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Telangana High Court · body

2021 DIGILAW 20 (TS)

Kota Reddy Veerappareddy v. State of Telangana Rep. by Public Prosecutor, High Court, Hyderabad

2021-01-18

K.LAKSHMAN

body2021
ORDER : 1. This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short Cr.P.C.) to quash the proceedings in Crime No. 458 of 2020 pending on the file of Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad City Commissionerate. The petitioner herein is sole accused in the said Crime. The offences alleged against him are under Sections 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’). 2. BRIEF FACTS AND ALLEGATIONS LEVELLED AGAINST THE PETITIONER IN THE COMPLAINT: (i) Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP was incorporated under Section 12(1)(b) of the Limited Liability Partnership Act, 2008 (for short ‘LLP Act’). Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) Agreement dated 21.05.2014 was executed. Petitioner-accused and respondent No. 2-de facto complainant, are designated partners. (ii) The LLP has undertaken a project named Sri. Aditya Casa Grand at Narsingi, Hyderabad. It had entered into three Development Agreements-cum-General Power of Attorneys (for short ‘DAGPAs’) dated 16.09.2016, 21.09.2016 and 26.09.2016 respectively in relation to the development of residential Villas over an extent of land admeasuring approximately Acs. 16-24 guntas in Survey Nos. 155 and 156 of Narsingi Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. (iii) The LLP has contributed its land towards the project, for which the de facto complainant has made the proportionate investment into the LLP. (iv) Pursuant to the DAGPAs, the LLP has agreed to develop the project consisting of 54 Villas, out of which 29.5 Villas fell to the share of the LLP. (v) As per Clause 4.1 of the LLP agreement, the day-to-day operation of the LLP vests in the designated partners and according to Clause 4.2, a designated partner is entitled to carry out such specific acts, deeds and things, as the partners, by resolution, authorize them to do. (vi) As per Article 12.1 of the LLP agreement, each partner of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP shall be bound to carry on the business of the LLP in a diligent manner to the greatest common advantage to be just and faithful to each other and to render true and fair statements of accounts and solvency and other information relating to the state of affairs of the LLP. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP shall be bound to carry on the business of the LLP in a diligent manner to the greatest common advantage to be just and faithful to each other and to render true and fair statements of accounts and solvency and other information relating to the state of affairs of the LLP. (vii) Ever since the date of incorporation of LLP, neither of the designated partners have signed any resolution or authorization, empowering the other to undertake any action on behalf of the LLP, more so, with regard to sale of Villas which fell to the share of LLP and the sale consideration at which the Villas should be sold and such decisions should be undertaken by both the designated partners, as set out in Clauses 4.1 and 4.2 of the LLP agreement. (viii) The petitioner-accused in utter disregard to the terms of the LLP Agreement and in violation of his fiduciary duty as a designated partner towards the LLP, has operated the affairs of the LLP in a unilateral manner, with a mala-fide intention to make illegal and wrongful gain and committed offence of cheating and criminal breach of trust. (ix) The LLP has not passed any resolution to sell any Villa that fell to its share, much less deciding the sale consideration for sale of such Villas and that the petitioner has unilaterally decided to sell the Villas falling to the share of the LLP without consent and concurrence of the de facto complainant which is a violative of the terms of the LLP Agreement and the fiduciary duty as a designated partner of the LLP. (x) The de facto complainant came to know about the unilateral execution of sale-deeds in respect of 23 Villas in favour of purchasers by the petitioner without the consent and signature of the de facto complainant and without the LLP passing any resolution for execution of any sale-deed only after getting certified copies of sale-deeds from the Registration office (e-Seva). (xi) The petitioner herein has unilaterally and without consent of the designated partner, authorized one Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, as a representative of the LLP, to execute the sale-deeds in favour of the purchasers which is illegal and amounts to breach of trust as a designated partner. (xi) The petitioner herein has unilaterally and without consent of the designated partner, authorized one Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, as a representative of the LLP, to execute the sale-deeds in favour of the purchasers which is illegal and amounts to breach of trust as a designated partner. (xii) The de facto complainant came to know that the petitioner has unilaterally executed sale-deeds on behalf of the LLP in respect of Villa Nos. 5, 24 and 36, which fell to the share of the LLP and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, as a representative of the LLP, in pursuance of the unauthorized authorization given to him by the petitioner, has executed registered sale-deeds in respect of Villa Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13, 15, 17, 18, 22, 23, 27, 35, 38, 41, 42, 43 and 44, considered as 44 only, 45, 47, 48 and 55. (xiii) The sale consideration amounts for the Villas sold under 23 registered sale-deeds are specifically mentioned in the tabular form of the complaint dated 20.07.2020 by the de facto complainant, including the details of the Villa number, sale-deed number, date, name of the purchaser, sale consideration amount, date of first advance amount, size of plot, constructed area and the difference amount when compared to sale consideration of Villa No. 36 etc. (xiv) That all the Villas were sold for a lesser sale consideration, which is ridiculously low price compared to the sale consideration of Villa No. 36 as mentioned in the complaint. (xv) All the Villas except two are on the same extent of land i.e. 832.18 square yards and approximately the same constructed area. The Villa No. 36 was agreed to be sold for Rs. 8,04,40,000/- by determining the sale consideration as early as 30.06.2016. The Villa No. 35 was agreed to be sold for an abnormally low price of Rs. 3.00 Crores only on 19.09.2016 i.e. less than three months after determining the price of Villa No. 36 at Rs. 8,04,40,000/-. Villa Nos. 41 and 42 together were agreed to be sold for Rs. 7.00 Crores on 13.11.2017 which is twice the size of Villa No. 36. (xvi) All the Villas were sold at a price lesser than Villa No. 36. (xvii) All the Villas except two Villas were sold after Villa No. 36 for a lesser price when the general market trend was on the upside in the said area from 2016 onwards. 7.00 Crores on 13.11.2017 which is twice the size of Villa No. 36. (xvi) All the Villas were sold at a price lesser than Villa No. 36. (xvii) All the Villas except two Villas were sold after Villa No. 36 for a lesser price when the general market trend was on the upside in the said area from 2016 onwards. (xviii) There is no reason for the sale consideration being lesser than Villa No. 36 having regard to the uptrend in prices in that area. (xxix) The petitioner has received a minimum sale consideration for all the Villas on par with Villa No. 36 or an amount above than that. (xx) Even by taking the sale consideration of Villa No. 36 as per the registered sale-deed as base price, the sale consideration of rest of the Villas is substantially lower and the difference in the values when compared to Villa No. 36 which shows the extent of misappropriation. (xxi) Thus, the said differential amount of Rs. 73.96 Crores is minimum amount that was misappropriated by committing criminal breach of trust by the petitioner while acting as an agent without authorization from the LLP. (xxii) The actual amount misappropriated could be far greater than the above mentioned amount as the real market value was higher than what was reflective in the registered sale-deeds and such actual extent of misappropriation is in the exclusive knowledge of the petitioner. (xxiii) The extent of misappropriation mentioned in the complaint is based on admitted sale consideration in the registered sale-deed executed by the petitioner and the actual extent of misappropriation can be known only after thorough investigation of actual sale consideration received from the Vendors which is in the exclusive knowledge of the petitioner. (xxiv) The petitioner herein has dishonestly misappropriated and converted to his own use by suppressing the differential amount of sale consideration between the actual sale consideration and the sale consideration shown in the registered sale-deeds while exercising dominion over the property of LLP in complete violation and direction of the law prescribing his functioning as a designated partner as per the Articles of the LLP according to which such trust is to be discharged and, thus, the petitioner has committed the offence of criminal breach of trust. (xxv) The petitioner-accused had conducted the business of the LLP Company in complete breach of trust reposed on him and conducted all banking operations according to his own whims and fancies without keeping the de facto complainant informed of his actions in many major matters. (xxvi) Thus, the petitioner has violated the provisions set forth in the LLP Agreement by breaching the provisions of the Agreement which he is expected to follow. (xxvii) The LLP is having its bank account in Andhra Bank, Jubilee Hills Branch which is now known has Union Bank of India, and the de facto complainant has obtained statement of account of the LLP from the said bank which discloses that the petitioner directly transferred LLP funds to his own company called M/s. Aditya Homes Pvt. Ltd. an amount of Rs. 1,15,09,708/- on various dates as mentioned in the tabular form of the complaint. (xxviii) Thus, according to the de facto complainant, the petitioner has committed cheating and criminal breach to the extent of magnitude stated in the complaint. (xxix) With the above said allegations, respondent No. 2-de facto complainant (hereinafter referred to as ‘de facto complainant’) has requested the police to take action against the petitioner in accordance with law. 3. On receipt of the said complaint, the Station House Officer, Banjara Hills Police Station, has registered the case vide Crime No. 458 of 2020 against the petitioner for the aforesaid offences and started investigated. 4. Heard Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel representing Mr. B. Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, Mr. E. Ajay Reddy, learned counsel for de facto complainant and the learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent no. 1-State. 5. CONTENTIONS OF THE PETITIONER: (i) The contents of the complaint do not disclose cognizable offences and lacks the ingredients of the offences alleged against the petitioner. (ii) The dispute eventually of civil in nature. (iii) Virtually, the de facto complainant is seeking interpretation of Clauses of LLP agreement by the police during investigation. (iv) On 08.07.2020 itself, the de facto complainant has invoked the arbitration clause i.e. Clause 7.4 of LLP Agreement. (v) There is abnormal delay in lodging the complaint by the de facto complainant. (vi) The de facto complainant has signed the Financial Statements and balance sheets filed by the LLP every year including the latest one. (iv) On 08.07.2020 itself, the de facto complainant has invoked the arbitration clause i.e. Clause 7.4 of LLP Agreement. (v) There is abnormal delay in lodging the complaint by the de facto complainant. (vi) The de facto complainant has signed the Financial Statements and balance sheets filed by the LLP every year including the latest one. (vii) There is suppression of fact by the de facto complainant. (viii) The de facto complainant is trying to criminalize the civil proceedings by lodging the present complaint. (ix) The de facto complainant has filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide C.O.P. No. 23 of 2020 seeking to restrain the petitioner herein from alienating, encumbering, parting with possession or creating third-party rights of any means whatsoever over Villa Nos. 37, 39, 40, 46 and 52 in Sri. Aditya Casa Grand, situated in Survey Nos.155 (P) and 156 (P) of Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District and for other reliefs. The said C.O.P. is pending. (x) The de facto complainant has filed the said application (C.O.P. No. 23 of 2020) on 20.07.2020 and failed to succeed in getting interim order. Therefore, he has lodged the complaint on the very same day i.e. 20.07.2020 at 9.30 p.m. with Banjara Hills Police Station. Thus, the de facto complainant tried to criminalize the civil proceedings with a mala-fide intention to settle the score and it amounts to abuse of process of law. (xi) The de facto complainant got issued a legal notice dated 04.07.2020, for which the petitioner herein has sent a reply dated 08.07.2020, and even then the de facto complainant suppressing the said facts, lodged the present complaint. (xii) The punishment for the offence under Section 406 of IPC alleged against the petitioner herein is an imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Similarly, the punishment for the offence under Section 420 of IPC is an imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Therefore, the Investigating Officer has invoked the procedure laid down under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. by issuing a notice, for which the petitioner herein has submitted his explanation along with relevant supporting documents. Therefore, the Investigating Officer has invoked the procedure laid down under Section 41A of Cr.P.C. by issuing a notice, for which the petitioner herein has submitted his explanation along with relevant supporting documents. The Investigating Officer without considering the same and under the guise of investigation, calling the petitioner to the police station and making him to wait for hours together and harassing him. Explaining the same, he has filed an affidavit. (xiii) The de facto complainant has suppressed the fact of his suspension which is basis for the entire litigation. (xiv) There is no allegation in the entire complaint that the petitioner herein induced the de facto complainant at the beginning while entrusting the property. (xv) Entrustment is on both parties and there is no obligation of duties, and placed reliance on Sections 4, 6, 7(4), 7(5), 7(6), 8 and 37 of LLP Act, 2008. (xvi) The de facto complainant having signed the financial statements filed by the LLP every year including the current year, suppressed the same in the entire complaint and lodged the present complaint with a mala-fide intention to harass the petitioner to settle the score and, therefore, it is abuse of process of law. (xvii) There is no criminal intention or dishonest intention at the time of entering into LLP Agreement and formation of LLP and, therefore, the contents of the complaint lack the ingredients of Sections 405 and 415 of IPC. There must be entrustment of property and inducement at the threshold of offence under Section 406 of IPC, which is lacking in the present complaint. (xviii) The de facto complainant failed to plead the alleged entrustment in the complaint. The contents of FIR, the legal notice and the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act vide C.O.P. No. 23 of 2020 are contrary to the contents of complaint. (xix) Placed reliance on the principle laid down in several judgments of the Apex Court and other High Courts which would be dealt with contextually. 6. CONTENTIONS OF DE FACTO COMPLAINANT: (i) The contents of the complaint are very much forms the ingredients of Sections 405 and 415 of IPC and there is cognizable offence. Therefore, the police have to necessarily register a case by following the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lalita Kumari vs. State of Utter Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 . Therefore, the police have to necessarily register a case by following the guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Lalita Kumari vs. State of Utter Pradesh, (2014) 2 SCC 1 . (ii) The complaint cannot be quashed on the grounds of delay and pendency of civil proceedings. (iii) The contents of the complaint disclose the ingredients of criminal breach of trust and cheating specifically. In the complaint, it is specifically pleaded about the modus operandi adopted by the petitioner and criminal breach of trust and cheating. (iv) The petitioner acted unilaterally which is detrimental to the interests of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. He has executed sale-deeds by receiving sale consideration and the comparative consideration received by the petitioner representing Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP mentioned in the tabular form would disclose the same. (v) The petitioner has appointed one Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy as Power of Attorney Holder to execute sale-deeds without consent and proper resolution of LLP. All the sale-deeds executed by the petitioner are without any supporting resolution. (vi) Clause 4.3 is not an exception to Clause 4.2 of LLP agreement dated 21.05.2014. (vii) The de facto complainant came to know about illegalities of breach of trust committed by the petitioner on receipt of legal notice and, thereafter, the de facto complainant has obtained certified copies and lodged the present complaint. (viii) Financial statements do not contain the meticulous details. (ix) 20 Villas were sold after 01.04.2019 and the financial statement for the year 2019-20 of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP was not filed. Therefore, the de facto complainant is unaware of the criminal breach of trust and cheating committed by the petitioner. (x) Reliance was placed on the principle laid down in various judgments rendered by the Apex Court as well as other High Courts, which would be dealt with later contextually. 7. CONTENTIONS OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR: (i) The matter is at crime stage. (ii) Investigation is pending. (iii) The punishment for the offence under Section 406 of IPC alleged against the petitioner herein is an imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. Similarly, the punishment for the offence under Section 420 of IPC is an imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Similarly, the punishment for the offence under Section 420 of IPC is an imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. Therefore, the Investigating Officer has already invoked the procedure laid down under Section 41-A of the Cr.P.C. by issuing notice. (iv) The petitioner has already submitted reply to the said notice along with supporting documents and, therefore, the Investigating Officer in the present crime will consider the same in accordance with law. (v) Neither the Investigating Officer, nor any police official of Banjara Hills Police Station harassed the petitioner under the guise of investigation as alleged by the petitioner. (vi) The contents of the complaint prima facie disclose the commission of offences alleged against the petitioner and also a cognizable offence. Therefore, by following the guidelines issued by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari (supra), the present crime was registered against the petitioner, and there is no error in it. (vii) Investigation cannot be stifled which is at initial stage. (viii) In many cases, police have closed the criminal cases on the ground of lack of evidence and civil in nature etc. (ix) The petitioner has already obtained anticipatory bail and, therefore, there is no threat of his arrest. 8. ANALYSIS AND FINDING OF THE COURT: (i) The above stated rival contentions and the material available on record would reveal that the petitioner and the de facto complainant are designated partners of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP and it was incorporated on 15.05.2014. They have entered into a Limited Liability Partnership Agreement on 21.05.2014. (ii) The sum and substance of the allegations made by the de facto complainant against the petitioner-accused is that the petitioner herein has acted unilaterally and carried on business of LLP unilaterally without the consent of the de facto complainant, appointed Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, as an Agent to execute sale-deeds without any resolution of LLP and, thus, the petitioner has acted in the manner which is detrimental to the interests of LLP in general and the de facto complainant, designated partner of LLP in particular. The said unilateral action of the petitioner is in violation of several Articles/Clauses of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014, more particularly Articles 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Thus, the petitioner has committed criminal breach of trust and cheated the de facto complainant. The said unilateral action of the petitioner is in violation of several Articles/Clauses of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014, more particularly Articles 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Thus, the petitioner has committed criminal breach of trust and cheated the de facto complainant. In support of the same, he has mentioned the details, such as Villa Number, Sale-Deed document Number and its date, name of customer, consideration amount mentioned in the sale-deed, date of payment of first advance amount, plot size, area of construction, difference of amount when compared with the sale consideration amount of Villa No. 36 in a tabular form. (iii) By referring to the same, on the analysis of the data, the bone contention of the de facto complainant is that the petitioner has sold the Villas at a price less than Villa No. 36 and all the Villas except two Villas were sold after Villa No. 36 and they were sold for a lesser price when the general market trend was on consideration being lesser than Villa No. 36 having regard to the uptrend in prices in that area from 2016 onwards. Thus, the de facto complainant would contend that the petitioner has acted unilaterally which is detrimental to the interests of the LLP and, thus, committed criminal breach of trust and cheated him. (iv) In view of the above stated rival contentions, it is apt to refer to the relevant Articles/Clauses of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014: (a) Article 1.8 deals with ‘bank accounts’ which is as under: “The LLP may open and operate any bank account with any banks or as the Partners may from time to time unanimously agree upon. The bank account in the Designated Bank shall be operated by any of the Designated Partners or in such manner as may be unanimously decided by all the Partners of the LLP.” (b) Article 4.1 of the said LLP Agreement, dated 21.05.2014 deals with ‘day-to-day management’ which is as under: “Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, day-to-day operation of the LLP shall be vested with the Designated Partners, who shall have the power on behalf and in the name of Sri. Aditya Vamsiram Homes LLP to carry out any and all of the purposes of the LLP in accordance with the powers delegated to them by the Partners, in the manner prescribed herein below.” (c) Article 4.2 deals with ‘delegation of authority’ which is as under: The partners would through a resolution passed authorize the Designated Partners to do such specific acts, deeds and things, as they may think fit and proper.” (d) Article 4.3 deals with ‘matters requiring approval’ of all partners, which is as under: “Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, the following shall be unanimously decided upon and approved by all the Partners: (a) Change of name of the LLP. (b) Change in business of the LLP by way of omitting, adding or substantially changing any business. (c) Admission of new partner. (d) Increase in the capital contribution of the Partners. (e) Appointment or removal of a Designated Partner. (f) Opening of new bank account in the name of the LLP. (g) Purchase of any immovable property for the purpose of LLP business. (h) Amendment to any Article of the Agreement. (i) Finalizing and signing the annual statement of accounts and statement of accounts.” (e) Article 9 deals with ‘statutory records and filings’ and Article 9.1 deals with ‘maintenance of records’ which is as under: “The LLP shall keep at its registered office: (a) LLP Agreement and all amendments and modifications hereto. (b) Statutory records prescribed under the Act. (c) Copies of the income-tax returns of the LLP, if any. (d) Copies of any financial statements and audit reports of the LLP. (b) Statutory records prescribed under the Act. (c) Copies of the income-tax returns of the LLP, if any. (d) Copies of any financial statements and audit reports of the LLP. (e) Copies of annual returns of the LLP.” (f) Article 9.2 deals with ‘Annual fling’ which is as under: “The LLP shall prepare and file with the Registrar, a Statement of Account and Solvency, within a period of six months from the end of each financial year and an Annual return with the Registrar within sixty days of closure of its financial year, in the form prescribed under the LLP Act.” (g) Article 18.7 deals with ‘dispute resolution’ which is as under: “In case of any dispute or differences among the Partners or between the partners or between the partners and the legal heirs/representatives of the deceased partner or between and LLP whatsoever concerned with the affairs of the LLP or the interpretation of this Agreement, efforts shall be made to resolve such dispute or difference through mutual dialogue. Where such dialogue fails, the matter shall be referred to a Single arbitrator, if the parties agree upon one, or if the parties fail to reach a consensus on such appointment then such appointment shall be made in accordance with the subject to the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the ‘Arbitration Act’) and/or any statutory modification or re-enactment thereof for the time being in force. Such arbitral awards shall be binding on all parties to the dispute.” (v) The main object of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP is to carry on the business of real estate. The same was specifically mentioned in Schedule 3 of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014. (vi) It is not in dispute that, in the course of its business, the said Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP has undertaken a Project named Sri. Aditya Casa Grand at Narsingi, Hyderabad and entered into three DAGPAs, dated 16.09.2016, 21.09.2016 and 26.09.2016 respectively in relation to development of residential Villas over Acs. 16.24 Guntas of land in Survey Nos. 155 and 156 of Narsingi Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The LLP has agreed to develop the project consists of 54 Villas, out of which, 29.5 Villas fell to the share of LLP. 9. 16.24 Guntas of land in Survey Nos. 155 and 156 of Narsingi Village, Gandipet Mandal, Ranga Reddy District. The LLP has agreed to develop the project consists of 54 Villas, out of which, 29.5 Villas fell to the share of LLP. 9. RESOLUTION DATED 09.03.2016: (i) As per Article 1.8 of the LLP Agreement, it has opened an account and the petitioner and the de facto complainant being designated partners of the said LLP have passed a resolution on 09.03.2016 jointly authorizing Mr. B. Venkatarami Reddy and Mr. B. Vijay Kumar Reddy to operate accounts belonging to the LLP. In the said resolution, it is mentioned that it is further resolved that the petitioner being Managing Partner, authorized to operate the Current Account No. CBCA-01140012 with Corporation Bank, Jubilee Hills Branch, Hyderabad, and to sign for the value of cheques less than or exceeding Rs. 50,000/- individually. It is further resolved that the same be communicated to the bank and remain in force until duly rescinded and notice thereof in writing be given to the Bank by the partnership firm. (ii) It is also relevant to note that as per Article 9.2 of the Agreement, the said LLP has filed annual financial statements duly signed by the petitioner and the de facto complainant being designated partners of the said LLP. Both of them have filed annual returns made up to 31.03.2019 and starting date of financial year for which annual return is being filed is 01.04.2018, and also filed balance sheets with the appropriate Authority. The latest balance sheet was dated 26.09.2019 signed by both the petitioner and the de facto complainant as designated partners. The ledger account of the LLP for the period from 01.04.2019 to 23.07.2020 was also filed. (iii) By referring to the above, the learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the de facto complainant is having knowledge of the entire transactions including sale consideration received by LLP in respect of Villas being constructed by the LLP. He would further submit that the above said resolution of the LLP wherein it was jointly authorized Mr. B. Venkatarami Reddy and Mr. B. Vijay Kumar Reddy to operate the account on behalf of the LLP for the amount not exceeding Rs. 50,000/- on behalf of the partnership firm and also authorizing the petitioner individually for the value of cheques less than or exceeding Rs. B. Venkatarami Reddy and Mr. B. Vijay Kumar Reddy to operate the account on behalf of the LLP for the amount not exceeding Rs. 50,000/- on behalf of the partnership firm and also authorizing the petitioner individually for the value of cheques less than or exceeding Rs. 50,000/- on behalf of the firm is in force. The said resolution was dated 09.03.2016. Thereafter, the de facto complainant did not raise any dispute till 04.07.2020, the date on which he has sent legal notice to the petitioner. It is also not in dispute that the de facto complainant has signed the financial statement for all the financial years including the financial year 2018-19. As per the said resolution, the petitioner herein is the Managing Partner of the said LLP. In all the documents including the Agreement of Sale-cum-GPA bearing document No. 2579 of 2014, dated 23.05.2014, DAGPA bearing document No. 7512 of 2016 dated 16.09.2016, DAGPA bearing document No. 191 of 2016, dated 21.09.2016 and DAGPA bearing document No. 7511 of 2016, dated 26.09.2016, the petitioner represented the said LLP as Managing Partner. Thus, prima-facie it appears that the de facto complainant is having knowledge of the entire transactions of the said LLP, including sale of Villas, sale consideration etc. 10. EXCHANGE OF NOTICES: (i) Legal notice dated 04.07.2020; The de facto complainant has issued the said notice to the petitioner which was received by the petitioner on 06.07.2020 putting the petitioner on notice that he has no authority to sell Villa No. 52 without prior consent of the de facto complainant or any action or decision taken by a partner of LLP that determines profit or loss to LLP has to be taken only after meeting between the partners. It was further mentioned in the said legal notice that the petitioner has to immediately cancel any sale agreement that he has reached for sale of Villa No. 52 with third party and restrain him from registering sale-deed with any third party for sale of Villa No. 52 as same is not valid and the petitioner did not have consent of the de facto complainant for the same. It is relevant to note that the de facto complainant did not make any allegation against the petitioner about cheating and criminal breach of trust. It is relevant to note that the de facto complainant did not make any allegation against the petitioner about cheating and criminal breach of trust. His entire grievance in the said legal notice dated 04.07.2020 was with regard to Villa No. 52 and payment of certain amount with regard to the same. (ii) The de facto complainant has also got published a public notice dated 05.07.2020 in Namaste Telangana and Eenadu Telugu Daily Newspapers and Deccan Chronicle English Daily News Paper cautioning the general public not to transact with the petitioner in respect of Villa No. 52. (iii) The de facto complainant has lodged complaints with Joint Sub-Registrar, District Registrar, Inspector General of Stamps and Registration, on 06.07.2020 requesting them not to entertain any sale-deed submitted by the petitioner on behalf of LLP with regard to Villa No. 52. It is relevant to note that the de facto complainant did not make any allegation against the petitioner about cheating and criminal breach of trust. (iv) Similar letters were submitted to the Manager, Union Bank of India (Andhra Bank), Manager, Union Bank of India (Corporation Bank) on 06.07.2020 informing that the de facto complainant is withdrawing the consent resolution given to the Bank at the time of opening of the account and not to honour the cheques. It is also relevant to note that the de facto complainant did not make any allegation against the petitioner about cheating and criminal breach of trust. (v) The petitioner got issued a reply notice dated 08.07.2020 adverting to all the allegations levelled against him. In the reply, the petitioner has informed about the arbitration Article 18.7 of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014, and proposed the names of three arbitrators. (vi) The petitioner herein vide letter dated 08.07.2020 informed the de facto complainant that a resolution was passed expelling the de facto complainant as designated partner of the LLP. (vii) On 10.07.2020, a public notice was issued by the petitioner informing the same to the general public. (viii) On 10.07.2020, a resolution was passed admitting Veerapureddy Aditya Reddy as designated partner of the said LLP. (vii) On 10.07.2020, a public notice was issued by the petitioner informing the same to the general public. (viii) On 10.07.2020, a resolution was passed admitting Veerapureddy Aditya Reddy as designated partner of the said LLP. (ix) On 11.07.2020, the de facto complainant has addressed a letter to the petitioner informing him that the petitioner will be expelled as partner of the LLP and the arbitration of dispute is deemed to have been commenced with effect from the date of letter dated 08.07.2020 issued by the petitioner invoking the arbitration clause. It is relevant to note that the de facto complaint did not make any allegation of criminal breach of trust and cheating even in the reply dated 11.07.2020. 11. EXPLUSION OF THE DE FACTO COMPLAINANT: (i) According to the petitioner, the de facto complainant was expelled as designated partner of the Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP for the actions and activities resorted to by the de facto complainant, which are detrimental to the interests of LLP and accordingly, a resolution was passed on 08.07.2020. According to him, the said fact was informed to the Registrar of Companies by filing appropriate forms. Thereafter, the petitioner got issued notice with regard to the said expulsion. According to the petitioner, a resolution was passed admitting V. Aditya Reddy as designated partner of the said LLP. (ii) Whether the said expulsion and admission of Mr. V. Aditya Reddy are in accordance with the procedure laid down under the Articles of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014 or not is a matter to be decided by the jurisdictional competent Civil Court, but not by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation in the present crime. The same is not permissible under law. 12. INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 18.7 OF LLP AGREEMENT DATED 21.05.2014 AND PENDENCY OF PETITIONS UNDER SECTION 9 OF THE ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION ACT VIDE C.O.P. Nos. 23, 73 and 85 OF 2020: (i) The said Article deals with dispute resolution. According to the petitioner, he has invoked the same by way of issuing reply notice dated 08.07.2020, wherein he has proposed the names of the three arbitrators. It is relevant to note that the de facto complainant in the legal notice dated 04.07.2020 did not inform the petitioner that he is invoking the said dispute resolution mechanism. According to the petitioner, he has invoked the same by way of issuing reply notice dated 08.07.2020, wherein he has proposed the names of the three arbitrators. It is relevant to note that the de facto complainant in the legal notice dated 04.07.2020 did not inform the petitioner that he is invoking the said dispute resolution mechanism. In the said legal notice, the de facto complainant specifically mentioned that he is limiting the said legal notice to his rights on Villa No. 52 of the Gated Community built by the LLP. (ii) Thereafter, the de facto complainant has filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide C.O.P. No. 23 of 2020 against the petitioner seeking to restrain the petitioner from managing, encumbering, parting with possession or creating third party creating third-party rights of any means whatsoever over Villa Nos. 37, 39, 40, 46 and 52 in Sri. Aditya Casa Grand, situated in Survey Nos. 155 (P) and 156 (P) of Narsingi Village, Rajendranagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, and to restrain the petitioner, his agents, servants, representatives or any person claiming through him from operating or instructing or issuing cheques or drawing funds from the Company’s bank accounts maintained in Union Bank (Andhra Bank and Corporation Bank), Jubilee Hills Branches and also restrain the petitioner, his agents etc. from changing the status of the current assets and their nature of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP and also from alienating, encumbering, parting with possession or creating third party rights by any means whatsoever over the other Villas under construction at Sri. Aditya Casa Grand project of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP, and to appoint a Receiver to supervise the day-to-day management of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. The de facto complainant has filed the said C.O.P. on 20.07.2020. In proof of the same, the petitioner has filed copy of the said COP. (iii) In the said COP, the de facto complainant has specifically pleaded that both the partners had several meetings and approved suitable resolutions that are required for the said phase of activity. They have also passed unanimous resolution to open account and that the de facto complainant has authorized to operate the bank account and to look after day-to-day management of the LLP and construction of project. They have also passed unanimous resolution to open account and that the de facto complainant has authorized to operate the bank account and to look after day-to-day management of the LLP and construction of project. (iv) In the said petition, it is also specifically pleaded by the de facto complainant that the petitioner has taken law into hands, behaved as though no such consent of the de facto complainant is ever required, within the span of 16 months, the petitioner went ahead and registered 24 Villas to various third-party purchasers. The petitioner practiced deceitful activity in the said aspect to keep away any information except year ending financial statements, which do not reveal the complete information to the partner. The de facto complainant is given only the year ending financial statement up to 31.03.2019. Major sales revenue will not be part of the said financial statement and majority of Villas are sold and registered during the period after April, 2019 to June, 2020. It is further alleged that the petitioner herein has resorted to mismanagement of LLP and its funds. Thus, even in the said COP, the de facto complainant did not allege any breach of trust, much less criminal breach of trust and cheating against the petitioner herein. In the said COP, the de facto complainant has pleaded that the cause of action arose on 23.02.2019, the date on which first sale-deed for Villa No. 24 was registered, on 08.06.2020, the last such sale-deed for Villa Nos.41 and 42 were registered. A perusal of the contents of the petition in COP No. 23 of 2020 would reveal that the grievance of the de facto complainant is with regard to Villa No. 52 and the transactions thereupon. There is no allegation of criminal breach of trust and cheating in the entire petition which was filed on 20.07.2020 itself. (v) According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, having failed in getting an interim order in the said COP on 20.07.2020, the de facto complainant has lodged the present complaint with Banjara Hills Police Station on the very same day i.e. 20.07.2020 at 21.30 hours. A perusal of the complaint in the present crime would reveal that the de facto complaint has lodged the complaint on 20.07.2020 at 21.30 hours. A perusal of the complaint in the present crime would reveal that the de facto complaint has lodged the complaint on 20.07.2020 at 21.30 hours. (vi) Thus, the de facto complainant herein has not alleged the criminal breach of trust and cheating in the legal notice, public notice dated 05.07.2020, letter dated 11.07.2020 sent by him to the petitioner and said petition vide COP No. 23 of 2020, and his grievance was only with regard to transactions in respect of Villa No. 52. (vii) It is also relevant to note that two more applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide COP Nos.73 and 85 of 2020 are also pending. In the said applications, the parties are virtually seeking adjudication of various Articles of LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014, more particularly, Articles 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. Therefore, the de facto complainant cannot seek interpretation of the Clauses/Articles of the said LLP agreement and a finding thereon by the Investigating Officer in the present crime during the course of investigation, which is not permissible under law. It appears that the dispute is purely civil in nature. 13. DELAY IN LODGING THE COMPLAINT: (i) As discussed above, the de facto complainant got issued legal notice on 04.07.2020 making several allegations with regard to Villa No. 52 and the petitioner issued reply notice on 08.07.2020 adverting to the allegations levelled therein. He has issued public notice dated 05.07.2020. Thereafter, the de facto complainant has sent a letter dated 11.07.2020 to the petitioner herein. He has also sent letters dated 06.07.2020 and 07.07.2020 to the Sub-Registrar, Banks etc. requesting them not to entertain the petitioner. (ii) The de facto complainant herein has filed C.O.P. No. 23 of 2020 under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on 20.07.2020. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the de facto complainant failed to obtain interim orders in the said COP and, therefore, the de facto complainant has lodged the present complaint on the very same day i.e. 20.07.2020 at 21.30 hours with Banjara Hills Police Station. (iii) Admittedly, there are no interim orders in COP No. 23 of 2020. The de facto complainant has lodged the present complaint at 21.30 hours of 20.07.2020. The police have registered the present crime on the very same day at 21.30 hours. (iii) Admittedly, there are no interim orders in COP No. 23 of 2020. The de facto complainant has lodged the present complaint at 21.30 hours of 20.07.2020. The police have registered the present crime on the very same day at 21.30 hours. (iv) In the said COP No. 23 of 2020, the de facto complainant herein has mentioned the cause of action for the COP arose on 23.02.2019, the date on which first sale-deed was registered, 08.06.2020, last sale-deed was registered, 04.07.2020, the date on which the de facto complainant has issued legal notice, 08.07.2020, the date on which, the petitioner got issued reply and invoked dispute resolution clause. Thus, there is delay in lodging the complaint. The de facto complainant failed to explain the said delay. (v) It is also relevant to note that as per the Articles of LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014, the LLP has to file financial statements and balance sheets with the concerned Authority and the same were filed. Both the petitioner and the de facto complainant have signed the said financial statements and balance sheets. As per the complaint, the first advance amount was received by the petitioner being the Managing Partner of LLP on 09.03.2015 in respect of Villa Nos. 43 and 44, on 30.03.2016 in respect of Villa No. 38, on 30.06.2016 in respect of Villa No. 36, on 19.09.2016 in respect of Villa No. 35. Thus, even according to the de facto complainant, the petitioner herein has received the first advance amount from 09.03.2015 to 26.10.2019. The de facto complainant did not dispute the same at any point of time during the said period. He has not addressed any letter either to the banks informing about withdrawal of the resolution passed by the LLP authorizing the petitioner to operate the account and did not submit any letter to the Sub-Registrar etc. as he has done on 06.07.2020. The only explanation offered by the de facto complainant with regard to the said delay is that 20 Villas were sold after 01.04.2019, the financial statement for the year 2019-20 of the said LLP was filed. Therefore, he is unaware of the criminal breach of trust and cheating of the petitioner. According to him, the financial statements do not contain meticulous details. (vi) As stated above, he has signed on the financial statements and also balance sheets. Therefore, he is unaware of the criminal breach of trust and cheating of the petitioner. According to him, the financial statements do not contain meticulous details. (vi) As stated above, he has signed on the financial statements and also balance sheets. The de facto complainant is aware that he can invoke the dispute resolution mechanism in accordance with Clause 18.7 of the LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014, he can file applications under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which he has not done for the reasons best known to him. On the other hand, he has lodged the present complaint after filing COP No. 23 of 2020 and also after issuance of legal notice dated 04.07.2020, public notice dated 05.07.2020 in News Papers, letter dated 11.07.2020 and also letters dated 06.07.2020 and 07.07.2020 addressed to the Sub-Registrar and the Banks respectively. Thus, there is delay in lodging the complaint by the de facto complainant, and prima facie it appears that he has lodged the said complaint against the petitioner during pendency of the above said three COPs. only to build pressure on the petitioner to settle the score including the transactions in respect of Villa No. 52 as mentioned in the legal notice dated 04.07.2020. 14. OTHER CRIMES BETWEEN THE PARTIES: (a) Crime No. 447 of 2020: It was registered on the complaint lodged by the petitioner herein with the very same police station (Banjara Hills Police Station) on 16.07.2020 against his brother-in-law, Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, for the offences under Sections 448, 406, 470 and 380 of IPC. The allegation in the said complaint is that in the absence of the petitioner, on 08.07.2020 at 11:15 hours, his brother-in-law Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy visited his office, illegally entered into his cabin and took away material available in two card board boxes at 1.20 p.m. without his knowledge and that his staff did not stop him as he is petitioner’s brother-in-law. It was further alleged that his brother-in-law had taken away his licensed weapon 0.32 Revolver License No. 584/Jubilee Hills with 20 cartridges Revcart and some original documents, the details of the same are specifically mentioned therein. (b) Crime No. 377 of 2020: It was registered on the complaint lodged by one Mr. It was further alleged that his brother-in-law had taken away his licensed weapon 0.32 Revolver License No. 584/Jubilee Hills with 20 cartridges Revcart and some original documents, the details of the same are specifically mentioned therein. (b) Crime No. 377 of 2020: It was registered on the complaint lodged by one Mr. M. Chaitanya Reddy before the Jubilee Hills Police Station on 18.07.2020 at 22.30 hours against the petitioner, his family members and others, and the police have registered the said case for the offences under Sections 341 and 506 read with 34 of IPC. In the said complaint, it is alleged that on the request of the petitioner, he went to the house of the petitioner, where the petitioner, his family members and others enquiring him about Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, on which he replied them that he does not know anything about him, still they insisted upon him to say something otherwise they would not allow him to go out and even threatened him with dire consequences. (c) Crime No. 378 of 2020: It was registered on 18.07.2020 at about 23.00 hours on the complaint lodged by Mrs. Sushma Battula, wife of Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, against her mother-in-law, petitioner herein and his wife, Mrs. V. Supraja, with Jubilee Hills Police Station, who in turn registered the above said crime for the offence under Section 498A read with 34 IPC. (d) It is relevant to note that in Crime No. 378 of 2020, the wife of Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, the complainant therein, did not make any allegation against her husband i.e. Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, she has made certain vague allegations against her mother-in-law, sister-in-law and her husband i.e. the petitioner herein. A perusal of the said complaint in Crime No. 378 of 2020 would reveal that there are no specific instances. There is no date and other details of alleged harassment. Thus, the complainant in Crime No. 378 of 2020 i.e. wife of Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, has lodged the complaint against the petitioner herein, his wife and his mother-in-law at the instance of her husband Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, who is having disputes with the petitioner herein with regard to the above said Villas. It is unfortunate that they have dragged the mother-in-law of the petitioner and mother of the said Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy i.e. Smt. B. Ajantha into the said litigation. B. Sudheer Reddy, who is having disputes with the petitioner herein with regard to the above said Villas. It is unfortunate that they have dragged the mother-in-law of the petitioner and mother of the said Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy i.e. Smt. B. Ajantha into the said litigation. (e) As discussed above, it is also relevant to note that the complaint in Crime No. 458 of 2020 was lodged on 20.07.2020 at 21.30 hours with Banjara Hills Police Station. Complaint in Crime No. 447 of 2020 was lodged with Banjara Hills Police Station on 16.07.2020 at 11.15 hours. The Complaint in Crime No. 377 of 2020 was lodged with Jubilee Hills Police Station on 18.07.2020 at 22.30 hours. In the said complaint, according to the complainant, he left the house of the petitioner on 17.07.2020 at 7.30 p.m. whereas he has lodged the said complaint on 18.07.2020 at 22.30 hours. Thus, there is delay of about 27 hours in lodging the said complaint, whereas, the complaint in Crime No. 378 of 2020 was lodged on 18.07.2020 at 23.00 hours. As stated above, particulars of alleged harassment etc. are not mentioned in the complaint at all. The said two complaints were lodged with Jubilee Hills Police Station on 18.07.2020 at 22.30 hours and 22.00 hours i.e. with a gap of half-an-hour. 15. The above stated facts would reveal that Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy is the brother-in-law of the petitioner. The de facto complainant is the designated partner of the said Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. As per the complaint dated 20.07.2020 lodged by the de facto complainant, the petitioner has authorized Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, his brother-in-law, as a representative of the LLP to execute sale-deeds in favour of purchasers which is illegal and amounts to breach of trust as designated partner. According to the de facto complainant, he has neither permitted, nor consented to appoint Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy as a Signatory to sale-deeds on behalf of LLP and therefore, the sale-deeds are not valid and binding on him. 16. The above said facts would further reveal that the disputes among the petitioner, de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy arose from 04.07.2020, the date on which the de facto complainant got issued a legal notice. 16. The above said facts would further reveal that the disputes among the petitioner, de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy arose from 04.07.2020, the date on which the de facto complainant got issued a legal notice. In the said legal notice, the de facto complainant has specifically mentioned that it is a normal practice in the real estate industry that any of the Partners in the business can select a Villa/apartment for his own purpose in the project being built by the firm and inform the other partners who will note his desire and either take equivalent share in the project in the same form of Villas/apartments or debit the cost of such Villa to the account of the partner who selected the villa/apartment. On these lines, the de facto complainant right at the time of commencement of construction, has opted to keep for himself Villa No. 52. It is now more than three and half years after this decision is communicated by the de facto complainant to the petitioner. During this period, the de facto complainant has also invested considerable amount of money in making changes to the internal layout and design of Villa No. 52. According to the de facto complainant, he has sent several drawings designed by his Architect to the petitioner. Internals of Villa No. 52 is also built as per the said drawings only. It is also informed that Villa No. 52 has to be registered in favour of the de facto complainant. There is no question of the de facto complainant separately and specifically paying for Villa No. 52 for the purpose of registering a conveyance deed. 17. The contents of the said legal notice would further reveal that the dispute between the petitioner and the de facto complainant appears to be with regard to Villa No. 52. In the entire complaint, there is no allegation of conspiracy and connivance against Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, brother-in-law of the petitioner. Since there is no such allegation against Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, the police have not shown him as an accused in the present crime. There are no allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating in the said legal notice dated 04.07.2020 got issued by the de facto complainant against the petitioner. 18. B. Sudheer Reddy, brother-in-law of the petitioner. Since there is no such allegation against Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, the police have not shown him as an accused in the present crime. There are no allegations of criminal breach of trust and cheating in the said legal notice dated 04.07.2020 got issued by the de facto complainant against the petitioner. 18. In the reply issued by the petitioner on 08.07.2020, the petitioner has adverted to all the allegations made by the de facto complainant in his legal notice. In the petition filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide COP No. 23 of 2020, the allegation made by the de facto complainant against the petitioner are altogether different. A perusal of contents of said petition, legal notice and FIR are contradictory to each other. The de facto complainant has taken different versions which are contradictory to each other in FIR, legal notice and the petition in COP No. 23 of 2020. Thus, the de facto complainant failed to succeed in obtaining interim order in COP No. 23 of 2020, lodged the present complaint against the petitioner on 20.07.2020 at 21:30 hours. 19. Whether the petitioner being designated partner is having power to appoint Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy as a representative to execute sale-deeds on behalf of LLP and whether the petitioner herein has conducted business in terms of the Articles of LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014 and whether there is any violation of any of the Articles of the said LLP Agreement etc. are the matters to be decided by the competent Civil Court in COP Nos. 23, 73 and 85 of 2020 and the same are pending, but not by the Investigating Officer in the present crime during the course of investigation. The Investigating Officer cannot go into the said legal aspects during the course of investigation. 20. As discussed supra, there are disputes between the petitioner and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, his brother-in-law. Thus, the said material would prima facie reveal that the de facto complainant being designated partner of the LLP has lodged the present complaint against the petitioner at the instance of Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy to settle the score/dispute with regard to Villa No. 52. The disputes among the petitioner, de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy are civil in nature. 21. B. Sudheer Reddy to settle the score/dispute with regard to Villa No. 52. The disputes among the petitioner, de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy are civil in nature. 21. The learned counsel for the de facto complainant relied on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in Mohd. Allauddin Khan vs. State of Bihar, (2019) 6 SCC 107 , wherein it was held that merely because a civil claim is maintainable does not mean that criminal complaint cannot be maintained. Merely on the ground that it was a civil wrong, the criminal prosecution could not have been quashed. He has also relied on the decisions in Smt. Lalmuni Devi vs. State of Bihar, (2001) 2 SCC 17 , Trisuns Chemical Industry vs. Rajesh Agarwal, (1999) 8 SCC 686 , Kamaladevi Agarwal vs. State of West Bengal, (2002) 1 SCC 555 and Smt. Madhavi Ramesh Dudani vs. Ramesh Kimatrai Dudani, AIR 2019 SC 847 for the very same principle. 22. The learned counsel for the de facto complainant has also relied on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 and V.P. Shrivastava vs. Indian Explosives Limited, (2010) 10 SCC 361 and would contend that Section 405 of IPC does not contemplate the creation of the Trust with all the technicalities of the law of trust. It contemplates the creation of relationship whereby owner of the property makes it over to another person to be detained by him until a certain contingency arises or to be disposed of by him on the happening of certain events. 23. A Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the criminal breach of trust in Inder Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1 and after referring to the principles laid down in various judgments held as under: “In the instant case, the first information report has been registered under sections 420/467/120B IPC. The allegations levelled in the first information report are of (1) cheating and (2) forgery. Analysis of relevant provisions of law: Firstly, we shall deal with the section 420 IPC. Cheating is defined in Section 415 IPC and is punishable under section 420 IPC. Section 415 is set out below: 415. The allegations levelled in the first information report are of (1) cheating and (2) forgery. Analysis of relevant provisions of law: Firstly, we shall deal with the section 420 IPC. Cheating is defined in Section 415 IPC and is punishable under section 420 IPC. Section 415 is set out below: 415. Cheating - Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to cheat. Explanation - A dishonest concealment of facts is a deception within the meaning of this section. Section 415 IPC thus requires: 1. Deception of any person. 2. (a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing that person: (i) to deliver any property to any person. (ii) to consent that any person shall retain any property. (b) Intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body mind, reputation or property. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. In the second class of acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning.” Thus, there should be deception of any person, fraudulently or dishonestly inducing of that person to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property or intentionally inducing that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body mind, reputation or property. In the definition of cheating, there are two separate classes of acts which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the first class of acts, inducing must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of acts, inducing must be intentional but need not be fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention to break the promise from the beginning. Thus, in the present case, the de facto complainant failed to allege the same in the complaint. The contents of the complaint lack the said ingredients of Section 415 of IPC. 24. In C.B.I. vs. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. (1996) 5 SCC 591 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the scope and ambit of Section 406 of IPC i.e. criminal breach of trust and held in Paragraph Nos. 27 to 29, which is as under: “27. In the instant case, a serious dispute has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respective party as to whether on the face of the allegations, an offence of criminal breach of trust is constituted or not. 27 to 29, which is as under: “27. In the instant case, a serious dispute has been raised by the learned counsel appearing for the respective party as to whether on the face of the allegations, an offence of criminal breach of trust is constituted or not. In our view, the expression ‘entrusted with property’ or ‘with any dominion over property’ has been used in wide sense in Section 405 I.P.C. Such expression includes all case in which goods are entrusted, that is, voluntarily handed over for a specific purpose and dishonestly disposed of in violation of law or in violation of contract. The expression entrusted appearing in Section 405 I.P.C. is not necessarily a term of law. It has wide and different implication in different context. It is, however, necessary that the ownership or beneficial interest in the ownership of the property entrusted in respect of which offence is alleged to have been committed must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. The expression ‘Trust’ in Section 405 I.P.C. is a comprehensive expression and has been used to denote various kinds of relationship like the relationship of trustee and beneficiary, bailer and bailee, master and servant, pledger and pledger. When some goods are hypothecated by a person to another person. the ownership of the goods still remains with the person who has hypothecated such goods. The property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be in other person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person or for his benefit. In a case of pledge, the pledged article belongs to some other person or for his benefit. In a case of Pledge, the pledged article belongs to some other person but the same is kept in trust by the pledgee. In the instant case, a floating charge was made on the goods by way of security to cover up credit facility. In our view, in such case for disposing of the goods covering the security to cover up credit facility. In our view, in such case for disposing of the goods covering the security to cover up credit facility. In the instant case, a floating charge was made on the goods by way of security to cover up credit facility. In our view, in such case for disposing of the goods covering the security to cover up credit facility. In our view, in such case for disposing of the goods covering the security to cover up credit facility. In our view, in such case for disposing of the goods covering the security against credit facility the offence of criminal breach of trust is not committed. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it, however, appears to us that the Respondents moved the High Court only in 1991 although the first Fir was filed in 1987 and the second was filed in 1989. The CBI, therefore, got sufficient time to complete the investigation for the purpose of framing the charge. 28. Although Mr. Tulsi, the learned Additional Solicitor General, is justified in his submission that a particular act may constitute both civil wrong as well as criminal wrong and merely because a civil action is also pursued, it does not render the criminal action impermissible, in the facts of the case, it appears to us that long after the completion of civil suits, the further investigation in connection with the complaints may not be expedient. It may be noted that the opinion given by the Senior Manager (Legal) that the credit facility which was given to DAIL for its tobacco division should be transferred to the newly formed Company, namely, New Tabacco Company Limited, cannot be held to be per se mala-fide or illegal in view of the provisions of Section 394 of the Companies Act. That apart, the legal opinion of the said Senior Manager (Legal) was placed for consideration by the highest administrative body of the bank i.e. the Board that the credit liability which stood in favour of DAIL should be transferred in favour of the New Tobacco Company Limited. In the aforesaid circumstances, it appears to use that even if the Senior Manager (Legal) or any other officer of the bank had not acted properly, in view of the fact that the ultimate decision was taken by the Board of Directors, it cannot be reasonably held that some of the Officers of the Bank connived and misled the Board. It may be noted that no allegation has been made against the members of the Board. It may be noted that no allegation has been made against the members of the Board. 29. In the facts of the case, it appears to use that there is enough justification for the High Court to hold that the case was basically a matter of civil dispute. It Banks had already filed suits for recovery of the dues of the Banks on account of credit facility and said suits have been compromised on receiving the payments from the concerned Companies. Even if an offence of cheating is prima facie constituted, such offence is compoundable offence and compromise decrees passed in the suits instituted by the banks, for all intents and purposes, amount to compounding of the offence of cheating. It is also to be noted that long time has elapsed since the complaint was filed in 1987. It may also be indicated that although such FIRs were filed in 1987 and 1989, the Banks have not chosen to institute any case against the alleged erring official despite allegations made against them in the FIRs. Considering that the investigations had not been completed till 1991 even though there was no impediment to complete the investigations and further investigations are still pending and also considering the fact that the claims of the Banks have been compromised on receiving payments, we do not think that the said complaints should be pursued any further, In our view proceeding further with the complaints will not be expedient. In the special facts of the case, it appears to us the decision of the High Court in quashing the complaints does not warrant any interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. We, therefore, dismiss these appeals.” Thus, there should be entrustment of property. The ‘entrusted’ appearing in Section 405 IPC is not necessarily a term of law. It has wide and different implication in different context. It is, however, necessary that the ownership or beneficial interest in the ownership of the property entrusted in respect of which offence is alleged to have been committed must be in some person other than the accused and the latter must hold it on account of some person or in some way for his benefit. 25. The expression ‘Trust’ in Section 405 IPC is a comprehensive expression and has been used to denote various kinds of relationship etc. 25. The expression ‘Trust’ in Section 405 IPC is a comprehensive expression and has been used to denote various kinds of relationship etc. The property in respect of which criminal breach of trust can be committed must necessarily be the property of some person other than the accused or the beneficial interest in or ownership of it must be in other person and the offender must hold such property in trust for such other person or for his benefit. 26. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court and also the contents of Section 405 IPC, the contents of the complaint in the present case lacks the ingredients of the said provision of law as the de facto complainant did not plead any entrustment of property and inducement by the petitioner at the threshold or beginning. A perusal of the entire material including the financial statements/development agreements, annual returns, ledger accounts would reveal that the de facto complainant is having knowledge of the affairs of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. Therefore, the principle laid down by the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the de facto complainant is not applicable to the facts of the present case. 27. As stated above, the de facto complainant tried to criminalize the civil proceedings and he is seeking interpretation of Clauses/Articles of LLP Agreement dated 21.05.2014 by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation, which is not permissible under law. On the other hand, in the present case, admittedly, three petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act are pending between the parties herein and the finding with regard to the Clauses/Articles of LLP Agreement is awaited in the said COPs from a jurisdictional competent Civil Court. 28. SUPPRESSION OF FACTS: It is also relevant to consider the contention raised by Mr. M.V. Durga Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, brother-in-law of the petitioner, is a Director of Sri. Aditya Homes Limited, a parent company of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. He is none other than own brotherin- law of the petitioner. The said fact was not mentioned in the complaint by the de facto complainant. It is simply mentioned that the petitioner has appointed Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy as representative to represent LLP for execution of sale-deeds. Aditya Homes Limited, a parent company of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. He is none other than own brotherin- law of the petitioner. The said fact was not mentioned in the complaint by the de facto complainant. It is simply mentioned that the petitioner has appointed Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy as representative to represent LLP for execution of sale-deeds. In the complaint, there is no mention with regard to legal notice, public notice published in News Papers, reply notice, letters addressed to the Sub-Registrar, Banks and filing of COPs. It is relevant to note that Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy and his wife are joined as consenting parties to the DAGPAs dated 21.09.2016 and 26.09.2016. Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy is not stranger to the LLP or to the de facto complainant. Even then, he has simply stated that the petitioner has appointed Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy to represent LLP to execute sale-deeds. Thus, there is a clear suppression of facts by the de facto complainant. 29. The above stated facts would clearly reveal that it is a family fight between the petitioner, his brother-in-law and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, who is also a Director in M/s. Aditya Homes Limited, a parent company of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP and the de facto complainant. They have dragged the mother-in-law of the petitioner and mother of the said Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy into the litigation. 30. The Apex Court in several judgments examined the scope and ambit of powers of High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In Bhajan Lal (supra) the Apex Court cautioned that power of quashing should be exercised very sparingly and circumspection and that too in the rarest of rear cases. While examining a complaint, quashing of which is sought, Court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or in the complaint. The Apex Court in the said judgment laid down certain guidelines/parameters for exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. which are as under: “(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 31. In Rashmi Chopra vs. State of U.P. (2019) 15 SCC 357 , the Apex Court after referring to the principle held by it in various other judgments including Bhajan Lal (supra) and Vineet Kumar vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2017) 13 SCC 369 , held that the criminal prosecution can be allowed to proceed only when a prima facie offence is disclosed. The judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or harassing. If the High Court finds that the proceedings deserve to be quashed as per the parameters as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) the High Court shall not hesitate, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. 32. If the High Court finds that the proceedings deserve to be quashed as per the parameters as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) the High Court shall not hesitate, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings. 32. In Skoda Auto Volkswagen India Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of U.P. 2020 SCC Online SC 958 after referring to the principle laid down by it in Bhajan Lal (supra) and S.M. Datta vs. State of Gujarat, (2001) 7 SCC 659 , the Apex Court held that High Court has to exercise power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in rarest of rear cases and with great caution. 33. In Priya Vrat Singh vs. Shyam Ji Sahai, (2008) 8 SCC 232 , the Apex Court held that the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective without sufficient material. It further held that no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. 34. In R.K. Vijayasarathy vs. Sudha Seetharam, 2019 (1) Crimes 18 (SC) the Apex Court held that jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. has to be exercised with care. In the exercise of its jurisdiction, a High Court can examine whether a matter which is essentially of a civil nature has been given a cloak of a criminal offence. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. 35. Where the ingredients required to constitute a criminal offence are not made out from a bare reading of the complaint, the continuation of the criminal proceeding will constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. 35. In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar vs. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 9 SCC 608 , the Apex Court by referring to the principle laid down by it in Bhajan Lal (supra) and Inder Mohan Goswami (supra) held as under: “8. Given the varied nature of cases that come before the High Courts, any strict test as to when the court's extraordinary powers can be exercised is likely to tie the court's hands in the face of future injustices. This Court in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal conducted a detailed study of the situations where the court may exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and laid down a list of illustrative examples of where quashing may be appropriate. It is not necessary to discuss all the examples, but a few bear relevance to the present case. The court in Bhajan Lal noted that quashing may be appropriate where.......In deciding whether to exercise its jurisdiction Under Section 482, the Court does not adjudicate upon the veracity of the facts alleged or enter into an appreciation of competing evidence presented. The limited question is whether on the face of the FIR, the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. As this Court noted in Dhruvaram Murlidhar Sonar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2018 SCC Online SC 3100: “13. It is clear that for quashing proceedings, meticulous analysis of factum of taking cognizance of an offence by the Magistrate is not called for. Appreciation of evidence is also not permissible in exercise of inherent powers. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken, it is open to the High Court to quash the same in exercise of its inherent powers.” 36. In Anand Kumar Mohatta vs. State NCT of Delhi, (2019) 11 SCC 706, wherein the Apex Court had discussed about quashing of FIR for the offences under Sections 405 and 406 of IPC and also the facts of the case therein which includes disputes arising out of agreement entered between the parties therein, relying on the principle held by it in Bhajan Lal (supra), quashed the FIR. Paragraph Nos. Paragraph Nos. 28 and 29 of the said judgment are also relevant, which are extracted hereunder: “28. It is necessary here to remember the words of this Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy which read as follows:- “7........In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice......” 29. We find that the prosecution is mala-fide, untenable and solely intended to harass the Appellants. We are forfeited in view of the Respondent not having made any attempt to recover the deposit of Rs. One Crore through a civil action.” 37. In Indian Oil Corporation vs. NEPC India Limited, (2006) 6 SCC 736 , the Apex Court held that “while on the issue, it is necessary to take notice of a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. This is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. Such a tendency is seen in several family disputes also, leading to irretrievable break down of marriages/families. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 38. There is also an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is likelihood of imminent settlement. Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. 38. In Ahmed Ali Quresh vs. State of U.P. AIR 2020 SC 788 , the Apex Court held that when a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. The Apex Court has also relied upon its principle laid down in Vineet Kumar (supra). 39. In Som Mittal vs. Govt. of Karnataka, (2008) 3 SCC 574 , the Apex Court held that when a clear case for quashing is made out and failure to interfere would lead to miscarriage of justice. 40. In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Limited vs. Rajvir Industries Limited, (2008) 13 SCC 678 , the Apex Court held that ordinarily, defence of an accused although appears to be plausible should not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction. Yet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a disputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of unimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for the purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of Court or that the complaint petition is filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. 41. In B. Suresh Yadav vs. Sharifa Bee, (2007) 14 SCC 776 , the Apex Court held that for the purpose of establishing the offence of cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making promise or representation. In a case of this nature, it is permissible in law to consider the stand taken by a party in a pending civil litigation. The liability of a person cannot be both, civil and criminal at the same time. But, when a stand has been taken in a complaint petition which is contrary to or inconsistent with the stand taken by him in a civil suit, it assumes significance. 42. The liability of a person cannot be both, civil and criminal at the same time. But, when a stand has been taken in a complaint petition which is contrary to or inconsistent with the stand taken by him in a civil suit, it assumes significance. 42. In M. Srikanth vs. State of Telangana, (2019) 10 SCC 373 , the Apex Court while dealing with the protection granted by High Court from arrest without quashing the FIR held that issues reflecting civil disputes viz. dispute with regard to the inheritance under a Will and Deed of Confirmation cannot be decided in a criminal proceeding and the same can be done only in an appropriate civil proceeding and also finding that the other civil litigation is suppressed in the criminal case. With the said findings, the Apex Court has quashed the criminal proceedings. 43. The sum and substance of the principle laid down in the above said judgments is that while exercising its power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. the High Court has to examine the facts of the case on case to case basis and has to exercise its inherent power in rarest of rear cases with caution. Seven parameters/guidelines laid down by the Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra) have to be followed. 44. As discussed supra, in the present case also, there are disputes among the petitioner, the de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy, brother-in-law of the petitioner and Director of Aditya Homes Limited, a parent limited company of Sri. Aditya-Vamsiram Homes LLP. There are civil proceedings pending between the petitioner and the de facto complainant with regard to Villa No. 52. Three applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vide C.O.P. Nos. 23, 73 and 85 of 2020 are pending. As discussed supra, the de facto complainant is seeking to adjudicate the interpretation of Clauses/Articles of LLP by the Investigating Officer during the course of investigation in the present crime which is not permissible under law that too during pendency of said the three COPs filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act on the very same aspect between the very same parties. Thus, the Investigating Officer has no power to deal with the interpretation of Clauses/Articles of the Agreement and it is a matter to be decided by the jurisdictional Civil Court in the applications filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act. There is suppression of facts by the de facto complainant in the present complaint. Thus, the complaint lodged by the de facto complainant against the petitioner is an abuse of process of law. Therefore, the facts of the present case will fall under the 7th guideline/parameter in Bhajan Lal (supra). 45. It is relevant to note that this Court vide order dated 24.08.2020 in I.A. No. 2 of 2020, directed the police not to take any coercive steps against the petitioner and that the said order will not preclude the police from investigating into the matter. The said order is subsisting as on this day. It is also relevant to note that the petitioner is on anticipatory bail. According to the petitioner, under the guise of investigation, the police are trying to harass him by making calls to him and by making him to wait hours together at the police station, and the police are also pressuring the petitioner to compromise with the de facto complainant and settle the issues with the de facto complainant. Accordingly, the petitioner herein has filed an affidavit dated 20.11.2020 in the present case. 46. In the said affidavit, the petitioner has specifically mentioned that the police have already issued a notice under Section 41-A of Cr.P.C. on 23.07.2020 and he has submitted his explanation on 07.08.2020. Even then, the police have called him on several dates and pressurized him to compromise the matter with the de facto complainant. In the affidavit dated 20.11.2020 filed by the petitioner, the dates, time, name of the Police Officer and mobile number etc. have specifically mentioned. It is also mentioned that he sought appointment of DGP by sending mail dated 18.11.2020 and submitted a representation dated 19.11.2020 to the DGP bringing the said facts to the notice of the DGP. 47. The said facts would reveal the intention of the de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy to criminalize the civil litigation to settle the score and the disputes pending among them, that too during pendency of three petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 48. 47. The said facts would reveal the intention of the de facto complainant and Mr. B. Sudheer Reddy to criminalize the civil litigation to settle the score and the disputes pending among them, that too during pendency of three petitions filed under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. 48. In view of the above, this Court can safely conclude that the de facto complainant has lodged the present complaint with an ulterior motive and intention for wrecking vengeance on the petitioner and, thus, it is a fit case to exercise inherent power of this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. as the present case is one of the rarest of rare cases. The said effort to settle the civil disputes and claims which do not involve any criminal offence by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged as held by the Apex Court in NEPC India Limited (supra). As discussed supra, in the present case, the petitioner has made out a clear case for quashing the crime and failure to do so would lead to miscarriage of justice as held by the Apex Court in Som Mittal (supra). 49. Accordingly, the present Criminal Petition is allowed, and the proceedings in Crime No. 458 of 2020 pending on the file of Banjara Hills Police Station, Hyderabad City Commissionerate registered under Sections 420 and 406 of IPC are hereby quashed against the petitioner-accused herein. 50. As a sequel, Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in the Criminal Petition shall stand closed.