ORDER : 1.This writ petition is filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the following relief: “to issue an appropriate writ, order or direction more particularly one in the nature of Writ of Mandamus, declaring the inquiry report in C.No.01/OE/DIG-VR-VSP/2020 dt. .10.2020 and consequential show cause notice in Rc.No.302/O2/2017 dt.11.11.2020 of the 2nd and 1st respondents respectively as illegal, improper, unjust and arbitrary and contrary to law and also contrary to P.O.150 of APPM and further direct the not to proceed further with the departmental proceedings pursuant to the Charge Memo in Rc.No.302/02/2017 dt.04.10.2019 till the judgment is pronounced in Criminal case crime No.123/2017 and Crime No.668/2017 on the file of Gajuwaka PS as per P.O.150 of A.P.P.M”. 2. The case of the petitioner in nutshell is that the petitioner was initially appointed as Sub-Inspector of Police on 16.01.1989, and promoted as Inspector of Police in February, 1999, further promoted as Deputy Superintendent of Police in February, 2009 and posted as Assistant Commissioner of Police, Madhuravada, Visakhapatnam, he worked there from 09.11.2014 to 17.05.2016, later he was deputed to APSRTC as Vigilance and Security Officer, Vijayanagaram Zone, Visakhapatnam. 3. While the matter stood thus, one Smt.K.Kumari, W/o K.Satyanaraju, R/o Gajuwaka filed a complaint on 07.10.2017 stating that her husband K.Satyanaryana Raju left the house on 06.10.2017 at about 10.40 a.m. and he didn't turn-up and requested to find out about her husband, the same was registered as a case in Crime.No.123/2017 on the file of Newport Police Station, under the man missing. On the confession made by Gummadi Ravi (Accused No.3) and Suvvada Mahesh (Accused No.4), the petitioner was implicated as accused No.1 in the said Crime for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 201 of I.P.C. and Sri Bhupathiraju Srinivasaraju was shown as accused No.2 and he surrendered before Chodavaram Police Station on 19.10.2017, who handed over to New Port Police Station and remanded to judicial custody on 20.10.2017by the VIII Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Gajuwaka, Viskhapatnam. Later, he was enlarged on regular bail on 12.01.2018. Later, basing on the radio massage dated 16.10.2017 of respondent No.3, respondent No.1 issued orders in Crime No.302/02/2017 dated 23.10.2017 placing the petitioner under suspension. 4. Later, he was enlarged on regular bail on 12.01.2018. Later, basing on the radio massage dated 16.10.2017 of respondent No.3, respondent No.1 issued orders in Crime No.302/02/2017 dated 23.10.2017 placing the petitioner under suspension. 4. Preliminary enquiry was ordered against the petitioner and preliminary enquiry report was submitted on 01.05.2019, wherein it is stated that the petitioner had illegal intimacy with K.Padmalatha and she insisted the petitioner to marry her and for that she approached higher authorities and the petitioner got murdered her by engaging one Gedela raju. Charge Memo in RC.No.302/02/2017 dated 04.10.2019 was issued under Rule 20 of the APCS (CC and A) Rules, 199l (for short “CCA Rules”). The petitioner submitted explanation within the time and denied the charge. The basis for the issuance of Charge for departmental enquiry is the F.I.R in Crime Number No.123 of 2017 for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 201 of I.P.C. and F.I.R. in Crime.No.668/2017 under Section 120(B), 302, 201, 417, 497, 506, 500 of I.P.C. and Section (l) (XII) of SC and ST (POA) Act, Gajuwaka Police Station. The charge is not relating to discharge of official duty. 5. It is the specific contention of the petitioner that the evidence and witnesses in both the proceedings are one and the same and requested to postpone the departmental enquiry till the judgment is pronounced by the Criminal Court. The petitioner filed Writ petition No.15021 of 2020 questioning the parallel enquiry. 6. It is specifically contended that when the said case was pending, the inquiry was completed and submitted preliminary enquiry report hurriedly without considering the request of the petitioner by the inquiry officer. It is contended that charge is Cryptic and vague based on surmises and conjectures, and such complicated questions cannot be gone in to the departmental proceedings where strict proof of evidence is not required to be placed and as such proceeding with the enquiry and its consequential action lead to miscarriage of justice and will cause much prejudice to the entire defense in the prosecution case. 7. It is further contended that respondent No.1 shall postpone the final decision pursuant to inquiry report as per A.P. Police Manual at P.O.I50 which reads as follows: "Where there is a Grave Criminal Misconduct on the part of a Police Officer, action should be taken in terms of APCS CC & A Rules. 7. It is further contended that respondent No.1 shall postpone the final decision pursuant to inquiry report as per A.P. Police Manual at P.O.I50 which reads as follows: "Where there is a Grave Criminal Misconduct on the part of a Police Officer, action should be taken in terms of APCS CC & A Rules. If Prosecution is also launched against such Police Officer in a Criminal Court and if the Departmental Inquiry is completed before the Judgment in the Criminal Court is pronounced, the decision in the Departmental Proceedings shall ordinarily be postponed till the criminal case is disposed of.” 8. It is further contended that the action of the respondent No.1 in proceeding further pursuant to the inquiry report by issuing a show cause notice asking final explanation of the petitioner to the findings of the inquiry report is contrary to police Standing Order l50 of A.P.Police Manual. Due to the enquiry, the petitioner last some defense and if the petitioner discloses his further defence in the explanation, it would cause much prejudice to him, requested to grant relief as claimed by him. 9. Respondents filed counter narrating the facts of the case, more particularly involvement of the petitioner in Crime No.123 of 2017 on the file of New Port Police station, registered for the offence punishable under Section 302, 201 read with 34, 109 and 120 (B) of I.P.C. and Crime No.66 of 2018 on the file of Kotauratla Police Station, Visakhapatnam Rural District registered for the offence punishable under Section 120 (B), 302, 201, 417, 497, 506, 500 of I.P.C. and Section 3 (1) (2) (va) of S.Cs. and S.Ts (POA) Act and also admitted about the appointment of enquiry officer ordering departmental enquiry calling for explanation of the petitioner, but denied the submission of explanation by the petitioner by the date of filing writ petition and thus, the petitioner made a false allegation in the writ petition, on this ground the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. 10. The respondents further contended that the writ petitioner has ample opportunity to submit his objections to the Inquiry Report. He can raise all objections now being raised in the writ petition by way of representation in response to the show cause notice dated 11.11.2020, served on 24.11.2020. The inquiry report has not attained finality and is subject to consideration by the disciplinary authority. 11. He can raise all objections now being raised in the writ petition by way of representation in response to the show cause notice dated 11.11.2020, served on 24.11.2020. The inquiry report has not attained finality and is subject to consideration by the disciplinary authority. 11. It is further contended that the Writ petitioner having not availed the opportunity to submit his explanation (representation) questioning the legality of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Authority in his report, without exercising such right to make a representation questioning the Inquiry Report, the petitioner has approached this Court, therefore, the writ petition is a prematured one. 12. Thus, it is clear from the material that the enquiry against the petitioner is completed and a written representation was called as per Rule 21 (1) of APCS and (CC and A) Rules, 1991. But the petitioner did not submit his written representation as to the punishment to be imposed against the petitioner for the misconduct. Earlier, the petitioner approached this Court, filed the present writ petition and postponed the final order pursuant to the enquiry report in C.No.01/OE/DIG – VR – VSP/2020 dated 31.10.2020 of respondent No.2 and consequential show-cause notice Rc.No.302/02/2020 dated 11.11.2020 till the judgment is pronounced by the competent criminal Court as per the Standing Order 150 of A.P.Police Manual. The petitioner is not entitled to claim benefit under A.P.Police Standing Order 150 since the enquiry is already completed finding the petitioner is guilty and called for written representation as to the punishment to be imposed against the petitioner. 13. When the departmental enquiry is pending during pendency of the charge sheet, the petitioner may claim such relief, but when the enquiry is completed and report is submitted, this Court cannot issue a direction against the respondents not to pass final order on the basis of the enquiry report. In support of the contentions, the respondents placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in, “M/s Stanzen Toyotestsu India Private Limited v. Girish, AIR 2014 SC 989 ” and judgment of Madras High Court in “S.Subramanian v. The Commandant (W.A.No.1114 of 2017)”, requested to dismiss the petition. 14. The petitioner filed reply affidavit reiterating the contentions urged in the petition. Therefore, it is not necessary to extract the contentions urged in the reply as it is only denial of specific contentions urged by the respondents in the counter. 15. 14. The petitioner filed reply affidavit reiterating the contentions urged in the petition. Therefore, it is not necessary to extract the contentions urged in the reply as it is only denial of specific contentions urged by the respondents in the counter. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner while reiterating the contentions urged in the petition, relied on the judgment of the High Court of Bombay in “Babulal Verma v. Union of India, 2008 (3) BomCR 696 ” 16. Learned Government Pleader for Services – I while reiterating the contentions urged in the counter, requested to dismiss the petition. 17. Considering rival contentions, perusing the material available on record, the point that arose for consideration is : Whether respondent Nos.1 and 2 be directed not to pass final orders on the inquiry report in C.No.01/OE/DIG-VR-VSP/2020 dated .10.2020 and the consequential show-cause notice in Rc.No.302/02/2017 dated 11.11.2020 be declared as illegal and arbitrary? POINT: 18. Admittedly, the petitioner is facing enquiry in C.No.01/OE/DIG-VR-VSP/2020 besides trial in Crime No.123 of 2017 registered for the offence punishable under Section 302 and 201 of I.P.C. and Crime No.668 of 2017 registered for the offence punishable under Section 120 (B), 302, 201, 417, 497, 506 and 500 I.P.C. and Section (l) (XII) of SC and ST (POA) Act. Both the cases are at the stage of trial, whereas departmental enquiry is completed and show-cause notice in compliance of Rule 21 of APCS (CC and A) Rules, 1991 was issued calling the petitioner to submit written representation for imposition of penalty on the findings recorded by the enquiry officer. When the Police Standing Orders are the rules governing the service conditions of the police besides CCA Rules, it can be said to be a supplementary to APCS and CCA Rules. Though, there is no bar in CCA Rules to proceed with both the departmental enquiry and prosecution based on the same facts, the interdict is created by Police Standing Order 150, which I extracted in the earlier paragraphs. 19. As per the Police Standing Order 150, when an enquiry was ordered under CCA Rules, if prosecution is also launched against the police officer in a criminal Court, and if the departmental enquiry is completed before the judgment in the criminal Court is pronounced, the decision in the departmental proceeding shall ordinarily be postponed till the criminal case is disposed of. 20. 20. Thus, it is a clear bar on disposal of departmental proceedings in view of language employed in Police Standing Order 150, since the word “shall” is used, which indicates that it is mandatory. Besides the A.P.Police Manual, the law is well settled that when the departmental enquiry and criminal prosecution are launched based on the same incident and charges in both the departmental enquiry and criminal prosecution are one and the same and the cause for launching both the departmental enquiry and criminal prosecution is one and the same, normally Courts by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India granting stay of departmental proceedings as divulgence of probable defence in the departmental proceedings, which is likely to be raised in the criminal prosecution, would cause serious prejudice to the government employee. The law is wells settled on this issue regarding simultaneous prosecution as well as departmental enquiry, in “Delhi Cloth and General Mills Ltd. v. Kushal Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806 ”, the Supreme Court considered the similar question and held as under: “Though ordinarily a departmental action is not initiated in regard to sub-judice matter, yet there is no provision of law which empowers Courts to stay departmental proceedings merely because a criminal prosecution of the same person is launched in a Court of Law. The object of departmental proceeding is to ascertain if the employee is a fit person to be retained in service and the object of the court trial is to see if the ingredients of the offence have been made out warranting conviction. In the instant case, the Supreme Court observed that often employers stay enquiries pending decision of the criminal courts and that is fair. But it could not be said that principles of natural justice require that an employer must wait for the decision at least of the trial Court before taking action against an employee. If the case is of grave nature or involves question of facts or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to wait the decision of the trial Court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal Court may not be prejudiced.” 21. If the case is of grave nature or involves question of facts or law, which are not simple, it would be advisable for the employer to wait the decision of the trial Court, so that the defence of the employee in the criminal Court may not be prejudiced.” 21. In view of the law declared by the Apex Court in the judgment (referred supra), it is clear that when the cause for initiation of both the departmental enquiry and criminal prosecution is one and the same, charges and documents are one and the same, the Court can interdict such departmental enquiry by exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 22. In the present case, enquiry is completed and report was submitted, it is at the stage of imposition of penalty for the alleged proved misconduct and notice was issued calling for explanation exercising power under Rule 21 of CCA Rules. At this stage, the petitioner approached this Court for grant of stay of all further proceedings in the departmental enquiry i.e. imposition of penalty. 23. In “Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. C.Nagaraju, (2019) 10 SCC 367 ” the Apex Court held as follows: “…..It is settled law that the acquittal by a Criminal Court does not preclude a Departmental Inquiry against the delinquent officer. The Disciplinary Authority is not bound by the judgment of the Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in the Departmental Inquiry is different from that produced during the criminal trial. The object of a Departmental Inquiry is to find out whether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conduct rules for the purpose of determining whether he should be continued in service. The standard of proof in a Departmental Inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the Criminal Court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.” 24. The standard of proof in a Departmental Inquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order of dismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry Officer in the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidence available to the Criminal Court, is justified and needed no interference by the High Court.” 24. On analysis of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the said judgments, there is no bar to grant stay of all further proceedings in the enquiry as divulgence of defence in the departmental enquiry would cause prejudice and it will seriously affect the right of the fair trial in the criminal prosecution, which is pending before the Court. 25. The principle laid down in the judgments (referred supra) has no direct application to the present facts of the case. In “M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited, 1999(3) SCC 679 ” the Apex Court while dealing with similar question held as follows: “The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are: (i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately. (ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case. (iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed. (v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.” 26. In view of the judgment in “M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited” (referred supra), it is appropriate to grant stay of all further proceedings of departmental enquiry till pronouncement of judgment in criminal case. 27. In “M/s Stanzen Toyotestsu India Private Limited v. Girish” (referred supra) the Apex Court referred to the principle laid down in “State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, 1996 (6) SCC 417 ”, where the Apex Court reiterated that there was no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously unless there is a likelihood of the employee suffering prejudice in the criminal trial. What is significant is that, the likelihood of prejudice itself is hedged by providing that not only should the charge be grave but even the case must involve complicated questions of law and fact. Stay of proceedings at any rate cannot and should not be a matter of course. Finally, in M/s Stanzen Toyotestsu India Private Limited v. Girish” (referred supra) the Apex Court concluded that there is no legal bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and a criminal trial simultaneously, but the Courts has to consider the prejudice likely to be caused to the Government servant while taking into consideration of gravity and seriousness of the charges and complicated questions of law and fact. 28. In the present case, the petitioner charged for the grave offence punishable under Section 302, 120(B), 201, 497, 506 and 500 of I.P.C. and Section (1) (xii) of S.Cs and S.Ts (POA) Act and its trial is a complicated one. 28. In the present case, the petitioner charged for the grave offence punishable under Section 302, 120(B), 201, 497, 506 and 500 of I.P.C. and Section (1) (xii) of S.Cs and S.Ts (POA) Act and its trial is a complicated one. If the petitioner disclosed defence, there is every possibility of causing prejudice to the petitioner since the prosecution will prepare to adduce evidence based on the defence set up by the petitioner before the enquiry officer and such trial would cause prejudice to the Government Servant. Therefore, taking into consideration of gravity of charges and genesis of both the departmental enquiry and criminal prosecution, witnesses and nature of evidence to be adduced in both the matters, it is difficult to apply the principle laid down in the judgments referred above as there is no straight jacket formula for grant of stay of all further proceedings. 29. Apart from that, the Court has to weigh the pros and cons in case the departmental enquiry and criminal prosecution launched against the Government servant are proceeding simultaneously, as the circumstances to grant stay vary from case to case. Therefore, taking into consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, prejudice likely to be caused in the criminal case, in case final order is passed against the petitioner in the above matter, I find that it is appropriate to grant stay of all further proceedings. 30. Learned Government Pleader for Services – I also relied on the judgment of Madras High Court in “S.Subramanian v. The Commandant (W.A.No.1114 of 2017)”. In the said judgment, the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras noted the principle laid down in various judgments including in “M.Paul Anthony v. Bharat Gold Mines Limited” (referred supra) and concluded that the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should be exercised cautiously. In the facts of the case before the Division Bench of the High Court of Madras, already departmental officers have been examined and it is for the petitioner to cross-examine them. At this stage, if the department has to defer the departmental proceedings, till the criminal prosecution is over, then it will adversely affect the administrative functioning of the disciplined force, declined to grant stay. 31. In the present case, departmental proceedings are completed and it is at the stage of imposition of penalty. 32. At this stage, if the department has to defer the departmental proceedings, till the criminal prosecution is over, then it will adversely affect the administrative functioning of the disciplined force, declined to grant stay. 31. In the present case, departmental proceedings are completed and it is at the stage of imposition of penalty. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed on record, the recent judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Writ Petition No.18204 of 2015 dated 23.02.2021. In the said judgment, the Division Bench of this Court, based on the principle laid down by the Apex Court in “Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Limited v. C.Nagaraju” (referred supra) and “Pandiyan Roadways Corporation Limited v. N.Balakrishnan, (2007) 9 SCC 755 ” upheld the order of the tribunal interdicting departmental proceedings based on the charge memo served on the delinquent employee. 33. If this principle is applied to the present facts of the case, the petitioner is entitled to claim relief in this petition. 34. Besides the law declared by the Apex Court, Police Standing Order 150 says that when an enquiry was ordered under CCA Rules, if prosecution is also launched against the police officer in a criminal Court, and if the departmental enquiry is completed before the judgment in the criminal Court is pronounced, the decision in the departmental proceeding shall ordinarily be postponed till the criminal case is disposed of. 35. The police standing order 150 being a special rule, it will prevail over the general rule. 36. It is a well settled law that, the special law prevails over the general law vide G.P. Singh’s Principles of Statutory Interpretation (9th Edition). This principle is expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant. 37. In “R.S.Raghunath v. State of Karnataka, (1992) 1 SCC 335 ”, the Supreme Court held that the special law prevails over general law with one exception and that is a later general law prevails over earlier special law, if it clearly indicates the intention to supersede the special law. 38. In “St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 ” the Apex Court held as follows: “140. 38. In “St. Stephen’s College v. University of Delhi, (1992) 1 SCC 558 ” the Apex Court held as follows: “140. …The golden rule of interpretation is that words should be read in the ordinary, natural and grammatical meaning and the principle of harmonious construction merely applies the rule that where there is a general provision of law dealing with a subject, and a special provision dealing with the same subject, the special prevails over the general. If it is not constructed in that way the result would be that the special provision would be wholly defeated. 39. The Supreme Court of Canada in “Lalonde v. Sun Life, [2002] I.L.R. 1-4106 (O.S.C.J.)”, Justice Gonthier in his own words held that, “This is an appropriate case in which to apply the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant and give precedence to the special Act. The principle is, therefore, that where there are provisions in a special Act and in a general Act on the same subject which are inconsistent, if the special Act gives a complete rule on the subject, the expression of the rule acts as an exception to the subject-matter of the rule from the general Act." 40. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments (referred supra), Police Standing Order, which is a special rule, which deals with the power of the authorities to postpone the decision on the departmental inquiry till pronouncement of judgment in the criminal case, will prevail over the general rule. 41. Cumulative effect of the law declared by various Courts in the judgments (referred supra) and mandatory requirement in Police Standing Order 150, I find that it is appropriate to grant stay of all further proceedings including inquiry report in C.No.01/OE/DIG-VR-VSP/2020 dated -10-2020 and consequential show cause notice in Rc.No.302/02/2017 dated 11.11.2020 till pronouncement of judgment in the criminal cases relating crime No.123 of 2017 of New Port Police station and 668 of 2017 of Gajuwaka Police Station. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. 42. Accordingly, the point is answered in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. 42. In the result, the writ petition is disposed of granting stay of all further proceedings pursuant to the charge memo in Rc.No.302/02/2017 dated 04.10.2019, inquiry report in C.No.01/OE/DIG-VR-VSP/2020 dated -10-2020 and consequential show cause notice in Rc.No.302/02/2017 dated 11.11.2020 till pronouncement of judgment in the criminal cases relating crime No.123 of 2017 of New Port Police station and 668 of 2017 of Gajuwaka Police Station. No costs. 43. Consequently, miscellaneous applications pending if any, shall also stand dismissed.