JUDGMENT : Rohit Arya, J. 1. IA No.19237/2017 is taken up for consideration. 2. This is an application under Section 5 of Limitation Act filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh seeking condonation of delay of 2563 days in filing the instant second appeal arising out of the judgment and decree dated 14.09.2010 passed by XXI Additional District Judge, Indore in Civil Regular Appeal No. 06/10. 3. Upon perusal of the explanation offered in this application, it appears that the appellant/State has actually misdirected itself in the matter of pursuing the remedy of second appeal under Section 100 CPC. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant/State contends that the State Government had granted permission for filing second appeal on 27.12.2010 but the respondent/plaintiff had challenged that permission in the High Court filing writ petition vide WP No. 4391/2011. Though there was no interim order passed by the High Court but, the State Government waited the outcome thereof which stood disposed of on 05.12.2013. 5. The Collector since has passed the order dated 27.01.2014 on the pending application of the respondent/plaintiff filed under Section 115 of the M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959. This order was again challenged by the respondent/plaintiff by filing separate writ petition i.e. WP No. 2335/2014 which was dismissed as withdrawn on 07.04.2014. Thereafter, the State Government has taken steps for filing the instant second appeal. 6. Heard. 7. As regards meaning, scope and rationale of the law of limitation, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (Dead) by Lrs., Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project and another, (2008) 17 SCC 448 has held as under: "26. Basically the laws of Limitation are founded on public policy. In Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Ed., Vol. 28, p. 266, para 605, the policy of the Limitation Acts is laid down as follows: "605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.- The courts have expressed at least three different reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitation, namely,(i) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (ii) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to dispute the stated claim, (iii) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence." 27. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as 'statutes of peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as 'statutes of peace'. An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind of limitation is essential for public order. This court in Rajender Singh and others vs. Santa Singh and others [ (1973) 2 SCC 705 ] has observed: (SCC p. 712, para 18) "18. The object of law of Limitation is to prevent disturbance and deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches". 28. In Motichand vs. Munshi [ AIR 1970 SC 898 ], this court observed that this principle is based on the maxim "interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, that is, the interest of the State requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same time law of Limitation are a means to ensuring private justice suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing oppression. 29. It needs no restatement at our hands that the object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on public policy fixing a life span for legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy." 8. While dealing with the scope of jurisdiction under section 5 of the Limitation Act, as regards condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by L.Rs., Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 has observed as under: "19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107 . 23. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107 . 23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh Vs. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 , as follows:- "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation." 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers." 9. Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision Maniben Devraj Shah Vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 has held in para 24 as under:- "24. What colour the expression "sufficient cause" would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay." 10. In the considered opinion of this Court, the explanation offered for delay of 2563 days caused in filing this second appeal is in despair and devoid of substance. The right to file an appeal under Section 100 CPC is a statutory right. There was no intervention by way of interim order against the permission granted by the State to file the appeal in WP No. 4391/2011 and the said writ petition was disposed of by an innocuous order as quoted below:- "Order dated: 05.12.2013 The prayer in the petition is for quashment of order Annexure P/3 dated 27.12.2010. There was no intervention by way of interim order against the permission granted by the State to file the appeal in WP No. 4391/2011 and the said writ petition was disposed of by an innocuous order as quoted below:- "Order dated: 05.12.2013 The prayer in the petition is for quashment of order Annexure P/3 dated 27.12.2010. From perusal of the order it appears that the application filed by petitioner has yet to decided. In the facts and circumstances of the case petition is disposed of with a short direction that upon production of copy of the order passed by this Court, respondent No. 2 shall decide the application filed by petitioner within a period of four weeks after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. With the aforesaid, petition stands disposed of" 11. The said order has no bearing on right of the appellant to file second appeal. It is beyond comprehension as to why the State Government did not take expeditious action to file appeal. Instead, misdirected itself, waiting for decision on some application filed by respondent/plaintiff to be decided by revenue authorities in the context of correction in land record etc. 13. In view of the aforesaid authoritative pronouncement of law as regards object, scope, extent, limit and the discretionary power to be exercised under section 5 of the Limitation Act by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the delay of about 2563 days caused in filing the appeal by the appellant/State is miserably barred by limitation as neither sufficient cause is shown in the application seeking condonation of delay nor the same is found to be plausible in nature. 14. Accordingly, I.A. No. 19237/2017 seeking condonation of delay in filing the appeal is dismissed. Consequently, second appeal is also dismissed. No order as to cost.