Bipin Pavithran v. VS State Of Kerala, Represented By Its Secretary To Government, General Education Department
2021-03-02
DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : The Manager of the 'P.M.M.U.P School', Chentrappinni, as the 1st petitioner; and a Peon working in the said School, as 2nd petitioner, have approached this Court impugning Exts.P2, P4 and P9 orders issued by the various educational Authorities and the Government, declining approval to the appointment of the 2nd petitioner on the ground that the School in question is an 'uneconomic one'. 2. The specific case of the petitioners is that the second petitioner was appointed against a retirement vacancy with effect from 28.09.2015 and that, as per Rule 1 of Chapter XXIVA of the Kerala Education Rules (KER for short), one post of Peon is mandatory in every School -whether or not there are sufficient student strength. 3. The petitioners say that without adverting to this, the educational Authorities, including the Government, have, relying on Exts.P5 and P10 circulars, held that no one can be appointed as Peon in the School since it is an “uneconomic one”. The petitioners, therefore, pray that the impugned orders be set aside and the appointment of the 2nd petitioner be directed to be approved in terms of the provisions of Rule 1 of Chapter XXIVA of the KER. 4. In response, the learned Senior Government Pleader -Sri.P.M.Manoj, submitted that the Government has issued Ext.P9, after validly examining all the relevant issues and noticing that the School is an 'uneconomic one', thus rightly denying approval to the appointment of the 2nd petitioner with effect from 28.09.2015. The learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that even though Exts.P5 and P10 circulars are intended for teaching staff, it will apply mutatis mutandis to the non-teaching staff also. He therefore, prayed that this writ petition be dismissed. 5. I have evaluated the afore submissions and have also gone through the materials available on record, especially Ext.P9. 6. There is no doubt, going by Ext.P9, that the School has only one Peon presently working, namely the 2nd petitioner. As rightly stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as per Chapter XXIVA of the KER, the post of Peon in every School is mandatory, whether or not it has sufficient students. The statutory strength of the non-teaching staff has been fixed through Rule 1 of the said Chapter and one post of Peon is imperative. 7.
As rightly stated by the learned counsel for the petitioner, as per Chapter XXIVA of the KER, the post of Peon in every School is mandatory, whether or not it has sufficient students. The statutory strength of the non-teaching staff has been fixed through Rule 1 of the said Chapter and one post of Peon is imperative. 7. In that sense of the matter, the petitioners are justified in asserting that the appointment of the 2nd petitioner is without fault, since he has been appointed to the sole vacancy available in the School and which is mandatory, irrespective of the students' strength. 8. That said, I cannot find favour with the submission of the learned Government Pleader that Exts.P5 and P10 circulars should automatically apply to non-teaching staff of the Aided Schools also, because, as I have already said above, the provisions of Chapter XXIVA of the KER would apply in greater force since they are statutory in nature. 9. I am therefore, of the view that the Government must reconsider the matter, taking note of the fact that the School has only one post of Peon, which is mandatory under Rule 1 of Chapter XXIVA of the KER. In the afore circumstances, I set aside Ext.P9; with a resultant direction to the competent Secretary of the Government to reconsider the 2nd petitioner's claim for approval as Peon with effect from 28.09.2015, adverting specifically to the provisions of Rule 1 of Chapter XXIVA of the KER and abiding by the declarations of law made by this Court in W.P. (C)No.41575/2018. The afore exercise shall be completed by the Government after affording an opportunity of being heard to both the petitioners — either physically or through video conferencing — thus culminating in an appropriate order thereon, as expeditiously as is possible but not later than four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. This writ petition is thus disposed of.