JUDGMENT : This Regular Second appeal filed by the plaintiff/appellant challenging the judgment and decree dtd. 14/7/2010 passed by the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) and JMFC, Turuvekere in RA.No.40/2007, dismissing the appeal and confirming the judgment and decree dtd. 26/7/2007 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.) JMFC, Turuvekere in OS.No.142/1998. 2. For the sake of convenience, the parties shall be referred to in terms of their status and ranking before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff has filed a suit in OS.No.142/1998 before the trial Court for declaration and possession against the defendant with regard to the land bearing Sy.No.47/2 of Heggere Village, Kasaba Hobli, Turuvekere to an extent of 32 guntas, out of which 12 guntas of land was acquired for Hemavathi Nala, contending that the defendant who is in unlawful possession of suit schedule property is enjoying the fruits of the said land. Said suit was resisted by the defendant. 4. After service of summons, the defendant contested the case by filing written statement. He denied all plaint averments. It is contention of the defendant that he is owner in possession of suit schedule property more than 40 years and he is the rightful owner of the suit schedule property. It is the contention of the defendant that the suit is barred by limitation. On these grounds he sought for dismissal of the suit. 5. On the basis of the rival pleadings, the trial Court has framed following issues for its consideration : 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the schedule property fell to his share in the partition effected between himself and his uncle during the year 1981 ? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves that 12 guntas of land out of the schedule property is acquired for the formation of Hemavathi channel and 20 guntas has been left ? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant is in unlawful possession of the schedule property since one and half year prior to filing the suit ? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitle for possession of the schedule property from the defendant ? 5. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff got the revenue documents changed in to his name by taking advantage of synonymous name ? 6. Whether the defendant proves that the schedule property is his ancestral property and he is in possession since more than 40 years ? 7. 5. Whether the defendant proves that the plaintiff got the revenue documents changed in to his name by taking advantage of synonymous name ? 6. Whether the defendant proves that the schedule property is his ancestral property and he is in possession since more than 40 years ? 7. Whether the suit is barred by limitation ? 8. To what Order or Decree ? In support of his case, the plaintiff got examined himself as PW1 and examined two witnesses as PW2 and PW3 and produced 7 documents as Exs.P1 to P7. On the other hand, the defendant got examined himself as DW1 and examined two witnesses as DW2 and DW3 and got marked 3 documents as Exs.D1 to 6. The trial Court after considering the material on record and oral documentary evidence of the parties, by its judgment and decree dtd. 26/7/2007 dismissed the suit filed by the plaintiff. Being aggrieved by the same, the plaintiff has preferred RA.No.40/2007 on the file of the Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) and JMFC, Turuvekere. The regular appeal was resisted by the defendant/respondent. The First Appellate Court after re-appreciating the material on record, by its judgment and decree dtd. 14/7/2010 dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in OS.No.142/1998. 7. Being aggrieved by judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court and trial Court, the plaintiff/appellant has preferred this Regular Second Appeal under Sec. 100 of CPC. 8. On perusal of records, it would indicate that at the time of filing of the appeal before this Court, there was a delay of 1561 days in filing the appeal and thereby, the plaintiff has filed IA.I of 2015 under Sec. 5 of Limitation Act to condone the inordinate delay of 1561 days. 9. I have carefully gone through the contents of IA.I of 2015 filed along with affidavit. 10. Sri. Thomas Devapriya, learned counsel appearing on behalf of Sri. Gangadharaiah, for plaintiff/appellant submits that both the Courts below have not considered the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in right perspective and the reasons set out in the affidavit accompanying IA.I of 2015 are just and proper. Therefore, the delay has to be condoned and consequently, prays for allowing the appeal. 11. Per contra, Sri. Gangadharaiah, for plaintiff/appellant submits that both the Courts below have not considered the evidence adduced by the plaintiff in right perspective and the reasons set out in the affidavit accompanying IA.I of 2015 are just and proper. Therefore, the delay has to be condoned and consequently, prays for allowing the appeal. 11. Per contra, Sri. A.C. Chethan, learned counsel for the defendant/respondent contended that the reasons set out in affidavit accompanying IA.I of 2015 are unreasonable and there is no sufficient cause shown to condone the inordinate delay of 1561 days in filing the appeal. Therefore, he sought for dismissal of the appeal. 12. Heard learned counsel appearing for both the parties and perused the records along with IA. I of 2015. 13. On perusal of IA.I of 2015, the reasons set out at paragraph-4 of the affidavit reads as follows : “4. I submit that, as I am agriculturist and was busy in agricultural activities, I could not collect the papers and contact our counsel to prefer an appeal well in time. I along with my brother met our counsel at Turuvekere seeking guidance to prefer an appeal during 3rd week of November, 2014 after respondents high handedness.” 14. Perusal of the aforesaid reasons would clearly indicate that the appellant is not diligent in prosecuting the matter and has not given cogent reasons for condoning the delay of 1561 days in filing the appeal. It is settled principle of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Nagaland Vs. Lipok, AO and others - 2005 (3) SCC 752 , where the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the length of the delay, but the cause of delay should be properly explained by the parties for exercise of extraordinary discretion vested in the court, while accepting the sufficient cause under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act. The observation made by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case at paragraphs-8 and 9 is as follows : “8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy. ( AIR 1998 SC 3222 ) it was held by this Court that Sec. 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the Court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have been resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels. 9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard and fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra ( 1975 (2) SCC 840 ) this Court held that discretion given by Sec. 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression "sufficient cause" should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram (ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94, it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Sec. 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari ( AIR 1969 SC 575 ) a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Sec. 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.” 15. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment would clearly indicate that while considering the sufficient cause and diligence of the party for condonation of delay as provided under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act is not with regard to the length of delay, but it is sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay as one of the circumstances to be taken into account for using the discretion. If the parties to the lis have not properly shown the cause for condoning the delay in filing the appeal and in such circumstances exercising power under Sec. 100 of CPC is very limited as laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kripa Ram (deceased) through Legal Representatives and others Vs. Surendra Deo Gaur and others in Civil Appeal No.8971/2010, rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court on 16/11/2020. 16. Considering the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to above, with regard to the exercising power under Sec. 100 of CPC, I am of the considered view that the appellant has not made out a case to condone the delay by showing sufficient cause in IA.I of 2015. In view of the aforesaid discussion, IA.I of 2015 is dismissed and consequently, the Regular Second Appeal is dismissed.