JUDGMENT : Gurpal Singh Ahluwalia, J. 1. Heard on the question of admission. 2. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of Civil Procedure Code has been filed against the Judgment and Decree dated 27-9-2018 passed by VIIth ADJ, Gwalior in Regular Civil Appeal No. 4A/2015 arising out of Judgment and Decree dated 28-4-2015 passed by IXth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 19A/2013, by which the suit filed by the appellant has been dismissed. 3. The necessary facts for disposal of the present appeal in short are that the appellant filed a civil suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction as well as for declaration of Sale deed dated 23-3-2006 as null and void. 4. It is her case that the property mentioned in para 1 of the Plaint is the property belonging to the ownership and in possession of the appellant. It is her case that after purchasing the property, the appellant has constructed a house and her name is also mutated in the revenue records. The property mentioned in para 1 of the plaint has following boundaries: East - Public Road West - House of Naruddin North - House of Babulal South - House of Deegaran 5. Kalabai and Puniabai were the joint owners of the property. Puniabai and Kalabai have already sold some part of their share. After the sale deeds were executed by Puniabai, nothing was left in her share, whereas Kalabai by a registered sale deed dated 4-1-2012, sold her share to the appellant in survey No. 270 Min, 272 Min total area 520 sq. ft. The vacant possession was also given to the appellant. The property in dispute is situated in Ward No. 55. After the sale deed was executed, the name of the appellant was also recorded in the revenue records. The boundaries of the property purchased by the appellant are as under:- East - House of Prahlad, Munna & Babulal West - Public Road North - House of Chhatrapal and Babulal South - House of Hakim Singh 6. The appellant, with an intention to construct her house, started storing stones for the purpose of laying foundation. However, the defendants after uprooting the poles which were being used for tying cattle, tried to take possession of the property in dispute. Police complaint was made. The appellant, with an intention to construct her house, started storing stones for the purpose of laying foundation. However, the defendants after uprooting the poles which were being used for tying cattle, tried to take possession of the property in dispute. Police complaint was made. It was further pleaded that the defendants are not allowing the appellant to use the land and are creating hurdles in construction. In response to the police complaint, the appellant was given a copy of sale deed, from which She came to know that a forged sale deed has been executed in favour of the defendants in respect of Public Road and the property in dispute, whereas Puniabai had no right or title to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendants. The defendants had earlier filed a suit against one Mohan Singh and others for declaration of title and permanent injunction which was dismissed, and the defendants were not recognized as the owners of the disputed property. Thus, it was claimed that the defendants are trying to dispossess the appellant and accordingly, the suit for declaration of title, permanent injunction as well as for declaration of sale deed null and void was filed. 7. The defendants filed their written statement and denied the plaint averments. It is submitted that the property mentioned in para 1 of the plaint is not the subject matter of the suit. It was further pleaded that Puniabai and Kalabai were sisters, but the plaintiff has wrongly pleaded that Puniabai had sold her entire share. It is further submitted that after the execution of sale deed dated 2-3-2005, in favour of the plaintiff by Puniabai and Kalabai, some more land was left in the share of Puniabai which was the part of Survey No. 270/Min-2 and 272/Min-2, situated in village Gudi Avadpura Nagar, Lashkar, Gwalior. The said property i.e., 2485.7 sq. ft. of land was sold in favor of the defendants by registered sale deed dated 23-3-2006 and possession was given. The boundaries of the property purchased by the defendants are as under: East - Public Way and Building of Hakim Singh and Laxman West - Public Way and Property of Shanker Singh North - House of Shanker Singh South - Plot of Gulab Singh 8. It was further pleaded that in fact the defendants have kept stones etc. for the purposes of raising construction. It was further pleaded that in fact the defendants have kept stones etc. for the purposes of raising construction. The plaintiff is not in possession of any part of the land. The husband of the plaintiff, namely Gulab Singh is in the police department, and by misusing his official position, he always threatens the defendants to dispossess them. The plaintiff has no right or title over the land in dispute. Puniabai had full authority to execute the sale deed in favour of the defendants. It was also admitted that although a civil suit was filed against Mohan Singh, but it was in respect of only 12.6 inch Gokh. Accordingly, it was denied that the plaintiff is in possession of the land in dispute and even her title was also denied. 9. The Trial Court, after framing issues, recording evidence of both the parties, and after hearing them, dismissed the suit by holding that the plaintiff has failed to prove that Puniabai had no authority to execute the sale deed in favor of the defendants in respect of Survey No. 270 Min-2 and Survey No. 272 Min-1. It was also held that the sale deed dated 23-3-2006 executed in favor of the defendants is not a sham, forged or without title. The contention of the plaintiff that She had dumped stones for the purpose of laying foundation and the poles which were being used for tying cattle were uprooted, was also disbelieved by the Trial Court. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. 10. The Appellant being aggrieved by the Judgment and Decree passed by the Trial Court, filed a regular civil appeal, which too has been dismissed by the Appellate Court by impugned Judgment and Decree. 11. Challenging the judgments and decrees passed by the Courts below, it is submitted by the Counsel for the appellant that in absence of any finding regarding dispossession of appellant, the Courts below committed material illegality by dismissing the suit. However, it is submitted that the Substantial Questions of Law proposed by the appellant are in fact questions of fact and were accordingly not pressed. However, it is submitted that as the appellant is in possession of the property in dispute, the suit should not have been dismissed. 12. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant on question of admission. 13. The question of possession is necessarily a pure question of fact. However, it is submitted that as the appellant is in possession of the property in dispute, the suit should not have been dismissed. 12. Heard the learned Counsel for the appellant on question of admission. 13. The question of possession is necessarily a pure question of fact. The Courts below after evaluating the evidence of witnesses examined by both the parties, has come to a conclusion that the evidence of the plaintiff regarding possession over the land in dispute is not worth reliable. Kalabai (P.W. 3) has admitted that the tanker of the defendant no. 2 is parked in the disputed property. She has further admitted that She is seeing the tanker and stones for the last three years. Further, the plaintiff has stated that stones are lying for the last 5 years. The Trial Court came to a conclusion that when the property was purchased by the appellant by registered sale deed dated 4-6-2012, then how She could put her stones on the plot about 5 years back? 14. The above mentioned findings recorded by the Trial Court cannot be said to be perverse or out of record. Further, the findings of facts recorded by the Trial Court have been affirmed by the Appellate Court. 15. It is well established principle of law that this Court in exercise of power under Section 100 of CPC cannot interfere with concurrent findings of facts, even if they might be erroneous. 16. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first Appellate Court, is the last Court of facts unless the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse. 17. The Supreme Court in the case of Damodar Lal Vs. Sohan Devi and others reported in (2016) 3 SCC 78 has held as under: "8. "Perversity" has been the subject-matter of umpteen number of decisions of this Court. It has also been settled by several decisions of this Court that the first appellate court, under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, is the last court of facts unless the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam, it has been held at para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. 9. In Krishnan v. Backiam, it has been held at para 11 that: (SCC pp. 192-93) "11. It may be mentioned that the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC is the last court of facts. The High Court in second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court under Section 96 CPC. No doubt the findings of fact of the first appellate court can be challenged in second appeal on the ground that the said findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, but even in that case a question of law has to be formulated and framed by the High Court to that effect." 10. In Gurvachan Kaur v. Salikram, at para 10, this principle has been reiterated: (SCC p. 532) "10. It is settled law that in exercise of power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the High Court cannot interfere with the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court which is the final court of fact, unless the same is found to be perverse. This being the position, it must be held that the High Court was not justified in reversing the finding of fact recorded by the first appellate court on the issues of existence of landlord-tenant relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and default committed by the latter in payment of rent." 18. The Supreme Court in the case of Pakeerappa Rai Vs. Seethamma Hengsu Dead by L.R.s and others reported in (2001) 9 SCC 521 has held as under: "2. ...But the High Court in exercise of power under Section 100 CPC cannot interfere with the erroneous finding of fact howsoever gross the error seems to be...." 19. The Supreme Court in the case of Gurdev Kaur Vs. Kaki reported in (2007) 1 SCC 546 has held as under: "46. In Bholaram v. Ameerchand a three-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. In Bholaram v. Ameerchand a three-Judge Bench of this Court reiterated the statement of law. The High Court, however, seems to have justified its interference in second appeal mainly on the ground that the judgments of the courts below were perverse and were given in utter disregard of the important materials on the record particularly misconstruction of the rent note. Even if we accept the main reason given by the High Court the utmost that could be said was that the findings of fact by the courts below were wrong or grossly inexcusable but that by itself would not entitle the High Court to interfere in the absence of a clear error of law. 47. In Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait a three-Judge Bench of this Court held: (a) that the High Court should be satisfied that the case involved a substantial question of law and not mere question of law; (b) reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded; (c) it has the duty to formulate the substantial questions of law and to put the opposite party on notice and give fair and proper opportunity to meet the point. The Court also held that it is the duty cast upon the High Court to formulate substantial question of law involved in the case even at the initial stage. 48. This Court had occasion to determine the same issue in Dnyanoba Bhaurao Shemade v. Maroti Bhaurao Marnor. The Court stated that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. 49. A mere look at the said provision shows that the High Court can exercise its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC only on the basis of substantial questions of law which are to be framed at the time of admission of the second appeal and the second appeal has to be heard and decided only on the basis of such duly framed substantial questions of law. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. The impugned judgment shows that no such procedure was followed by the learned Single Judge. It is held by a catena of judgments by this Court, some of them being, Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait and Sheel Chand v. Prakash Chand that the judgment rendered by the High Court under Section 100 CPC without following the aforesaid procedure cannot be sustained. On this short ground alone, this appeal is required to be allowed. 50. In Kanai Lal Garari v. Murari Ganguly this Court has observed that it is mandatory to formulate the substantial question of law while entertaining the appeal in absence of which the judgment is to be set aside. In Panchugopal Barua v. Umesh Chandra Goswami and Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari the Court reiterated the statement of law that the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law. These judgments have been referred to in the later judgment of K. Raj v. Muthamma. A statement of law has been reiterated regarding the scope and interference of the Court in second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 51. Again in Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari another three-Judge Bench of this Court correctly delineated the scope of Section 100 CPC. The Court observed that an obligation is cast on the appellant to precisely state in the memorandum of appeal the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and which the appellant proposes to urge before the Court. In the said judgment, it was further mentioned that the High Court must be satisfied that a substantial question of law is involved in the case and such question has then to be formulated by the High Court. According to the Court the word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means-of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with - technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code and Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. 52. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code and Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. 52. In Kamti Devi v. Poshi Ram the Court came to the conclusion that the finding thus reached by the first appellate court cannot be interfered with in a second appeal as no substantial question of law would have flowed out of such a finding. 53. In Thiagarajan v. Sri Venugopalaswamy B. Koil this Court has held that the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC was not justified in interfering with the findings of fact. The Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court in a catena of decisions held that where findings of fact by the lower appellate court are based on evidence, the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 54. In the same case, this Court observed that in a case where special leave petition was filed against a judgment of the High Court interfering with findings of fact of the lower appellate court. This Court observed that to say the least the approach of the High Court was not proper. It is the obligation of the courts of law to further the clear intendment of the legislature and not frustrate it by excluding the same. This Court further observed that the High Court in second appeal cannot substitute its own findings on re-appreciation of evidence merely on the ground that another view was possible. 55. This Court again reminded the High Court in Commr., HRCE v. P. Shanmugama that the High Court has no jurisdiction in second appeal to interfere with the finding of facts. 56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. 56. Again, this Court in State of Kerala v. Mohd. Kunhi has reiterated the same principle that the High Court is not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that, in doing so, the High Court has gone beyond the scope of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 57. Again, in Madhavan Nair v. Bhaskar Pillai this Court observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact. This Court observed that it is well settled that even if the first appellate court commits an error in recording a finding of fact, that itself will not be a ground for the High Court to upset the same. 58. Again, in Harjeet Singh v. Amrik Singh this Court with anguish has mentioned that the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the findings of fact arrived at by the first appellate court. In this case, the findings of the trial court and the lower appellate court regarding readiness and willingness to perform their part of contract was set aside by the High Court in its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC. This Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact arrived at by the courts below. 59. In H.P. Pyarejan v. Dasappa delivered on 6-2-2006, this Court found serious infirmity in the judgment of the High Court. This Court observed that it suffers from the vice of exercise of jurisdiction which did not vest in the High Court. Under Section 100 of the Code (as amended in 1976) the jurisdiction of the Court to interfere with the judgments of the courts below is confined to hearing of substantial questions of law. Interference with the finding of fact by the High Court is not warranted if it invokes re-appreciation of evidence. This Court found that the impugned judgment of the High Court was vulnerable and needed to be set aside." 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab SEB, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 216 has held as under:- "16. Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the order of the court. The Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Committee, Hoshiarpur Vs. Punjab SEB, reported in (2010) 13 SCC 216 has held as under:- "16. Thus, it is evident from the above that the right to appeal is a creation of statute and it cannot be created by acquiescence of the parties or by the order of the court. Jurisdiction cannot be conferred by mere acceptance, acquiescence, consent or by any other means as it can be conferred only by the legislature and conferring a court or authority with jurisdiction, is a legislative function. Thus, being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with the law in force, ensuring full compliance with the conditions mentioned in the provision that creates it. Therefore, the court has no power to enlarge the scope of those grounds mentioned in the statutory provisions. A second appeal cannot be decided merely on equitable grounds as it lies only on a substantial question of law, which is something distinct from a substantial question of fact. The court cannot entertain a second appeal unless a substantial question of law is involved, as the second appeal does not lie on the ground of erroneous findings of fact based on an appreciation of the relevant evidence. The existence of a substantial question of law is a condition precedent for entertaining the second appeal; on failure to do so, the judgment cannot be maintained. The existence of a substantial question of law is a sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under the provisions of Section 100 CPC. It is the obligation on the court to further clear the intent of the legislature and not to frustrate it by ignoring the same. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purshottam Tiwari; Sarjas Rai v. Bakshi Inderjit Singh; Manicka Poosali v. Anjalai Ammal; Sugani v. Rameshwar Das; Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal; P. Chandrasekharan v. S. Kanakarajan; Kashmir Singh v. Harnam Singh; V. Ramaswamy v. Ramachandran and Bhag Singh v. Jaskirat Singh.) 17. In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India this Court observed: "12. ...it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC. In Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India this Court observed: "12. ...it is not every question of law that could be permitted to be raised in the second appeal. The parameters within which a new legal plea could be permitted to be raised, are specifically stated in sub-section (5) of Section 100 CPC. Under the proviso, the Court should be 'satisfied' that the case involves a 'substantial question of law' and not a mere 'question of law'. The reason for permitting the substantial question of law to be raised, should be 'recorded' by the Court. It is implicit therefrom that on compliance of the above, the opposite party should be afforded a fair or proper opportunity to meet the same. It is not any legal plea that would be alleged at the stage of second appeal. It should be a substantial question of law. The reasons for permitting the plea to be raised should also be recorded." [Kshitish Chandra Purkait v. Santosh Kumar Purkait, (1997) 5 SCC 438 , pp. 445-46, para 10] 18. In Madamanchi Ramappa v. Muthaluru Bojjappa this Court observed: (AIR pp. 1637-38, para 12) "12. ...Therefore, whenever this Court is satisfied that in dealing with a second appeal, the High Court has, either unwittingly and in a casual manner, or deliberately as in this case, contravened the limits prescribed by Section 100, it becomes the duty of this Court to intervene and give effect to the said provisions. It may be that in some cases, the High Court dealing with the second appeal is inclined to take the view that what it regards to be justice or equity of the case has not been served by the findings of fact recorded by courts of fact; but on such occasions it is necessary to remember that what is administered in courts is justice according to law and considerations of fair play and equity however important they may be, must yield to clear and express provisions of the law. If in reaching its decisions in second appeals, the High Court contravenes the express provisions of Section 100, it would inevitably introduce in such decisions an element of disconcerting unpredictability which is usually associated with gambling; and that is a reproach which judicial process must constantly and scrupulously endeavour to avoid." 19. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala this Court held as under: (SCC pp. In Jai Singh v. Shakuntala this Court held as under: (SCC pp. 637-38, para 6) "6. ...it is only in very exceptional cases and on extreme perversity that the authority to examine the same in extenso stands permissible - it is a rarity rather than a regularity and thus in fine it can be safely concluded that while there is no prohibition as such, but the power to scrutiny can only be had in very exceptional circumstances and upon proper circumspection." 20. While dealing with the issue, this Court in Leela Soni v. Rajesh Goyal observed as under: (SCC p. 502, paras 20-22) "20. There can be no doubt that the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) is confined to the framing of substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal and to decide the same. Section 101 CPC provides that no second appeal shall lie except on the grounds mentioned in Section 100 CPC. Thus it is clear that no second appeal can be entertained by the High Court on questions of fact, much less can it interfere in the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate court. This is so, not only when it is possible for the High Court to take a different view of the matter but also when the High Court finds that conclusions on questions of fact recorded by the first appellate court are erroneous. 21. It will be apt to refer to Section 103 CPC which enables the High Court to determine the issues of fact: * * * * 22. The section, noted above, authorises the High Court to determine any issue which is necessary for the disposal of the second appeal provided the evidence on record is sufficient, in any of the following two situations: (1) when that issue has not been determined both by the trial court as well as the lower appellate court or by the lower appellate court; or (2) when both the trial court as well as the appellate court or the lower appellate court have wrongly determined any issue on a substantial question of law which can properly be the subject-matter of second appeal under Section 100 CPC." 21. In Jadu Gopal Chakravarty v. Pannalal Bhowmick the question arose as to whether the compromise decree had been obtained by fraud. In Jadu Gopal Chakravarty v. Pannalal Bhowmick the question arose as to whether the compromise decree had been obtained by fraud. This Court held that though it is a question of fact, but because none of the courts below had pointedly addressed the question of whether the compromise in the case was obtained by perpetrating fraud on the court, the High Court was justified in exercising its powers under Section 103 CPC to go into the question. (See also Achintya Kumar Saha v. Nanee Printers.) 22. In Bhagwan Sharma v. Bani Ghosh this Court held that in case the High Court exercises its jurisdiction under Section 103 CPC, in view of the fact that the findings of fact recorded by the courts below stood vitiated on account of non-consideration of additional evidence of a vital nature, the Court may itself finally decide the case in accordance with Section 103(b) CPC and the Court must hear the parties fully with reference to the entire evidence on record with relevance to the question after giving notice to all the parties. The Court further held as under: (Bhagwan Sharma case, SCC p. 499, para 5) "5. ...The grounds which may be available in support of a plea that the finding of fact by the court below is vitiated in law, does not by itself lead to the further conclusion that a contrary finding has to be finally arrived at on the disputed issue. On a reappraisal of the entire evidence the ultimate conclusion may go in favour of either party and it cannot be prejudged, as has been done in the impugned judgment." 23. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 278-79, para 34) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. In Kulwant Kaur v. Gurdial Singh Mann this Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 278-79, para 34) "34. Admittedly, Section 100 has introduced a definite restriction on to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as the High Court is concerned. Needless to record that the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives and since we are not required to further probe on that score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact, even if erroneous, will generally not be disturbed but where it is found that the findings stand vitiated on wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and conjectures and resultantly there is an element of perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view will be within its jurisdiction to deal with the issue. This is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity vis-à-vis the concept of justice. Needless to say however, that perversity itself is a substantial question worth adjudication - what is required is a categorical finding on the part of the High Court as to perversity. .... The requirements stand specified in Section 103 and nothing short of it will bring it within the ambit of Section 100 since the issue of perversity will also come within the ambit of substantial question of law as noticed above. The legality of finding of fact cannot but be termed to be a question of law. We reiterate however, that there must be a definite finding to that effect in the judgment of the High Court so as to make it evident that Section 100 of the Code stands complied with." 21. The Supreme Court in the case of State of M.P. Vs. Sabal Singh reported in (2019) 10 SC 595 has held as under:- ''31. ...Such finding of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence could not have been interfered with by the High Court within the ken of Section 100 CPC.'' 22. The Supreme Court in the case of Chacko Vs. Mahadevan reported in (2007) 7 SCC 363 has held as under: ''6. ...Such finding of fact based on proper appreciation of evidence could not have been interfered with by the High Court within the ken of Section 100 CPC.'' 22. The Supreme Court in the case of Chacko Vs. Mahadevan reported in (2007) 7 SCC 363 has held as under: ''6. It may be mentioned that in a first appeal filed under Section 96 CPC, the appellate court can go into questions of fact, whereas in a second appeal filed under Section 100 CPC the High Court cannot interfere with the findings of fact of the first appellate court, and it is confined only to questions of law. Hence we have to see the judgment of the first appellate court and its findings of fact.'' 23. The Supreme Court in the case of Gurnam Singh Vs. Lehna Singh reported in (2019) 7 SCC 641 has held as under:- ''19. Before parting with the present judgment, we remind the High Courts that the jurisdiction of the High Court, in an appeal under Section 100 CPC, is strictly confined to the case involving substantial question of law and while deciding the second appeal under Section 100 CPC, it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence on record and interfere with the findings recorded by the courts below and/or the first appellate court and if the first appellate court has exercised its discretion in a judicial manner, its decision cannot be recorded as suffering from an error either of law or of procedure requiring interference in second appeal. We have noticed and even as repeatedly observed by this Court and even in Narayanan Rajendran v. Lekshmy Sarojini, despite the catena of decisions of this Court and even the mandate under Section 100 CPC, the High Courts under Section 100 CPC are disturbing the concurrent findings of facts and/or even the findings recorded by the first appellate court, either without formulating the substantial question of law or on framing erroneous substantial question of law." (Underline supplied) 24. Considering the submissions made by the Counsel for the appellant and considering the concurrent findings of facts recorded by both the Courts below, and as the Counsel for the appellant has failed to point out that the concurrent finding of fact regarding possession of the parties is perverse or contrary to record, no Substantial Question of Law arises in the present case. 25. 25. Accordingly, the Judgment and Decree dated 27-9-2018 passed by VIIth ADJ, Gwalior in Regular Civil Appeal No. 4A/2015 and the Judgment and Decree dated 28-4-2015 passed by IXth Civil Judge, Class II, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 19A/2013, are hereby affirmed. 26. The appeal fails and is hereby Dismissed.