K. Hemalata, W/o. R. Ramesh v. Nagaraju, S/o. Ramaiah
2021-02-06
KRISHNA S.DIXIT
body2021
DigiLaw.ai
ORDER : The question of law that arises for consideration of this court in these two similar cases relates to invocability of the provisions of Chapter IV of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957, for impounding of unduly or unstamped instruments even after they are marked & admitted to evidence; the subject documents have been admitted to evidence sans objection when they were so admitted, is not in dispute. 2. After service of notice, the respondents having entered appearance through their counsel, resist the writ petitions making submission in justification of the impugned orders and the reasons on which they are predicated. 3. Both the sides have banked upon the following decisions in support of their version & counter version: (i) M/s Cave Caterers Private Limited vs. M/s Sudha Enterprises, ILR 2011 KAR 2017. (ii) W.P.No.27694/2012 dated 20.03.2014 Smt. Huchamma and others Vs. Sri. Chandrashekar. (iii) W.P.Nos.49640-49651 of 2017 (GM-CPC) between S. Byregowda and others Vs. Saramma Joseph Thannickal. (iv) W.P.No.49424 of 2017 (GM-CPC) between R Mahesh and Others Vs. B.P. Venugopal. (v) C.R.P.No.505 of 2018 between P.N. Babu Vs. K.S. Ananth and Others. (vi) Digambar Warty and Others Vs. District Registrar, Bangalore Urban District and Another, ILR 2013 KAR 2099. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the petition papers. There appear to be decisions on both the sides of the spectrum; most of these decisions are rendered by learned single Judges of this court and apparently they are fact-specific; however, some light is thrown by the Division Bench of this court in Digambar Warty & others Vs. District Registrar, Bangalore Urban District, ILR 2013 KAR 2099; the observations at para 36 are as under : “36. This provision refers to the power of the Civil Court which admits the documents in evidence. The main Section is couched in the negative. Unless the instrument is duly stamped, it is inadmissible in evidence. As an exception, the proviso provides for payment of duty and penalty. In the matter of collection of duty and penalty no discretion is vested with the authority admitting such an instrument in evidence. The duty payable on the instrument is prescribed by statute. Therefore, there is no question of any discretion being vested with the authority impounding the document in the matter of collecting the duty.
In the matter of collection of duty and penalty no discretion is vested with the authority admitting such an instrument in evidence. The duty payable on the instrument is prescribed by statute. Therefore, there is no question of any discretion being vested with the authority impounding the document in the matter of collecting the duty. Once the duty payable is ascertained from the statute, no discretion is vested with the authority admitting the document in evidence, in the matter of imposition of duty and penalty. The word used in the said proviso is ‘shall’. It is mandatory. However, Section 35 makes it clear, that where an instrument has been admitted in evidence without there being objection at the time of admitting the said instrument in evidence, then such admission shall not, except as provided in Section 58, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped. Section 58 deals with the power of the Appellate Court to review the finding recorded by the original Court under Section 34 of the Act, either suo motu or on the application of the Deputy Commissioner. Section 36 of the Act deals with admission of improperly stamped instrument. The State Government may make rules providing that, where an instrument bears a stamp of sufficient amount but of improper description, it may, on payment of the duty with which the same is chargeable, be certified to be duly stamped, and any instrument so certified shall then be deemed to have been duly stamped as from the date of its execution.” 5. What emerges from the above observations is that once an instrument as defined u/s 2(e) of the 1957 Act is admitted in evidence & marked, as contradistinguished from marking per se, sans objection thereto, the issue as to inadmissibility of the said instrument on the ground of absence or insufficiency of stamp duty on such instruments cannot be raised in the self same proceedings; presumably it is so because, the said proceedings cannot be kept at a bay for treating the issues of the kind, which otherwise could have been adverted to had there been objection at the time when the instruments were admitted in evidence; however, that issue is not foreclosed once for all since Section 58 provides for some remedy in the appeal or revision proceedings. 6.
6. In W.P.No.13684/2020, learned counsel Miss. Parina Lalla, appearing for the respondents contends that she has already taken objection in the Written Statement as to the subject document being unduly stamped and therefore the admitting & marking of the same even otherwise should be treated as being subject to such objection; this is difficult to agree with; objection of the kind needs to be taken when the document is being admitted in evidence and marked; an argument to the contrary would result into every litigant taking up such a contention in his pleadings, which would produce only an undesirable result; the objection of the kind is a serious matter which cannot be formally taken by way of pleadings much before the appropriate stage; by any stretch of logic contra cannot be countenanced. 7. Miss. Parina Lalla, passionately contends that the ratio emerging from the aforesaid observations of the Division Bench merit consideration by a Larger Bench, there being a plethora of decisions each running counter to the other; this Court is not persuaded to accept the said contention; when a Bench of two judges state what the law is, it is not open to a Bench of one single judge to differ from the same and seek reference of the matter to a still larger Bench; the discretion to ‘differ and refer’ under the provisions of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961is confined to the decisions of the Bench of equal strength, of course subject to all just exceptions into which argued case of the respondents does not fit. 8. Ms. Parina Lalla also contends that the object of Chapter IV of the Act is to ensure that what is due to Caesar reaches HIM and therefore, the construction of these provisions should be consistent with that object; she also submits that although a limited window is open as provided u/s 58 of the said Act, for raising the grievance in appeal or otherwise, the fraud on the Exchequer may remain unearthed, should there be no occasion for such appeal or revision; these contentions are ingenious, cannot be disputed; however, if there is arguably such a lacuna, it is for the law maker to address it; but this court cannot assume the role of the legislator. In the above circumstances, these Writ Petitions succeed; the impugned orders are set at naught with the observations herein above. No costs.