ORDER : Vishal Mishra, J. 1. The present petition is being filed arising out of the order dated 10.2.2020 which was delivered to the petitioner vide covering letter dated 7.8.2020 received on 14.8.2020 passed by the Disciplinary Committee of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India constituted under Section 21B of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (in short "Act of 1949"). By the aforesaid order the Disciplinary Committee has observed that the petitioner is guilty of professional gross negligence and held him guilty for expressing opinion on financial status of company in which he was having substantial interest and it has been observed that the disciplinary committee is of the opinion that petitioner is guilty of professional misconduct as defined under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 and the petitioner was held guilty under clause (2) of Part IV of 1st Schedule and clause (4) and (7) of Part 1 of 2nd Schedule of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. 2. A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondents with respect to maintainability of the writ petition before the High Court of M.P. Bench at Gwalior on the ground of territorial jurisdiction. It is alleged that the order impugned is being passed at New Delhi. The entire proceedings have taken place in the New Delhi, therefore, the petition should have been preferred at High Court Judicature at New Delhi. It is submitted that the petition is not maintainable owing to want of jurisdiction. The second objection is with respect to maintainability of the petition on the ground of alternative remedy. It is argued that the petitioner is having an alternative, efficacious remedy of filing an appeal against the order impugned under section 22G of the Chartered Accountant Act, 1949, which is headed by a Retired Judge of the High Court. Without availing the alternative, efficacious remedy available to him the petition has directly before this Court is not maintainable. He has relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Lts. Vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 658 and also in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 . 3. Prior to going into merit of the case, this Court deems it proper to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the respondents in the petition. Vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 658 and also in the case of Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 . 3. Prior to going into merit of the case, this Court deems it proper to deal with the preliminary objections raised by the respondents in the petition. So far as objection with respect to the territorial jurisdiction is concerned, the petitioner is the resident of Gwalior having its firm registered at Gwalior. He is doing his profession as Chartered Accountant at Gwalior in the name of M/s. Ramakant Gupta and Co. having registered office at 8, Near Chandra Nagar, Behind GDA, Kherapati Road, Gwalior (M.P.). The complainant is also a resident of Gwalior. Therefore, the cause of action to take cognizance against the petitioner arose at Gwalior. Because of action has arisen at Gwalior, wherein the complaint was made against the petitioner from Gwalior itself. Merely the fact that disciplinary committee constituted under section 21B of Act of 1949 its functioning at New Delhi does not debar the jurisdiction of this Court to entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of an order passed by the Committee placed at Gwalior. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of ONGC Vs. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711 , has held as under: "5. Clause (1) of Article 226 begins with a non obstante clause--notwithstanding anything in Article 32--and provides that every High Court shall have power "throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction", to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, "within those territories" directions, orders or writs, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. Under clause (2) of Article 226 the High Court may exercise its power conferred by clause (1) if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territory over which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories. On a plain reading of the aforesaid two clauses of Article 226 of the Constitution it becomes clear that a High Court can exercise the power to issue directions, orders or writs for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose if the cause of action, wholly or in part, had arisen within the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, notwithstanding that the seat of the Government or authority or the residence of the person against whom the direction, order or writ is issued is not within the said territories. In order to confer jurisdiction on the High Court of Calcutta, NICCO must show that at least a part of the cause of action had arisen within the territorial jurisdiction of that Court. That is at best its case in the writ petition." 4. Recently, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Devi alias Shanti Mishra Vs. Union of India and others, (2020) 10 SCC 766 had an occasion to consider the aspect of territorial jurisdiction and cause of action and has held as under: "17. Mulla on the Code of Civil Procedure while commenting on Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code defined cause of action in following words:- "The expression 'cause of action' has acquired a judicially settled meaning. In the restricted sense 'cause of action' means the circumstances forming the infraction of the right or the immediate occasion for the action. In the wider sense, it means the necessary conditions for the maintenance of the suit, including not only the infraction of the right, but the infraction coupled with the right itself. Compendiously the expression means every fact by which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court..................." 18. Compendiously the expression means every fact by which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of the Court..................." 18. P. Ramanatha Aiyar in Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition, Volume 1, has defined the cause of action in following words:- "'Cause of action' has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court a remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to succeed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. "Cause of action" has also been taken to mean that particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject matter of the grievance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action." 19. Black's Law Dictionary defines the cause of action in following words:- "A group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person............" 29. Another submission which has been advanced by learned counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 is that the writ petition was rightly dismissed on the principle of forum non conveniens. Forum non conveniens has been defined by P. Ramanatha Aiyar, Advanced Law Lexicon, 3rd Edition in following words:- "Forum non conveniens.-The principle that a case should be heard in a Court of the place where parties, witnesses, and evidence are primarily located." 5. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Nawal Kishore Sharma Vs. Union of India, (2014) 9 SCC 329 has held that the question, whether or not cause of action, wholly or in part, has arisen within the territorial limit of any High Court, shall have to be decided in the light of the nature and character of the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction. 6. In order to maintain a writ petition, the petitioner has to establish that a legal right claimed by him has been infringed by the respondents within the territorial limit of the Court's jurisdiction. 6. Considering the several judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on earlier occasion and recently in the case of Shanti Devi (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has quashed the order passed by the High Court dismissing the petition on the ground of territorial jurisdiction and has held that even a part of cause of action gave jurisdiction to Court to entertain the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case the petitioner is resident of Gwalior. The petitioner and his Company is situated at Gwalior. Complainant is resident of Gwalior. All the work which was carried out for which complaint was made, was done at Gwalior. The complaint was made from Gwalior and part of cause of action has arisen at Gwalior. In such circumstances and following the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid cases, this Court is of the considered opinion that this Court is having territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to entertain the issue. 7. Next objection raised with respect to alternative remedy is concerned, it is a settled preposition of law that alternative remedy is no bar to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the large number of judgments. The present case is arising out of the fact that the disciplinary committee had violated the procedure as contemplated under the Act of 1949 as no proper opportunity of hearing and order impugned is violative of principle of natural justice as no opportunity to lead evidence was provided to the petitioner nor any opportunity was provided to cross-examine the witnesses. In such circumstances, the case is clearly falling under the guidelines issued by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be any straight jacket formula in respect of filing of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "14. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and others, (1998) 8 SCC 1 , wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that there cannot be any straight jacket formula in respect of filing of the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: "14. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 of the Constitution is plenary in nature and is not limited by any other provision of the Constitution. This power can be exercised by the High Court not only for issuing writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights contained in Part III of the Constitution but also for "any other purpose". 15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged. There is a plethora of case-law on this point but to cut down this circle of forensic whirlpool, we would rely on some old decisions of the evolutionary era of the constitutional law as they still hold the field. 16. Rashid Ahmed Vs. Municipal Board, Kairana, AIR 1950 SC 163 laid down that existence of an adequate legal remedy was a factor to be taken into consideration in the matter of granting Writs. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son Vs. The Income Tax Investigation Commissioner AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This was followed by another Rashid case, namely, K.S. Rashid & Son Vs. The Income Tax Investigation Commissioner AIR 1954 SC 207 which reiterated the above proposition and held that where alternative remedy existed, it would be a sound exercise of discretion to refuse to interfere in a petition under Article 226. This proposition was, however, qualified by the significant words, "unless there are good grounds therefor", which indicated that alternative remedy would not operate as an absolute bar and that Writ Petition under Article 226 could still be entertained in exceptional circumstances. 17. A specific and clear rule was laid down in State of U.P. vs. Mohd. Nooh AIR 1958 SC 86 , as under: "But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the Writ will be granted is a rule of policy convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies." 18. This proposition was considered by a Constitution Bench of this Court in A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 and was affirmed and followed in the following words: "The passages in the judgments of this Court we have extracted would indicate (1) that the two exceptions which the learned solicitor General formulated to the normal rule as to the effect of the existence of an adequate alternative remedy were by no means exhaustive and (2) that even beyond them a discretion vested in the High Court to have entertained the petition and granted the petitioner relief notwithstanding the existence of an alternative remedy. We need only add that the broad lines of the general principles on which the Court should act having been clearly laid down, their application to the facts of each particular case must necessarily be dependent on a variety of individual facts which must govern the proper exercise of the discretion of the Court, and that in a matter which is thus per-eminently one of discretion, it is not possible or even if it were, it would not be desirable to lay down inflexible rules which should be applied with rigidity in every case which comes up before the Court". 19. Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. 19. Another Constitution Bench decision in Calcutta Discount Co. Ltd. vs. ITO Companies Distt, AIR 1961 SC 372 laid down: "Though the writ of prohibition or certiorari will not issue against an executive authority, the High Courts have power to issue in a fit case an order prohibiting an executive authority from acting without jurisdiction. Where such action of an executive authority acting without jurisdiction subjects or is likely to subject a person to lengthy proceedings and unnecessary harassment, the High Court will issue appropriate orders or directions to prevent such consequences. Writ of certiorari and prohibition can issue against Income Tax Officer acting without jurisdiction under Section 34 Income Tax Act". 20. Much water has since flown beneath the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a Writ Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the Writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. 21. That being so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without examining the contention that the show-cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and that the Registrar, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the "Tribunal"." 8. The Constitutional Bench in Mohinder Singh Gill Vs. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405 held that natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence concept although varying in its play and that the "exceptions" to the rules of natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. The rule of audi alteram partem is the justice of law, without of course making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the common sense of the situation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "47. It is fair to hold that subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although varying in its play. 48. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held as under: "47. It is fair to hold that subject to certain necessary limitations natural justice is now a brooding omnipresence although varying in its play. 48. Once we understand the soul of the rule as fairplay in action-and it is so-We must hold that it extends to both the fields. After all, administrative power in a democratic set-up is not allergic to fairness in action and discretionary executive justice cannot degenerate into unilateral injustice. Nor is there ground to be frightened of delay, inconvenience and expense, if natural justice gains access. For fairness itself is a flexible: pragmatic and relative concept, not a rigid, ritualistic or sophisticated abstraction. It is not a bull in a china shop nor a bee in one's bonnet. Its essence is good conscience in a given situation: nothing more-but nothing less. The 'exceptions' to the rules of natural justice are a misnomer or rather are but a shorthand form of expressing the idea that in those exclusionary cases nothing unfair can be inferred by not affording an opportunity to present or meet a case. Text-book excerpts and ratios from rulings can be heaped, but they all converge to the same point that audi alteram partem is the justice of the law without, of course, making law lifeless, absurd, stultifying, self-defeating or plainly contrary to the commonsense of the situation. 66. It was argued, based on rulings relating to natural justice, that unless civil consequences ensued, hearing was not necessary. A civil right being adversely affected is a sine qua non for the invocation of the audi alteram partem rule. This submission was supported by observations in Ram Gopal, Col. Sinha. Of course, we agree that if only spiritual censure is the penalty, temporal laws may not take cognizance of such consequences since human law operates in the material field although its vitality vicariously depends on its morality. But what is a civil consequence, let us ask ourselves, bypassing verbal booby-traps? 'Civil consequence' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. "Civil" is defined by Black (Law Dictionary 4th Edn.) at p.311. 'Civil consequence' undoubtedly cover infraction of not merely property or personal rights but of civil liberties, material deprivations and non-pecuniary damages. In its comprehensive connotation, everything that affects a citizen in his civil life inflicts a civil consequence. "Civil" is defined by Black (Law Dictionary 4th Edn.) at p.311. "Ordinarily, pertaining or appropriate to a member of a civil as of free political community; natural or proper to a citizen. Also, relating to the community, or to the policy and government of the citizens and subjects of a state. The word is derived from the Latin civilise, a citizen... In law, it has various significations. Civil Rights' are such as belong to every citizen of the State or country, or, in a wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organisation or administration of government. They include the rights of property, marriage protection by the laws, freedom of contract, trial by jury, etc.... Or, as otherwise defined, civil rights are rights appertaining to a person in virtue of his citizenship in a State or community. Rights capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action. Also a term applied to certain rights secured to citizens of the United States by the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution, and by various act of Congress made in pursuance thereof. (p. 1487, Blacks Legal Dictionary)" The petition can directly be entertained owing to certain limitations. The case of the petitioner is fallen under the parameters as being established by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, the petition directly before this Court is maintainable. 9. So far as merits of the case are concerned it is alleged by the petitioner that he is working as a Chartered Accountant having registered company at Gwalior in the name o M/s. Rama K. Gupta and Co. The complaint was made against the petitioner to the effect that complainant wife is Director, therefore, she cannot sign balance-sheet. The petitioner cannot act as independent professional. Shares shown to be allotted against them money was not paid. The petitioner signed most of the documents thus, the act is not in accordance with the rules and manipulation has been done by the petitioner. The complaint was forwarded on 23.2.2017 and the disciplinary committee has taken the cognizance on the complaint. On 5.11.2018 the application was moved for calling one Amit Shrivastava as witness. The petitioner signed most of the documents thus, the act is not in accordance with the rules and manipulation has been done by the petitioner. The complaint was forwarded on 23.2.2017 and the disciplinary committee has taken the cognizance on the complaint. On 5.11.2018 the application was moved for calling one Amit Shrivastava as witness. On 5.12.2018 certain objections were submitted with respect to forming prima facie opinion in the matter. The objections are submitted as Annexure P/7 along with the petition. During the pendency of the disciplinary committee proceedings an affidavit was submitted by the complainant and prayer was made for withdrawal of the complaint. The affidavit was given by Amit Shrivastava. Thereafter the rights of the petitioner was closed by the Disciplinary Authorities and even Amit Shrivastava was not permitted to be cross-examined. In such circumstances, the action of the disciplinary committee is violative of principle of natural justice and no opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses or leading any evidence in defence has not been provided to the petitioner and only on the basis of presumption the impugned order has been passed. 10. Counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention of this Court to para 7 of the impugned order and has argued that although the respondent wife's holding does not fall within the clear cut definition of substantial interest, yet looking into the supporting documents which shows that she has been authenticating the Financial Statements of the Company for the Financial Year 2009-2010, signing annual return, holding more than 20% shares in the Company seem to suggest that she had substantial interest in the Company. It is further observed in para 8 by the disciplinary committee that the act of Amit Shrivastava being working as Director is indicating some possible collusion of the respondent with the Director. Further in para 10 the disciplinary committee has observed that the application is being received on 31st October, 2014 from the complainant requesting for withdrawal of her complaint. The Committee is of the opinion that these are again points towards the indulgence of the Respondent in trying to extricate himself from the case through undesirable means. Moreover, mentioning of the civil suit and various complaints filed against the complainant does not absolve the misconduct on the part of the respondent. The Committee is of the opinion that these are again points towards the indulgence of the Respondent in trying to extricate himself from the case through undesirable means. Moreover, mentioning of the civil suit and various complaints filed against the complainant does not absolve the misconduct on the part of the respondent. It was also observed that later-on complainant for the reason best known to him withdrew the complaint through the affidavit as mentioned above dated 3.7.2019 received from E-mail ID of Sanjeev Kumar Kansal (husband of complainant) but still kept on making request for the adjournments also subsequently, but the disciplinary committee has not permitted to withdraw the complaint and on his own has proceeded with the matter. Once the complainant itself was not cross-examined before the disciplinary committee and thereafter no opportunity to lead defence evidence was provided to the petitioner the order passed by the Authorities itself is bad in law. It is argued that the disciplinary committee on its own motion has drawn the conclusion against the petitioner and has held that the petitioner is guilty for expressing his opinion on financial statements of Company where he has a substantial interest as his wife was appointed as a Director of the abovesaid Company and also brings disrepute to the profession by perusal of false affidavit and forged signature of Complainant to gain undue benefit related to his case. The petitioner was held guilty under Clause (2) of Part IV of First Schedule and Clause (4) of Part 1 of the Second Schedule and Clause (7) of Part 1 Second Schedule of Chartered Accountant Act 1949. It is submitted that the entire procedure adopted by the disciplinary committee is not in consonance with the procedure prescribed for conducting the departmental inquiry. Even otherwise the order impugned suffers from principle of natural justice and only on the basis of presumption the impugned order has been passed and the petitioner has been held to be guilty. The Disciplinary Authorities themselves could not arrive at a definite conclusion, regarding guilt of petitioner. In such circumstances the order impugned is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. 11. The Disciplinary Authorities themselves could not arrive at a definite conclusion, regarding guilt of petitioner. In such circumstances the order impugned is unsustainable and deserves to be set aside. 11. Per contra counsel appearing for the respondents apart from raising preliminary objections has supported the impugned order and has argued that the impugned order passed by the Disciplinary Committee is based on facts and material placed on record and is in consonance with the law applicable thereto. The petitioner has totally failed to make out any ground warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The complaint against the petitioner has been dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Act and the Rules. Particularly the procedure provided under Rule 18 of the Rules has been followed. A fair and reasonable opportunity has been provided to the petitioner to lead his defence, but the petitioner has suppressed, misrepresented and twisted the material facts with the sole intent of framing a case of violation of principle of natural justice. The petitioner has participated in the proceedings, but has sought unnecessary adjournments. It is pointed out that the petitioner's witness Amit Shrivastava appeared before the disciplinary committee on 15.5.2019 and was examined at length by the counsel for the petitioner. Thereafter the said witness was even cross-examined by the complainant as is evident from the notes of hearing dated 15.5.2019. 12. After conclusion of the cross-examination time was sought which was also granted to the petitioner, but despite of opportunity being granted to him he has adopted the dilatory tactics of seeking adjournments on one ground or the other. Ample time was provided to him, but he has not chosen to conclude the arguments. In such circumstances the authority was not having any other option except to proceed in the matter and accordingly on the basis of material available on record the authorities have proceeded in the matter. It is further pointed out that the petitioner's wife has been shown as Chairman cum Managing Director and Mr. Amit Shrivastava as Director of the Company for Financial Year 2008-2009. The equity shares allotted to his wife are being shown as 33.33%, whereas the annual return signed by the petitioner himself that for the financial year 2008-09 showed his wife's shares as 38.33%. Amit Shrivastava as Director of the Company for Financial Year 2008-2009. The equity shares allotted to his wife are being shown as 33.33%, whereas the annual return signed by the petitioner himself that for the financial year 2008-09 showed his wife's shares as 38.33%. The supporting documents filed by the parties during the disciplinary proceedings clearly reflect that the wife of the petitioner has been authenticating the financial statements of the Company for the financial year 2009-2010 signing annual return and also holding more than 20% shares in the Company which clearly shows that she had substantial interest and control over the operations of the Company. It is submitted that even for the sake of arguments it is presumed that the complainant has filed an affidavit for withdrawal of the complaint, then under the Act of 1949 there is provision of taking suo motu cognizance in the matter looking to the interest of the institution at large. The parties are having powers and has dealt the matter suo motu once for the reasons best known to the complainant, has submitted an affidavit for withdrawal. Thereafter the Authorities have arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner's wife was having substantial interest in the company and after scrutiny of entire documents available on record and arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner was held guilty under clause (2) of Part IV of 1st Schedule and clause (4) and (7) of Part 1 of 2nd Schedule of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949. It is argued that scope of interference in departmental enquiry case is very limited and the High Court exercising the supervisory jurisdiction is not required to go into the merit of the case. It is required to see the procedure which has been adopted by the Authorities. He has relied upon he judgment passed in the case of Kusum Ingots & Alloys Lts. Vs. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 658, Union of India Vs. Adani Exports Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 567 , Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore and another Vs. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 and in the case of Oswal Fats and Oils Lts. Vs. Additional Commissioner, Bareilly Division, (2010) 4 SCC 728. He has prayed for dismissal of the petition. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 14. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85 and in the case of Oswal Fats and Oils Lts. Vs. Additional Commissioner, Bareilly Division, (2010) 4 SCC 728. He has prayed for dismissal of the petition. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 14. From perusal of the record it is seen that some undisputed facts are that initially the complaint made against the petitioner was on the basis of which the cognizance was taken by the disciplinary authority was prayed to be withdrawn by filing the affidavit by the complainant itself. Even after filling of withdrawal application the Committee has continued the proceedings. The order impugned reflects that same is being based on mere considering the possibility of collusion of the respondent with the Director of the Company. There is no substantial material available on record which have been considered by the disciplinary committee who arrived at conclusion that the wife of the respondent was having substantial interest in the company. In para 7 of the impugned order it is held by the disciplinary committee that "Although, the Respondent wife's holding does not fall within the clear cut definition of substantial interest, yet looking into the supporting documents which shows that she has been authenticating the Financial Statements of the Company for the Financial Year 2009-2010, signing annual return, holding more than 20% shares in the Company seem to suggest that she had substantial interest in the Company." In para 8 the disciplinary committee has arrived at the conclusion that there is some possible collusion of the Respondent with the Director of the Company. He is being guilty by the disciplinary committee on the basis of material available on record. Further in para 11 of the impugned order shows that despite an application for withdrawal of the complaint which was received on 31.10.2014 the disciplinary committee has continued with the proceedings. This clearly goes to show that the impugned order has been passed merely on the basis of possibilities. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of H.V. Panchaksharappa Vs. K.G. Eshwar, AIR 2000 SC 3344 has observed that: "....... a charge of professional misconduct is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge. Such a charge requires to be proved in the manner of proving a criminal charge and the nature of proof required to prove it is that of beyond a reasonable doubt......" 15. K.G. Eshwar, AIR 2000 SC 3344 has observed that: "....... a charge of professional misconduct is in the nature of a quasi-criminal charge. Such a charge requires to be proved in the manner of proving a criminal charge and the nature of proof required to prove it is that of beyond a reasonable doubt......" 15. In the present case the disciplinary committee has passed the order only on the basis of preponderance of probability and the petitioner was held guilty, despite of the fact that the charges levelled against the petitioner are required to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Once the complainant has itself submitted an affidavit for withdrawal of his complaint there was no occasion for the disciplinary committee to continue the proceedings as the proceedings is not in the nature of suo motu proceedings. The arguments advanced by the respondents that the authorities are having powers to take up the matter on its suo motu, but these proceedings are taken up by the authorities on the basis of complaint made against the petitioner and not under the suo motu proceedings. Thus, the aforesaid arguments has no limbs to stand. In such circumstances the order impugned is unsustainable as the same is violative of principle of natural justice and fair play and has been passed without following the procedure as contemplated under the Act of 1949. 16. Accordingly, finding merits in the writ petition the same is allowed. The order impugned dated 7th August, 2020 is hereby quashed. No order as to costs. E-copy/certified copy as per rules/directions.