JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J. 1. In view of outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic, case has been taken up through Video Conferencing and heard at length. Learned counsel for the petitioner has no objection with regard to the proceeding which has been held through Video Conferencing and there is no complaint in respect to audio and video clarity and quality and after hearing at length, the matter is being disposed of finally. 2. Instant writ petition has been filed with a prayer for quashing the order dated 15.04.2019, passed by Presiding Officer, Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi in M.W. Appeal No. 01 of 2017 whereby and whereunder the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed directing him to pay difference of wages of Rs. 3,83,356.00 to the respondent. Petitioner has also prayed to set aside the order dated 29.09.2016, passed in M.W. No. 13/2015, whereby claim of the applicant-respondent regarding payment of difference of wages is allowed. 3. Brief fact of the case is that the applicant-respondent filed an application under Section 20(2) of the Minimum Wages Age through the General Secretary, Jharkhand General Kamgar Union, Ranchi alleging therein that he worked in the Forest Range Office from 02.01.2009 to 30.08.2015 and his wages was fixed as Rs. 3,000/- for 26 working days in a month but he was paid Rs. 1,500/- only per month from the office of Forest Range Officer, Mahilong Territorial, District-Ranchi and claimed for difference of wages and compensation at the rate of ten times of difference money. After service of notice, petitioner appeared but could not file show-cause and relevant documents and the proceeding proceeded. During evidence stage, respondent-applicant had filed his evidence with affidavit in which he had stated that he worked from 01.01.2009 to 30.08.2015 at Check Post of Forest Department situated in Angara as Cattle Guard. A sum of Rs. 3,000/- was fixed as his wage but he was given a sum of Rs. 1,500/- only and rest amount was never paid rather it was assured that whenever allotment will be given by the Government, the dues will be cleared and since the applicant-respondent repeated his demand for payment of balance amount, he was ousted from the job. Another witness of the applicant-respondent namely Puskar Munda also filed his evidence on oath in support of evidence of the applicant-respondent. Another witness of the applicant-respondent namely Puskar Munda also filed his evidence on oath in support of evidence of the applicant-respondent. Both the witnesses stood discharged without cross examination as no one was there to cross examine on behalf of the opposite party-petitioner. Upon conclusion of proceeding, vide order dated 29.09.2016, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi allowed the application filed by the applicant-respondent under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC holding that claim of the applicant regarding payment of minimum wages on account of less payment than the minimum wages was correct and directed for payment of a sum of Rs. 1,91,678/- including one time compensation, total whereof comes to Rs. 3,83,356/-. 4. Being aggrieved, the opposite party-petitioner preferred an Appeal under Section 20(6) of the Minimum Wages Act before the Presiding Officer, Industrial Disputes Tribunal, Ranchi in M.W. Appeal No. 1 of 2017, which also stood dismissed vide order dated 15.04.2019 holding that the conclusion arrived at by the Court concerned needs no interference. Being aggrieved by orders of two Courts, petitioner has knocked door of this Court. 5. Ms. Kumari Rashmi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that petitioner was engaged in plantation work and as such he could not take steps for filing show-cause and relevant documents and the case stood proceeded under Order VIII Rule 10 CPC for evidence on behalf of the applicant/ respondent and ended ex-parte. Learned counsel further submits that false claim has been made by the claimant and the Courts below have arrived at a wrong conclusion and directed the petitioner to pay balance amount and the compensation, which is fit to be interfered by this Court. From perusal of representation of the concerned workman dated 13.05.2015 also it is apparently clear that he was working since last seven years for which he was already paid and nothing remains due. Learned counsel further submits that the Courts below did not consider that there was delay of 78 months without any proper explanation and as such, the same should not have been entertained. 6. No one appears on behalf of the respondent. However, from the counter affidavit it appears that concerned workman was paid less amount and as such, there is no illegality or any infirmity in the impugned order. Concerned workman has rightly been compensated for the wrongs done by the petitioner. 6. No one appears on behalf of the respondent. However, from the counter affidavit it appears that concerned workman was paid less amount and as such, there is no illegality or any infirmity in the impugned order. Concerned workman has rightly been compensated for the wrongs done by the petitioner. Order was duly communicated to the petitioner but he did not respond. Workman had a rightful claim for payment of minimum wages and as such both the Courts have rightly decided the matter in his favour. 7. I have heard counsel for the petitioner and perused the records. From perusal of facts of the case and considering arguments advanced by counsel for the petitioner, I find findings derived by the Industrial Tribunal, Ranchi and affirmed by the Appellate Court requires no interference. The Industrial Tribunal is the final court of facts and the same can be interfered only if findings are perverse. From perusal of orders, this Court is in total agreement with the findings expressed by the Labour Court as well as the Appellate Court. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate whether order of the Court below are perverse and based on no evidence. 8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. vs. S. Viswanathan, (2005) 3 SCC 193 has dealt with the same and observed in Para 12, 13 and 16 as under: “12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise, it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. But before going into such an exercise, it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere has he come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court was either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court. 13. The Division Bench too in appeal, in our opinion, has committed the same error. Maybe, there was some justification, since if it had to allow the appeal, then it had to consider the points on facts decided by the learned Single Judge. In that process it also took up for consideration every bit of evidence that was considered by the Labour Court as well as by the learned Single Judge and disagreed with the finding of the learned Single Judge. 16. We note that the Labour Court has taken into consideration the fact that the complainant had stated that on the day when he went to meet the workman he was greeted with an abuse, but this piece of evidence was not accepted by the Labour Court rightly because it is rather difficult to accept that any normal person who meets another person for the first time in his life would straightaway abuse him without any rhyme or reason. In this background, we cannot conclude that the finding of the Labour Court on this question is perverse. The other argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there was evidence to show that the demand of Rs.10 was made as illegal gratification in the guise of donation and that case ought to have been accepted. In this background, we cannot conclude that the finding of the Labour Court on this question is perverse. The other argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that there was evidence to show that the demand of Rs.10 was made as illegal gratification in the guise of donation and that case ought to have been accepted. We must state that even this question was considered by the Labour Court and was rejected on the ground that the mere statement of the complainant in this regard without there being any corroborative material was insufficient to hold the workman guilty. Even this finding in our opinion cannot be held to be perverse taking into consideration the overall fats of the case. In regard to the third charge of not allowing the complainant to enter the godown also, it cannot be said that the finding of the Labour Court is perverse. In such a background it is not possible for this Court to accept the contention of the management that the Labour Court’s findings are unsustainable in law. It may be possible for another person to take a different view, but certainly it is not possible to give a finding that the conclusion of the Labour Court was either perverse or not based on evidence.” 9. Further the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Depot Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation vs. N. Danaiah, (2020) 3 SCC 267 has observed as under: “3.2 The reasons recorded by the enquiry officer which were accepted by the disciplinary officer, were considered by the Labour Court which refused to pass an order in favour of the respondent. The learned Single Judge also upheld the award of the Labour Court. The findings of fact as recorded in the departmental enquiry and upheld by the Labour Court could not have been upset by the Division Bench without any justifiable reasons. The conclusions of the Division Bench are contrary to the findings recorded by the enquiry officer.” 10. It has repeatedly been held that findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiry and upheld by Labour Court and Single Judge of High Court cannot be interfered by the Division Bench without justifiable reason. Admittedly, the claim of the applicant regarding payment of minimum wages is correct and applicant is entitled for payment of Rs. 1,91,678/- including one time compensation which will be Rs. 3,83,356/-. 11. Admittedly, the claim of the applicant regarding payment of minimum wages is correct and applicant is entitled for payment of Rs. 1,91,678/- including one time compensation which will be Rs. 3,83,356/-. 11. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioner regarding delay has already been met with by the Appellate Authority and as per the ratio laid down by the Hon’ble Division Bench of the Patna High Court in the case of Baliram Sarraf vs. State of Bihar and Others, 1968 Lab. I.C. 1073, it has been held that one composite order condoning delay in filing application and disposing it off on merits, it not illegal. 12. From the aforesaid observations, this Court is of the considered opinion that the order passed by the Labour Court as well as the Appellate Court requires no interference and this Court is in full agreement with the same. 13. The writ petition is devoid of any merits and accordingly the same is hereby dismissed.