JUDGMENT Aniruddha Roy, J. - The present writ petition has been filed by the Union of India challenging the impugned order dated July 27, 2015 (for short, the impugned order) passed by the Central Administrative Tribunal, Kolkata Bench (for short, the Tribunal) in OA No. 77 of 2010 (Shri Rajabali Prasad versus Union of India & Ors.) (for short, the said Original Application) whereby the said Original Application was allowed by directing to grant the respondent promotion and the consequential benefits thereof. 2. The respondent was employed in the Income Tax department, on August 26, 1969 as a lower division clerk and was later re- designated as Stenographer Grade-III. He served the Union of India, the employer, for about 39 years. From time to time the respondent was promoted to various posts i.e. Inspector of Income Tax, Income Tax Officer etc. As an Income Tax Officer the respondent rendered his service on various posting and discharged his duties as such, including the Tax Recovery Officer (Judicial) etc. and ultimately promoted as Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax (Group-A) w.e.f. November 7, 2001 vide letter dated September 7, 2001. Till such period the respondent had served the Union of India in an uninterrupted and continuous manner. 3. After receiving the promotion as Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, the respondent served Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-XII and Chief Commissioner of Income Tax XI till he was transferred as Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle-38. The respondent on transfer assumed the charge of Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle-38 w.e.f. July 2/3, 2003. While serving as Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax Circle-38, Kolkata the Annual Confidential Report (for short, ACR) for the year 2003-04 for the period from July 2/3, 2003 to March 31, 2004 was reported by the then Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-38, as Reporting Officer and was reviewed by the Reviewing Officer the Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-XII. There were no adverse remarks in the ACR for the year 2003-04 in the relevant columns as against resume of work done by the respondent. The ACR of the respondent always reflected to be 'good' and 'very good'. In the ACR's for other years namely 2005-06 or 2007-08 there were no adverse remarks. The ACR for the year 2008-09 was submitted after the retirement of the respondent on March 31, 2009. The ACR of the respondent always reflected to be 'good' and 'very good'. In the ACR's for other years namely 2005-06 or 2007-08 there were no adverse remarks. The ACR for the year 2008-09 was submitted after the retirement of the respondent on March 31, 2009. However, the ACR for the year 2004-05 of the respondent contained adverse remarks. 4. The respondent was communicated his adverse ACR through a letter dated June 30/July 5, 2005 issued by DCIT Headquarter (Administration). The respondent vide letter dated August 5, 2005 refuted such adverse remarks. The said objection of the respondent dated August 5, 2005 was sent to the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-38 for comments. Two letters of the Joint Commissioner of Income Tax, Range-38 dated January 5, 2005 and January 7, 2005 referred to in the said ACR were not communicated to the respondent for his reply and as such the respondent had no knowledge of the same and could not reply thereto, as alleged by the respondent. 5. The said objection of the respondent dated August 5, 2005 was considered and disposed of by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-VII vide his order dated October 27, 2005. 6. Being aggrieved by the said order dated October 27, 2005 passed by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-VII, the respondent preferred an appeal dated November 18, 2005 before the competent authority of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi. After 3 years the said competent authority rejected the said appeal of the respondent on December 15, 2008. Such rejection was conveyed to the respondent by a letter dated February 09, 2009, which was received by the respondent on February 10, 2009. 7. Being further aggrieved by the said decision of the competent authority dated December 15, 2008 the respondent made an appeal before the Hon'ble President of India for expunging the adverse remarks from his ACR for the year 2004-05. The said appeal preferred before the Hon'ble President of India dated June 26, 2009 was submitted in the Office of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and was forwarded to the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi for onward transmission to the Office of the Hon'ble President of India. The said appeal preferred before the Hon'ble President of India dated June 26, 2009 was submitted in the Office of the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax and was forwarded to the Chairman, Central Board of Direct Taxes, New Delhi for onward transmission to the Office of the Hon'ble President of India. The Central Board of Direct Taxes by its communication dated August 19, 2009 refused and declined to entertain and forward the said appeal of the respondent before the Hon'ble President of India and rejected the same on the ground that as per DOPT instruction no memorial or appeal is allowed after six months from the date of order. 8. Thus being aggrieved, the respondent filed the said Original Application before the Learned Tribunal and prayed for the following reliefs: "a) To pass an order directing upon the Respondents to expunge the adverse remarks in the ACR for the year 2004-05. b) To pass an order directing the respondents to include the name of the applicant in the promotion list as Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax with effect from 1st January 2006. c) To pass an order directing the respondents to grant the pay and allowances including pensionery benefits in the revised scale of pay implemented on recommendation of the 6th Pay Commission. d) Any order and/or further order or orders as the Hon'ble Tribunal may deem fit and proper". 9. Mr. Amit Chakraborty, learned counsel appearing with Mr. P. Karan Singh, Advocate for the writ petitioner assailing the said impugned order, at the outset submitted that the Original Application filed by the respondent was hopelessly time barred and in addition the same was speculative, frivolous and without any merit. He submitted that Section 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, the said 1985 Act), inter alia, prescribes a period of limitation within which an action has to be brought before the Tribunal. He submitted that, in the instant case adverse ACR was duly communicated to the respondent and the respondent was aware of the same in July 2005 and the respondent filed his objection thereto on August 5, 2005. Such objection was rejected by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-VII vide his order dated October 27, 2005. He submitted that, in the instant case adverse ACR was duly communicated to the respondent and the respondent was aware of the same in July 2005 and the respondent filed his objection thereto on August 5, 2005. Such objection was rejected by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata-VII vide his order dated October 27, 2005. The respondent then preferred an appeal on November 18, 2005 before the Central Board of Direct Taxes which was rejected on December 15, 2008 and the respondent was communicated the same immediately. The respondent allowed all such things to happen. The respondent at that juncture chose not to assail the said adverse ACR through the due procedure established under the law by applying before the Tribunal. The respondent retired on March 31, 2009. Much after his retirement the respondent filed the said Original Application before the learned Tribunal in the year 2010 at a grossly belated stage and beyond the period of statutory limitation. 10. Mr. Chakraborty, the learned counsel for the Union of India further submitted that the necessary information regarding his adverse ACR and all the relevant documents were duly placed before him and the respondent was all along aware of the same. The respondent was afforded adequate opportunities to defend himself at various stages and as such there was no violation of principles of natural justice. The action of the Union of India, employer, against the respondent was followed by due process of law. 11. Mr. Chakraborty, learned counsel on behalf of the Union of India further submitted that despite the point of limitation being taken on behalf of his client in the Original Application at the threshold, the learned Tribunal failed to appreciate and adjudicate the same and proceeded to adjudicate upon the issues on merits without appreciating that the said application being barred by limitation, the learned Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the same and, therefore, the impugned order is wholly without jurisdiction and is liable to be set aside. In as much as, the Tribunal further failed to appreciate from the facts of this case that the respondent had initiated a speculative proceeding before the learned Tribunal at a belated stage after waiting for about more than 3 to 4 years from the date right accrued to the respondent. Such a speculative application should have been dismissed at the threshold. 12. The respondent is not represented. Such a speculative application should have been dismissed at the threshold. 12. The respondent is not represented. The case made out by the respondent before the Tribunal was that the relevant material on the basis of which ACR was recorded by his employer was never furnished to him and as a result he was not in a position to deal with the same and defend himself. The decision to record adverse comments in the ACR by the Union of India against him was clearly in breach of the principles of natural justice and was a result of personal grievance. The material relied upon in support of the said adverse ACR was procured, manufactured, concocted, baseless and contrary to the actual service record of the respondent. 13. After hearing learned counsel for the writ petitioner and on a perusal of the material before us, it appears that the facts are not disputed. The respondent was aggrieved with the adverse remarks in his ACR for the year 2004-05. The respondent came to know about the said adverse ACR in July, 2005. He raised necessary objection vide letter dated August 5, 2005. Such objection of the respondent was considered and rejected by the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Kolkata, VIII vide his order dated October 27, 2005. The same was communicated to him. Being aggrieved with the said decision of the department dated October 27, 2005, the respondent preferred a departmental appeal on November 18, 2005 before the competent authority of the Central Board of Direct Taxes. Such departmental appeal was disposed of on December 15, 2008. From such rejection the respondent filed a representation before the Hon'ble President of India. From the above facts it is evident that the respondent was aware of adverse comments in his ACR in July, 2005 itself. Even appeal filed by him was also rejected on December 15, 2008 his right to challenge the same in the established procedure of law accrued then only. However, the respondent challenged the said ACR in 2010 through the said Original Application filed before the Tribunal after he retired from his service w.e.f. March 31, 2009. 14. The said Original Application was filed under The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, the said 1985 Act). Section 21 of the said 1985 Act prescribes the period for limitation for filing an Original Application. The provision reads as under: "21. 14. The said Original Application was filed under The Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (for short, the said 1985 Act). Section 21 of the said 1985 Act prescribes the period for limitation for filing an Original Application. The provision reads as under: "21. Limitation.- (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a)in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made, within one year from the date on which such final order has been made; (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as is mentioned in clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of the said period of six months. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),where- (a) the grievance in respect of which an application is made had arisen by reason of any order made at any time during the period of three years immediately preceding the date on which the jurisdiction, powers and authority of the Tribunal becomes exercisable under this Act in respect of the matter to which such order relates; and (b) no proceedings for the redressal of such grievance had been commenced before the said date before any High Court, the application shall be entertained by the Tribunal if it is made within the period referred to in clause (a), or, as the case may be, clause (b), of sub-section (1) or within a period of six months from the said date, whichever period expires later. Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) or sub-section (2), an application may be admitted after the period of one year specified in clause (a) or clause (b) of sub-section (1) or, as the case may be, the period of six months specified in sub-section (2), if the applicant satisfies the Tribunal that he had sufficient cause for not making the application within such period." 15. The Original Application having been filed five years after the adverse ACR was communicated by the respondent and nearly two years after reject of his appeal deserved to be dismissed on account of delay and latches only and more so on a true and proper construction of Section 21 of the said Act. It is settled law that the persons who approached the Court or a Tribunal at a belated stage placing reliance upon its futile diligence can be denied the discretionary relief on account of delay and latches more so in the instant case when section 21 of the said act bars the said Original Application to be filed before the Ld. Tribunal and such a long waiting on the part of the petitioner shows lack of diligence on his part and reluctance to avail of statutory remedy within the prescribed time. 16. The objects of the provisions of limitation are preventive and not creative. It interposes a statutory bar after a certain period and gives a quietus to any action to enforce existing right such extinguishment to claims by statutory interference resulting in making certain demands stale should be construed strictly. No doubt the provisions of the Limitation Act should be interpreted strictly in accordance with the language used, but it is always necessary that litigant, who relies upon it should bring his cause within the four corners of the terms of the provisions of limitation. It is well settled that, the provisions for limitation, with regard to proceeding bars the remedy without extinguishing the rights. When a provisions for limitation for initiating an action is specifically provided under the statute such a provision must be construed as mandatory and it is the duty of the Court or Tribunal to see whether on the basis of material on record the action is barred by limitation under the provisions of the relevant law. It is equally true that even if the point of limitation, where there is such provisioned mention in a statute, is not specifically taken in defense, it is the duty of the Court to examine the same before entertaining the action. It is equally true that even if the point of limitation, where there is such provisioned mention in a statute, is not specifically taken in defense, it is the duty of the Court to examine the same before entertaining the action. Even though the point of limitation is not taken before the Court or Tribunal, yet if it is clear on the face of the record that the action is barred by limitation, the Court or Tribunal is duty bound to give effect to such provisions for limitation. 17. The point of limitation is really a point of jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter. If an action is barred by limitation then the Court or Tribunal cannot entertain such an action and as such if any order is passed in such an action on merit the same will be rendered as nonest. Where the plea of limitation involves only questions of law and which can be decided on the facts proved or admitted before the Court or Tribunal, it can be raised at any stage of the proceedings. If it is not mentioned as grounds of appeal in the memorandum it would be open to the Appellate Court in such cases to allow the appellant to argue the point or to raise the point even suo moto. 18. Taking the facts in the present case, it is ex facie evident that the Original Application was filed by the respondent before the Tribunal much after the period of limitation in terms of Section 21 of the 1985 Act. It is also to be considered equally that the respondent had waited for a substantial period of time behind the fence and ultimately after his retirement took place in March, 2009 he filed the Original Application as a speculative litigation. 19. In the affidavit-in-opposition filed by the Union of India before the Tribunal to the said Original Application, the point of Limitation had been raised, still the Tribunal without application of mind and without considering the point of limitation had proceeded on the merits of the application though from the material before the Tribunal it was ex facie evident that the Original Application was barred under the provisions of limitation in terms of Section 21 of the 1985 Act. Thus, the Tribunal had erred in exercising it is jurisdiction and ought to have dismissed the said Original Application at the threshold on the ground of limitation. 20. In view of foregoing discussions and the stated reasons above the impugned order dated July 27, 2015 passed by the Tribunal in OA No. 77 of 2010 stands set aside and the Original Application consequently stands dismissed. 21. The instant writ petition is thus, allowed. 22. WPCT 107 of 2017 and CAN 1 of 2017 (Old No.:- CAN 5120 of 2017) are disposed of accordingly. 23. There shall, however, be no order as to costs. I agree. Rajesh Bindal, J.