JUDGMENT : The present Second Appeal is filed under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) by the unsuccessful plaintiffs assailing the decree and judgment dated 02.12.2020 in A.S.No.43 of 2013 on the file of V Additional District Judge, Tirupati confirming the decree and judgment dated 06.02.2013 in O.S.No.1335 of 2008 on the file of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Tirupati. 2. The parties in this second appeal are referred to as they are arrayed in the original suit for the sake of convenience. 3. The appellant who is the plaintiff filed O.S.No.1335 of 2008 seeking the relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1984. The specific case of the plaintiff is that the plaint schedule property originally belonged to the defendant. On 30.03.1984 the defendant entered into an agreement of sale i.e. Ex.A.1 with the plaintiff agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property for Rs.20,000/-for his family expenses. On the date of executing Ex.A.1 the defendant received the sale consideration and he delivered the physical possession of the plaint schedule property to them and promised that he will execute sale deed on sufficient valuable stamps and get it registered in their favour whenever they demand him. Since then they are in absolute possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property with absolute rights by raising rain fed crops some times they also irrigated the crops raised in the plaint schedule property with the tank water whenever available. They also obtained the said discharged promissory notes. It is the further case of the plaintiffs that from September, 2008 they had been demanding the defendant to execute sale deed on sufficient valuable stamps in their favour and get it registered but the defendant had been postponing the same on some pretext or the other for the reasons best known to him. As such, on 31.10.2008 they got issued Ex.A-2 legal notice to the defendant calling upon him to execute sale deed. The defendant having received the said notice issued reply denying the execution of Ex.A-1. As such, on 31.10.2008 they got issued Ex.A-2 legal notice to the defendant calling upon him to execute sale deed. The defendant having received the said notice issued reply denying the execution of Ex.A-1. Further, the plaintiffs came to know that as the land rates have been increased abnormally the defendant is trying to create some sham and nominal documents in favour of others with regard to the plaint schedule property with an intention to defeat their rights and the defendant has no right to do so, and the defendant is trying to dispossess them and occupy the plaint schedule property, as such they filed caveat petition before the Principal Senior Civil Judge’s Court, and III Additional District Judge’s Court, Tirupati. Since the defendant denied the execution of Ex.A-1 in favour of plaintiffs, they are constrained to file the suit. 4. The defendant filed written statement contending that he never executed any document agreeing to sell the plaint schedule property to the plaintiffs and himself and his family members are in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. the alleged agreement of sale was of 24 years back, if really the alleged sale agreement is true, certainly plaintiffs would have asked him for execution of sale deed one or two years after the sale agreement, which itself shows the falsity of the case of plaintiffs. It is pleaded that the suit is barred by limitation. He further pleaded that he is having differences with the brother of plaintiffs by name M.Sankar Reddy as both of them belonged to different political groups, and in order to take revenge against him the plaintiffs filed the false suit and requested to dismiss the suit. 5. Basing on the above pleadings, the Court below framed the following issues: 1) Whether the agreement of sale deed dated 30.03.1984 is true and valid? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get regular sale deed in pursuance of sale agreement dated 30.03.1984 from the defendant? (3) To what relief? 6. On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-11. On behalf of defendant, D.Ws.1 to 4 are examined and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.8. 7. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. (3) To what relief? 6. On behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and got marked Exs.A-1 to A-11. On behalf of defendant, D.Ws.1 to 4 are examined and got marked Exs.B.1 to B.8. 7. After considering the evidence on record, the trial Court dismissed the suit of the plaintiffs. Aggrieved thereof, the plaintiffs preferred appeal and the appellate Court has dismissed the appeal by confirming the decree and judgment of the Court below. Assailing the same, the present second appeal is preferred by the plaintiffs. 8. Heard Sri Y.N.Vivekananda, learned counsel for the appellants/plaintiffs. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the Court below ought to have seen that the defendant sold the suit schedule property for Rs.20,000/-for his necessities and family expenses and for discharging the promissory notes debt owed to Muniswami Reddy and Ademma. He submits that the Court below erred in discarding the cogent evidence of PW.1. Further the Court below misconstrued the agreement of sale in its entirety and erroneously held that Exs.A.4 and A.5 are time barred promissory notes and that the case of the plaintiffs that to discharge the time barred promissory notes debt, the defendant borrowed money is unbelievable. He further submits that the Court below completely went wrong in holding that the onus lies on the plaintiffs to prove Ex.A.1 just based on the pleading of the defendant that it is a forged document and failed to consider the evidence of PWs.3 and 4-the attestors of Ex.A.1 and erred in holding that the appellants/ plaintiffs have not discharged their burden in proving Ex.A.1. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants submits that the following substantial questions of law fall for consideration before this Court: 1) Whether the Court below erred in holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove their readiness and willingness to perform their part of the contract inspite of the plaintiffs having tendered the entire sale consideration amount as per the agreement of sale to the defendant? (2) Whether the Court below was correct in holding that the plaintiffs are dis-entitled to get a relief for specific performance on the ground of latches? (3) Whether the Court below was correct in holding that the silence of the plaintiffs for about 24 years from the date of Ex.A.1 undoubtedly disproves the case of the plaintiffs? (2) Whether the Court below was correct in holding that the plaintiffs are dis-entitled to get a relief for specific performance on the ground of latches? (3) Whether the Court below was correct in holding that the silence of the plaintiffs for about 24 years from the date of Ex.A.1 undoubtedly disproves the case of the plaintiffs? (4) Whether the alleged delay in making a demand by the plaintiffs for registration of the sale deed disentitles them for a relief of specific performance? (5) Whether the Court below erred in failing to see that the plaintiffs having paid the entire sale consideration in terms of Ex.A.1 they are not required to display any further readiness or willingness to enable them to seek specific performance? (6) Whether the Court below erred in not holding that the plaintiffs displayed adequate readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract after having remitted the entire sale consideration? 11. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and perused the material on record. The Court has to examine whether any substantial question of law arises in this case which warrant interference of this Court with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. It is settled law that the Courts will entertain the second appeal only if it is satisfied that the appeal involves a substantial question of law. 12. The Court below having considered the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, held that Ex.A.1 clearly goes to show that it is not an agreement of sale and it is an unregistered deed. In Ex.A.1, it was recited that possession was delivered on the date of Ex.A.1, but the plaintiffs failed to prove their possession for about 24 years i.e. from the date of Ex.A.1 to prior to the filing of the suit. On the other hand, the documents produced by the defendant i.e., Ex.B.2-fair adangal and Ex.B.3 10(1) account clearly goes to show that the defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule property. Another important point is that in the plaint itself it is recited that from September, 2008 onwards the plaintiffs are demanding the defendant for execution of registered sale deed. It clearly goes to show that the plaintiffs maintained silence for about 24 years from the date of Ex.A.1. The 1st plaintiff is none other than the brother of 2nd plaintiff. Another important point is that in the plaint itself it is recited that from September, 2008 onwards the plaintiffs are demanding the defendant for execution of registered sale deed. It clearly goes to show that the plaintiffs maintained silence for about 24 years from the date of Ex.A.1. The 1st plaintiff is none other than the brother of 2nd plaintiff. The scribe of Ex.A.1 is not examined by the plaintiffs and in view of the admissions of PW.4 in his cross examination it is not safe to believe his evidence. Further, the recitals of Ex.A.1 clearly goes to show that it is an unregistered sale deed, but not agreement of sale. The Court below having considered the oral and documentary evidence on record held that the plaintiffs failed to prove that they are in possession and enjoyment of plaint schedule property for a period of 24 years. The plaintiffs after maintaining silence for about 24 years from the date of Ex.A.1, subsequently approached the Court and there are several latches on the part of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs suppressed the truth and approached the Court with false pleadings as such, the Court below on consideration of both oral and documentary evidence in its proper perspective answered all the issues against the plaintiffs and dismissed the suit. The 1st appellate Court concurred with the findings of the Court below in all respects and dismissed the first appeal preferred by the plaintiffs. 13. Before dealing with the merits of the case it is appropriate to have a look at the legal position on scope of interference of the High Court in a second appeal. 14. In Habazat Hussain vs. Abdul Majeed & Ors., 2001 (7) SCC 189 , it is held that: 8) We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. 14. In Habazat Hussain vs. Abdul Majeed & Ors., 2001 (7) SCC 189 , it is held that: 8) We have carefully considered the submissions of the learned counsel appearing on either side. No doubt, it has been repeatedly pointed out by this Court that concurrent findings recorded by the Trial Judge as well as the First Appellate Judge on proper appreciation of the materials on record should not be disturbed by the High Court, while exercising Second Appellate Jurisdiction, but at the same time, it is not an absolute rule to be applied universally and invariably since the exceptions to the same also were often indicated with equal importance by this Court, and instances are innumerable where despite such need and necessity warranting such interference, if the Second Appellate Court mechanically declined to interfere, the matter has been even relegated by this Court to the Second Appellate Court to properly deal with the claims of parties in the Second Appeal objectively keeping in view the parameters of consideration for interference under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Therefore, it becomes necessary to see whether the learned Single Judge in the High Court has transgressed the permissible limits. (9) The judgments of the Trial and First Appellate Court could be said to be concurrent only in the sense that both the courts have chosen to reject the suit as well as the First Appeal and on the question as to whether the property in dispute was acquired by Zohra Bibi from out of her income earned as a prostitute. In other respects, namely, the factum of creation of the document of gift, Wakf deed, the conduct of the parties throughout thereafter in acting upon the same and the collusive and void nature of the proceedings before the Court instituted by Hazi Mohammed Siddiq and Mubarak Hussain, the conclusions could not be said to be concurrent. The learned First Appellate Judge has noticed a flaw in the judgment of the Trial Court to the extent that there was no specific issue as it ought to have been as to whether the properties were acquired by Zohra Bibi from her earning as a prostitute, and framed it as an additional issue. The learned First Appellate Judge has noticed a flaw in the judgment of the Trial Court to the extent that there was no specific issue as it ought to have been as to whether the properties were acquired by Zohra Bibi from her earning as a prostitute, and framed it as an additional issue. It has been pointed out supra that the learned Trial Judge despite castigating the Court proceedings instituted by Hazi Mohammed Siddiq, the husband of Zohra Bibi, as also the partition suit instituted by Mubarak Hussain, the defendant in the present proceedings, against the Hazi Mohammed Siddiq for partition of his half share, to be collusive and the decree procured thereon to be not only void but illegal and not binding upon any one or affecting the property, has chosen to place reliance upon the claims in such make-believe and collusive proceedings to hold that Zohra Bibi acquired the properties in question out of her earnings as a prostitute, overlooking the position that though a prostitute she had other income from properties as well to purchase the disputed property and the further fact that the defendant miserably failed to substantiate his claim about the tainted nature of acquisition of the same. The Second Appellate Judge was able to indicate and highlight the serious infirmities and illegalities committed by the learned Trial Judge as well as the First Appellate Judge, and the necessity for his interference to prevent total miscarriage of justice, with convincing reasons. The findings recorded by the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court was shown to be not only vitiated due to perversity of reasoning but also due to surmises and misreading of the materials on record. On a careful and critical scanning through of the judgment in the Second Appeal, we are unable to agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that any findings of fact concurrently recorded were mechanically interfered without justification or by transgressing the limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100, CPC. The reasons assigned by the learned Judge in the High Court for the conclusions arrived at do not suffer from any infirmity warranting our interference in this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs”. 15. In Kulwant Kaur and Ors vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By Lrs. The reasons assigned by the learned Judge in the High Court for the conclusions arrived at do not suffer from any infirmity warranting our interference in this appeal. The appeal, therefore, fails and shall stand dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs”. 15. In Kulwant Kaur and Ors vs. Gurdial Singh Mann (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors., it is held that: “34) Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact even if erroneous will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stands vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to dealt with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the Concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. 16. In Yadavarao Dajiba Shrawane vs. Ma&niolrasl, 2002 (6) SCC 404 , it is held that: From the discussions in the judgment it is clear that the High Court has based its findings on the documentary evidence placed on record and statements made by some witnesses which can be construed as admissions or conclusions. The position is well settled that when the judgment of the final Court of fact is based on misinterpretation of documentary evidence or on consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring material evidence the High Court in second appeal is entitled to interfere with the judgment. The position is also well settled that admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weightage by Courts. The position is also well settled that admission of parties or their witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be given due weightage by Courts. A finding of fact ignoring such admissions or concessions is vitiated in law and can be interfered with by the High Court in second appeal. Since the parties have been in litigating terms for several decades the records are voluminous. The High Court as it appears from the judgment has discussed the documentary evidence threadbare in the light of law relating to their admissibility and relevance. 17. In Leela Soni vs. Rajesh Goyal, 2001 (7) SCC 494 , it is held that: It will be apt to refer to Section 103 of C.P.C. which enables the High Court to determine the issues of fact: "103. Power of High Court to determine issue of fact.-In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue necessary for the disposal of the appeal, - (a) which has not been determined by the Lower Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and the Lower Appellate Court, or (b) which has been wrongly determined by such court or courts by reason of a decision on such question of law as is referred to in section 100." The section, noted above, authorizes the High Court to determine any issue which is necessary for the disposal of the second appeal provided the evidence on record is sufficient, in any of the following two situations : (1) when that issue has not been determined both by the trial court as well as the Lower Appellate Court or by the Lower Appellate Court; or (2) when both the trial court as well as the Appellate Court or the Lower Appellate Court has wrongly determined any issue on a substantial question of law which can properly be the subject matter of second appeal under Section 100 of C.P.C. 18. In Ishwasdas Jain vs. Sohan lal, 2000 (1) SCC 434 , it is observed thus: “Under section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate Court without doing so.” 19. In Ishwasdas Jain vs. Sohan lal, 2000 (1) SCC 434 , it is observed thus: “Under section 100 CPC, after the 1976 amendment, it is essential for the High Court to formulate a substantial question of law and it is not permissible to reverse the judgment of the first appellate Court without doing so.” 19. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC has to confine to the substantial question of law involved in the appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court below where the Courts below have exercised the discretion judicially. Further the existence of substantial question of law is the sine quo nan for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the Court are manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 20. Coming back to the facts of this case, appellant has filed the suit seeking the discretionary relief of specific performance of agreement of sale dated 30.03.1984 which is alleged to have been entered 28 years prior to filing of the suit. Both the Courts below on a meticulous examination of both oral and documentary evidence have dismissed the suit. It is the case of the appellant that to discharge the amount under a pronote dated 29.11.1972, the defendant entered into an agreement of sale in the year 1984. The Court below rightly disbelieved the same observing that the pronote which is of the year, 1972 will be barred by limitation by the year, 1975. Further it is highly unbelievable and improbable that the plaintiff who has paid the entire sale consideration in the year 1984 has kept quiet till 2008 for getting the regular sale deed in his favour and also it is deposed by PW1 that till 2008 he has not even issued any notice to the defendant asking him to execute the regular sale deed. Coming to the possession claimed by the plaintiff form 1984 the Courts below observed that in Ex.A6-pahani there are corrections and even in the tax receipt i.e. Ex.A7 also there are corrections. Hence, the same was disbelieved by the Courts below rightly. Coming to the possession claimed by the plaintiff form 1984 the Courts below observed that in Ex.A6-pahani there are corrections and even in the tax receipt i.e. Ex.A7 also there are corrections. Hence, the same was disbelieved by the Courts below rightly. The appellants/ plaintiffs miserably failed to prove the execution of Ex.A1 as well as their possession over the suit schedule property from 1984 and the Courts below appreciated the evidence in a proper perspective and dismissed the suit. 21. Though the learned counsel for the appellants has pointed out the grounds which are extracted in the earlier paragraphs as substantial questions of law, this Court is of the view that there are no questions of law much less the substantial questions of law involved in this appeal for exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 C.P.C. 22. In view of the aforesaid discussion and having given earnest consideration to the facts and submissions, this Court finds that there is no error or illegality with the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below warranting interference of this Court. 23. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed. No order as to costs. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall also stand closed.