ORDER : Heard both side. The above revision petition is filed by the accused challenging the order of the XX Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru dated 25.05.2017 in C.C.No.31119/2014. 2. In C.C.No.31119/2014, respondent was the complainant and the petitioner was the accused. Respondent prosecuted the petitioner in the said case for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 3. When the matter was pending before the Trial Court, on the request of the parties, the Court referred the matter to the Lok-adalat. The petitioner and the respondent entered into a settlement before lok-adalat on 14.02.2015. 4. Admitting the settlement entered into between the parties, the lok-adalat passed the following award: “Accused shall pay amount of Rs.27,35,279/-(Rupees twenty seven lakh thirty five thousand and two hundred and seventy nine only) on or before 15.06.2015 towards the entire amount with respect to seven cheque issued by the accused in favour of the complainant. In default to pay, complainant is at liberty to file a recovery proceedings as if fine. Accordingly, case is closed. Accused is discharged for the offence punishable U/s. 138 of N.I. Act.” 5. The petitioner filed Crl.P.No.3851/2015 before this Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., seeking quashing of the lokadalath award dated 14.02.2015. This Court, vide detailed order dated 22.02.2017, dismissed the said petition on merits. That order has attained finality. 6. Even after dismissal of Crl.P.No.3851/2015, petitioner did not pay the agreed amount. Therefore, the respondent sought to execute the lokadalath award before the Trial Court. On his application, the Trial Court by the impugned order dated 25.04.2017 issued Fine Levy Warrant against the petitioner. 7. This matter was already once disposed of by order dated 16.01.2021. On the application of the petitioner seeking opportunity of hearing was recalled and the matter was heard again. 8. Sri.N.Ravindranath Kamath, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that an award passed by the lok-adalat is deemed to be a decree of Civil Court by virtue of Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act. Therefore, the only remedy of the respondent was to execute the said award by filing petition under Order XXI of CPC. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the cases filed in the lok-adalat awards passed in his favour he has filed the execution petitions before the Civil Courts and has submitted the copies of the said proceedings. 10. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that in the cases filed in the lok-adalat awards passed in his favour he has filed the execution petitions before the Civil Courts and has submitted the copies of the said proceedings. 10. In support of his contentions, he relies upon the following judgments: (i) K.N.Govindan Kutty Menon vs. C.D. Shaji, (2012) 2 SCC 51 (ii) Bhargavi Constructions and another vs. Kothakapu Muthyam Reddy and others, (2018) 13 SCC 480 11. Per contra, Sri. B.A.Chandrashekar learned counsel for the respondent justifies the impugned order on the ground that in the agreement as well as in the award of the lokadalath there is a specific clause enabling the respondent to enforce the award and seek recovery of the amount due as fine. He further submits that Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act or the judgment in Govindan Kutty Menon’s case do not bar the respondent to recover the amount due under the award following the procedure prescribed under the criminal procedure code. He further submits that such interpretation of the judgment in Govindan Kutty Menon’s case is incorrect. He submits that, since the lok-adalat award has attained finality, the petitioner cannot go behind that to claim that the respondent cannot recover the amount as fine. 12. Having regard to the rival contentions the questions that arise for consideration are “whether Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act or the judgment in Govindan Kutty Menon’s case bar the respondent from seeking recovery of the dues as fine and the Trial Court from issuing process for recovery of the same.” ? 13. Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act reads as follows: “21. Award of Lok Adalat.— [(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other court and where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by a Lok Adalat in a case referred to it under sub-section (1) of section 20, the court-free paid in such case shall be refunded in the manner provided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).] (2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and binding on all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any court against the award. 14. 14. The above provision makes it clear that it provides for deeming the award of the lok-adalat as a decree of a Civil Court, as well as an order of any other Court, that means the Court which referred the matter to lok-adalat. In the case on hand, the matter was referred to lok-adalat by criminal Court. Therefore, by virtue of Section 21 of Legal Services Authorities Act, the lok-adalat award becomes the order of the said Court. 15. In Govindan Kutty Menon’s case, in a case involving the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the matter was referred to lok-adalat and the lok-adalat award was passed. The beneficiary of the award filed an application in the very same criminal case to execute the award. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that award passed by the lok-adalat on reference from the Magistrate Court cannot be construed as a decree executable by the Civil Court. There the question was whether an award passed on reference from the Magistrate’s Court (criminal Court) could be executed invoking Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act. 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court interpreting Section 21 of the Legal Services Authorities Act held that even a matter referred by a criminal Court is covered under Section 21 and award passed on such reference also can be executed. Nowhere in the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court said that the criminal Court is barred from executing the award passed on its reference or in such case only order XXI CPC applies. Ultimately, in para 27 of the judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court remanded the matter to the Trial Court directing to restore the execution petition and to proceed further in accordance with law. 17. Then what is the law applicable is the question. For recovery of the fine by a criminal Court, the enabling provision is Section 421 of Cr.P.C. Section 421 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Court passing the order of sentence to issue Fine Levy Warrant for recovery of the fine amount, if the offender fails to pay the fine. 17. Then what is the law applicable is the question. For recovery of the fine by a criminal Court, the enabling provision is Section 421 of Cr.P.C. Section 421 of Cr.P.C. empowers the Court passing the order of sentence to issue Fine Levy Warrant for recovery of the fine amount, if the offender fails to pay the fine. Section 143 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 (‘the NI Act’ for short) also states that offence under Section 138 of NI Act shall be tried as per Sections 262 to 265 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, the Trial Court was justified in issuing the Fine Levy Warrant invoking Section 421 of Cr.P.C. By such of its action in the considered opinion of this Court the Trial Court in no way transgressed the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Govindan Kutty Menon’s case. Therefore, the judgment in Bhargavi Construction’s case and Article 141 of the Constitution do not in any way advance the case of the petitioner. 18. The contention that the petitioner has filed execution petition before the City Civil Court to execute the similar award passed in his favour, therefore that becomes precedent for respondent, deserves no merit. Merely because he has opted for such course, he cannot compel others to follow the same, that too when award itself enables the respondent to recover that as fine amount. 19. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that the petitioner on voluntarily entering into a settlement is taking ‘U’ turn on vexatious contentions and since 2014, unnecessarily persecuting the respondent. He submits that such action of the petitioner lacks bonafides and amounts to abuse of the process of the Court. Having regard to the above discussions, this Court finds sufficient force in the said submission. Therefore, the petition is dismissed with cost of Rs.5,000/-.