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2021 DIGILAW 200 (TS)

Pranav Oil Processing Industry Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Andhra Pradesh

2021-06-28

A.ABHISHEK REDDY

body2021
ORDER : (A. Abhishek Reddy, J.) 1. Aggrieved by the issuance of the notice dated 23.1.2012 under Section 7 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (in short, the Act) by respondent No. 5, the present writ petition is filed. 2. The case of the petitioner, in brief is that, the petitioner is the absolute owner and possessor of the land admeasuring Acs. 8.35 guntas in Survey Nos. 165/1, 165/2 and 165/3 of Donthanpally Village, Shankarpally Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, having purchased the same under registered sale deeds bearing Nos. 1337/1993 dated 3.11.1993, 1317/1993 dated 25.10.1993 and 1318/1993 dated 25.10.1993. The petitioner claims that their vendors were in possession of the subject land even since prior to 1950 till the date of sale of the land to the petitioner. After the purchase, the petitioner had constructed buildings after obtaining permission from the statutory authorities including Gram Panchayat, A.P. Pollution Control Board, Director of Factories, Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board, etc., to run the oil industry in the name of Anagha Oil Industries Private Ltd. While so, the respondent No. 5-Tahsildar, Shankarpally Mandal, issued the impugned proceedings stating that the subject land is a Government land and the petitioner is in unauthorized occupation of the same. Petitioner had submitted a reply on 4.2.2012. However, no orders are passed thereon. The grievance of the, petitioner is that without passing any orders on the reply submitted by the petitioner, the official respondents are taking steps to forcefully dispossess the petitioner from the subject land. Hence, this writ petition. 3. Heard Sri L. Ravi Chandran, learned Senior Counsel, appearing for Sri K.R. Prabhakar, learned Counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for respondents. Perused the record. 4. Learned Senior Counsel has argued that the notice which is impugned in the present writ petition is one without jurisdiction and that the official respondents cannot take recourse to the summary proceedings envisaged under the Land Encroachment Act, 1905 (in short 'the Act'). Learned Senior Counsel has further stated that this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases have held that the official respondents cannot take recourse to the provisions of the Act when there is a bona fide dispute with regard to the longstanding title over the subject land. Learned Senior Counsel has further stated that this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court in a catena of cases have held that the official respondents cannot take recourse to the provisions of the Act when there is a bona fide dispute with regard to the longstanding title over the subject land. Learned Senior Counsel has taken this Court through the documents filed by him wherein he has relied on the pahanies from the year 1954-55 (khasra pahani) till the pahani for the year 2014-15 to buttress his contention that all the revenue records supported the case of the petitioner that the subject lands are private patta lands and that at no point of time the lands are shown as Government land. Hence, the issuance of the present impugned notice after lapse of more than 60 years is one without jurisdiction, illegal and arbitrary. Therefore, he seeks to set aside the same. Learned Senior Counsel has further contended that the petitioner has purchased the subject land through registered sale deeds from the original pattadars, whose names are reflected in the pahanies from the year 1954-55. That after the purchase, the petitioner has been issued pattadar passbooks and title deeds, after due enquiry, by the Mandal Revenue Officer concerned. Thereafter, the petitioner has constructed a factory encompassed with a compound wall after obtaining a valid building permission from the concerned Gram Panchayat. The Electricity Department has also provided necessary power connection and the petitioner is also paying property tax in respect of the subject property to the concerned Gram Panchayat. The Government of India (Ministry of Industries) has given the necessary permission for running of the factory and the Pollution Control Board has also issued No-Objection Certificate after duly verifying the premises of the factory. Further, to buttress his contention that the impugned notice issued by the official respondents is one without jurisdiction, the learned Senior Counsel has relied on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh v. Thummala Krishna Rao and others, (1982) 2 SCC 134 ; State of Rajasthan v. Padmavati Devi, 1995 (4) LAWS 29 (SC); Rame Gowda (D) by LRs. v. M. Varadappa Naidu (D) by L.Rs., 2004 (2) ALD 31 (SC) : 2003 (12) LAWS 30 (SC); Roshan Minoo Patel v. Union of India, 2011 (5) ALD 626 : 2011 (7) LAWS 67 (AP) and this Court in B.N. Manga Devi v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2011 (6) ALD 283 : 2011 (0) LAP 195 and Narendra M. Agarwal v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, 2019 (4) ALD 60 : 2018 (10) LAWS 35 (AP). 5. On the other hand, the learned Government Pleader has vehemently opposed the maintainability of the writ petition itself on the ground that the petitioner has an alternative and efficacious remedy of filing an appeal, if he is aggrieved by the orders if any issued by the authorities. That without taking recourse to the alternative and efficacious remedy of filing an appeal under Section 10 of the Act, the petitioner has straightaway approached this Court and, therefore, the present writ petition is liable to be dismissed solely on the said ground. 6. In reply, the learned Senior Counsel has contended that when the impugned notice is one without jurisdiction and there is a bona fide dispute with regard to the title between the parties, the authorities cannot issue notice under Section 7 of the Act, which is summary in nature, and the authorities cannot be the Judge of their own fault and has contended that the writ petition is maintainable. 7. On 28.4.2014, while issuing notice before admission, this Court has directed the parties to maintain status quo in respect of the subject land. 8. Even though the learned Government Pleader has raised the question of maintainability, this Court is not inclined to go into the said controversy, as almost seven years have been lapsed and it would not be proper to relegate the party again to the authorities under the Act for settling the issue in controversy. Moreover, on number of occasions, this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that where the authority issuing the notice suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction, the parties can approach the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the very jurisdiction and validity of the notices issued. 9. Moreover, on number of occasions, this Court as well as the Hon'ble Supreme Court have held that where the authority issuing the notice suffers from inherent lack of jurisdiction, the parties can approach the Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India questioning the very jurisdiction and validity of the notices issued. 9. In Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. Assistant Commissioner (AA) and another, (2009) 14 SCC 338 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that when an order of a statutory authority is questioned on the ground that the same suffers from lack of jurisdiction, alternative remedy may not be a bar. 10. In view of the above settled proposition of law, this Court is not inclined to go into the aspect of maintainability. 11. Now coming to the question as to whether impugned notice issued by the respondents is valid or not, as seen from the record, the petitioner is claiming ownership through the registered sale deeds bearing Nos. 1337/1993 dated 3.11.1993, 1317/1993 dated 25.10.1993 and 1318/1993 dated 25.10.1993, which were executed by the original owners in the year 1993. A perusal of the revenue record shows that right from the year 1954-55, the classification of the land is being shown as 'patta land' and the name of the pattadars is reflected both in the 'pattadar' as well as 'possessor' columns. The said entries continued upto 2014-15 i.e., till filing of the writ petition. Moreover, the petitioner has been issued pattadar passbooks and title deed and number of buildings are constructed in the subject lands after taking due permission from the concerned authorities and a factory is being run in the said buildings after obtaining necessary approvals from the competent authority. The Pollution Control Board has also issued necessary approval for running of the factory. 12. It is apt to extract Section 7 of the Act, under which provision the impugned notice has been issued. Section 7 is as follows : 7. Before taking proceedings under Section 5 or Section 6 the Collector or Tahsildar, or Deputy Tahsildar, as the case may be shall cause to be served on the person reputed to be in unauthorized occupation of land being the property of Government a notice specifying the land so occupied and calling on him to show-cause before a certain date why he should not be proceeded against under Section 5 or Section 6. Such notice shall be served in the manner prescribed in Section 25 of the Telangana Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 or in such other manner as the State Government by rules or orders under Section 8 may direct. 13. While interpreting the above provision, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Thummala Krishna Rao's case (supra), has held as under : 8......Facts which raise a bond fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon by the ordinary Courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law. 14. In Roshan Minoo Patel's case (supra), this Court has held as under: "It is not the duration, short or long, of encroachment that is conclusive of the question whether the summary remedy prescribed by the Act can be put into operation for evicting a person. What is relevant for the decision of that question is more the nature of the property on which the encroachment is alleged to have been committed and the consideration whether the claim of the occupant is bona fide. Facts which raise a bona fide dispute of title between the Government and the occupant must be adjudicated upon the ordinary Courts of law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally in its own favour and evict any person summarily on the basis of such decision. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law." 15. But duration of occupation is relevant in the sense that a person who is in occupation of a property openly for an appreciable length of time can be taken, prima facie, to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law." 15. In Express Newspapers Private Limited v. Union of India, (1986) 1 SCC 133 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court, while observing that due process of law in a case like the present necessarily implies the filing of suit by the lessor i.e., the Union of India, Ministry of Works & Housing for the enforcement of the alleged right of re-entry, if any, upon forfeiture of lease due to breach of the terms of the lease, held as under: "there was no question of the Lessor applying for eviction under Section 5(1) of the 1971 Act nor has the Estate Officer any authority or jurisdiction to direct their eviction under sub-section (2) of Section 5 by summary process." 16. In Shivalingappa v. State of Andhra Pradesh rep. by the Secretary to Government, Revenue Department, 1988 (1) ALT 716 , this Court, after referring to the judgments of this Court in Thummala Krishna Rao's case (supra) and The Special Deputy Collector v. Konda Lakshman Bapuji, 1984 (1) APLJ 219 (DB), held that if there is a bona fide dispute between the parties, about the nature of the occupation, then such a dispute takes the matter beyond the provisions of the Land Encroachment Act and the summary proceedings provided by the Act, being wholly inadequate to decide the title of the parties, should not be allowed to be put into operation. 17. In Manga Devi's case (supra), this Court has held as under: "10. In view of the well settled principles of law on the subject, all I need to do, is to leave it to the State to initiate appropriate legal proceedings for having its title declared and possession restored and until that is done, the petitioners cannot be evicted from the lands in question pursuant to the summary procedure followed under the L.E. Act." 18. In Narendra M. Agarwal's case (supra), this Court has held as under:- "12..........the respondents still contend that the land is a Government land. In Narendra M. Agarwal's case (supra), this Court has held as under:- "12..........the respondents still contend that the land is a Government land. If that is so, the respondents/State are required to seek the reliefs of declaration of title of the Government in respect of the subject land and eviction of the writ petitioners therefrom by approaching an ordinary Civil Court, but, they cannot resort to the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 of the said Act of 1905 as the same is not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated question of title and as the procedure under the said Act is, therefore, not the due process of law for evicting the present writ petitioners from the subject property." 19. In Special Deputy Collector v. Konda Lakshman Bapuji (supra), a Division Bench of this Court has observed that the occupation of the property for an appreciable length of time can be taken prima facie to have a bona fide claim to the property requiring an impartial adjudication according to the established procedure of law by the ordinary Courts of Law. The Government cannot decide such questions unilaterally. 20. In view of the fact that the petitioner and its predecessors-in-title are having long standing possession over the subject land, as reflected in the revenue records, the recourse taken by the official respondents under the provisions of the Act, which are summary in nature, cannot be sustained. In view of the longstanding possession of the petitioner and its predecessors coupled with the fact that number of buildings came into existence in the subject land, the question as to whether the lands are Government lands or private patta lands cannot be gone into by the authorities under the provisions of the Act, which are summary in nature. However, if the respondents are so advised, they are always at liberty to approach the Competent Civil Court for adjudicating their rights. 21. In view of the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, in the cases referred to above, the writ petition has to be allowed and the same is accordingly allowed setting aside the impugned notice dated 23.1.2012, however, as one without jurisdiction, leaving it open to the authorities to approach the Civil Court to adjudicate their rights, if any. 22. 22. Miscellaneous petitions pending in this writ petition, if any, shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.