ORDER : Hariprasad, J. Every dispute brought up before a judicial authority for determination, be it a court or a tribunal, no doubt, should culminate in a final decision at some point. Law always favours finality of the litigation and frowns upon its perpetuity. Even when a statute permits a cause to be moved from the original authority to the appellate forum or provides for review as a measure to correct the mistakes in the decision, the adjudication should come to an end at some point. This is not based on any assumption that the highest authority will always be right, but on the fundamental reason that certainty and finality are the essential attributes required for the credibility of the justice dispensation system. This general proposition is embodied in Order XLVII Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in short, "the Code"). It enunciates that no application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained. 2. We are called upon to decide the question whether this Court can allow a claim petitioner to seek a second review of the appellate judgment passed by this Court under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, "MV Act"), against which an earlier review petition filed has already been dismissed. As a general proposition, it can be said that this Court, while deciding appeals under the MV Act, possesses all the powers under the Code besides the constitutional powers. Yet, can a second review be permitted as a matter of course? 3. Short facts essential for disposal of the matter are thus: Review petitioner filed a petition under Section 166 of the MV Act seeking compensation on account of multiple injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred on 15.07.2008. At that time, the review petitioner was aged 20 years. She was pursuing tailoring as her profession. While the review petitioner was sitting in the sit-out of her house, a mini lorry dashed into her house causing serious injuries to her. She sustained multiple comminuted fractures involving postero-superior aspect of vertebral body and suffered severe damage to vertebral column. Her spinal code was also badly injured. Resultantly, she has become paraplegic and totally bed ridden. Doctors assessed her permanent whole body disability as 100%. She sustained multiple comminuted fractures involving postero-superior aspect of vertebral body and suffered severe damage to vertebral column. Her spinal code was also badly injured. Resultantly, she has become paraplegic and totally bed ridden. Doctors assessed her permanent whole body disability as 100%. It is an undisputed fact that she is completely bed ridden with no hope of coming back to normal life. 4. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (in short, "MACT"), after considering the oral and documentary evidence, awarded a total compensation of Rs.18,42,653/- with 9% interest from the date of filing the petition till realisation of the amount. 5. Dissatisfied with the award amount, the review petitioner filed an appeal as M.A.C.A.No.1467 of 2017 before this Court. The respondent insurance company entered appearance in the appeal through their standing counsel. While so, the matter was settled between the parties and a compromise agreement was executed and signed by the counsel for appellant (review petitioner) and the manager of the insurance company. The compromise agreement is dated 07.11.2018. In accordance with the compromise, a judgment was passed by the learned single Judge of this Court on 07.11.2018. It reads thus: “This appeal is preferred against the award in O.P.(M.V.)No. 1147 of 2012 of the Additional Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal-II, Kollam. The appellant sustained injuries in a motor accident and the learned Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.18,42,653/- (Rupees Eighteen Lakh Forty Two Thousand Six Hundred and Fifty Three only) with interest and proportionate cost. Being dissatisfied with that, she preferred this appeal. 2. When the matter came up for hearing, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that the parties have settled the matter for a total sum of Rs.10,85,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh Eighty Five Thousand only) in addition to the award amount. The above settlement amount includes 4.5% interest and cost. In the circumstance, the above compromise is recorded and the case is settled for Rs.10,85,000/- (Rupees Ten Lakh Eighty Five Thousand only). The insurer shall deposit the amount within 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, failing which it will carry 12% interest from the date of default. The terms and conditions of the compromise shall form part of the judgment." 6. Thereafter the review petitioner filed an application to review the judgment by invoking Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code. The terms and conditions of the compromise shall form part of the judgment." 6. Thereafter the review petitioner filed an application to review the judgment by invoking Section 114 and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code. It is pertinent to note that the review petitioner had not signed the compromise agreement on the basis of which the judgment was pronounced by the learned single Judge. First review petition filed by the petitioner herein was dismissed by the same learned single Judge on 11.04.2019 by passing the following order: "This Review Petition is filed seeking review of the judgment in M.A.G.A.No.1467/2017 of this court. Petitioner submitted that the parties have settled the matter by filing a compromise petition. In the circumstance, there is no merit in this Review Petition. Hence it is dismissed.” 7. The petitioner has now approached this Court with a second review petition through another counsel contending that the compromise petition purported to be signed by her lawyer and the insurance company cannot bind her as she had not put her signature on it. It is also contended that the settlement was arrived at without her consent or knowledge. Further, the settlement of the matter without her consent or knowledge has caused serious prejudice to her because the enhancement of compensation, according to her, was only nominal. Legal principles regarding fixation of a just compensation were not considered by the learned single Judge. According to the petitioner, the first review petition was dismissed without having regard to the mandate of law. It is therefore contended that the present review petition is perfectly maintainable. 8. Per contra, learned standing counsel for the insurance company contended that the compromise was arrived at after considering the merits of the claim with reference to all the inputs. Fact that the review petitioner is suffering from 100% disability was also considered while enhancing the compensation. According to him, a fair and reasonable enhancement was given in the appeal and the counsel engaged by the review petitioner then was satisfied about justness of the compensation. 9. We heard Shri B.Mohan Lal, learned counsel for the review petitioner and Shri A.R.George, learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondent insurance company. At the time of passing the order of reference the learned single Judge has appointed advocate Shri Sheji P. Abraham as Amicus Curiae. We heard him too. 10. 9. We heard Shri B.Mohan Lal, learned counsel for the review petitioner and Shri A.R.George, learned standing counsel on behalf of the respondent insurance company. At the time of passing the order of reference the learned single Judge has appointed advocate Shri Sheji P. Abraham as Amicus Curiae. We heard him too. 10. Indisputably, this Court while dealing with an appeal under Section 173 of MV Act possess all the powers under the Code as well as those under the Constitution. Yet, the interdict in Order XLVII Rule 9 should normally bar an application for second review of the appellate judgment. In order to surmount this difficulty, learned counsel for the review petitioner contended that this should be taken as a special case because the legal requirements under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code, that the agreement or compromise should be in writing and signed by the parties, have not been fulfilled. Refuting this argument, learned counsel for the insurance company submitted that the advocate who appeared for the review petitioner was having authority to enter into a compromise on her behalf. Learned Amicus Curiae supported the review petitioner's view and contended that in the peculiar facts and circumstances there is no bar for filing a second application for review. 11. Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code reads thus: "Compromise of suit.-Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit: Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment. Explanation.-An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule." It is pertinent to note that the words "in writing and signed by the parties" occurring therein were introduced by the Amendment Act 104 of 1976 which came into effect from 01.02.1977. Regarding the counsel's authority to compromise a matter without the junction of his party, it can be said that it was a vexed question answered by different High Courts in different tone and tenor. Rajasthan High Court in Mohan Bai v. Jai Kishan ( AIR 1983 Raj 240 ) held that a compromise petition filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code signed by the counsel (though not signed by the parties) can be acted upon. It is observed that the counsel must have acted in good faith and for the benefit of his client. 12. On the other hand, High Court of Andhra Pradesh had taken a contrary view in this matter. In Raghuram v. Vasundhara (AIR 1983 AP 32) the court held that the compromise must be signed by the parties themselves. The words "lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties" occurring in Order XXIII Rule 3 have to be given due significance. In this view of the matter, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that the signatures of the parties are mandatory for the lawfulness of the compromise. 13. It appears that later binding pronouncements by the Supreme Court have now settled the issue. The controversy regarding the words "in writing and signed by the parties" appearing in Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code was considered by the Supreme Court in Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel ( AIR 1988 SC 400 ). It was observed that the legislature's insistence that the compromise must be in writing and signed by the parties must be to avert a dispute raisable on account of the fact that under the rule prior to the amendment, the agreement compromising a suit could have been written or oral and necessarily the court had to enquire whether or not such a compromise had been effected. According to the Supreme Court, the whole object of the amendment by adding the words "in writing and signed by the parties" is to prevent false and frivolous pleas that a suit had been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, with a view to protract or delay the proceedings in the suit. 14. Another decision relevant in this context is Byram Pestonji Gariwala v. Union Bank of India ( AIR 1991 SC 2234 ). In that case, a decree was passed purportedly on the basis of a compromise in writing, signed by the counsel representing the parties, but not signed by the parties in person. Question raised was whether the compromise was valid and binding on the parties. In that context the Supreme Court made the following observations in paragraphs 37 to 40: "37. We may, however, hasten to add that it will be prudent for counsel not to act on implied authority except when warranted by the exigency of circumstances demanding immediate adjustment of suit by agreement or compromise and the signature of the party cannot be obtained without undue delay. In these days of easier and quicker communication, such contingency may seldom arise. A wise and careful counsel will no doubt arm himself in advance with the necessary authority expressed in writing to meet all such contingencies in order that neither his authority nor integrity is ever doubted. This essential precaution will safeguard the personal reputation of counsel as well as uphold the prestige and dignity of the legal profession. 38. Considering the traditionally recognized role of counsel in the common law system, and the evil sought to be remedied by Parliament by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, namely, attainment of certainty and expeditious disposal of cases by reducing the terms of compromise to writing signed by the parties, and allowing the compromise decree to comprehend even matters falling outside the subject-matter of the suit, but relating to the parties, the legislature cannot, in the absence of express words to such effect, be presumed to have disallowed the parties to enter into a compromise by counsel in their cause or by itself duly authorised agents. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise. 39. Any such presumption would be inconsistent with the legislative object of attaining quick reduction of arrears in Court by elimination of uncertainties and enlargement of the scope of compromise. 39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or compromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in the case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that a party can always act by his duly authorised representative. If a power-of-attorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his principal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorisation by vakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognize such capacity is not only to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to delay the progress of proceedings in Court. If the legislature had intended to make such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and needless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated. 40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words 'in writing and signed by the parties', inserted by the C.P.C.(Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily mean, to borrow the language of O.III, R.1, C.P.C. "any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader, appearing, applying or acting as the case may be, on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person". Principle laid down in Byram Pestonji Gariwala's case has been followed in Jineshwardas v. Jagrani ( AIR 2003 SC 4596 ), Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh ( (2006) 5 SCC 566 ) and Bakshi Dev Raj v. Sudheer Kumar ( AIR 2011 SC 3137 ). So, it is indisputable, no one can insist that the parties must personally put their signatures in a compromise petition in order to make it lawful under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code. So, it is indisputable, no one can insist that the parties must personally put their signatures in a compromise petition in order to make it lawful under Order XXIII Rule 3 of Code. In other words, even if the counsel engaged by the party/parties puts signature on behalf of him/them, the compromise will be valid and binding unless it is specifically shown that the party/parties did not authorize the counsel to compromise the matter. In this regard we may refer to Order III Rules 1 and 4 of the Code which read as follows: "1. Appearances, etc., may be in person, by recognized agent or by pleader.- Any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person, or by his recognized agent, or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting, as the case may be, on his behalf: Provided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made by the party in person. 4. Appointment of pleader.-(1) No pleader shall act for any person in any Court, unless he has been appointed for the purpose by such person by a document in writing signed by such person or by his recognized agent or by some other person duly authorized by or under a power-of-attorney to make such appointment. (2) Every such appointment shall be filed in Court and shall, for the purposes of sub-rule (1), be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the Court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader, as the case may be, and filed in Court, or until the client or the pleader dies, or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-rule, the following shall be deemed to be proceedings in the suit,- (a) an application for the review of decree or order in the suit, (b) an application under section 144 or under section 152 of this Code, in relation to any decree or order made in the suit, (c) an appeal from any decree or order in the suit, and (d) any application or act for the purpose of obtaining copies of documents or return of documents produced or filed in the suit or of obtaining refund of moneys paid into the Court in connection with the suit. (3) Nothing in sub-rule (2) shall be construed - (a) as extending, as between the pleader and his client, the duration for which the pleader is engaged, or (b) as authorising service on the pleader of any notice or document issued by any Court other than the Court for which the pleader was engaged, except where such service was expressly agreed to by the client in the document referred to in sub-rule (1). (4) The High Court may, by general order, direct that, where the person by whom a pleader is appointed is unable to write his name, his mark upon the document appointing the pleader shall be attested by such person and in such manner as may be specified by the order (5) No pleader who has been engaged for the purpose of pleading only shall plead on behalf of any party, unless he has filed in Court a memorandum of appearance signed by himself and stating- (a) the names of the parties to the suit (b) the name of the party for whom he appears, and (c) the name of the person by whom he is authorized to appear: Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall apply to any pleader engaged to plead on behalf of any party by any other pleader who has been duly appointed to act in Court on behalf of such party." On a conjoint reading of Rules 1 and 4 of Order III of the Code it will be evident that any appearance, application or act in or to any court, required or authorized by law to be made or done by a party in such court, may, except where otherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or done by the party in person or by a pleader appearing, applying or acting on his behalf. Likewise, Rule 4(2) clearly says that every appointment of a pleader shall be deemed to be in force until determined with the leave of the court by a writing signed by the client or the pleader and filed in court or until the client or the pleader dies or until all proceedings in the suit are ended so far as regards the client. In the Explanation to the above Rule, the instances which can be regarded as proceedings in the suit have been enlisted. As observed by the Supreme Court in Byram Pestonji Gariwala (supra), a counsel duly engaged by a party has the authority to enter into a compromise on behalf of his party as is evident from Rule 1 of Order III of the Code and Rule 4 thereto clarifies the time upto which and the proceedings in the suit in which his authority as a pleader can be exercised. The question whether a compromise petition, signed by the counsel engaged by a party and without the party's signature, is valid and binding on him is, therefore, answered in the affirmative as it is well covered by the precedents and no more res integra. 15. In this regard, we may refer to a contention raised by the learned counsel for the review petitioner that the vakalath duly executed by the review petitioner in favour of her counsel, earlier engaged, which was filed In M.A.C.A.No.1467 of 2017 before this Court, did not authorize the counsel to compromise the case. Since this dispute is raised by the learned counsel for the review petitioner, we called for and examined the Judge's papers in M.A.C.A.No.1467 of 2017 to consider the sustainability of that argument. 16. Rule 19 of the Rules of High Court of Kerala, 1971 (in short, "the Rules") speaks about the form and attestation of vakalath. Every advocate who appears before this Court is required to file a vakalathnama under Rule 19 read with Form NO.1 of the Rules. Form No.1 relating to vakalath reads thus: "Form No.1 (Rule 19) VAKALATH BEFORE THE ………..... No………… of 20…… Petitioner Respondent We do hereby appoint and retain Advocate to appear for me/us in the above suit (Appeal or Petition) and to conduct and prosecute (or defend) the same and all proceedings that may be taken in respect to my/our application for execution of any decree or order passed therein. I/We empower the said Advocates to appear in all miscellaneous proceedings in the above suit or matter till all decrees or orders are fully satisfied or adjusted and to produce in court any money, document or valuable security on my/our behalf, to apply for their return and to receive back the same, to apply for and obtain copy of all documents in the record of the proceedings, to draw any moneys that may be payable to me/us in the above suit or matter and I/We do further empower my/our Advocates to accept on my/our behalf service of notice of all or any appeals or petitions filed in any court of appeal, reference or revision with regard to the said suit or matter, before the disposal of the same in this Honourable Court. I/We do hereby agree that everything lawfully done or made by the said Advocates in the conduct of the suit or matter shall be as valid and binding on me/us if done by me/us in person. Signed this the………….. day of ……20 ………duly executed before me. WITNESSES:- 1. 2. I know the party/parties personally who executed to Vakalath in my presence. Accepted Roll Number" On a perusal of the form of vakalath prescribed under the Rules as above and the vakalath actually filed by the previous counsel for the review petitioner, we find some differences in the wording used in the said vakalath. In fact, the entire aspects mentioned in the form are not set out in the vakalath, but substantially all the powers have been conferred on the counsel. Neither in the form prescribed nor in the vakalath filed there is an express mention about the conferment of a power by the party on the counsel to compromise a matter. 17. In the absence of such a requirement in the prescribed form, we are bound to follow the considered observations in an order passed on 10.04.2002 by a Division Bench of this Court in the Vicar, St.Thomas Forane Church v. St.Francis Reading Association (R.P.No.230 of 2002 filed against the judgment in WA.No.113 of 2002). 18. The full text of the above order has not been reported in any of the leading journals. It is reported in one journal, but as a short note. Decision reported in a law journal as a short note or case note cannot be followed as a binding precedent because such a report will be bereft of the relevant facts on which the ratio decidendi is founded. In other words, any legal principle stated without the factual basis cannot be taken as a binding precedent. Ratio decidendi of every case should be understood in the context of the facts involved in the case. It is an unquestionable and more than a century old legal proposition. Right from Quinn v. Leathem (1901 A.C. 495), authored by Lord Halsbury, and religiously reiterated in very many decisions by the Supreme Court, the settled law is that every judgment must be read as applicable to the facts proved or assumed to be proved in a case. It is an unquestionable and more than a century old legal proposition. Right from Quinn v. Leathem (1901 A.C. 495), authored by Lord Halsbury, and religiously reiterated in very many decisions by the Supreme Court, the settled law is that every judgment must be read as applicable to the facts proved or assumed to be proved in a case. It is because the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governs and are qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. We need not labour much to cite the whole body of case law to fortify this point except the decision in Kunhikrishnan T.K. v. State of Kerala (2018 (2) KHC 813) wherein one of us (Hariprasad, J.) had surveyed the case law to arrive at the above conclusion. 19. Therefore, we collected a copy of the decision in full from the records section of this Court. It is seen in the above case that a review petition was filed in a writ appeal, which was allowed to be withdrawn on the request of the learned counsel appearing for the appellant. That order was sought to be reviewed through another counsel contending that the original counsel for the review petitioner had no authority to withdraw the appeal. The Division Bench after considering Rule 19 of the Rules and Form No.1 held thus: "In our view, the authority granted to an Advocate "to conduct, prosecute or defend" proceedings before this Court extends not only for conducting or prosecuting or defending, but also for fairly withdrawing them, if there is no case to argue. This is a matter of the Advocate's standing at the Bar, maturity and the ability to understand the legal implications of the client's case. We consider an Advocate basically as an Officer of the High Court and, therefore, by that presumption, interested in avoiding fruitless expenditure of precious judicial time. If the Advocate at the bar, perspicaciously decides that there is no point to be argued in an appeal, the Advocate is entitled to seek leave of the Court to withdraw the appeal. We consider an Advocate basically as an Officer of the High Court and, therefore, by that presumption, interested in avoiding fruitless expenditure of precious judicial time. If the Advocate at the bar, perspicaciously decides that there is no point to be argued in an appeal, the Advocate is entitled to seek leave of the Court to withdraw the appeal. If such an appeal is allowed to be withdrawn and dismissed as such, it is difficult to find fault with the action of the Advocate on the footing that the express consent of the litigant is not obtained. In our view, every counsel has necessarily the implied consent of the client to deal with the matter to the best of his ability and in the best of the interests of the client, as adjudged by him." With the above observations, the Bench found that the writ appeal was competently withdrawn by the then counsel. The Division Bench also found no reason to review the said judgment. 20. We find that the observations therein are squarely applicable to the facts in this case too. Moreover, the ratio in Byram Pestonji Gariwala (supra) also prompt us to take a view that the then counsel, though not conferred with an express power in the vakalath to compromise the case, has exercised his authority traceable to Order III Rule 1 of the Code coupled with Rule 19 of the Rules to compromise the suit in the best interest of his party. 21. Learned counsel for the review petitioner, relying on Section 152 of MV Act, contended that no settlement made by an insurer in respect of any claim which might be made by a third party in respect of any liability of the nature referred to in Section 147(1)(b) shall be valid unless such third party is a party to the settlement. It is vehementally argued that this provision provides sufficient indications to infer that the third party claimant necessarily has to sign the compromise to make it valid and binding. We express our inability to accept this argument. Reasons mentioned in the earlier paragraphs and following reasons prompt us to reject this argument. No where in the provision it is mentioned that the third party claimant himself/herself should sign the settlement agreement. We express our inability to accept this argument. Reasons mentioned in the earlier paragraphs and following reasons prompt us to reject this argument. No where in the provision it is mentioned that the third party claimant himself/herself should sign the settlement agreement. Besides, to make the settlement valid and binding, what is required is only that the third party claimant should be a party to the settlement, which means he/she can endorse the settlement through a duly constituted agent or a counsel appointed. No statutory mandate can be read into Section 152 of MV Act to hold that the third party should personally sign the settlement. Hence we dismiss this contention. 22. We also notice that the first review petition was filed by the earlier counsel himself. On going through the grounds urged in the first review petition, we do not find any contention raised regarding the lack of authority for the counsel to compromise on behalf of his party. Instead, the main contention was regarding non-consideration of medical bills while quantifying the compensation. That review application was dismissed by this Court. Now, that order has become final. In the present review petition, the main grounds taken are that the quantum of enhanced compensation arrived at between the parties was too meagre, that the earlier counsel for the review petitioner, without any instructions or consent from her, settled the appeal and that the principles enunciated in various decisions regarding the fixation of compensation under the MV Act were not considered. 23. Learned standing counsel for the insurance company contended that the additional compensation was worked out after duly considering the initial compensation paid, the 100% disability of the review petitioner and the relevant decisions relating to payment of just compensation. In reality, there is no material before us to find that the compensation amount enhanced in the appeal was grossly inadequate. 24. In this review petition, primarily what is to be established is the right of the review petitioner to file a second application for review. In reality, there is no material before us to find that the compensation amount enhanced in the appeal was grossly inadequate. 24. In this review petition, primarily what is to be established is the right of the review petitioner to file a second application for review. In the light of the above said legal principles, we are of the view that apart from the interdict in Order XLVII Rule 9 of the Code, which bars a second review petition, the binding precedents also lead us to an irresistible conclusion that the earlier counsel engaged by the review petitioner had acted competently on behalf of her and in the absence of any material to indicate otherwise, the settlement was in the best interest of the review petitioner. This Court while exercising its power of review is circumscribed by the stipulations in Section 114 and Order XLVII of the Code. It is axiomatic, the court's inherent powers cannot be used to circumvent the statutory prescriptions. We, therefore, answer the reference as below: As a general proposition, no application to review an order made on an application for a review or a decree or order passed or made on a review shall be entertained. An appellant who approached this Court, with an appeal under Section 173 of the MV Act, by challenging the award of MACT cannot file successive review petitions on the ground that the compromise arrived at between the parties was on the basis of a petition filed under Order XXIII Rule 3 of the Code on which he/she did not sign and his/her counsel alone had signed. Remedy available to such a party is either to show at the first instance that the counsel had no authority to compromise or to show that any of the grounds under Order XLVII of the Code existed in his/her favour. He/she has no second chance to show it before this Court. In this case, we find that the counsel engaged by the review petitioner in the appeal had exercised his authority traceable to Order III Rule 1 of the Code and Rule 19 of the Rules and acted in good faith to settle the matter. The review petition filed initially through the same counsel was rejected by this Court and it has become final. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, a second review petition cannot be entertained. The review petition filed initially through the same counsel was rejected by this Court and it has become final. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, a second review petition cannot be entertained. The unnumbered review petition is rejected.