ORDER : 1. This writ petition has been filed by the petitioner aggrieved against the order dated 28.2.2019 (Annex. 4), whereby, exercising the power under Rule 23(2) and 23A read with Rule 86 of the Rajasthan Service Rules, 1951 (‘the Rules 1951’) the petitioner, who was working as Junior Assistant (Probationer Trainee), has been dismissed from service. 2. The petitioner was accorded appointment on the post of LDC after going through the selection process conducted by RPSC vide order dated 16.3.2018 and was directed to join her duty under Sub Registrar, Jhanwar, District Jodhpur. 3. As the petitioner had given birth to a baby boy on 1.3.2018, she applied for extension of joining time for six months but she was accorded extension for three months and she joined her duties on 21.5.2018. The petitioner, thereafter applied for maternity leave under Rule 103 of the Rules, 1951 and her application was forwarded on 23.5.2018. The petitioner also moved another application dated 12.6.2018 seeking leave without pay, however, no order was passed on the said applications. The petitioner received the impugned order dated 28.2.2019 (Annex. 4), whereby, it was indicated that her applications were rejected on 24.10.2018 and as the petitioner remained absent from duty since 13.6.2018 without leave, the same was misconduct as per Clause 13 of her order of appointment dated 16.3.2018 and therefore, the order impugned dismissing her from service was passed. 4. The petitioner made representations indicating that her services have been terminated without affording her any opportunity of hearing. The petitioner sought information regarding the order dated 24.10.2018, whereby, her applications for leave were rejected under Right to Information Act, which was supplied to her under communication dated 20.5.2019 (Annex. 9). The petitioner sought information regarding communication of order dated 24.10.2018 to her, for which a communication dated 6.1.2020 (Annex. 16) was sent by the Sub-Registrar, Jhanwar that neither the order dated 24.10.2018 was received by the office nor the same was sent to the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner made submissions that action of the respondents in dismissing the petitioner from service is ex facie illegal and inhumane. 16) was sent by the Sub-Registrar, Jhanwar that neither the order dated 24.10.2018 was received by the office nor the same was sent to the petitioner. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner made submissions that action of the respondents in dismissing the petitioner from service is ex facie illegal and inhumane. Submissions were made that admittedly just before the petitioner was accorded appointment, she had given birth to a child on 1.3.2018 and pursuant to her order of appointment dated 16.3.2018 sought extension, which was granted for three months only and as such, the petitioner was forced to join her duties on 21.5.2018 and, thereafter, applied for maternity leave, to which she was entitled as laid down by this Court in Smt. Neeraj vs. State of Rajasthan, S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 4384/2020 decided on 7.12.2020 and upheld by the Division Bench in State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Neeraj, D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No. 376/2021 decided on 4.8.2021, however maternity leave was not sanctioned to her. 6. Further, the petitioner was also entitled for child care leave, which though was applied by her in the form of ‘leave without pay’ the same was also not granted, no communication was made to the petitioner regarding rejection of her applications, though the same was purportedly rejected on 24.10.2018. The fact of non-communication of rejection is amply proved by the communication (Annex. 16) and as such the petitioner being unaware of the fact of rejection of her applications, could not join her duties. The respondents, without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and/or holding disciplinary inquiry, has passed the order impugned, which is ex facie illegal and deserves to be set aside. 7. Learned counsel for the respondents vehemently opposed the submissions. It was submitted that though the petitioner had applied for maternity leave and leave without pay, without sanction of the said leave, she should not have remained absent from duty and once she chose to remain absent from duty, the consequences have followed, whereby, in terms of Clause 13 of the order of appointment, in the case of misconduct no notice was required to be given to the petitioner and as admittedly, the petitioner remained absent without leave, the passing of order dismissing her from service was inevitable. 8. 8. Submissions were also made that even if it is accepted that the petitioner was entitled to maternity leave, she was entitled for the same for 180 days and as the child was born to her on 1.3.2018, the period of 180 days came to an end around 31.8.2018, however, she thereafter also, did not join her duties till the order of termination was passed on 28.2.2019 and as such, the petitioner is not entitled to any indulgence whatsoever and the petition deserves to be dismissed. 9. It may be noticed at this stage that a coordinate bench of this Court on 5.3.2020, after hearing the learned counsel for the petitioner, had stayed the effect and operation of the order dated 28.2.2019 and by way of mandatory injunction ordered that the respondents shall permit the petitioner to join duties forthwith and ever since the petitioner is serving the respondents. 10. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 11. The entire sequence of events, as noticed hereinbefore, simply reflects the insensitive approach of the officers of the State in dealing with the employees. The petitioner gave birth to a child on 1.3.2018, came to be appointed on 16.3.2018, sought extension for joining, which was granted for three months and as such, the petitioner joined her duties on 21.5.2018 and made application (Annex. 2) seeking maternity leave and made another application dated 12.6.2018 for grant of leave without pay, which now is being claimed to be a child care leave. 12. Admittedly, the respondents for over four months did not pass any order on the applications and by order dated 24.10.2018 (part of Annex. 9) the Sub Registrar was informed by the Additional Inspector General (Administration) that petitioner's application be rejected and she be directed to join. However, admittedly, neither the said communication was received by the Sub-Registrar nor the same was communicated to the petitioner, as is evident from the communication (Annex. 16) written by Sub Registrar to the petitioner. As such, the petitioner apparently was unaware of the rejection of her application for grant of maternity leave/leave without pay. 13. However, admittedly, neither the said communication was received by the Sub-Registrar nor the same was communicated to the petitioner, as is evident from the communication (Annex. 16) written by Sub Registrar to the petitioner. As such, the petitioner apparently was unaware of the rejection of her application for grant of maternity leave/leave without pay. 13. Submissions made that as the period of maternity leave, for which even if the petitioner was entitled, came to an end in August, 2018 and, therefore, at least thereafter, she should have joined, also apparently have no substance inasmuch as the language of order dated 24.10.2018 clearly reflects that the Sub Registrar was required to reject the application and seek the petitioner's joining, that means the authorities were well aware of the fact that the petitioner was no attending the office. Once the said aspect of rejection was not communicated to the petitioner, the petitioner in the circumstances of the case, where she was caring for her newly born child, cannot held solely responsible for her failure to join back the duties. 14. The submission made that the petitioner should not have gone on leave unless the leave was granted to her, in normal circumstances is perfectly justified as no employee can assume grant of leave, however, in the extra ordinary circumstances, as noticed, wherein, the petitioner had choice either to take proper care of her three months' old child or join the duties only on account of inaction/failure on the part of the respondents in deciding her application, the submission made cannot be accepted. 15. It is now well settled by the decision of this Court in the case of Smt. Neeraj (supra) that an employee, irrespective of the fact whether a child was born prior to the date of joining or before issuance of letter of appointment, is entitled to maternity leave under Rule 103 of the Rules, 1951 and, therefore, even the rejection of her application by the respondents by order dated 24.10.2018 itself was incorrect. 16. Further exercise of power by the respondents under Rule 23, 23A read with Rule 86 of the Rules, 1951 without affording any opportunity of hearing/holding disciplinary inquiry, in the circumstances of the case also cannot be sustained. 17. 16. Further exercise of power by the respondents under Rule 23, 23A read with Rule 86 of the Rules, 1951 without affording any opportunity of hearing/holding disciplinary inquiry, in the circumstances of the case also cannot be sustained. 17. Under Rule 23(2), where a Government servant remains absent from duty without leave or before leave applied for has been sanctioned by the competent authority, the matter has to be dealt with in accordance with Rule 86 of the Rules, 1951. 18. Rule 86 provides for the consequences of above situation as well as the effect on emoluments etc. and makes an employee liable to disciplinary action, which can even lead to removal from service. However, the said provision nowhere dispense with the requirement of notice to the employee/holding disciplinary inquiry before passing order in terms of said Rule. 19. The reliance placed on Clause 13 of the order of appointment is also misplaced inasmuch as the same inter-alia provides that in case of misconduct if the services are terminated then no notice would be necessary. However, in the circumstances of the case, as noticed hereinbefore, it cannot be said that petitioner's absence from duty would be such, whereby, even a notice in this regard would be dispensed with so as to violate the principles of natural justice, as the order impugned, besides being stigmatic, is to the prejudice to the petitioner. 20. This Court in Dinesh Kumar Meena vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2019 (2) RLW 1002 while dealing with the issue whether the probationers can be removed from service during probation by invoking Rule 23A of the Rules, 1951 treating them temporary employees on account of willful absence from duty came to the conclusion that once the petitioners therein were appointed on probation, they could not have been treated to be appointed as temporary Government servants as they were appointed on substantive basis against substantive posts on regular basis and that they were to be proceeded by way of departmental inquiry only. 21. Similarly, in Prakash Kachhawa vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2013 (1) RLW 274, this Court referring to the provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules, 1951 came to the following conclusion: “11. 21. Similarly, in Prakash Kachhawa vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, 2013 (1) RLW 274, this Court referring to the provisions of Rule 86 of the Rules, 1951 came to the following conclusion: “11. Upon perusal of Rule 86(3), it emerges that for terminating the services of an employee who remained willfully absent from duty the departmental inquiry under the Rules of 1958 is required to be conducted, but in this case, apparently no inquiry was conducted against the petitioner who remained willfully absent from duty for more than one month; meaning thereby, the termination of the services of the petitioner is obviously against the spirit of Rule 86(3) of the Rajasthan Service Rules. Therefore, in my opinion, the termination of services of the petitioner with effect from 31.3.2001 is not sustainable in law.” 22. In view of the above discussion, action of the respondents in passing the order dated 28.2.2019 (Annex. 4) in dismissing the petitioner from service cannot be sustained. 23. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the petitioner is allowed. The order dated 28.2.2019 (Annex. 4) and order dated 24.10.2018 (Annex. 9) rejecting the petitioner's applications for grant of leave are quashed and set aside. 24. The respondents would be free to deal with the period of petitioner's absence in accordance with law, as admittedly, the petitioner, pursuant to the interim order granted by the coordinate bench of this Court, is serving the respondents since March, 2020. 25. No order as to costs.