, in a suit for injunction which ultimately reached the Supreme Court, parties were referred for mediation. They entered into settlement. Supreme Court directed that both parties shall abide by the settlement and there was a direction to the petitioner to vacate the premises. It was a case wherein, in a suit for injunction which ultimately reached the Supreme Court, parties were referred for mediation. They entered into settlement. Supreme Court directed that both parties shall abide by the settlement and there was a direction to the petitioner to vacate the premises. It was held that, by not vacating the building, the tenant has committed willful disobedience and hence the parties were liable for contempt. It was held that, when parties entered into a settlement and agreed to settle all disputes in mediation and once settlement is accepted by the Court, it becomes part of court's order and the Court disposes of the matter in terms of settlement agreement. Thereafter, the order in terms of settlement agreement is executable and is binding on the parties and was required to be acted upon. The order was liable to be complied with. It was held that, in case of a breach of it, contempt proceedings can be initiated. 9. In Ashish Seth and Ors. v. Sumit Mittal and Ors. ( AIR 2020 SC 2218 ) almost identical situation arose before the court. It was held that the entire object and purpose of entering into the settlement was to resolve all the disputes between the parties. Therefore, it was the duty of the Court to ensure that the settlement entered into between the parties and the consent order passed by the Court should be given effect to in its letter and spirit. All the parties to the consent terms are required to fully comply with the terms of settlement and the consent order. It was found that the respondent had deliberately and willfully disobeyed such order and the memorandum settlement parties have rendered themselves liable for the action under the Contempt of Courts Act. Though the Supreme Court found that, the party had committed contempt of court, before taking any further action, parties were given two months time to fulfill their part of the agreement in terms of the memorandum of settlement. 10. Though the Supreme Court found that, the party had committed contempt of court, before taking any further action, parties were given two months time to fulfill their part of the agreement in terms of the memorandum of settlement. 10. The three Judges Bench of Supreme Court in Ram Narang v.s Ramesh Narang ( AIR 2006 SC 1883 ) had held that when parties arrive at a settlement and when it is adopted by the Court, it is a consent given to the court and when the seal of the court is affixed on it, it is an undertaking given not to the party, but to the court. If that is violated, it may amount to contempt of court and appropriate proceedings can be initiated. In Periyakkal v. Dakshayani (1983 KHC 375), in a consent decree, the time for compliance was stipulated. When time was sought to be extended by filing an application, it was opposed by the opposite side contending that the time fixed by parties cannot be extended by Court. Rejecting it, Supreme Court held that, when the parties enter into a compromise and invite the Court to pass an order on it, the time stipulated becomes the time allowed by the Court. This view has been consistently followed by Supreme Court, as evident from a series of decisions, namely Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya ( 2004(1) SCC 360 ), Mohammad Idris and Another v. Rustam Jehangir Babuji and Others ( AIR 1984 SC 1826 ), Kanwar Singh Saini v. High Court of Delhi ( 2012(4) SCC 307 ) etc. The above decisions consistently support the view that when settlement arrived at parties is recorded by Court, it becomes the order of Court and breach of it amounts to contempt of court. 11. In the case at hand, it is an admitted fact that the respondents, after entering into the settlement and undertaking to pay the amount in installments, have not repaid the amount. Consequently, the proceedings before this Court and the executing court have been closed pursuant to settlement. They have completely violated the terms of the settlement. Even now, the respondents have not given any valid explanation or expressed their willingness to comply with the order. All the contentions set up by the judgment debtors are technical in nature. Consequently, the proceedings before this Court and the executing court have been closed pursuant to settlement. They have completely violated the terms of the settlement. Even now, the respondents have not given any valid explanation or expressed their willingness to comply with the order. All the contentions set up by the judgment debtors are technical in nature. In the light of the above facts, it is clear that the judgment debtors have willfully committed breach of the terms of the agreement and thereby exposed themselves liable for contempt of Court. 12. In the above situation, this Court is to consider the further course of action. Since this Court has affixed its stamp of approval on the settlement, this Court has a duty to ensure that no part to the proceedings, violate the terms of settlement to the prejudice of other or to take advantage of the situation to the prejudice of other party. No party shall also be permitted to play fraud on the Court. The Court which recorded the settlement is also competent even to revoke the settlement in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction in appropriate cases and put back the parties to the original position where they stood prior to the settlement, to meet the ends of justice. A Court competent to record settlement is equally competent to revoke it in appropriate cases. In short, the Court, in the above circumstances, cannot be held to be powerless or lacks such ancillary and incidental powers to meet the ends of justice. 13. In this case, though prima facie there are materials to indicate that the judgment debtors have committed contempt of court, I feel that the decree holder being a bank, is essentially interested in enforcing the decree, rather than punishing the judgment debtors. Having considered this, though I am fully satisfied that the respondents have committed contempt of court, I refrain from initiating proceeding against them, since an alternate efficacious remedy can be moulded. By virtue of the terms in settlement and by the consequential breach, the settlement stands automatically revoked and all the concessions granted by the decree holder will stand lost. Hence, the order of this Court recording settlement agreement is withdrawn and the decree holder will be entitled to enforce the award as it originally stood, with all consequential reliefs. By virtue of the terms in settlement and by the consequential breach, the settlement stands automatically revoked and all the concessions granted by the decree holder will stand lost. Hence, the order of this Court recording settlement agreement is withdrawn and the decree holder will be entitled to enforce the award as it originally stood, with all consequential reliefs. Consequently, all the execution proceedings will stand restored to the position where it stood at the time of institution of the CRPs and OP. 14. In the result, settlement agreement recorded by this Court by order dated 19.03.2019 stands revoked. E.P.Nos.11/2014, 7/2014/ 14/2014, 15/2014, 9/2014, 8/2014 and 10/2014 filed before the Munsiffs court, Muvattupuzha stands restored. Execution court is directed to proceed from the stage where it stood at the time of filing the CRP. Immediately on receipt of a copy of this judgment, the Court shall issue fresh warrants to the respondents in all the execution petitions except E.P.No.8 of 2014. The Court shall post the case awaiting return of warrant within two weeks from the date of issue of warrant. The Court shall take every endeavour to see that the warrants are executed and the decree is enforced, considering the long pendency of the case and the history of this execution. E.P.No.8 of 2014 will stand restored to the original position and the Court shall proceed from the stage where it originally stood. Contempt of court proceedings are disposed of in the light of the above directions.