JUDGMENT : SURESHWAR THAKUR, J. 1. For utilization of land of the writ petitioners, by the respondents, for construction of “Shilla-Naya Gatta Mandwach Road”, and, that too without payment of compensation to them, has, led, the writ petitioners to approach this Court. Consequently, they seek a mandamus being rendered, upon, the respondent to draw proceedings under the relevant Act, and, to determine compensation, vis-a-vis, the lands utilized by them for construction of the road, nomenclatured, as, “Shilla-Naya Gatta Mandwach Road”. 2. The respondents, in the reply, meted to the writ petition, did not contest, the factum of the lands of the writ petitioners, except petitioners No. 3 & 9, as occurring in khasra numbers 5518, 895, 5270, 963, 1027, 848 and 5271, being utilized for construction of “Shilla-Naya Gatta Mandwach Road”. However, the respondents contended that the utilization of lands of the afore petitioners, for the afore purpose, was in the late sixties. They further contend that since there is an immense delay, since then, and, upto now, thereupon, the bar of delay, and, latches, and, consequent thereof estopping principles of waiver, and, abandonments rather baulk this Court, to grant, the espoused mandamus to the writ petitioners. 3. The afore contention, cannot be accepted, as, the Hon'ble Apex Court in a verdict rendered in a case titled as Tukaram Kana Joshi and others vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation and others, reported in (2013)1 SCC 353 , (i) has propounded a principle that the right of property contemplated in Article 300-A, of the Constitution of India, cannot be given short shift, (ii) and, deprivation of property of land owners concerned, is to occur only in accordance with the procedure established by law, (iii) and, that only after a notice for acquisition being issued by the authorities under the relevant statue, and, thereafter compensation being determined qua the acquired land, would adherence be meted thereto. Moreover in paragraphs No. 12 to 15 of the judgments supra, paragraphs whereof stand extracted hereinafter, it has been expounded that the barring effects of vices, of, delay laches, would not constitute, any absolute impediments against the making of mandamus, upon the authority concerned, to comply with the mandate of Article 300-A of the Constitution of India:- “12. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. The State, especially a welfare State which is governed by the Rule of Law, cannot arrogate itself to a status beyond one that is provided by the Constitution. Our Constitution is an organic and flexible one. Delay and laches is adopted as a mode of discretion to decline exercise of jurisdiction to grant relief. There is another facet. The Court is required to exercise judicial discretion. The said discretion is dependent on facts and circumstances of the cases. Delay and laches is one of the facets to deny exercise of discretion. It is not an absolute impediment. There can be mitigating factors, continuity of cause action, etc. That apart, if whole thing shocks the judicial conscience, then the Court should exercise the discretion more so, when no third party interest is involved. Thus analysed, the petition is not hit by the doctrine of delay and laches as the same is not a constitutional limitation, the cause of action is continuous and further the situation certainly shocks judicial conscience. 13. The question of condonation of delay is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of the facts of the case at hand, as the same vary from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose. It is not that there is any period of limitation for the Courts to exercise their powers under Article 226, nor is it that there can never be a case where the Courts cannot interfere in a matter, after the passage of a certain length of time. There may be a case where the demand for justice is so compelling, that the High Court would be inclined to interfere in spite of delay. Ultimately, it would be a matter within the discretion of the Court and such discretion, must be exercised fairly and justly so as to promote justice and not to defeat it. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 14. The validity of the party’s defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. (Vide: P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of T.N. AIR 1974 SC 2271 ; State of M.P. & Ors. v. Nandlal Jaiswal & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 251 ; and Tridip Kumar Dingal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768 ;) 14. No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when the High Court should refuse to exercise its jurisdiction in favour of a party who moves it after considerable delay and is otherwise guilty of laches. Discretion must be exercised judiciously and reasonably. In the event that the claim made by the applicant is legally sustainable, delay should be condoned. In other words, where circumstances justifying the conduct exist, the illegality which is manifest, cannot be sustained on the sole ground of laches. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have a vested right in the injustice being done, because of a non- deliberate delay. The court should not harm innocent parties if their rights have infact emerged, by delay on the part of the Petitioners. (Vide: Durga Prasad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports & Ors., AIR 1970 SC 769 ; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., AIR 1987 SC 1353 ; Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 802 ; Dayal Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1140 ; and Shankara Coop Housing Society Ltd. v. M. Prabhakar & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 2161 ) 15. In the case of H.D Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1984 SC 866 , this Court condoned a 30 year delay in approaching the court where it found violation of substantive legal rights of the applicant. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed.” 4. Be that as it may, the respondents are unable to establish through cogent material becoming placed on record that the petitioners concerned, had in contemporaneity of their lands being utilized, for the construction of the afore road, had meted any express consent, for the relevant purpose. In that case, the requisition of premises made by the State was assailed.” 4. Be that as it may, the respondents are unable to establish through cogent material becoming placed on record that the petitioners concerned, had in contemporaneity of their lands being utilized, for the construction of the afore road, had meted any express consent, for the relevant purpose. The solitary stand in opposition to the writ claim, is, founded upon implied consent of the writ petitioners concerned, and, the afore being marshable from the writ petition being hit by estopping vices of delay, and, laches. As aforestated, the afore opposition to the allowing of the writ claim, as, reared by the respondents, is outside the verdict supra, rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 5. Strikingly, also, a similar plea became reared before the Hon'ble Apex Court, in a case titled as Vidya Devi vs. State of H.P. and, others, reported in (2020)2 SCC 569 . A reading thereof, does unveil that the afore plea of any implied or verbal consent of the landowners concerned, besides the writ claims being hit by vices of delay, and, laches, becoming completely repudiated by the Hon'ble Apex Court. 6. For the foregoing reasons, the extant writ petition is allowed, and, the respondents are directed to, within four weeks from today, issue the requisite acquisition under the relevant statute, vis-a-vis, the lands of the writ petitioners, excepting petitioners No.3 and 9, and, thereafter determine compensation qua the lands of the landowners concerned. All pending applications also stand disposed of.