JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. (Prayer: Appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, against the order dated 05.12.2018, passed in W.P.(MD) No.18628 of 2017.) 1. The writ petitioner is in appeal upon having failed to convince the Court of the first instance that the recovery proceedings initiated against him were illegal. 2. It appears, on a plain reading of the judgment and order impugned dated 05.12.2018, that the writ Court gave credence to the submission made on behalf of the respondent authorities that the writ petitioner was not eligible to receive the incentives for the additional qualification that he already possessed prior to the writ petitioner's appointment as a Physical Education teacher. 3. The writ petitioner joined the service as a Physical Education teacher in or about the year 1998. On the basis of the writ petitioner's representation that he was entitled to additional payment because of his higher qualification, the writ petitioner was granted requisite incentives. The writ petitioner had cited that he had obtained the Master's and M.Phil., degrees in addition to the basic qualification of graduation in the field of Physical Education. The payment continued to be made till on about the year 2017. By the notice impugned in the writ petition dated March 22, 2017, the respondent authorities cited the audit objection to suggest that the writ petitioner had to refund the additional incentives payment that the writ petitioner had obtained from or about the year 1999. No grounds were indicated as to why the audit had objected and the writ petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to present his case or contend otherwise than what was suggested in the so called audit objection. 4. What may have weighed with the learned Single Bench could be that since the writ petitioner had obtained additional qualifications prior to the writ petitioner joining the service in or about the year 1998, the relevant Government notification pertaining to higher incentive payment did not apply to the writ petitioner. However, such reasoning is not explicit in the judgment. 5. What is specifically mentioned by the Single Bench is that the higher incentives would not be applicable to teachers imparting Physical Education training. However, such reasoning is not explicit in the judgment. 5. What is specifically mentioned by the Single Bench is that the higher incentives would not be applicable to teachers imparting Physical Education training. The court of the first instance also referred to the judgment of the Supreme Court reported at 2015 (4) SCC 334 (State of Punjab vs. Rafiq Masih), where, at paragraph 18 of the report, the Supreme Court observed as follows:- “18. It is not possible to postulate all situations of hardship, which would govern employees on the issue of recovery, where payments have mistakenly been made by the employer, in excess of their entitlement. Be that as it may, based on the decisions referred to herein above, we may, as a ready reference, summarise the following few situations, wherein recoveries by the employers, would be impermissible in law: (i) Recovery from employees belonging to Class-III and Class-IV service (or Group 'C' and Group 'D' service). (ii) Recovery from retired employees, or employees who are due to retire within one year, of the order of recovery. (iii) Recovery from employees, when the excess payment has been made for a period in excess of five years, before the order of recovery is issued. (iv) Recovery in cases where an employee has wrongfully been required to discharge duties of a higher post, and has been paid accordingly, even though he should have rightfully been required to work against an inferior post. (v) In any other case, where the Court arrives at the conclusion, that recovery if made from the employee, would be iniquitous or harsh or arbitrary to such an extent, as would far outweigh the equitable balance of the employer's right to recover.” 6. Prima facie, the writ petitioner's case would be covered by the third clause as indicated by way of example in the judgment of the Supreme Court. It must also to be noticed that the judgment expressly makes out the clauses not to be exhaustive. 7. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner made a representation to the respondent authorities for obtaining the higher pay and such request was acceded to in the year 1999. It must also to be noticed that the judgment expressly makes out the clauses not to be exhaustive. 7. It is not in dispute that the writ petitioner made a representation to the respondent authorities for obtaining the higher pay and such request was acceded to in the year 1999. As a consequence, the higher incentive payment continued to be granted to the writ petitioner for nearly 18 years and the writ petitioner got accustomed to receive such amount and may have adopted a life style commensurate with the higher incentive payment being his due. In such a scenario, to reverse the process would seriously prejudice the writ petitioner, particularly, since the writ petitioner may not have obtained the payment by making any fraudulent representation or by distorting facts or otherwise misrepresenting his case. 8. It is a matter of interpretation as to whether a teacher with higher qualifications at the time of appointment would be entitled to the higher incentive pay by virtue of the higher qualifications; or the higher incentive pay would be reserved only to the teachers who obtained such qualifications in an area relevant to their subject in course of their employment. It is nobody's case that the writ petitioner herein had represented to the authorities that the writ petitioner had obtained the additional degrees subsequent to the writ petitioner's appointment. 9. In the circumstances, the writ petitioner ought to have been given notice of the objection taken by the auditors and the writ petitioner ought to have been permitted an opportunity to deal with such objection. At any rate, it was incumbent on the respondent authorities to have appropriately addressed the issue since the respondent authorities had themselves allowed the higher incentive pay to the writ petitioner. 10. The notice impugned in the writ petition was singularly lacking in any form of reasons. The nature of the audit objection was not indicated and it does not appear that either the writ petitioner himself or the respondent authorities on behalf of the petitioner espoused the cause of the writ petitioner or contested the objection. In the fitness of things, the writ petitioner ought to have been permitted a chance to deal with the objection even if the respondents failed in their obligation to impress the auditors that the respondents had duly approved the higher incentive pay in favour of the writ petitioner. In the fitness of things, the writ petitioner ought to have been permitted a chance to deal with the objection even if the respondents failed in their obligation to impress the auditors that the respondents had duly approved the higher incentive pay in favour of the writ petitioner. As a consequence, the notice impugned in the writ petition dated March 22, 2017, which includes a direction for recovery the incentive pay made available to the petitioner from 1999, is set aside. 11. The writ petitioner has to be given an opportunity to deal with the objection upon being informed of the nature of the objection. The respondent authorities will carry the writ petitioner's representation or views to the auditors, for the auditors to take a call on the matter. In the event the auditors are dissatisfied and do not accept the views presented by the writ petitioner, the resultant notice will give raise to a fresh cause of action to the petitioner. At any rate, in view of clause 3 of paragraph 18 of the Supreme Court judgment noticed above, it may not be possible to recover the payment already made, since such payment had been paid from or about 1999 and long before the impugned notice dated 2017 was issued to the writ petitioner. 12. It is a cardinal principle that a person cannot be allowed to unjustly enrich himself. However, the principle of unjust enrichment is qualified by several exceptions, some of which are enumerated in the Supreme Court judgment. Payments that have been made over a long period of time and the recovery whereof would cause serious hardship are not allowed to be recovered, unless the payments are induced by the egregious fraudulent conduct of the recipient. 13. For the reasons aforesaid, the judgment and order impugned are set aside. However, this order will not prevent the respondent authorities from citing the nature of objection raised by the auditors and allowing the writ petitioner to make a representation thereagainst. 14. Writ Appeal (MD) No.197 of 2019, is allowed as above. There will be no order as to costs. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petition is closed.