JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. T. Lalnunsiama, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 2. This appeal had been filed by the appellant/ plaintiff against dismissal of Civil Suit No. 35/2009 vide Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2015, passed by the Court of the Civil Judge, Aizawl. 3. The case of the appellant/plaintiff is that as the appellant was in need of money, she approached the respondent for a loan of Rs. 12 lakhs in the month of December, 2008. The respondent agreed to give the loan and stated that the loan agreement would be in the form of an oral agreement. However, a Sale Deed would have to be made for the appellant’s land and building covered by LSC No. AZL. 91 of 1974, which would be used as collateral security for repayment of the loan. The further case of the appellant is that the respondent assured the appellant that the Sale Deed would only be used to secure the loan amount and that the Sale Deed would be cancelled once the loan amount was repaid. Accordingly, on 10.12.2008, Sale Deed was executed between the parties and the respondent handed over a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs to the appellant. The interest payable on the loan amount of Rs. 15 lakhs was 10% per month. Out of the Rs. 15 lakhs loan, Rs. 3 lakh was returned by the appellant to the respondent, as interest on the Rs. 15 lakhs loan for the months of December, 2008 and January, 2009. The appellant’s further case is that the appellant was to return the entire loan amount with interest within 6 months w.e.f. 10.12.2008. 4. On 10.06.2009, the appellant requested the respondent to receive Rs. 21 lakhs, which included the principal amount and interest and to return the LSC (land document) which had been put up as collateral security and to cancel the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008. The respondent however refused to receive the money, return the LSC and declined to cancel the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008. Further, the respondent asked the appellant to leave the property. The respondent however refused to receive the money, return the LSC and declined to cancel the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008. Further, the respondent asked the appellant to leave the property. The appellant consequently filed Civil Suit No. 35/2009 stating that the appellant had executed the Sale Deed, due to the misrepresentation made by the respondent and that there would be no actual sale of the land covered by the LSC No. AZL 91/1974, as the same would treated as collateral security for the loan/money given by the respondent to the appellant. The appellant thus prayed for a declaration that the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 be declared void and that the Sale Deed be cancelled. The further prayer of the appellant was to allow the appellant to take back the LSC which was put up as collateral security, upon repayment of the loan amount. 5. The respondent submitted his written statement in Civil Suit No. 35/2009 praying for dismissal of the suit on the ground the Sale Deed had been executed by the parties and as there was no infirmity with the registration of the same. The respondent’s stand was that the land and building covered by LSC No. AZL 91/1974 had been sold by the appellant to the respondent for a sum of Rs. 15 lakhs, which had been received by the appellant. The money had not been given as a loan to the appellant and that there was no oral agreement made between the parties. Also, no part of the Rs. 15 lakhs had been given back to the respondent. Further, the appellant had also executed the Government document, i.e., “Hmun Inleina Lehkha”, which was also a kind of a Sale Deed, besides being the standard form used for transfer of ownership of the land from the name of the seller to the name of the buyer. As the appellant was bound by the same, the stand taken by the appellant that there was no sale of the land and building was a completely false and mischievous statement. 6. The learned Trial Court thereafter framed seven issues, which are as follows:- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style. 2. Whether the suit is barred by the doctrine of estoppel and whether the suit can be entertained without sufficient amount of Court fees. 3. Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party. The learned Trial Court thereafter framed seven issues, which are as follows:- 1. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form and style. 2. Whether the suit is barred by the doctrine of estoppel and whether the suit can be entertained without sufficient amount of Court fees. 3. Whether the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary party. 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief claimed, if so, to what extent? 5. Whether the Sale Deed was in fact a mortgaged agreement or not and whether it was valid or not. 6. Whether the plaintiff has the right of redemption. 7. Whether the mortgaged property is redeemable, if so, on what amount? 7. After examining seven plaintiff witnesses and three defendant witnesses, the learned Trial Court came to a finding that the appellant had sold her land and building to the respondent with her free consent that the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 had been duly registered and stamped as per law. The Civil Suit No. 35/2009 was consequently dismissed. Aggrieved by the impugned Judgment and Order dated 09.03.2015, passed by the Court of the Civil Judge, Aizawl in Civil Suit No. 35/2009, the appellant has filed the present appeal. 8. Mr. L.H. Lianhrima, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the cross examination of the respondent and his witness, namely, Sh. Lalchungnunga shows that they have admitted that the money given by the respondent to the appellant was a loan amount, as their evidence adduced in the cross examination is to the effect that the appellant “borrowed” money from the respondent. The further stand of the learned senior counsel for the appellant is that the market value of the building at the relevant point of time, as per the evidence of the respondent during cross examination on 27.08.2013, is that he believed the market price of the land and building covered by LSC No. AZL. 91/1974 would be around Rs. 50 lakhs. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellant had taken a loan of Rs. 15 lakhs and though the same was sought to be repaid, the respondent refused to receive the same. 91/1974 would be around Rs. 50 lakhs. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the appellant had taken a loan of Rs. 15 lakhs and though the same was sought to be repaid, the respondent refused to receive the same. He submits that the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008, which had been executed by the appellant due to misrepresentation by the respondent, should be cancelled and in support of his submission, he relies upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade Vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor, reported in (1999) 2 SCC 471 . 9. Mr. T. Lalnunsiama, the learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand submits that the only ground of challenge made by the appellant to the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 is that the same had been executed due to misrepresentation. However, the evidence adduced by the parties goes to show that there was no giving of loan by the respondent to the appellant. Instead, there had been a sale of land and building covered by LSC No. AZL 91/1974, by executing a sale deed which had been registered under the Registration Act, 1908. Rs. 15 lakhs was paid by the respondent to the appellant for the sale of the property and no money was returned by the appellant to the respondent. The respondent counsel submits that the appellant has not denied that the Sale Deed had been executed and registered as per law. The appellant had also executed a form made by the State Government, i.e. “Hmun Inleina Lehkha”, which proved that sale of property had taken place and which provided for transfer/mutation of ownership of LSC No. AZL 91/1974 from the name of the appellant to the respondent. He also submits that besides the execution of Sale Deed under the Registration Act, the original land document had been handed over by the appellant to the respondent. He submits that as there is a registered Sale Deed, the same would have an over-riding effect over any oral agreement made between the parties, though it is denied by the respondent’s counsel that any oral agreement was made between the parties. The respondent’s counsel also submits that the market value of the land at the time the Sale Deed was executed was Rs. 15 lakhs and the appropriate land value of Rs. The respondent’s counsel also submits that the market value of the land at the time the Sale Deed was executed was Rs. 15 lakhs and the appropriate land value of Rs. 50 lakhs in the opinion of the respondent, as reflected in the evidence, was in relation to the land value when the cross examination took place, i.e. 27.08.2013 and not when the Sale Deed was executed. The respondent’s counsel submits that as the ‘Sale Deed’ and the ‘Hmun Inleina Lehkha’ was executed by the appellant with open eyes, the appellant cannot now be allowed to take the stand that no sale of land and building had taken place. 10. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties. 11. A perusal of the pleadings, the evidence adduced in the Trial Court and considering the submissions made by the counsels for the parties, there is no dispute with the fact that money amounting to Rs. 15 lakhs had been taken by the appellant from the respondent. The basic issue to be decided, is whether the money taken by the appellant was in the form of a loan and whether the land and building covered by LSC No. AZL 91 of 1974 had been mortgaged as a collateral security. 12. The counsel for the appellant has not denied the fact that the appellant had executed the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 in respect of LSC No. AZL 91 of 1974 and that it had been duly registered and stamped as per law. The issue is whether the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 had been made by way of misrepresentation, inasmuch as, the appellant has taken the stand that there was an oral agreement that the money taken by the appellant was a loan and the sale deed was to be cancelled, once the loan amount was repaid. In this respect, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the evidence given by the respondent in his cross examination, as reflected in the Paper Book, wherein he has purportedly stated in paragraph No. 14 as follows:- “14. Actually, Mrs. Vanlalruati borrowed my money and in return mortgaged her LSC No.Azl 91 of 1974. In this respect, the learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon the evidence given by the respondent in his cross examination, as reflected in the Paper Book, wherein he has purportedly stated in paragraph No. 14 as follows:- “14. Actually, Mrs. Vanlalruati borrowed my money and in return mortgaged her LSC No.Azl 91 of 1974. It is however not a fact that I made the Sale Deed only based on my own terms and conditions.” A reading of the entire evidence including the examination-in-chief and cross examination of the respondent as reflected in the Paper Book prepared by the Registry and in the Lower Court Records, is basically to the effect that the respondent had bought LSC No. AZL 91 of 1974 for Rs. 15 lakhs and a sale deed had been made for the same on 10.12.2008. Further, the application for transfer of ownership of the land from the appellant to the respondent as per the prescribed form made by the Government, which is “Hmun Inleina Lehkha” was executed by the appellant. Though the respondent has purportedly stated in paragraph No. 14 of the cross examination, as reflected in the Paper Book, that the appellant borrowed his money, the same cannot be relied upon, as the same is an English translation of the evidence adduced by the respondent in the Mizo language before Trial Court. 13. A perusal of the English translation in the Paper Book vis-à-vis the evidence adduced in the Mizo language by the respondent before the learned Trial Court clearly goes to show that there was no admission made by the respondent, admitting that the appellant had borrowed money from him and that LSC No. AZL 91 of 1974 had been mortgaged as collateral security. A reading of the evidence of the respondent in his cross examination before the learned Trial Court, which is in the Mizo language, shows that a suggestion was put to the respondent, which he denied. The counsel for the appellant had made a suggestion that the appellant had borrowed money, LSC No. AZL 91 of 1974 had been mortgaged as security and that the sale deed had been made as per the wishes of the respondent. This suggestion had been denied by the respondent in paragraph No. 14 of his cross examination, as can be seen in the Lower Court Records. This suggestion had been denied by the respondent in paragraph No. 14 of his cross examination, as can be seen in the Lower Court Records. The evidence recorded in the Mizo language before the learned Trial Court is as follows: 14. Pi Vanlalruati hian anihna takah chuan ka pawisa a puk a, a in leh a hmun LSC No.AZL 91 of 1974 a dahkham a, amaherawhchu, keima ruahmanna in sale deed kan siam ta mai a ni i tih hi dik ka ti lo.” 14. The learned counsel for the appellant had also relied upon the evidence of the respondent’s witness, Sh. Lalchungnunga, in paragraph No. 4 of his cross examination, as reflected in the Paper Book, which is to the following effect:- “4. The Plaintiff borrowed money from the Defendant. It is not a fact that the Plaintiff mortgaged her LSC in the process.” 15. As can be seen, the evidence of the respondent’s witness Sh. Lalchungnunga, in paragraph 4 of his cross-examination, as reflected in the Paper Book, is to the effect that the respondent had lent money to the appellant. On perusing the Lower Court records, it is again seen that the evidence of the respondent’s witness Sh. Lalchungnunga, in paragraph No. 4 of his cross examination, which is in the Mizo language, has not been properly translated, inasmuch as, the evidence which was taken in Mizo before the learned Trial Court shows that a suggestion had been made to the witness that the appellant had borrowed money from the respondent and that the appellant had mortgaged her land and building in return. This suggestion was however denied by the witness. The evidence recorded in the Mizo language before the learned Trial Court is as follows:- “4. Plaintiff hian Defendant hnen atang hian pawisa a puk a, chumi a pukna atan chuan a inhmun leh LSC te a dahkham a ni i tih hi ka pawm lo.” 16. Thus, as per the evidence recorded in the Trial Court, there is nothing to show that the money received by the appellant from the respondent was a loan. Plaintiff hian Defendant hnen atang hian pawisa a puk a, chumi a pukna atan chuan a inhmun leh LSC te a dahkham a ni i tih hi ka pawm lo.” 16. Thus, as per the evidence recorded in the Trial Court, there is nothing to show that the money received by the appellant from the respondent was a loan. The translation of the evidence of the parties by the Registry of the High Court, as given in the paper book, leaves a lot to be desired and could have occasioned a failure of justice, if one were to rely only upon the English translation of the evidence, as reflected in the Paper Book. 17. The submission made by the learned counsel for the appellant that the market value of the land and building covered by LSC No. AZL. 91 of 1974 was much more than Rs. 15 lakhs on the date of the Sale Deed was executed, i.e. on 10.12.2008 is not proved, as the evidence of the respondent, which is being relied upon by the appellant, only reflects the opinion of the respondent that the cost of the said property would be around Rs. 50 lakhs on the date the evidence was recorded, i.e. on 27.08.2013. There is also no evidence or proof in the Lower Court Records that Rs. 3 lakhs out of Rs. 15 lakhs had been given back by the appellant to the respondent. 18. In the case of Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade Vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (Supra), the Apex Court had set aside the judgment of the High Court and upheld the judgments of the Lower Courts, wherein the sale deed which had been executed as security for a loan had been set aside. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to show or prove that the sale deed executed on 10.12.2008 was to be used as security, for the amount of Rs. 15 lakhs taken by the appellant from the respondent, assuming that the said amount was a loan amount. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the judgment of the Apex Court in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade Vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (Supra), cannot be applied to the facts of this case. 19. In the case of Grasim Industries Limited & Anr. Vs. Accordingly, this Court is of the view that the judgment of the Apex Court in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade Vs. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor (Supra), cannot be applied to the facts of this case. 19. In the case of Grasim Industries Limited & Anr. Vs. Agarwal Steel, reported in (2010) 1 SCC 83 , the Apex Court has held that when a person signs a document, there is a presumption, that he has read the document properly and understood it and only then he has affixed his signature thereon, otherwise no signature on a document can ever be accepted. This is of course subject to a person being made to sign a document by having proof of force or fraud. In the present case, the appellant has not denied signing the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 or the “Hmun Inleina Lehkha”, a form made by the Government, which not only acts as a Sale Deed but by which ownership of land is mutated/transferred from one person to another. In fact, while the appellant/plaintiff in her plaint in Civil Suit No. 35/2009 has prayed for a declaration to declare the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 to be void, she has not challenged the validity of “Hmun Inleina Lehkha”, which was executed by her on 09.12.2008. She has also not denied making the “Hmun Inleina Lehkha”. In the present case, the appellant has not been able to show or prove that any fraud or misrepresentation had taken place, at the time “Hmun Inleina Lehkha” dated 09.12.2008 and the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 were executed. As the Sale Deed dated 10.12.2008 had been registered as per Registration Act, 1908 and the original land documents have been delivered by the appellant to the respondent, the purported oral agreement, which the appellant has failed to prove had existed, cannot override the registered document made under the Registration Act, 1908. 20. In view of the reasons stated above, this Court does not find any ground to interfere with the impugned judgment and order. The appeal is accordingly dismissed. Send Back the LCR.