JUDGMENT : The Manager of the Corporate Educational Agency of the Diocese of Kanjirappally, as the first petitioner; and Sr.Thresiamma T.D., who is working as a Lower Primary School Teacher (LPST) in the “St.Antony's High School” managed by the said Corporate Agency, as the second petitioner, has approached this Court impugning Exts.P9 and P17 orders, through which, the latter has been placed under suspension on various allegations, including that the third respondent – National Commission for Protection of Child Rights (NPCR) has recommended the same, since she had caned certain students. 2. The petitioners say that even though no disciplinary action was in contemplation or had been initiated at the relevant time or even thereafter until today, the second petitioner was placed under suspension without any valid or cogent reason, merely based on the unsubstantiated allegations against her which, she says, has been proved to be baseless when one examines the final report settled by the Police, namely Ext.P18. 3. The petitioners, thereafter, say that, on the basis of an interim order of this Court dated 17.12.2012, the second petitioner was reinstated in service, but that no action was subsequently taken to have the period of 131 days, when she was kept illegally under suspension, regularised. They submit that, however, pending this lis, the District Educational Officer (DEO) has issued Ext.P19, whereby, the afore period of 131 days has been regularised, treating the first hundred days as being “half pay leave” and the balance 31 days as “loss of pay leave”. The petitioners contend that this order is wholly illegal and unlawful; and thus pray that Exts.P9 and P17 be set aside, as also the consequential Ext.P19 order of the DEO; and to direct the respondents to treat the entire period of suspension of the second petitioner as being duty. 4. I have heard Sri.Kurian George Kannanthanam, learned senior counsel, instructed by Sri.Tony George Kannanthanam, appearing for the petitioners and Sri.P.M.Manoj, the learned Senior Government Pleader. 5. Sri.P.M.Manoj submitted that the second petitioner's suspension was warranted on account of the various allegations against her; but to a pointed question, conceded that no disciplinary action was ever initiated against her and that not even a Charge Memo was issued. 5. Sri.P.M.Manoj submitted that the second petitioner's suspension was warranted on account of the various allegations against her; but to a pointed question, conceded that no disciplinary action was ever initiated against her and that not even a Charge Memo was issued. He submitted that, however, since the second petitioner was reinstated in service consequent to the interim order of this Court dated 17.12.2012, instructions were given by the competent Authority to the DEO to regularise the period of suspension as per the provisions of the applicable law. He submitted that it is in such circumstances, that Ext.P19 has been issued. He, therefore prayed that this writ petition be dismissed. 6. I am afraid that I cannot find favour with the afore submissions made on behalf of the official respondents by the learned Senior Government Pleader, since it is without any doubt that the provisions of the Kerala Education Act, particularly Section 12A thereof, make it clear that the suspension of a teacher is permissible only when a disciplinary action is either contemplated or is continuing. This is unmistakable from the tenor of Section 12A of the Act which is as under: “12A. Disciplinary powers of Government over Teachers of aided schools: (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 11 or section 12 and subject to such rules as may be prescribed, the Government or such officer not below the rank of an Educational Officer, as may be authorised by the Government in this behalf, shall have power to take disciplinary proceedings against a teacher of an aided school and to impose upon him all or any of the penalties specified in the rules made under this Act. (2) The Government or the Officer authorised under sub-section (1) as the case may be, may suspend a teacher of an aided school when any disciplinary proceedings is proposed to be taken against him under that sub-section or when such disciplinary proceedings are pending: provided that:- (a) before exercising the powers under subsection (1) the Government or the authorised officer as the case may be, may intimate the manager regarding the circumstances requiring disciplinary action against the teacher concerned and give the manager a reasonable opportunity of taking disciplinary action; and (b) if the manager fails to take appropriate action it shall be open to the Government or the authorised officer to take appropriate disciplinary action against the teacher concerned.” 7. In the case at hand, it is indubitable – it being virtually admitted – that the second petitioner was not even served with a charge memo until now and that, consequently, no disciplinary action was ever initiated against her, after she had been placed under suspension, or until this day. 8. Going by Ext.P9 order, it only records that the DEO had directed the Manager to place the second petitioner under suspension as per the provisions of Rule 67 of Chapter XIV of the Kerala Education Rules (KER), based on a preliminary enquiry, which is stated to have been conducted by the said Authority against the allegations against her. Thereafter, through Ext.P17, which is dated 06.08.2012, the DEO concluded that the explanation given by the second petitioner was not satisfactory and that disciplinary action against her ought to be initiated and concluded; with a further direction that the report of the same be forwarded to the third respondent. 9. It is thus obvious that when Ext.P9 was issued, a disciplinary action was not even contemplated; while in Ext.P17, the DEO only requires such action to be taken and its report forwarded to the third respondent. However, it is expressly conceded by the respondents that no such action had even been taken against the 2nd petitioner any time thereafter and that the position continues so even as on this day. 10. Certainly, the afore are not in conformity with the mandate of the KER relating to disciplinary action and suspension of teachers; and it is limpidly, therefore, that this Court issued an interim order on 17.12.2012, directing that the 2nd petitioner be reinstated in service, wherein, it has also been recorded that the pleadings and the proceedings on record would not justify the continuation of such suspension. 11. That said, since the status continues without any change even today -it being unequivocally admitted that no disciplinary action has ever been taken against the second respondent any time thereafter or until this date -she can only be presumed and found innocent of all charges against her; and resultantly, the period during which she was forced to spend on suspension will have to be reckoned as duty. 12. 12. That having been said, I fail to comprehend how Ext.P19 order has been issued by the DEO directing that the period of suspension spent by the petitioner be regularised as “half pay leave” and “loss of pay leave”, since it is conspicuously silent as to the reasons that persuaded the said officer in ordering so. This is pertinent because Ext.P19 unequivocally records that the Director of General Education (DGE) has directed the DEO to regularise the period of suspension of the second petitioner, but it remains silent as to why this was not done and why the said period was not reckoned as duty, in spite of the fact that none of the allegations against the second petitioner have been, in any manner, even attempted to be proved through a proper enquiry. In the afore circumstances and for the reasons above, I allow this writ petition and set aside Exts.P9 and P17 for the singular reason that no disciplinary action was even initiated pursuant thereto for the last more than eight years thereafter, thus consequentially quashing Ext.P19 order; with a resultant direction to the DEO to issue fresh orders regularising the period spent by the second petitioner on suspension as duty and to ensure that all benefits flowing therefrom are made available to her within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment