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2021 DIGILAW 213 (KER)

State of Kerala v. Laxmi Vasanth

2021-03-03

BECHU KURIAN THOMAS, S.V.BHATTI

body2021
JUDGMENT : S.V. BHATTI, J. 1. The State of Kerala (for short 'the State') is the appellant in the instant Writ Appeals and the Regular Second Appeal. Lekshmi Vasanth and J Raj Mohan Pillai are the contesting respondents (for short, 'L.V' and 'R M P' respectively). 2. The State, aggrieved by the judgment dated 20.09.2016 in W.P.(C) No.5783 of 2014; dated 29.06.2016 in W.P. (C) No.9021 of 2015 and dated 20.09.2016 in W.P.(C) No.32715 of 2014 and the judgment and decree dated 10.09.2009 and in A.S No.153 of 2004 on the file of Second Additional District Judges Court, Kollam, filed the appeals, in the order referred to above. 3. The issues for consideration have bearing on the provisions in The Kerala Revenue Recovery Act and Rules (for short 'the RR Act and Rules' ) and The Indian Partnership Act, 1932 (For short 'Act 1932'.) 4. The circumstances necessary for disposing of these matters are noted as under: W.P.(C) No. 5783 of 2014 was filed by 'L V' for writ of mandamus directing the District Collector, Kollam and his Subordinate Officers to accept tax payable on the property of the 'L V' comprised in 37 cents equivalent to 14 Ares 94 square meters in Survey No.244 of Eravipuram Village covered by Block No.145 and simultaneously direct respondents to strike off all entries and obliterate attachment of property effected for alleged recovery of sales tax arrears of M/s.Malabar Cashew Nuts and Allied Products, a partnership Firm, (for short 'the Firm'), entered in the revenue books. The writ petition was allowed vide judgment dated 09.06.2016 and hence, W.A No.1521 of 2017 at the instance of the State. 4.1 W.P(C). No.9021 of 2015 was filed by 'R M P' praying writ of ceritiorari and quash Ext.P5 05.11.2012 as illegal and unconstitutional. On 29.06.2016, the writ petition was allowed and hence W.A No.1536 of 2017 at the instance of the State. 4.2 W.P(C) No.32715 of 2014 was filed by 'L V' for the relief of a writ of certiorari to call for the records leading up to and inclusive of Exts.P11 to 13, and to quash Exts.P11 to 13 as grossly illegal and unconstitutional. On 20.09.2016 the writ petition was allowed; and the State, aggrieved thereby, filed W.A No.1551 of 2017. 4.2 W.P(C) No.32715 of 2014 was filed by 'L V' for the relief of a writ of certiorari to call for the records leading up to and inclusive of Exts.P11 to 13, and to quash Exts.P11 to 13 as grossly illegal and unconstitutional. On 20.09.2016 the writ petition was allowed; and the State, aggrieved thereby, filed W.A No.1551 of 2017. 4.3 O.S No.35/1999 on the files of the Principal Munsiff Court of Kollam was filed by 'L V' for the reliefs of declaration and perpetual injunction against the State, the Tahsildar and the Village Officer. The plaint schedule consists of the property and building lying in Sy.No.244 of Eravipuram Village (Resurvey No.145/19). The learned trial judge on 29.06.2004, dismissed O.S. No.35/1999. 'L V' filed A.S No.153 of 2004 before the II Additional District Judge, Kollam and the learned Appellate Judge vide judgment dated 10.09.2009 allowed the appeal as prayed for. Hence, RSA No.21 of 2016 has been filed by the State with an application to condone the delay of 2197 days in presenting the RSA No.21 of 2016. 5. Heard the learned Senior Government Pleader Mr.C.E Unnikrishnan for the State, the learned Advocates Mr.Harish Gopinath and Mr.Harishankar Menon for Lakshmi Vasanth and Raj Mohan Pillai respectively. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the parties have referred to the admitted chronology of dates and events, and have treated W.A No.1536/2017 as the lead writ appeal, and the outcome of W.A. No.1536/2017 would, as a natural corollary, decide the outcome of other two writ appeals and RSA. Before adverting to the circumstances set out in WA No.1536 of 2017 [W.P.(C) No.9021 of 2015], a few undisputed and admitted circumstances, as a prelude to the present litigation, are adverted to. 7. M/s. Malabar Cashew Nuts and Allied Products is a partnership firm registered under Act 1932. The Firm was served orders of assessment under the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963. The Firm committed default and fell in arrears of the demand raised by the Department/State. Finally, steps to recover the tax arrears under the RR Act and Rules were initiated, by the State through the District Collector. As part of its efforts, the State attempted to attaching the property covered by the schedule in O.S. No.35 of 1999. The Firm committed default and fell in arrears of the demand raised by the Department/State. Finally, steps to recover the tax arrears under the RR Act and Rules were initiated, by the State through the District Collector. As part of its efforts, the State attempted to attaching the property covered by the schedule in O.S. No.35 of 1999. 'L V', as noted above, filed the suit and finally resulted in the decree as prayed for vide judgment and decree in A.S. No.153/2004 dated 10.09.2009. 8. Thereafter, 'R M P' and 'L V' have filed W.P.(C) Nos.23498/2008, 19555/2009 and 2029/2009 in this Court and on 19.03.2012 the writ petitions were disposed of. 'R M P' filed W.A. No.481/2013 against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.19555/2009. On 29.01.2014 the writ appeal was disposed. At appropriate stage of our judgment we would be referring to the operative portion in the judgment of the writ petition and the writ appeal. The District Collector, pursuant to the judgment in the writ petition, issued proceedings No.R-8-23158/00 dated 05.11.2012 [Ext.P5 in W.P.(C) No.9021/2015] determining liability on 'R M P' and 'L V' also. 9. Now, let us advert to the genesis of long series of cases between parties: The Firm was a dealer registered with Commercial Tax Office, Kollam, and as per the admitted details furnished by the Assistant Commissioner (Assessment), Special Circle, Commercial Taxes dated 08.10.2012, the Firm was registered vide document dated 11.12.1964 with P Santhakumari Amma, V K Jishnu Nair and J Mohandas Rajan (Minor) as partners of the said Firm. Between 1964 and 1973, M/s. Malabar Cashew Nuts and Allied Products was reconstituted as many as six times. This judgment need not refer to these changes i.e., either inclusion or exclusion of partners of Firm during the said period, for, those details have no bearing on the merits of cases on hand. The first important reconstitution was on 01.01.1975, and the constituent partners of the Firm as on that date are detailed as under: Partners- 1. V K Jishnu Nair 2. N Devaki Amma 3. N Saraswathy Amma 4. R Meena Vasanth 5. P Santhakumari Amma 6. A Sasikanth Minor Partners admitted for the benefits of partnership Firm 1. R Sobha Vasanth 2. R Jyothi Vasanth 3. R Lakshmi Vasanth [L V] 4. J Raj Mohan Pillai [R M P] 9.1 On 01.01.1976 the Firm was again reconstituted. N Devaki Amma 3. N Saraswathy Amma 4. R Meena Vasanth 5. P Santhakumari Amma 6. A Sasikanth Minor Partners admitted for the benefits of partnership Firm 1. R Sobha Vasanth 2. R Jyothi Vasanth 3. R Lakshmi Vasanth [L V] 4. J Raj Mohan Pillai [R M P] 9.1 On 01.01.1976 the Firm was again reconstituted. P Santhakumari Amma, V K Jishnu Nair, and four minors admitted to the benefits of partnership, i.e., R Sobha Vasanth, R Jyothi Vasanth, R Lakshmi Vasanth [L V], and J Raj Mohan Pillai [R M P], were retired or to use the expression of these parties removed from the Firm. One N Sarojini Amma was admitted as a partner. Therefore, the case of both 'R M P' and 'L V' is that they were minors when included for the benefits of the Firm and also minors when removed from the constitution of the Firm. 10. The District Collector issued proceedings in Ext.P5 determining the tax liability of partners of the Firm between the period 1970-71 to 1995-96 and fastened liability on 'R M P' and 'L V', who were admitted only to the benefits of partnership for one year and retired from the Firm during their minority with effect from 01.01.1976. Hence, 'R M P' filed W.P.(C) No. 9021/2015 challenging Ext.P5 dated 05.11.2012 on several grounds of law and fact. 11. The learned counsel appearing for the parties have hence treated W.P.(C) No.9021/2015 [in W.A. No.1536/2017] as the lead case or decision. 12. Before taking up the successful challenge to Ext.P5 dated 05.11.2012, and the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.9021/2015, it is contextual to refer to writ petition filed by Santhakumari Amma i.e., a partner admitted into the Firm on 01.01.1975 and retired with effect from 01.01.1976. W.P.(C) No.4179/2002 was filed by Santhakumari Amma challenging the Revenue Recovery steps initiated by the State for recovering the tax arrears of the Firm for the period 1970-71 to 1996-97. On 14.03.2012 the W.P.(C) No.4179/2002 filed by Santhakumari Amma was ordered and was relieved from the duty of paying the sales tax arrears of the Firm. W.P.(C) No.9021/2015 13. The case of 'R M P' is that the petitioner was born on 02.05.1964, was admitted to only the benefits of the Firm and was retired with effect from 01.01.1976. On 14.03.2012 the W.P.(C) No.4179/2002 filed by Santhakumari Amma was ordered and was relieved from the duty of paying the sales tax arrears of the Firm. W.P.(C) No.9021/2015 13. The case of 'R M P' is that the petitioner was born on 02.05.1964, was admitted to only the benefits of the Firm and was retired with effect from 01.01.1976. The District Collector ignored the order of Government dated 02.08.2003 and even without appreciating the judgment [W.P.(C) No.19555/2009] of this Court fastened the liability on a minor partner only allowed to the benefits of partnership Firm; the recovery proceedings under R.R. Act and Rules are illegal, without jurisdiction, and unconstitutional. 13.1 The appellant/State filed counter affidavit. The reply of the State, adverted to briefly, is that the minors 'L V' and 'R M P' have failed to conform to the requirement of Section 30(5) read with proviso of Act 1932. The retiring partners upon reconstitution of Firm, have not intimated to the Department in terms of Rule 5(8)(b) of KGST Act read with Rules, 1963. The reconstitution of Firm, in several points in time, does not comply with the requirement of giving public notice. Further, the Registrar of Firms was informed on 15.09.1987. Consequently, the intimation is beyond the time limit prescribed in Section 30(5) of Act 1932. Therefore, by inference, 'R M P' and 'L V' though were admitted to Firm as minors, by virtue of their failure to exercise the option under Section 30(5) of Act 1932, are deemed to be partners continuing in the Firm and hence are liable to the tax arrears of the Firm between 1970 and 1995. 13.2 The learned Single Judge, through the judgment under appeal, has noted that it is trite, that a minor cannot be made liable for the liability of the Firm. The sales tax dues relate to the period 1970-71 to 1995-96. Going by the record, 'R M P' was admitted to the benefits of partnership during 01.01.1975 to 01.01.1976. The State and the District Collector referred to Sections 30, 30(5), 30(7) and 35 of the Partnership Act, to impose liability on the minor partners. After extracting Section 30, the learned Single Judge posed the question whether the petitioner who was a minor had issued notice in terms of Section 30(5) of Act 1932. The State and the District Collector referred to Sections 30, 30(5), 30(7) and 35 of the Partnership Act, to impose liability on the minor partners. After extracting Section 30, the learned Single Judge posed the question whether the petitioner who was a minor had issued notice in terms of Section 30(5) of Act 1932. Thereafter, examined the materials produced on record and held that the record clearly shows that he, i.e., 'R M P', had ceased to be a person admitted to the benefits of partnership with effect from 01.01.1976. Therefore, in the fact situation of this case it has been held that Section 30(5) to (7) do not arise for consideration at all. The finding of fact recorded by the learned Single Judge is that the minor partner ceased to have any concern with the Firm with effect from 01.01.1976. The right of Department to recover the revenue dues from other partners is not shut out by the judgment. Hence, for the aforementioned reasons, allowed W.P. (C) No.9021/2015, which resulted in setting aside Ext.P5 dated 05.11.2012. 14. Senior Government Pleader Unnikrishnan contends that Section 30(5) and (7) of Act 1932 are attracted to the case on hand. The minor partners, either by choice or otherwise, did not act in the manner obligated by law within the period of six months from the date of attaining majority. The consequence thereof is that the minors admitted to the benefits of Firm continue to be partners and the liability accrued to the Firm is answerable by the minors. In other words, the minors continue to be the partners of the Firm and the liability fastened by Ext.P5 order is sustainable in law. 15. Advocate Harishankar Menon contends that the recovery proceedings initiated against erstwhile minor partners are totally illegal and in ignorance of the judgment of this Court in W.P.(C) Nos.23498/2008, 19555/2009 and 2029/2009. According to him, Section 30 has no application to the facts of the case, for, the minor was introduced into the Firm during the minority and was removed from the Firm during the minority. The occasion or option arises to minor if the minor had been continued by other partners, till the minor attained majority. The acts by other partners are unilateral and do not inflict on minor's liability. Along with the minor, one Santhakumari Amma was made a partner and was retired with effect from 01.01.1976. The occasion or option arises to minor if the minor had been continued by other partners, till the minor attained majority. The acts by other partners are unilateral and do not inflict on minor's liability. Along with the minor, one Santhakumari Amma was made a partner and was retired with effect from 01.01.1976. The said P Santhakumari Amma, questioning the steps initiated by the appellant under R.R. Act towards sales tax arrears of the Firm, filed W.P.(C) No.4179/2012. The writ petition was ordered by this Court. Accepting the said judgment, recovery proceedings against Santhakumari Amma were abandoned by the State. The retirement of a partner with effect from 01.01.1976 being accepted and recovery abandoned against Santhakumari Amma, the minors i.e., 'R M P' and 'L V', who were also retired with effect from 01.01.1976, should be given same treatment if not more. Therefore, the steps now taken against erstwhile minors for realizing the sales tax arrears of the Firm for a slab period 1970 to 1995 are illegal and unconstitutional. This Court, in the judgment in W.P.(C) No.4179/2002 noted, and, in effect, accepted the reconstitution of Firm with effect from 01.01.1976. Therefore, the minor partners 'R M P', 'L V', etc on attaining the majority were not in the partnership Firm at all to exercise the option. The finding of the learned Single Judge, according to him, is clear on these aspects and no ground is made out warranting interference of this Court in the instant intra-Court appeal. According to him, Ext.P5 dated 05.11.2012 has misunderstood the directives issued in judgments in W.P.(C) Nos.23498/2008, 19555/2009 and 2029/2009 and W.A.No.481/2013. Imposition of liability on minor partners should be clear, strictly in accordance with law and the Department having accepted the intimation of reconstitution from time to time, cannot introduce a comfortable plea in law that there is no public notice; that option under Section 30(5) of Act 1932 was not exercised or intimation under Rule 5(8)(b) of KGST Rules was not given. 16. 16. Advocate Harish Gopinath substantially reiterates the submissions touching on the rights of minor partners, and that, either at the time of entry into the Firm and when removed from the Firm, the minors have no competence in any manner; the minors are not concerned with the Firm on the date of attaining majority; calling upon minors upon becoming majors, to exercise option under Section 30(5) is completely artificial and unwarranted. The minors have chosen to ignore the entry and exit from the Firm. For the purpose of tax liability they cannot be treated as partners continued even beyond the period of reconstitution. 17. We have perused the record and noted the submissions of all the counsel appearing for the parties. Let us now understand the brittle ground on which the liability of Firm is enforced against 'R M P' and 'L V'. The genesis for present order can be traced to the filing of W.P.(c) No.19555/2009. 18. W.P.(C) No.19555/2009 was filed by 'R M P' for the following prayers: “(i) To quash Ext.P12 order passed by the 1st respondent by the issue of a writ of certiorari or such other writ or order or direction: (ii) To grant the petitioner such other incidental reliefs including the costs of these proceedings.” 18.1 On 19.03.2012 the learned Single Judge disposed of the writ petition and the operative portion of the judgment reads thus: “16. Pursuant to the revision filed by the petitioner in W.P(C) No.19555/2009, the matter was remanded by the Government as per Ext.P3, directing the District Collector to take necessary steps to enquire and arrive at the actual facts and figures of partnership and to proceed against all the persons who were partners of the firm for the period for which the arrears fell due to the Government. The specific submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner in this case is that, since Ext.P3 has become final, it is no more open to the District Collector to have directed the second respondent to conduct any enquiry as to the status of the petitioner. But it has to be borne in mind, that the proceedings were finalized by the Government as per Ext.P3, in relation to the correctness and sustainability of the steps taken by the concerned respondent under Section 65 of the R.R. Act. But it has to be borne in mind, that the proceedings were finalized by the Government as per Ext.P3, in relation to the correctness and sustainability of the steps taken by the concerned respondent under Section 65 of the R.R. Act. Under Section 65 of the R.R. Act, only two ingredients are to be satisfied; i.e., with regard to the mandatory requirement of issuance of a notice under Section 34 and so also as to the satisfaction of the authority concerned as to the means involved and the conscious default on the part of the defaulter in evading the payment. It was in the above context, that some observations have been made in Ext.P3 and this being the position, this Court finds that the matter requires to be dealt in detail, touching all the aspects including as to the extent of rights and interest in partnership, the relevant period, the cessation of membership and such other details. (emphasis supplied) 17. It is revealed from Ext.P7 produced in W.P.(C).No.23496/2008, that the relevant particulars in respect of the shares and interest of the person concerned were procured from the Income Tax Department and it was accordingly that the liability for the period from 1991 onwards was sought to be fixed. Similar course is possible to be pursued in respect of the other firm, i.e., M/s. Malabar Cashewnuts and Allied Products, Kollam, as well; besides calling for particulars from the Registrar of Firms and such other authorities including the second respondent. The contents of the reconstituted deed of partnership dated 16.11.1967 are also relevant to be looked into. That apart, there is already a direction given by this Court, as per Ext.P11 judgment W.P.(C). No.6938/2008, whereby the District Collector has been directed to consider and finalize the enquiry with reference to Ext.P3. This Court finds that the said respondent could be directed to have a detailed analysis of all the facts and figures, so as to put a finality to the issue, more so, when the petitioners are brother and sister and that the transaction is in respect of the involvement in the same partnership concern. (emphasis supplied) 18. The specific direction given by this Court as per Ext.P11 judgment was to the District Collector, to finalize the proceedings, whereas, the District Collector has relegated the duty to be discharged by the second respondent, vide Ext.P12; which is not correct or proper. (emphasis supplied) 18. The specific direction given by this Court as per Ext.P11 judgment was to the District Collector, to finalize the proceedings, whereas, the District Collector has relegated the duty to be discharged by the second respondent, vide Ext.P12; which is not correct or proper. This Court makes it clear that the proceedings have to be finalised by the District Collector himself i.e., the first respondent in W.P.(C).No.19555/2009. 19. In the above circumstances, Ext.P12 in W.P.(C). No. 19555/2009 is set aside to the above extent and the first respondent is directed to complete the enquiry by collecting material/data from all available sources and to ascertain who the partners of the concerned firms were at the relevant point of time and to proceed with further steps for realisation of the due amount from all such persons concerned, including the petitioners; if and to the extent, they are liable. It is made clear that the actual liability to be satisfied by the parties concerned will be subject to the outcome of the above exercise. However, the admitted liability shall be satisfied by the petitioner in W.P. (C).No.23496/2008, as already undertaken before this Court, within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (emphasis supplied) 20. The first respondent shall finalize the matter as mentioned above, in accordance with law, after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned as expeditiously as possible, at any rate, within six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. Attachment already ordered will continue till the proceedings are finalised as above.” 18.2 'R M P', apprehending that a few of the observations in W.P.(c) No.19555/2009 are conclusively decided by the learned Single Judge, filed W.A. No.481/2013 against the judgment in W.P.(C) No.19555/2009. The Division Bench, after taking note of the objection of appellant , clarified the position in para 7 of the judgment as follows: “7. On perusal of paragraphs 12, 13 and 14 what we notice is, after discussing the facts on record with reference to the Partnership Act how a public notice has to be issued and what contemplated in Section 30(5) and within what time such public notice has to be given, learned Single Judge did not opine finally that there is no scope for fresh consideration of the matter. Reading of paragraphs 16 and 19 clearly indicate, it was open to the appellant herein, when the matter is remitted back to the District Collector, to establish that there was no obligation on him to discharge loans as he ceased to be the partner much prior to attaining majority i.e. 01.01.1976. If a controversy arises with regard to issuance of public notice as stipulated under Section 30(5) of the Act, it has to be decided only with reference to date of attaining majority by the minor partners. If the partners were to be excluded from the partnership with effect from 1976 question of giving any public notice as contemplated under Section 30(5) would not arise. Therefore, if the appellant was able to establish that there was proper exclusion of this appellant from the partnership with effect from 01.01.1976, the consideration of the matter under Section 30(5) of the Act would not arise. If no convincing material is forthcoming regarding the exclusion of minor partner from the benefits of partnership with effect from 01.01.1976, then a duty is cast on the minor partner on attaining majority to follow the proceedings contemplated under Section 30(5) of the Act. 8. In the light of these observations, we are of the opinion, it was open to the appellant to pursue the matter before the District Collector by bringing on record any additional information regarding his exclusion from partnership firm with effect from 01.01.1976. It was brought to our notice that subsequent to the disposal of the writ petition by the learned Single Judge, District Collector did consider the matter and has held the issue against the appellant herein which the subject matter of challenge in another writ petition.” 19. It is matter on record, on 14.03.2012, learned Single Judge P R Ramachandra Menon, as he then was, disposed of the writ petition filed by Santhakumari Amma. The circumstances leading to admitting P Santhakumari Amma into partnership and retirement with effect from 01.01.1976 are adverted to in paragraphs 10 and 11 and read thus: “10. It has been specifically stated in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner that, Form No.3 was submitted along with Ext.P5 deed before the second respondent. The circumstances leading to admitting P Santhakumari Amma into partnership and retirement with effect from 01.01.1976 are adverted to in paragraphs 10 and 11 and read thus: “10. It has been specifically stated in the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner that, Form No.3 was submitted along with Ext.P5 deed before the second respondent. It is to be noted, 'Form No.3' is just an intimation and no minute factual aspects or such other details have to be included therein, as to the business or the relative rights and interests, except as stipulated therein. 'Form No.3' is in the following terms: “I/We(have)..... ......of ......(address)......hereby declare that I/We ceased my/our connection with the above business with effect on and from. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Name of person Amount of nature of previous share in the business (1) (2) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ Place: Date: Signature.” The learned counsel submits that in view of the nature and contents of 'Form 3', it will not be accepted unless and until the same is produced along with the supporting documents i.e., Ext.P5 deed. Since there is no case of the respondents that they did not receive Ext.P5 reconstitution deed, it cannot be swallowed without a pinch of salt, when the second respondent contends that 'Form 3' was never submitted by the petitioner in conformity with Rule 5(8)(b). 11. The petitioner has got a further contention that the averment in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of the second respondent, that no 'Form 3' was submitted by the petitioner cannot be taken as it is, for the obvious reason that the deponent who has sworn to the affidavit (stated as done on behalf of the second respondent) is not having the custody and competency to do the same. It is pointed out that 'Form 3' is actually available with Ext.P9 in the records of the second respondent (Assistant Commissioner, Assessment), whereas the counter affidavit filed is by the Assistant Commissioner (Law) attached to the office of the Joint Commissioner (Law). This Court, however, does not make any comments in respect of the said averment, for the reason that, it is not necessary to be examined, in view of the observations and finding arrived at already.” (emphasis supplied) 19.1 The District Collector through Ext.P5 has called for a report from the Office of Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, and the report is excerpted in Ext.P5 order dated 05.11.2012. It is useful to refer to: “As per the documents available at the office of the Assistant Commissioner, Commercial Taxes, Kollam the details of partners of Malabar Cashews are as under: I. Partners vide partnership deed dated 11.12.1964 1. P.Santhakumari Amma 2. V.K. Jishnu Nair 3. J Mohandas Rajan (Minor) II. xxx xxx xxx” 20. Having referred to the contents in Ext.P5 dated 05.11.2012, let us, at the outset, appreciate a few intricacies which have bearing on the claim of State to proceed against the erstwhile minor partners for recovering the tax arrears of the Firm. Firstly, in the order dated 05.11.2012 the District Collector has set out in detail the names of partners of the Firm at different points in time. As noted earlier, in this writ petition we are primarily concerned with the reconstitution of Firm on 01.01.1975 and 01.01.1976. The minor partners, including 'R M P' and 'L V', have been, at the first instance, included in the partnership Firm only for the benefits of the Firm and removed/deleted with effect from 01.01.1976. The very next reconstitution on 01.02.1978 was informed to the Department and the Department accepted the details of partners reconstituted on 01.02.1978. In this reconstitution of Firm the names of minor partners and also one P Santhakumari Amma are not detailed in the array of partners. Therefore, it ought to have been objectively appreciated by the 2nd appellant/District Collector while determining the liability of different sets of partners. The order in Ext.P5, straight away it can be stated, could be remarked that without actually appreciating the legal nuances of the information submitted by the Firm to the Department, and accepted by the Department has come to a very broad finding that the partners failed to submit or prove that they were to be absolved from the liability of the Firm for the period 1970-71 to1995-96. We are of the view that the Department, having accepted reconstitution of Firm even subsequent to 01.01.1976, cannot be allowed to contend that the information furnished by the Firm to the Department is not conforming to the requirements of law. 21. Be that as it may, P Santhakumari Amma filed O.P. No.4179/2002 and on 14.03.2012 the Original Petition was allowed. We are of the view that the Department, having accepted reconstitution of Firm even subsequent to 01.01.1976, cannot be allowed to contend that the information furnished by the Firm to the Department is not conforming to the requirements of law. 21. Be that as it may, P Santhakumari Amma filed O.P. No.4179/2002 and on 14.03.2012 the Original Petition was allowed. The learned Single Judge, while disposing of the writ petition and exonerating the said outgoing partner P Santhakumari Amma from the tax liability of the Firm for the period subsequent to 01.01.1976, has also observed that the record was not completely placed before the Court by the Department. The learned Judge refrained from making further observation in that behalf. 22. Yet another aspect is that the Court while disposing of W.P.(C) No.19555/2009 on 19.03.2012 called upon the District Collector to re-examine the issue of liability of partners vis-a-vis the tax arrears of the Firm. The District Collector/2nd appellant refers only to the order of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.19555/2009 and the effect of directions are apparently not followed. The Division Bench, as excerpted above, has held that: if the partners were to be excluded from the partnership with effect from 01.01.1976, question of giving any public notice as contemplated under Section 30(5) would not arise. Therefore, if the appellant i.e., 'R M P' was able to establish that there was proper exclusion of this appellant from the partnership with effect from 01.01.1976, the consideration of the matter under Section 30(5) of the Act would not arise. If no convincing material is forthcoming regarding the exclusion of minor partner from the benefits of partnership with effect from 01.01.1976, then a duty is cast on the minor partner on attaining majority to follow the proceedings contemplated under Section 30(5) of Act 1932. We are of the view that the view taken by the Division Bench, insofar as the applicability of Section 30(5) of Act 1932, has been, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, clearly conditioned by the Division Bench. In spite of above conclusion, the Department still insists exercising option, notice etc. to realise arrears from 'R M P' & 'L V'. In spite of above conclusion, the Department still insists exercising option, notice etc. to realise arrears from 'R M P' & 'L V'. After perusing the record, we are of the view that the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Department is not justified in law and fact in proceeding against the erstwhile minor partners is justifiable and for the additional reasons stated supra, we are of the view that the judgment under appeal does not warrant interference and liable to be rejected. Hence, W.A. No.1536/2017 is liable to be dismissed and accordingly dismissed. W.A. No.1521/2017 and W.A. No.1551/2017 23. The prayers in W.P.(C) No.5783/2014 [W.A. No.1521/2017] and W.P.(C) No.32715/2014 [W.A. No.1551/2017] are already excerpted. The legal entitlement of the State to proceed against the parties herein is dependent on the status of the erstwhile partners of the Firm vis-a-vis the tax liability which could be recovered under Revenue Recovery Act. This Court has, in the preceding paragraphs, held that the continuation of proceedings against the minors of the Firm for the dues of the Firm for the period 1970-71 to 1995-96 is unsustainable in law. Having recorded a finding to that effect, we are of the view that the properties of the erstwhile minor partners ought not to come under a cloud by the orders made by the Department under RR Act. Therefore, the view taken in both the writ petitions, that the petitioners have made out a case for granting the prayers, is tenable and warranted in the facts and circumstances of this case. Hence, we confirm the judgments in W.P.(C) Nos.5783/2014 and 32715/2014 and accordingly dismiss W.A. Nos. 1521/2017 and 1551/2017. C.M. Appln. No.20/2016 in R.S.A. No.21/2016 24. The State filed the instant appeal with an application to condone the delay of 2197 days in filing the Regular Second Appeal. The appellant seeks the indulgence of this Court to condone the abnormal delay of 2197 days in filing the appeal. 1521/2017 and 1551/2017. C.M. Appln. No.20/2016 in R.S.A. No.21/2016 24. The State filed the instant appeal with an application to condone the delay of 2197 days in filing the Regular Second Appeal. The appellant seeks the indulgence of this Court to condone the abnormal delay of 2197 days in filing the appeal. A few decisions reported in State of Nagaland v. Lipok A O (2005) 3 SCC 752 ; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582 ; State of Kerala v. Kunju ( 2005 (4) KLT 611 ), and John K P v. Mani Varkey 2014 (4) KHC 36 are relied on by the appellant to convince this Court that a case is made out and particularly in the facts and circumstances of this case that the appellant is entitled for condonation of delay. 24.1 We will, if necessary, advert to the decisions on which the appellant is placing reliance in support of its case for condoning the delay. Let us first examine the reasons stated by the appellant as sufficient cause for condoning the abnormal delay. “2. The above appeal is filed against the judgment and decree in A.S. No.153/2004 of the II Additional District Court, Kollam dated 10.09.2009 in O.S. No.35/1999 of Munsiff Court, Kollam. The judgment in the above case was pronounced on 10.09.2009. The application for certified copy was filed on 16.09.2009. The judgment was ready on 04.11.2009 and date notified to receive the copy was on 07.11.2009. The copy was delivered on 07.11.2009. The appeal ought to have been filed on 07.02.2010. There is a delay of 2197 days in filing the appeal. The delay is neither willful nor deliberate. 3. It is submitted that pursuant to the receipt of the copy of the judgment, the same was forwarded to the concerned District Collector on 28.11.2009. Pursuant to that, legal opinion was sought from the concerned Government Pleader for filing appeal against the above judgment. The Government Pleader has opined that there is scope for filing appeal against the above judgment. Thereafter, request has been submitted to the Advocate General's Office for preparing appeal against the judgment. Thereafter, it is noticed that certified copy of the Appeal and judgment are not received from the concerned Government Pleader. Subsequently, it was requested to get the certified copy of the judgment and decree and the same was received only on 25.10.2014. Thereafter, request has been submitted to the Advocate General's Office for preparing appeal against the judgment. Thereafter, it is noticed that certified copy of the Appeal and judgment are not received from the concerned Government Pleader. Subsequently, it was requested to get the certified copy of the judgment and decree and the same was received only on 25.10.2014. Thus occurred a delay of 2197 days.” 24.2 The affidavit and the material allegations refer to the happenings up to the receipt of the certified copy of the judgment and decree on 07.11.2009. Thereafter, the affidavit refers to forwarding the certified copy to the District Collector on 28.11.2009. The affidavit does not refer to any of the details with sufficient certainty and at least with reasonable probability that the reason for the delay is on account of any of the specific circumstance stated in the said paragraphs. In other words, general and very casual statements are made for condoning the abnormal delay of 2197 days. A mere perusal of the affidavit is sufficient and would not encourage this Court to show indulgence in favour of the appellant for condoning the delay and revive the cause which has attained finality several years before the filing of the appeal. It is matter of record that the appeal is filed on 16.12.2015. The appellant, to be fair and i.e., serious in working out the remedies, ought to state what happened between 2009 and 2015. The minor partners on the other hand have been referring to and relying on the judgment of the Civil Court for removing the cloud fastened on the property by way of an attachment by the Revenue. The appellant, if is really aggrieved by the adjudication, ought to have moved in the matter at the earliest. In the case on hand, on the contrary, the appellant did not move in the matter within reasonable time or when it was brought to the notice of the appellant that the judgment is one of the documents on which the minor partners are relying on for exonerating their liability for the tax liabilities of the Firm. The appellant did not file appeal in this Court. Added to the above, the appellant has issued Ext.P4 accepting the judgment and initiated consequential steps as directed by the said judgment. The appellant did not file appeal in this Court. Added to the above, the appellant has issued Ext.P4 accepting the judgment and initiated consequential steps as directed by the said judgment. Ext.P4 is not even adverted to in the affidavit, but by ignoring what the appellant has accepted, the present appeal is filed only as a ground to resist the claim of minor partners in the connected or accompanying matters. Having appreciated the circumstances happening from 1999 till 2009 and from 2009-2015 we are of the view that no sufficient cause, much less cause is shown for condoning the delay. The Court is not persuaded to condone the delay. Accordingly, the application is dismissed. Consequently second appeal is also dismissed. No order as to Costs.