ORDER : This petition is directed against the impugned order dated 30.06.2015 passed in O.S.No.335/2011 on the file of the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Magadi, whereby the trial Court allowed I.A. No. IV filed by respondents 1 and 2 under Order VI Rule 17 CPC seeking amendment of the plaint. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the material on record. The respondents having been served have chosen to remain unrepresented and they have not contes ted the petition. 3. The material on record indicates that it is not in dispute that the respondents 1 and 2 were the plaintiffs in the aforesaid suit filed by them for partition and separate possession of their alleged share in the suit schedule properties and for other reliefs. 4. A perusal of the plaint indicates that respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs have claimed 1/4th equal share in the 1/3rd share of their father who is arrayed as 3rd defendant in the said suit. During the pendency of the suit, respondents 1 and 2 moved the aforesaid application IA No.IV seeking amendment of the plaint. Though the said application was opposed by the petitioners herein, who were arrayed as defendants 2 to 5 in the suit, the trial Court proceeded to pass the impugned order allowing the said application, aggrieved by which the petitioners are before this Court by way of present writ petition. 5. In addition to reiterating various contentions urged in the petition and referring to the documents produced by the petitioners, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that it was not in dispute that the plaintiffs are the children of Chikkahanumaiah who was arrayed as defendant No.3 in the suit. It was also not in dispute that the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs claimed share in the suit schedule properties under their father-Chikkahanumaiah. Under these circumstances, the proposed amendment seeking to challenge the compromise decree as well as the relinquishment deed said to have been executed by Chikkahanumaiah in favour of the first defendant was not permissible under law in the light of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of TRILOKI NATH SINGH VS. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. L.R.S AND ORS., REPORTED IN AIR 2020 SC 2111 . 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the materials on record. 7. ANIRUDH SINGH (D) THR. L.R.S AND ORS., REPORTED IN AIR 2020 SC 2111 . 6. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the materials on record. 7. The material on record indicates that by way of the aforesaid application IA No. IV, respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs seek to assail the alleged relinquishment deed dated 18.04.1994 and subsequent compromise decree dated 20.07.2002 on the ground that they were minors and their interest was not safeguarded by their father at the time of entering into the compromise in the said suit. In this context it is relevant to state that the proposed amendment in the nature of adding prayer of declaration qua compromise decree is not maintainable in the light of Order 23 Rule 3-A of CPC as held by the Apex Court in the case of TRILOKI NATH SINGH (Supra) wherein it is held as under : 19. Thus, after the amendment which has been introduced, neither any appeal against the order recording the compromise nor remedy by way of filing a suit is available in cases covered by Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC. As such, a right has been given under Rule 1A(2) of Order 43 to a party, who denies the compromise and invites order of the Court in that regard in terms of proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC while preferring an appeal against the decree. Section 96(3) CPC shall not be a bar to such an appeal, because it is applicable where the factum of compromise or agreement is not in dispute. 20. In the present case, the partition suit was filed in 1978 and after the decision of the trial Court, the matter went in first appeal and eventually, Second Appeal No. 495/86 before the High Court. During the pendency of first appeal being continuation of the suit as stated, one of the parties to the pending proceedings, namely, Sampatiya allegedly entered into a sale deed with the appellant on 6th January, 1984. Indubitably the issue regarding right, title and interest in respect of the land which was the subject matter of sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, was still inchoate and not finally decided. In that sense, the claim of the appellant was to be governed by the decision in favour of or against Sampatiya in the pending appeal. Indubitably the issue regarding right, title and interest in respect of the land which was the subject matter of sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, was still inchoate and not finally decided. In that sense, the claim of the appellant was to be governed by the decision in favour of or against Sampatiya in the pending appeal. It must follow that the alleged transaction effected in favour of the appellant by a sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 ought to abide by the outcome of the said proceedings which culminated with the compromise decree passed by the High Court in Second Appeal No. 495/86 dated 15th September, 1994. 21. Indeed, the appellant was not a party to the stated compromise decree. He was, however, claiming right, title and interest over the land referred to in the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, which was purchased by him from Sampatiya-judgment debtor and party to the suit. It is well settled that the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the second appeal would relate back to the date of institution of the suit between the parties thereto. In the suit now instituted by the appellant, at the best, he could seek relief against Sampatiya, but cannot be allowed to question the compromise decree passed by the High Court in the partition suit. In other words, the appellant could file a suit for protection of his right, title or interest devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984, allegedly executed by one of the party (Sampatiya) to the proceedings in the partition suit, which could be examined independently by the Court on its own merits in accordance with law. The trial Court in any case would not be competent to adjudicate the grievance of the appellant herein in respect of the validity of compromise decree dated 15th September, 1994 passed by the High Court in the partition suit. 22. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his predecessor-Sampatiya, to the extent of rights and remedies available to Sampatiya in reference to the compromise decree. 22. In other words, the appellant can only claim through his predecessor-Sampatiya, to the extent of rights and remedies available to Sampatiya in reference to the compromise decree. Merely because the appellant was not party to the compromise decree in the facts of the present case, will be of no avail to the appellant, much less give him a cause of action to question the validity of the compromise decree passed by the High Court by way of a substantive suit before the civil Court to declare it as fraudulent, illegal and not binding on him. Assuming, he could agitate about the validity of the compromise entered into by the parties to the partition suit, it is only the High Court, who had accepted the compromise and passed decree on that basis, could examine the same and no other Court under proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23 CPC. It must, therefore, follow that the suit instituted before the civil Court by the appellant was not maintainable in view of specific bar under Rule 3A of Order 23 CPC as held in the impugned judgment. 23. In the instant case, the suit was instituted in the year 1995 and 25 years have rolled by now and after the finding has been recorded in reference to issue no. 7 regarding the right, title and interest of the suit property against the appellant by the learned trial Judge devolved on the basis of a stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 and not interfered by the Court of Appeal preferred at the instance of the appellant, in the given circumstances, remitting the matter back to the learned trial Court to examine the suit filed at the instance of the appellant-plaintiff independently for protection of his right, title or interest being devolved on the basis of the stated sale deed dated 6th January, 1984 which as alleged to have been executed by one of the party to the compromise(Sampatiya) in the changed circumstances may not serve any purpose more so after the concurrent finding of Courts below have been recorded against the appellant-plaintiff. 8. 8. As held in the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision, the undisputed fact that the respondents 1 and 2/plaintiffs claim their alleged share in the suit schedule properties through their father Chikkahanumaiah who was undisputedly a party to the compromise decree, the claim by the plaintiffs by way of challenge to the compromise decree is clearly barred under Order 23 Rule 3A of CPC as held in the aforesaid decision, which is squarely applicable to the facts of this case. The trial Court has not considered this crucial aspect of the matter which has occasioned failure of justice warranting interference by this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 9. In the result, I pass the following: ORDER i. The petition is allowed. ii. The impugned order dated 30.06.2015 passed in O.S.No.335/2011 by the II Additional Civil Judge and JMFC, Magadi is hereby set aside. iii. Consequently, I.A. No.IV filed by the plaintiffs/respondents 1 and 2 stands dismissed.