ORDER : Shameem Akther, J. 1. Sri Setty Nagaraju, the petitioner, has filed this Habeas Corpus petition on behalf of his son, Shetti Rajashekhar, S/o. Nagaraju, aged about 21 years, the detenu, challenging the detention order vide No. 65/PD-CELL/CYB/2020, dated 12.11.2020, passed by the respondent No. 1-Commissioner of Police, Cyberabad Commissionerate, wherein, the detenu was detained under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertilizer Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, Fake Document offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders & White Collar or Financial Offenders Act, 1986 (for short, "P.D. Act"). 2. Heard the submissions of Sri B. Sarvotham Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, Sri T. Srikanth Reddy, learned Government Pleader for Home representing the learned Additional Advocate General for the respondents and perused the record. 3. The case of the petitioner is that by relying on a single criminal case registered against the detenu in Crime No. 596 of 2020 of Mailardevpally Police Station, Cyberabad Police Commissionerate, the respondent No. 1 passed the impugned detention order, dated 12.11.2020. According to the respondent No. 1, the detenu is a 'Sexual Offender', as he has engaged himself in unlawful acts of sexual offence committing penetrative aggravated sexual assault on a minor girl in the limits of Mailardevpally Police Station, Cyberabad Police Commissionerate, in an organized way and acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Subsequently, vide G.O.Rt. No. 243, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, dated 30.01.2021, the impugned detention order was confirmed by the respondent No. 2-Principal Secretary to Government, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Older)) Department, Government of Telangana Hence, this Writ Petition before this Court. 4. Sri B. Sarvotham Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following contentions before this Court: Firstly, that relying only on a single criminal case registered against the detenu in the year 2020, the impugned detention order is passed. Secondly, the alleged case does not add up to "disturbing the public order". It is confined within the ambit and scope of the word "law and older". Since the offences alleged are under the Indian Penal Code and a special legislation i.e., Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short. Secondly, the alleged case does not add up to "disturbing the public order". It is confined within the ambit and scope of the word "law and older". Since the offences alleged are under the Indian Penal Code and a special legislation i.e., Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short. 'POCSO Act'), the detenu can certainly be tried and convicted under the Indian Penal Code and the said special legislation. Thus, there was no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws. Hence, the impugned orders tantamount to colourable exercise of power. Thirdly, the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, while passing the impugned detention order. The detenu has no past criminal history. The detenu was granted bail in the crime relied upon by the detaining authority. After release on bail, the detenu has not involved in any crime or criminal activity and he never violated the bail conditions. Fourthly, the detaining authority is not justified in invoking the draconian power under the preventive detention laws. Already criminal law was set into motion against the detenu. Preventive detention cannot be made a substitute to punitive detention. The detaining authority has to be extremely careful while passing the detention order, since the detention ipso facto adversely affects the fundamental right and personal liberty enjoyed by the detenu under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Lastly, that the impugned detention order was passed on stale grounds, in a mechanical manner and without application of mind. In the impugned detention order, though it is stated that the activities of the detenu are affecting the public order, no reasons are assigned to come to such conclusion. Thus, the impugned orders are legally unsustainable. 5. On the other hand, Sri T. Srikanth Reddy, the learned Government Pleader for Home, appearing for the respondents, supported the impugned detention order and submitted that in the single case relied on by the detaining authority for preventively detaining the detenu, the detenu got conditional bail from the Court concerned. The crime allegedly committed by the detenu was sufficient to cause a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people at large. Since the modus of committing the crime was kidnap and rape on a minor girl aged about 14 years, it has created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. The crime allegedly committed by the detenu was sufficient to cause a feeling of insecurity in the minds of the people at large. Since the modus of committing the crime was kidnap and rape on a minor girl aged about 14 years, it has created sufficient panic in the minds of the general public. Therefore, the detaining authority was legally justified in passing the impugned detention order. Since the detenu was involved in sexual offence against a minor girl, which is heinous in nature, it cannot be said that the impugned detention order was passed on stale grounds and without application of mind. Further, the Advisory Board constituted under Section 9 of the P.D. Act reviewed the case and opined that there is sufficient cause for detention of the detenu and accordingly, the respondent No. 2-Principal Secretary to Government, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, Government of Telangana, confirmed the impugned detention order, vide G.O.Rt. No. 243, dated 30.01.2021. The impugned orders are legally sustainable. There are no grounds to grant the relief sought by the petitioner and ultimately, prayed to dismiss the Writ Petition. 6. In view of the submissions made by both the sides, the point that arises for determination in this Writ Petition is: "Whether the detention order, dated 12.11.2020, passed by the respondent No. 1 and the consequential confirmation order, dated 30.01.2021, passed by the respondent No. 2, are liable to be set aside?" 7. POINT: In catena of cases, the Hon'ble Apex Court had clearly opined that there is a vast difference between "law and order" and "public order". The offences which are committed against a particular individual fall within the ambit of "law and order". It is only when the public at large is adversely affected by the criminal activities of a person, the conduct of such person is said to disturb the public order. Moreover, individual cases can be dealt with by the criminal justice system. Therefore, there is no need for the detaining authority to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws against an individual. For the invoking of such law adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty, which is protected and promoted by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, according to the Hon'ble Apex Court, the detaining authority should be wary of invoking the immense power under the Preventive Detention Act. 8. For the invoking of such law adversely affects the fundamental right of personal liberty, which is protected and promoted by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. Hence, according to the Hon'ble Apex Court, the detaining authority should be wary of invoking the immense power under the Preventive Detention Act. 8. In the case of Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar AIR 1966 SC 740 , the Honourable Supreme Court has, in fact, deprecated the invoking of the preventive law in order to tackle a law and order problem. The Honourable Supreme Court has observed as under: "54. We have here a case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of a person likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. It follows that if such a person is not detained public disorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt prevented by the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is a broad spectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at the other the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of disorders or only some of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish "public order" from "law and order" because the latter undoubtedly takes in all of them Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder When two drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not public disorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintain law and order but cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters were of rival communities and one of them tried to raise communal passions. The problem is still one of law and older but it raises the apprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. The contravention of law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Defence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the public order are. A District Magistrate is entitled to take action under Rule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aid of maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances." 9. In the case of Kami Biswas v. State of West Bengal (1972) 3 SCC 831 , the Honourable Supreme Court has opined as under: "The question whether a man has only committed a breach of law and order or has acted in a manner likely to cause a disturbance of the public order is a question of degree and the extent of the reach of the act upon the society Public order is what the French call 'order publique' and is something more than ordinary maintenance of law and order. The test to be adopted in determining whether an act affects law and order or public order, as laid down in the above case, is: Does it lead to disturbance of the current of life of the community so as to amount to a disturbance of the public order or does it affect merely an individual leaving the tranquility of the society undisturbed?" 10. In the present case, the detaining authority basing on solitary crime viz., Crime No. 596/2020 of Mailardevpally Police Station, registered against the detenu, passed the impugned detention order dated 12.11.2020. We shall present it in a tabular form the date of occurrence, the date of registration of FIR, the offences complained of and their nature, such as bailable/non-bailable and cognizable/non-cognizable. Sl. No. Crime No. Date of Occurrence Date of registration of FIR Offences Nature 1 596/2020 of Mailardevpally PS 29.06.2020 29.06.2020 Sec. 363, & 376 IPC and Sec. 5 r/w 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 Sec. 363 IPC : Cognizable/Bailable Sec. 376 IPC : Cognizable/Non-Bailable Sec. 5 r/w 6 of POCSO Act: Cognizable/Non-Bailable 11. Sl. No. Crime No. Date of Occurrence Date of registration of FIR Offences Nature 1 596/2020 of Mailardevpally PS 29.06.2020 29.06.2020 Sec. 363, & 376 IPC and Sec. 5 r/w 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 Sec. 363 IPC : Cognizable/Bailable Sec. 376 IPC : Cognizable/Non-Bailable Sec. 5 r/w 6 of POCSO Act: Cognizable/Non-Bailable 11. Here, it is appropriate to refer the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 3 SCC 14 , wherein it was held that a single act or omission cannot be characterized as a habitual act or omission because, the idea of 'habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to repeat the acts or omissions of the same class or kind, if the acts or omission in question are not of the same kind or even if they are of the same kind when they are committed with a long interval of time between them, they cannot be treated as habitual ones. 12. A bare perusal of the impugned detention order clearly reveals that the detaining authority is concerned by the fact that in the case relied upon by it for preventively detaining the detenu, the detenu was granted conditional bail by the Court concerned on 10.08.2020 and he was released from jail on 14.08.2020. However, the apprehension of the detaining authority that since the detenu was already enlarged on bail, there is imminent possibility of his indulging in similar prejudicial activities, unless he is prevented from doing so by an appropriate order of detention, is highly misplaced. In the subject criminal case, the detenu was remanded to judicial custody on 02.07.2020. His first bail application vide Crl. M.P. No. 814 of 2020 was dismissed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Cyberabad, L.B. Nagar, vide order, dated 17.07.2020. Thereafter, he moved second bail application vide Crl.M.P. No. 973 of 2020 before the same Court and the same was allowed on 10.08.2020. on condition of detenu executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.10,000/- with two sureties for a like sum each to the satisfaction of learned XIV Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Rajendranagar. Further, the detenu shall not interfere with the investigation and shall not reside within the limits of the jurisdiction of Mailardevpally Police Station and shall not visit the residence of the victim. The detenu was released from jail on 14.08.2020. Further, the detenu shall not interfere with the investigation and shall not reside within the limits of the jurisdiction of Mailardevpally Police Station and shall not visit the residence of the victim. The detenu was released from jail on 14.08.2020. The impugned detention order was passed on 12.11.2020, i.e., nearly three months after the release of detenu on bail from judicial custody. Here, it is apt to refer to Section 29 of the POCSO Act, 2012, which reads as under: "29. Presumption as to certain offences:-When a person is prosecuted for committing or abetting or attenuating to commit any offence under Sections 3, 5, 7 and 9 of this Act, the Special Court shall presume, that such person has committed or abetted or attempted to commit the offence, as the case may be, unless the contrary is proved." 13. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the, bail order of the detenu, dated 10.08.2020, reveals that the prosecuting authority has not brought the aforementioned proviso to the notice of the learned Sessions Judge, who granted bail to the detenu. For the inaction of the prosecuting authority, the detaining authority cannot be permitted to invoke the draconian preventive detention laws, in order to breach the liberty of an individual. The detenu is being prosecuted for committing heinous offences of kidnap and rape on a girl aged about 14 years. He was granted bail by the Court of Session as indicated above. If the State is aggrieved by the grant of bail to the detenu, nothing prevented the State to move the Court concerned to seek cancellation of bail. The State did not choose to resort to such cancellation of bail, instead passed the impugned detention order. All the cases under POCSO Act are being tried by the Special Courts constituted for trial of POCSO Act cases. The minimum sentence of imprisonment prescribed for committing the offence of rape is ten years. As held in Vijay Narain Singh's case (1984) 3 SCC 14 (supra), a single act or omission cannot be characterized as a habitual act because, the idea of 'habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to commit or repeat similar offences, which is patently not present in the instant case. As held in Vijay Narain Singh's case (1984) 3 SCC 14 (supra), a single act or omission cannot be characterized as a habitual act because, the idea of 'habit' involves an element of persistence and a tendency to commit or repeat similar offences, which is patently not present in the instant case. In our opinion, the bald statement made in the grounds of detention that considering the detenu's involvement in heinous activities and his release from prison on bail, there is imminent possibility of his indulging in similar shameful and inhuman acts of sexual assault on minor girls and women exploiting their innocence in deceptive manner, which are detrimental to public order, would not justify the impugned detention order. 14. Further, in Gulab Mehra v. State of U.P. and others AIR 1987 SC 2332 , the Hon'ble Apex Court, relying on its earlier judgment rendered in Kanchanlal Maneklal Chokshi v. State of Gujarat AIR 1979 SC 1945 , held as follows: "The ordinary criminal process is not to be circumvented or short-circuited by ready resort to preventive detention, but that the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution is not an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. Nor is it correct to say that if such possibility is not present to the mind of the detaining authority the order of detention is necessarily bad. However, the failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of launching a criminal prosecution may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusion that the detaining authority had not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Where an express allegation is made that the order of detention was issued in a mechanical fashion without keeping present to its mind the question whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal prosecution could well serve the purpose, the detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. If the detaining authority fails to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so borne the question in mind the court would be justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of the mind of the detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenu." 15. If the detaining authority fails to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so borne the question in mind the court would be justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of the mind of the detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenu." 15. In the present case, further, the detaining authority failed to demonstrate the necessity to pass the impugned detention order invoking the draconian preventive detention laws, when recourse to normal criminal justice system is available for curbing the alleged illegal activities of the detenu. Even otherwise, there is nothing on record to show that there is 'imminent possibility' of the detenu indulging in similar offences which are detrimental to public order. It is true that the offences alleged against the detenu are heinous in nature. But, it is also equally true that the detenu has no criminal antecedents or criminal history, which could have formed the basis for recording 'subjective satisfaction' while passing the order of detention. In the instant case, there is only a solitary case in Crime No. 596 of 2020 of Mailardevpally Police Station registered for the offences punishable under Sections 363 and 376 of IPC and Section 5 read with 6 of POCSO Act, for which the detenu was arrested and remanded to judicial custody and later released on conditional bail. Lastly, it is also relevant to state that the detenu is the neighbour of junior paternal aunt of the victim girl, who is aged about 14 years. Whenever the victim girl used to visit her junior paternal aunt's house, the detenu used to follow her to make friendship with her. On 29.06.2020, the detenu took the victim girl to a temple and asked her to wear Mangalsutra, took her to his room and had sexual intercourse with her. On the next day evening, police came to the said room and took the victim girl to police station. Therefore, it cannot be held that the detenu would indulge in similar prejudicial activities in future. Under these circumstances, the detaining authority is not justified in passing the impugned order of detention, which tantamount's to colourable exercise of power. 16. On the next day evening, police came to the said room and took the victim girl to police station. Therefore, it cannot be held that the detenu would indulge in similar prejudicial activities in future. Under these circumstances, the detaining authority is not justified in passing the impugned order of detention, which tantamount's to colourable exercise of power. 16. Here, it is apt to state that the true distinction between the areas of 'law and order' and 'public order' lies not merely in the nature or quality of the act, but in the degree and extent of its impact on the society. Acts which are similar in nature, but committed in different contexts and circumstances, might cause different reactions. In one case, it might affect specific individuals only, and therefore touches the problem of 'law and order' only, while in another, it might affect the public order. Therefore, an act by itself would not determine its own gravity. It may not differ from other similar acts in quality, but it might be different in its potentiality, i.e., its impact on society. The words 'law and order' and 'public order' have well defined contours. Infractions of law may lead to disturbance of law and order, but every infraction of law does not necessarily result in public disorder. In the instant case, grave as the offences may be, in the given circumstances of the case, they are committed against particular individuals and not the general public at large and they relate to kidnap, rape and aggravated penetrative sexual assault. Hence, no inference of disturbance of public order can be drawn. The subject case can be tried, under the normal criminal law and/or special legislation. And, if convicted, can certainly be punished by the Court of law. Thus, the case does not fall within the ambit of the words "public order" or "disturbance of public order". Instead, it falls within the scope of the words "law and order". Hence, there was no need for the detaining authority to pass the impugned detention order. 17. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the impugned orders are legally unsustainable and are liable to be set aside. 18. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned detention order vide No. 65/PD-CELL/CYB/2020, dated 12.11.2020, passed by the respondent No. 1, and the consequential confirmation order vide G.O.Rt. No. 243, General Administration (Spl. 17. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, the impugned orders are legally unsustainable and are liable to be set aside. 18. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. The impugned detention order vide No. 65/PD-CELL/CYB/2020, dated 12.11.2020, passed by the respondent No. 1, and the consequential confirmation order vide G.O.Rt. No. 243, General Administration (Spl. (Law & Order)) Department, dated 30.01.2021, passed by the respondent No. 2, are hereby set aside. The respondents are directed to set the detenu, namely, Shetti Rajashekhar, S/o. Nagaraju, at liberty forthwith, if he is no longer required in any other criminal case. Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, pending in this Writ Petition shall stand closed. There shall be no order as to costs.