ORDER Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. - This writ petition has been preferred claiming the following reliefs: "By an appropriate writ, order or direction, the impugned judgment and certificate dated 28.05.2019 (Annex. 11) passed by the learned Rent Appellate Tribunal, Udaipur in Rent Appeal No.23/2015 (C.I.S. No.24/2015) may kindly be quashed and set aside." 2. As the pleaded facts would reveal, one Smt. Hukam Kanwar w/o Late Shri Chatur Singh Shaktawat (hereinafter referred to 'as original landlady") let out, on rent, a shop situated outside Surajpole, Opposite Ashok Cinema, National Highway Link Road, Udaipur (in short, 'shop in question") to the present petitioner by executing a rent note dated 22.09.1988; in the said rent note, a stipulation was made that in the event of the original landlady requiring vacation of the shop in question, she shall give one month's prior notice in regard thereto to the petitioner-tenant; similarly, in case the petitioner-tenant wishes to vacate the shop in question, she shall also be required to give one month's prior notice thereof to the original landlady. 3. The petitioner-tenant, while obtaining the possession of the shop in question gave, through cheque, an amount of Rs.10,000/-as advance security deposit to the original landlady, in pursuance whereto, an agreement was executed by the original landlady in favour of the petitioner-tenant on 22.09.1988 itself. 4. The original landlady, however, instituted a suit for eviction against the petitioner-tenant before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Udaipur on the ground of subletting, reasonable and bona fide necessity, requirement of alternative accommodation and default in payment of rent. 5. However, during pendency of the aforementioned eviction suit, the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act of 2001r) came into force, and therefore, the original landlady chose to withdraw the aforementioned suit, and the same was accordingly withdrawn. Thereafter, on 20.12.2003, an application (petition) under Section 9 of the Act of 2001 was filed before the learned Rent Tribunal, Udaipur by the original landlady for recovery of due rent and eviction of the shop in question on the ground of personal bona fide necessity of the original landlady and her family, subletting as well as availability of alternative shop with the petitioner-tenant situated at a distance of about 150-200 feet from the shop in question. The petitioner-tenant filed reply to the said eviction petition. 6. The petitioner-tenant filed reply to the said eviction petition. 6. During pendency of the aforementioned eviction petition, Smt. Hukam Kanwar sold the shop in question to Govind Agarwal (respondent-landlord) through sale deed dated 01.05.2009; whereafter the respondent-landlord moved an application under Order 1 Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure seeking his impleadment as the sole applicant in the eviction petition, in place of the original landlady. Thereafter, the respondent-landlord was impleaded as sole applicant in place of earlier applicant Smt. Hukam Kanwar (original landlady), and accordingly, the respondent-landlord pursued the said eviction petition. 7. On 09.04.2010, the petitioner-tenant, through her Advocate, served a notice upon the respondent-landlord, inter alia requiring the respondent-landlord to furnish his necessary bank details, for the purpose of deposition of the amount of rent. In pursuance of the said notice, the respondent-landlord on 08.07.2010, through his Advocate, served a reply/notice to the present petitioner, seeking vacation of the shop in question on the ground of personal bona fide necessity of the respondent-landlord, and until such vacation, the petitioner-tenant was asked to pay the rent regularly. 8. An averment was made in furtherance of the eviction suit that the petitioner-tenant sublet the shop in question to one Ambalal (in short, We alleged sub-lettee"), from which the petitioner-tenant is earning more amount than what was being paid to the landlord;, the petitioner-tenant's husband, Shri Manoharlal Verma, is running a business at a distance of about 150-200 feet from the shop in question, in the name and style of 'Hindustan Tyres'. 9. For the purpose of adjudication, the learned Rent Tribunal framed the following issues: i. Whether the shop has been sublet to the alleged sub-lettee without the consent of the landlord? ii. Whether the petitioner-tenant has any alternative premises for the purpose of running a business? iii. Whether the petitioner-tenant has committed any default in payment of rent from December 2000 to November 2003? 10. In support of the case of the respondent-landlord before the learned Rent Tribunal, three witnesses, apart from the respondent-landlord, were produced, i.e. Smt. Hukam Kanwar PW-1, Durgesh Kumawat PW-3 and Chandra Shekhar PW 4. The said witnesses were cross-examined by the petitioner-tenant and her husband Manohar Lal Verma. 11. 10. In support of the case of the respondent-landlord before the learned Rent Tribunal, three witnesses, apart from the respondent-landlord, were produced, i.e. Smt. Hukam Kanwar PW-1, Durgesh Kumawat PW-3 and Chandra Shekhar PW 4. The said witnesses were cross-examined by the petitioner-tenant and her husband Manohar Lal Verma. 11. Thereafter, vide judgment and certificate dated 30.03.2015, the learned Rent Tribunal rejected the eviction petition, and being aggrieved from such determination, the respondent-landlord preferred an appeal before the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Udaipur, which was allowed vide judgment and certificate dated 28.05.2019, against which the present petitioner-tenant has preferred this writ petition. 12. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant submits that as regards sub-letting of the shop in question, there was no such averment made in the eviction petition that the legal possession of the shop in question has been parted with by the petitioner-tenant in favour of the alleged sub-lettee (third party). Learned counsel has referred to Section 108 (B)(j) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which reads as under: "(B) Rights and Liabilities of the Lessee (j) the lessee may transfer absolutely or by way of mortgage or sub-lease the whole or any part of his interest in the property, and any transferee of such interest or part may again transfer it. The lessee shall not, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attaching to the lease; Nothing in this clause shall be deemed to authorise a tenant having an untransferable right of occupancy, the farmer of an estate in respect of which default has been made in paying revenue, or the lessee of an estate under the management of a Court of Wards, to assign his interest as such tenant, farmer or lessee;" 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant has also referred to Section 9(e) of the Act of 2001, while submitting that there was no pleading in the eviction petition, pertaining to the said provision of law. Section 9(e) reads as under:- "9. Eviction of tenants.- Notwithstanding, anything contained in any other law or contract but subject to other provisions of this Act, the Rent Tribunal shall not order eviction of tenant unless it is satisfied that,-(e) the tenant has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or part of the premises without the written permission of the landlord;" 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant further submits that only when the petitioner-tenant fell ill, her husband was looking after the business in the shop in question, and thus, the averment of the respondent-landlord that the petitioner-tenant was doing business through her husband, is not correct. 15. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant also submits that the Appellate Rent Tribunal laid emphasis on the statement of the petitioner-tenant that no such person in the name of the alleged sub-lettee exists, whereas in the written statement, the petitioner-tenant stated that the alleged sub-lettee is working in Hindustan Tyres, owned by her husband; the business in the shop in question is being run in the name and style of 'Verm a & Sons'. As per learned counsel, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal has taken the aforesaid content in the written statement to mean that both the petitioner-tenant and her husband denied the existence of the alleged sub-lettee, despite the fact that the existence of the alleged sub-lettee has been denied only in the context of Verma & Sons. 16. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant further submits that the learned court below has relied upon the statement of the original landlady through affidavit in pursuance of her examination-in-chief, whereas, the original landlady stated that she is not aware of such affidavit or the content thereof. 17. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant also submits that as regards the statement of Durgesh Kumawat available on record before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, the said witness has stated that the alleged sub-lettee is doing business in the shop in question, but that does not prove a transfer or parting with of exclusive and legal possession by the petitioner-tenant in favour of any third party. Learned counsel further submits that as regards the statement of Chandrashekhar available on record before the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal, the said witness has stated that the alleged sub-lettee obtained the shop in question from the petitioner-tenant, to which the petitioner-tenant contended that it was a hearsay statement. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant further submits that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal took note of the fact that one Naresh, who supplies tea, recognized the alleged sub-lettee doing business in the shop in question, but, as per the learned counsel, the same does not reflect transfer of the exclusive possession of the shop in question in favour of any third party. 19. 19. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant also submits that the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal however, has also not taken into consideration the relevance of the documents pertaining to sales tax, income tax etc. being filed by the petitioner-tenant with regard to the shop in question. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Jaswant Raj Soni Vs. Prakash Mal, reported in 2006 (1) WLC (SC) Civil 89, relevant portion of which reads as under: "1. By the impugned judgment the High Court of Rajasthan decided two Civil Revision Petitions. Facts in both the cases are quite similar. The only question involved is about the maintainability of the eviction suits filed by the landlord appellants herein against the respondents tenants in the absence of one months' notice to vacate the suit premises. The landlords instituted eviction petitions against their tenants on the ground of misuse of tenancy premises which had materially affected the premises and in the second case on the ground of bonafide requirement of the landlord for business of his son. The rent receipts issued by the landlord in both the cases have a printed condition as per which one months' notice either oral or written is required to be given by the landlord to the tenant and the tenant is obliged to vacate the premises on such notice being given. Relying on the said condition the respondents in both the cases took objection that since required one months' notice was not given by the landlord the eviction petition was not maintainable. As a matter of fact, in Jaswant Raj Soni's case, a notice dated 9th October, 1991 was admittedly served by the landlord on the tenant terminating the tenancy with effect from 31st October, 1991. The eviction petition was filed on 20th February, 1992. The objection is that notice does not allow thirty clear days before the date of termination of tenancy. In the second case relating to Jabar Lal, the case of the landlord is that he had orally intimated to the tenant to vacate the premises in terms of the condition printed on the rent receipt. The objection is that notice does not allow thirty clear days before the date of termination of tenancy. In the second case relating to Jabar Lal, the case of the landlord is that he had orally intimated to the tenant to vacate the premises in terms of the condition printed on the rent receipt. An additional fact has to be noticed at this stage with respect to Jabar Lal's case, that is, there is a rent note executed by the tenant which contains a condition to the following effect: "....on being asked to vacate I will vacate on being told to do so after prior intimation of the month." 2. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. So far as the requirement of issuance of notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before institution of an eviction petition is concerned, the issue stands concluded as per a seven Judge Bench decision Of this Court in V. Dhanpal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal 1979 (4) SCC 214 . It has been held that there is no legal requirement for issuance of a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act before institution of an eviction petition. Therefore, requirement of notice under Section 106 is not necessary. The only point left for decision in this case is whether there was agreement between parties requiring service of one months' notice prior to institution of an eviction petition. For agreement between the parties, reliance is placed only on a condition printed at the back of the rent receipt issued by the landlords. In our view, it cannot be said on the basis of what is printed on the back side of the rent receipt that the parties had accepted it as a condition of the lease. The rent receipt is a document issued by the landlord acknowledging receipt of payment of rent by him. Conditions printed at the back of rent receipt cannot be said to be a conscious decision taken by the parties governing the lease of premises. Terms and conditions of a lease result from conscious decision of parties. Therefore, we are unable to accept that the parties have entered into an agreement about service of one months' notice in advance to vacate the premises before institution of eviction petition." 21. Terms and conditions of a lease result from conscious decision of parties. Therefore, we are unable to accept that the parties have entered into an agreement about service of one months' notice in advance to vacate the premises before institution of eviction petition." 21. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri Mehboob Ali & Ors. Vs. Smt. Habiban, reported in 2007 (1) WLC (SC) Civil 360, relevant portion of which reads as under: "1. Challenge in this appeal is to the legality of the judgment rendered by a learned Single Judge of the Rajasthan High Court at Jodhpur allowing the Civil Misc. Appeal filed in terms of Order XLIII Rule 1 (U) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short the 'C.P.C.'). The only controversy involved in this appeal is whether the first Appellate Court could have allowed the application filed under Order VI Rule 17 C.P.C. and permitted the defendants-tenants to take a plea relating to non-termination of tenancy by the landlord by serving notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (in short the 'T.P. Act'). The First Appellate Court allowed the amendment on the basis of the judgment of a learned Single Judge of the High Court in the case of Prakash Mal & Ors. v. Jaswant Raj Soni reported in (RLW 2000 (2) Raj. 1227), wherein it was held that if there is a condition in the rent-deed relating to service of notice, then the suit of eviction can be maintained only after service of notice under Section 106 of the T.P. Act. 6. The learned counsel for the respondents- tenants tried to argue that in view of Section 28 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act 1950, the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act will apply to the facts of the present case and a notice to quit in terms of the said provision was required to be given. In view of V. Dhanpal's case (supra) we are unable to accept this argument. There is no legal or statutory requirement for a notice being given in the facts of the present case. In view of V. Dhanpal's case (supra) we are unable to accept this argument. There is no legal or statutory requirement for a notice being given in the facts of the present case. The only requirement regarding notice, if at all, arises from the condition printed on the back of the rent receipt which in our view cannot be said to be an agreement between the parties laying down requirement for issuance of a notice for institution of an eviction petition. In any case as noticed above, the landlords have tried to meet that requirement. In Jaswant Raj Soni's case the requirement of notice has been met, as observed by us above, while in Jabar Lal case the trial Court will consider whether the requirement has been met on basis of evidence led by the parties." 22. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Prakash Mal & Ors. Vs. Jaswant Raj Soni (S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.371/1998, decided on 06.12.1999), relevant portion of which reads as under: "3. Admittedly, tenancies are based on contract. There is no provision under the Rent Control Act of Rajasthan to give notice before filing of the suit. But when there is contract between the parties to the effect that the notice will be mandatory before getting the premises vacated, the clause cannot be said to be illegal as the parties to the contract with open eyes agreed as in the present cases they agreed that the landlord will be entitled for eviction only after giving a notice for the period mentioned in contract. 4......Admittedly, the Rajasthan Rent Control Act does not mandate a condition precedent to a suit for eviction regarding issuance of notice, but that does not mean that if the parties agree to such a notice, the contract will be illegal or the suit can be proceeded without issuance of notice. 6. Consequently, both these revision petitions are allowed and it is directed that the suits shall not proceed in absence of the notice in view of the agreement between the parties. No order as to costs." 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri H.D. Vashishta Vs. M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) (P) Ltd., reported in (1977) 1 SCC 170, relevant portion of which reads as under: "1. No order as to costs." 23. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shri H.D. Vashishta Vs. M/s. Glaxo Laboratories (I) (P) Ltd., reported in (1977) 1 SCC 170, relevant portion of which reads as under: "1. This is an appeal by special leave where the High Court has dismissed the suit of a workman who was dismissed by his employer, the respondent. The case put forward by the appellant in his plaint was that his dismissal was illegal and contrary to the Model Standing Orders which were applicable to this industry. Without going into the question as to the maintainability of the suit, the High Court dismissed the appeal on the short point that the material facts necessary to constitute a cause of action about the illegality of the dismissal had not been averred in the plaint. More specifically, the High Court pointed out that there was no averment to the effect that the past record of the worker had not been considered while making the order of dismissal. This is the basic contention relied upon by the appellant to demolish the dismissal order. Shri Jain appearing for the appellant has taken us through the plaint averments and other connected proceedings. We are satisfied that this plea that the past record of the employee has not been considered while dismissing the appeal has not been averred at all. On this alone the suit must fail. We do not go into the question, even as the High Court does not, whether the suit is maintainable in law. Assuming arguendo that such a suit is maintainable-we make it again clear that we do not decide in favour of the appellant on this point but Leave it open for the time being-the lack of a material fact in the averments in the plaint is sufficient to dismiss the suit as not disclosing a cause of action. This is precisely what the High Court has done. We agree. Therefore we dismiss the appeal." 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai & Anr. Vs. Raghunath Prasad, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 , relevant portion of which reads as under: "10. This is precisely what the High Court has done. We agree. Therefore we dismiss the appeal." 24. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hasmat Rai & Anr. Vs. Raghunath Prasad, reported in AIR 1981 SC 1711 , relevant portion of which reads as under: "10. Section 12 starts with a non-obstante clause thereby curtailing the right of the landlord to seek eviction of the tenant which he might have under any other law and the right of eviction is made subject to the overriding provision of section 12. It is thus an enabling section. In order to avail of the benefit conferred by section 12 to seek eviction of the tenant the landlord must satisfy the essential ingredients of the section. The landlord in this case seeks eviction of the tenant under section 12(1) (f). He must, therefore, establish (i) that he requires bona fide possession of a building let for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business; and (ii) that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. The burden to establish both the requirements of section 12(1) (f) is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings require that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction under section 12(1)(f) the court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issues namely (i) whether the plaintiff landlord proves that he bona fide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starting his business, and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Without elaborating we must notice a well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without pleadings is generally of no relevance. 16. Without elaborating we must notice a well established proposition that any amount of proof offered without pleadings is generally of no relevance. 16. There is an error apparent on the face of the record inasmuch as when the High Court was faced with a dilemma whether the landlord required the whole of the building including demised premises now in possession of the appellant tenant for starting his business of Chemists and Druggists and when the High Court had before it an indisputable fact that the respondent landlord has obtained vacant possession of a major portion of the building which was in possession of firm M/s. Goraldas Parmanand, was it necessary for him to have any additional accommodation ? The High Court got over this dilemma by observing and by affirming the finding of the subordinate courts that the remaining portion of the premises would be used by the landlord for his residence and even though the portion utilised for the purpose of running the business would be smaller compared to the one to be utilized for the residence it would still not be violative of sub-section (7) of sec. 12 because such a composite user would not radically change the purpose for which the accommodation was let. This finding is contrary to record and pleadings. Minutely scanning the plaint presented by the landlord there is not the slightest suggestion that he needs any accommodation for his residence. He has not even stated whether at present he is residing in some place of his own though he claimed to be residing in the same town. He does not say whether he is under any obligation to surrender that premises. Section 12(1) (e) specifically provides for a landlord obtaining possession of a building let for residential purposes if he bona fide requires the same for his own use and occupation. But there is an additional condition he must fulfil namely he must further show that he has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned. Utter silence of the landlord on this point would be a compelling circumstance for the court not to go in search for some imaginary requirement of the landlord of accommodation for his residence. Utter silence of the landlord on this point would be a compelling circumstance for the court not to go in search for some imaginary requirement of the landlord of accommodation for his residence. In the context of these facts the Trial Court and the first Appellate Court committed a manifest error apparent on the record by upholding the plaintiff's case by awarding possession also on the ground neither pleaded nor suggested. The landlord must have been quite aware that he cannot obtain possession of any accommodation for his residence. Therefore, the finding of the High Court and courts subordinate to it that the respondent-landlord requires possession of the whole of the building including the one occupied by the tenant for starting his business as Chemists and Druggists as also for his residence is vitiated beyond repair. Once impermissible approach to the facts of the case on hand is avoided although facts found by the Courts are accepted as sacrosanct yet in view of the incontrovertible position that emerges from the evidence itself that the landlord has acquired major portion of the building in which he can start his business as Chemists and Druggists he is not entitled to an inch of an extra space under section 12(1)(f) of the Act. 25. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Onkar Nath Vs. Ved Vyas, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1218 , relevant portion of which reads as under: "2. We have heard Counsel on both sides in this short rent control case. The ground on which eviction was sought was in terms of Section 13(3) (a) (i) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. The Subsection reads thus: "3(a) A landlord may apply to the Controller for an Order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession: (i) in case of the residential building, (a) he requires it for his own occupation; (b) he is not occupying any other residential building in the urban area concerned; and (c) has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Act, in the said urban area" It is common ground that there are three requirements to make out a cause of action for eviction under that provision, and indeed this is apparent from a bare reading of the Sub-section. In the present case the finding is to the effect that the landlord requires the residential building for his own occupation. But, the legislation has taken care to insist upon two more conditions, namely, (a) that the landlord is not occupying any other residential building in the area concerned; and (b) that he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause. There is not a scintilla of evidence nor indeed there is any averment in compliance with these latter conditions. The necessary consequence follows that not merely is there inadequacy of pleadings sufficient to make out a cause of action but total absence of proof of two vital requirements." 26. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court at Jaipur Bench in Phool Chand & Anr. Vs. Dr. Gulab Chand (S.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No.1/82, decided on 3.3.1999), relevant portion of which reads as under: "15. The sole object of pleadings is to give fair notice to contesting parties with respect to the case. They are required to meet and to call out points on which parties disagree or differ. Provisions relating to pleadings in civil cases are meant to give to each side intimation of the case of the other so that it may be met, to enable the courts to determine what is really at issue so that it may be met, to enable courts to determine what is really at issue between parties, and to prevent deviation from the course which litigation on particular cases causes must take. Order 6 Rule 2 CPC lays down affirmatively, that a pleading shall contain, and contain only material facts on which the party pleading relies; and negatively that it shall not contain facts which are only evidence by which such material facts to be proved. The rules of pleadings are also meant to help the court in narrowing controversies. The facts are of two kinds, 'facta probanda' and "facta probantia'. Facts on which the party pleadings relies for his claim or defence are called 'facta probanda' and the facts by means of which they are to be proved are called "facta probantia'. The former are material facts and the latter evidence to prove the former. The words 'material facts' mean all facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. The former are material facts and the latter evidence to prove the former. The words 'material facts' mean all facts upon which the plaintiff's cause of action or the defendant's defence depends. In other words, all those facts which must be proved in order to establish the existence of the cause of action or defence. All facts which though not necessary to establish the cause of action or defence, the party pleading them is entitled to prove at the trial are also material facts. The provisions contained in Rules 2 and 4 of Order 6 CPC are mandatory. The statement of material facts must appear in the pleadings and the particulars must be full so as to enable the opposite party to know the case he is required to meet. The absence of material facts and particulars would mean that the plea has not been raised at all." 27. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ganpat Ram Sharma & Ors. Vs. Smt. Gayatri Devi & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 2016 , relevant portion of which reads as under:- "21. Before we discuss the other aspect the result of the several decisions to which reference has been made above, indicate that the position in law is that the landlord in order to be entitled to evict the tenant must establish one of the alternative facts positively, either that the tenant has built, or acquired vacant possession of or has been allotted a residence. It is essential that the ingredients must be pleaded by the landlord who seeks eviction but after the landlord has proved or stated that the tenant has built acquired vacant possession or has been allotted a residence, whether it is suitable or not, and whether the same can be really an alternative accommodation for the tenant or not, are within the special knowledge of the tenant and he must prove and establish those facts. The other aspect is that apart from the question of limitation to which we shall briefly refer is that the landlord must be quick in taking his action after the accrual of the cause of action, and if by his inaction the tenant allows the premises to go out of his hands then it is the landlord who is to be blamed and not the tenant. In the light of these, we have now to examine whether the suit in the instant case was barred by the lapse of time. But quite apart from the suit being barred by lapse of time, this is a beneficial legislation, beneficial to both the landlord and the tenant. It protects the tenant against unreasonable eviction and exorbitant rent. It also ensures certain limit- ed rights to the landlord to recover-possession on stated contingencies." 28. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law of Durga Prasad Vs. Mst. Parveens & Ors., reported in AIR 1975 MP 196 , relevant portion of which reads as under: "46. That apart, the plaintiff has made no proper foundation for a claim based on contract. His claim for damages is based on the impropriety of the action of the defendants Nos. 4 and 5. The plea, as contained in para. 15 of the plaint, is vague and indefinite, lacking in particulars. Under Order 6, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff should have stated material facts. The non-mention of these facts amounts to no pleading and, therefore, no cause of action arises. It is wrong to suggest that the plaint should be read with the notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, In the Union of India v. Pan-durang Kashinath, AIR 1962 SC 630 their Lordships have stated: "It is well known that when an improper conduct is alleged, it must be set out with all particulars. In Wallingford v. Mutual Society, (1880) 5 AC 685 (697). Lord Selborne observed: 'with regard to fraud, if there be any principle which is perfectly well settled, it is general allegations, however strong may be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice.' We think what was said about fraud would equally apply to any improper conduct: (See Bharat Dharma Syndicate v. Harish Chandra, 64 Ind App 143 = ( AIR 1937 PC 146 ))." The principle behind this rule is well known. To take the present case, if a plea, as contained in para. 15 of the plaint, is considered sufficient where it is merely stated that the defendants Nos. To take the present case, if a plea, as contained in para. 15 of the plaint, is considered sufficient where it is merely stated that the defendants Nos. 4 and 5 purporting to act as servants of defendant No. 3 acted illegally and contrary to the Mining Rules and Regulations and far in excess of their powers in the discharge of their official duties, it would be impossible for the defendant No. 3 to adequately meet the allegation, unless there were particulars of the acts complained of. The allegations contained in para. 15 of the plaint are, therefore, to be struck out." 29. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the precedent law of Naider Mal Vs. Ugar Sain Jain & Anr., reported in AIR 1966 Punjab 509 (V 53 C 128), relevant portion of which reads as under: "8. The learned counsel for the respondents submits that the petitioner in his plaint did not even allege that the respondents had built a residential house or that it was suitable for their residence. Submits the learned counsel that unless the question of acquisition of a suitable residence had been put to issue at the instance of the petitioner, the respondents were not obliged to lead evidence or prove that the premises were not suitable for their occupation. Mr. Kapur on the other hand contends that the petitioner alleged in the plaint that the respondent had built a house and let it out. In view of this allegation made in the plaint and in view of the admission by respondent No. 2 Padam Sen, it was for the respondents to prove that that house was not suitable for their residence or that though built by respondent No. 2 it was not available for occupation to respondent No. 1 who is the father of respondent No. 2. Mr. Kapur submits that these facts were within the special knowledge of the respondents and, it was, in view of Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, for them to prove that the house was not suitable and or available. The learned counsel submits that respondent No.l did not even appear in the witness box and every inference should be drawn against him. He relies on Government General in Council Vs. Mahabir Ram AIR 1952 All 891 (FD) Ram Krishna Ram Nath Shop Vs. The learned counsel submits that respondent No.l did not even appear in the witness box and every inference should be drawn against him. He relies on Government General in Council Vs. Mahabir Ram AIR 1952 All 891 (FD) Ram Krishna Ram Nath Shop Vs. Union of India, AIR 1960 Bom 344 , Indian Trade and General Insurance Company Limited Vs. Union of India, Air 1957 Cal. 190 and submits that just as in the case of entrustment of goods to railway for transportation it is for railway to produce all the material before the Court showing how the goods were dealt with, it was for respondents to place all the materials before the court, including their account books showing who built the house and who provided the finance for the same. It is no doubt true onus to prove facts within the special knowledge of a party must be on him but in the case like the present the plaintiff must first allege that grounds exist entitling him to a judgment, it was in my view for the plaintiff to allege that the respondent has built or acquired vacant possession of a suitable residence for themselves and are therefore liable to be evicted. The petitioner did not, in my opinion, allege all the facts necessary to constitute a ground for eviction of the respondent. All that he said in the plaint was that the respondents have built a house and let it out. It was for the petitioner to allege that the house was suitable for their residence. In the absence of the proper plea by the petitioner, it would not be open to me to investigate whether all the requirements of Section 13(l)(h) of the said Act were met and whether the construction of a house by respondent No.2 entitles the petitioner to a decree for eviction. In Nevile v. Hardy, (1921) 1 Ch. 404 the Court was concerned with Clause (d) of Sub-section (1) of Section 5 of the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920 which enabled an order or judgment for the recovery of possession of any dwelling house to which the Act applied to be made where "the dwelling house is reasonably required by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself .... and the Court is satisfied that alternative accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all res-is available". and the Court is satisfied that alternative accommodation, reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all res-is available". It was contended on be-half of the landlord that the onus was on the lessee. Peterson J. said "But that would mean that the lessee had to satisfy the Court that alternative accommodation reasonably equivalent as regards rent and suitability in all respects, is not available. "Those, however, are not the words of the clause; the words are "that ; alternative accommodation" of the kind specified "is available". In my opinion, therefore, it is for the landlord who seeks possession to satisfy the Court by positive evidence that alternative accommodation of the kind specified "is available "." 30. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dev Kumar (Died) through LRs Vs. Smt. Swaran Lata & Ors., reported in (1996) 1 SCC 25 , relevant portion of which reads as under: "In our considered opinion having regard to the aforementioned decisions of this Court laying down the parameters of the High Court's jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the Act it is neither possible to accept the narrow construction put by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant nor the wide construction put by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant nor the wide construction put by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. The jurisdiction of the High Court under Sub Section (5) of Section 15 of the Act, therefore, would entitle the Court to examine the legality and propriety of a conclusion of the Appellate Authority and is thus much wider than the revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But it has to be exercised subject to the well known limitations inherent in all revisional jurisdictions and cannot be equated with an Appellate jurisdiction. This being the position, unless there is a perversity in the matter of appreciation of evidence by the Appellate Authority or unless the Appellate Authority has arrived at a conclusion which on the materials, no reasonable man can come, the High Court will not interfere with the same. Coming to the second question the expression "Subletting" has not been defined in the Act. Coming to the second question the expression "Subletting" has not been defined in the Act. The conclusion on the question of subletting is a conclusion on a question of law derived from the findings on the materials on record as to the transfer of exclusive possession and as to the said transfer of possession being for consideration. As to what is the true meaning of expression "Sub-letting", this Court considered the same in the case of Jagdish Prasad vs. Angoori Devi ( 1984 (3) SCR 216 ) in an eviction proceeding under UP Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act. The Court held that merely from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop, subletting cannot be presumed and as long as control over the premises is kept by the tenant and the business run in the premises is of the tenant, sub-letting flowing from the presence of the person other than the tenant in the shop cannot be assumed. It was further held that in an application for eviction of a tenant from a shop which is based on the allegations that the premises has been sublet, the allegation has to be proved. The question of subletting was considered by this Court in the case of M/s. Shalimar Tar Products Ltd. vs. H.C. Sharma & Ors. ( 1988 (1) SCR 1023 ) and it was held that in order to construe subletting there must be parting of legal possession of the lessee and parting of legal possession means "Possession with the right to include and also right to exclude others". In the case of Smt. Rajbir Kaur & Anr. vs. M/s. S. Chokosiri & Co. (supra) this Court considered the question of subletting and held that the burden of making a case of subletting is one the landlady. It was also held that the transaction of subletting in the guise of licenses are in their very nature clandestine arrangements between the tenant and the sub-tenant and it would be difficult to get direct evidence on the same. It exclusive possession of the alleged subtenant is established then it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with mandatory consideration in mind." 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Resham Singh Vs. It exclusive possession of the alleged subtenant is established then it may not be impermissible for the Court to draw an inference that the transaction was entered into with mandatory consideration in mind." 31. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Resham Singh Vs. Raghbir & Anr., reported in 1999 AIR SCW 3029, relevant portion of which reads as under: "7. It is settled position of law that to establish subletting the onus is on the landlord to prove through evidence that sub-tenant was in exclusive possession of the property in question; that between the subtenant and the tenant there was relationship of lessee and lessor and that possession of the premises in question was parted with exclusively by the tenant in favour of the sub-tenant. ( See - Kala and Anr. Vs. Madho Parshad Vaidya 1998 (6) 573 and Benjamin Premanand Rawade(Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Anil Joseph Rawade 1998 (9) SCC 688 ."- 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. S.F. Engineer Vs. Metal Box India Ltd. & Anr., reported in 2014 (1) RCJ 130 (SC), relevant portion of which reads as under: "25.....It is settled in law that the requisite conditions for establishing the factum of sub-letting are - parting of legal possession, and availing of monetary consideration which can be in cash or kind and which fact may not be required to be directly proven by the landlord in all circumstances. As is perceptible, the defendant No. 2 was given possession by the defendant No.l as an executive of the company. It was made available to him under the conditions of service and such provision was in consonance with the agreement entered into by the landlord and the tenant, i.e., the plaintiff and the defendant No.l." 33. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Koratala Leela Satya Sai Vs. Ghanta Dharma Rao, reported in 2014 (1) RCJ 147 (A.P.), relevant portion of which reads as under:- "Two aspects assume significance in this behalf. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in Koratala Leela Satya Sai Vs. Ghanta Dharma Rao, reported in 2014 (1) RCJ 147 (A.P.), relevant portion of which reads as under:- "Two aspects assume significance in this behalf. The first one is as to whether the lease in favour of the appellant was for manufacturing purpose, and the second is as to whether the defect, if any, in relation to the period mentioned in Ex. A.I notice, is fatal. Section 106 of the Act maintains a distinction between the leases, that are for agricultural or manufacturing purposes and those which are for other purposes. For the first category of leases, a quit notice is required to be issued six months in advance. For the leases of other category, the period is just one month. The question, as to whether the lease of particular premises is for manufacturing or for any different purpose, must be evident from the lease deed or the instrument in this behalf, particularly, when there is a serious dispute between the parties. A unilateral assertion by the lessee cannot be taken into account. In case reliance is placed upon any document, it should be the one, which can validly regulate the lease between the parties. The document, to which the lessee is not a party, or the one, which does not accord with the provisions of law, cannot be taken into account. In the instant case, the respondent categorically pleaded that the lease was from month to month, and Ex. A.I was issued, requiring the appellant to vacate the premises. The reply, Ex. A. 3 given by the appellant based upon Ex. B.I, cannot at all be taken into account. The inexcapable conclusion, therefore, is that the lease was from month to month. Coming to the form of notice, the plea raised by the appellant is about the period, within which, he was required to vacate the premises. Once it emerged that the lease was from month to month, the period mentioned in Ex. A.I is adequate. Sub-Section 2 of Section 106 of the Act makes such defect, if any, inconsequential. Even if the period mentioned in a quit notice is short of the one stipulated under law, the shortfall stands condoned, if it is established that the suit was filed within the period stipulated in law. A.I is adequate. Sub-Section 2 of Section 106 of the Act makes such defect, if any, inconsequential. Even if the period mentioned in a quit notice is short of the one stipulated under law, the shortfall stands condoned, if it is established that the suit was filed within the period stipulated in law. No effort was made by the appellant to establish that the notice is defective, despite the facility under Section 106(2) of the Act. The second ground urged by the appellant is about the propriety, on the part of the Presiding Officer, in delivering the judgment. A certified copy of the docket order, dated 03.04.2013, is placed before this Court. It is to the effect that the suit was advanced to that day, since the Presiding Officer is being relieved in the afternoon. It is also mentioned that notice is given to both parties. In case the appeal was heard by the learned Presiding Officer, that too, by advancing it, the ground pleaded by the appellant can certainly be taken into account. The record, however, discloses that the appeal was heard already, and the matter was reserved for judgment. However, before the date stipulated for pronouncement of judgment reached, the orders of transfer were received by the Presiding Officer. What all the learned Presiding Officer did was that he advanced the matter only for the purpose of pronouncement of the judgment. It cannot be said that there was any illegality in this regard. In fact, there would have been a serious lapse, on the part of the Presiding Officer, in case the judgment, which was otherwise ready, is not pronounced on the pretext of transfer. This Court does not find any merits in the Second Appeal, and it is, accordingly, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. Learned counsel for the appellant made a request for granting time for vacating the premises. The same is opposed by learned counsel for the respondent. Taking into account, the fact that the appellant is a lessee for the past 1 1/2 decades, this Court grants time, till the end of July, 2014, for the respondent to vacate the premises, on condition that the arrears of rent, if any, shall be cleared within one month from today, and the rent for the current period shall be paid on or before 10th of every month. The appellant shall file an undertaking before the trial Court within four weeks from today, to the effect that he would put the respondent in vacant possession of the premises within one month." 34. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gopal Saran Vs. Satyanarayan, reported in AIR 9 SC 1141, relevant portion of which reads as under: "20. From the aforesaid, it appears to us that the question whether there is a tenancy or licence or parting with possession in a particular case must depend upon the quality of occupation given to the licensee or the transferee. Mere occupation is not sufficient, in our opinion to infer either sub-tenancy or parting with possession. In Associated Hotel of India Ltd., Delhi Vs. Sardar Ranjit Singh (1968) 2 SCR 548 it was held on the question whether the occupier of a separate apartment in a premises is a licensee or a tenant, the test is whether the land lord retained control over the apartment. Similarly, it was held by this Court in Smt. Krishnawati Vs. Shri Hans Raj (1974) 1 SCC 289 that subletting like letting, is a particular type of demise of immovable property and is distinct from permissive user like that of a licensee. If two persons live together in a house as husband and wife and one of them who owns the house allows the other to carry on business in a part of it, it will be in the absence of any other evidence, a rash inference to draw that the owner has let out that part of the premises. Sree Sachhar sought to argue that in considering the question of eviction it has to be borne in mind that the purpose of the Rent Restriction Act is to protect dwelling house and not to protect a person who is not the resident of dwelling house but is making money by subletting it." 35. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Delhi Stationers and Printers Vs. Rajendra Kumar, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1208, relevant portion of which reads as under: "5. Learned counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s. Delhi Stationers and Printers Vs. Rajendra Kumar, reported in AIR 1999 SC 1208, relevant portion of which reads as under: "5. Under Section 13(l)(e) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act 1950, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the tenant is liable to be evicted, if he has assigned, sub-let or otherwise parted with the possession of the whole or any part of the premises without the permission of the landlord. Sub-letting means transfer of an exclusive right to enjoy the property in favour of the third party and the said right must be in lieu of payment of some compensation or rent. Parting of the legal possession means possession with the right to include and also a right to exclude others. Mere occupation is not sufficient to infer either sub tenancy or parting with possession (see: Gopal Saran v. Satya Narayana (supra))." 36. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon the precedent law of Amir Ahmed Vs. Yusuf, reported in 1985 (1) WLN 550 , relevant portion of which reads as under:- "15. In Abu v. Chakkyil 1970 RCR 212, V.R. Krishna Iyer, J., as he then was observed as under: Moreover, the burden under the statute is on the landlord to make out the ground for eviction and not on the tenant to forestall or rebut such grounds, I completely agree that unless the landlord makes out such a ground be cannot be given an order putting him in possession. But the manner of proof of a fact depends also upon the Evidence Act or at any rate, the principles embodied therein. While the initial onus of proving sub-letting or transfer of the leasehold is on the landlord, once the Court is satisfied that there has been a transfer of possession, the onus may shift and the tenant within whose special knowledge the facts explaining the manner in which such possession has been transferred he, may have to bear the burden thereafter. In Abdul Aziz v. Mohd. Yaqub 1971 RCJ 492 , it was observed as follows: A landlord is almost always a stranger to agreements of sub-letting between his tenant and sub-lessee and he has generally to rely on attending circumstances to establish sub-letting by necessary inference. In Abdul Aziz v. Mohd. Yaqub 1971 RCJ 492 , it was observed as follows: A landlord is almost always a stranger to agreements of sub-letting between his tenant and sub-lessee and he has generally to rely on attending circumstances to establish sub-letting by necessary inference. It must be very merely that direct evidence of sub-letting without the landlord consent, whether in the form of a lease deed or of the testimony of witnesses in whose presence the sub-lease is created, can come to the hands of the landlord. We may also notice Dharamchand v. Kesturilal 1977 (2) RCJ 276. It was a case Under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, where, the landlord made an application for the eviction of the tenant on the ground of sub-letting. It was held that the landlord has to show by attending circumstances that the tenant has vacated the demised premises in favour of another person and the other person is in exclusive possession thereof. Thereafter, the onus is shifted to the tenant to establish as to in what capacity the sub-tenant is in possession. The language of Section 13(1) of the Act shows that it is for the landlord to satisfy the court whether one or more grounds mentioned there in are made out so as to entitle him to the decree for eviction. Initial burden to prove such subletting or parting with possession is always on the tenant but on the fulfillment of the conditions mentioned in Section 13(2) when once parting with possession is proved, the burden shifts on the tenant to show that the person is not a tenant Reference may be made to Harishanker v. Radha 1970 RCR 604. 16. Our answer to the there question referred to shown by the learned single Judge are as under: (1) Where a tenant allows another person to merely use the premises or part of the premises, he cannot be said to have parted with possession of the premises or part of the premises so as to entail the liability of eviction Under Section 13(1)(e) of the Act. (2) that the conversion of exclusive possession of the premises by the tenant into a joint possession of the premises by the tenant and a third person, does not constitute parting with possession Under Section 13(l)(e) of the Act. (2) that the conversion of exclusive possession of the premises by the tenant into a joint possession of the premises by the tenant and a third person, does not constitute parting with possession Under Section 13(l)(e) of the Act. (3) that the decision in Bhagwat Prasad's case 1969 WLN 351 so far as it held that a tenant by sharing the premises with a third person can be said to have parted with the possession of the premises does not lay down the correct law. All the questions referred by the learned single Judge which have been mentioned here in above are, therefore, answered in the negative." 37. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord vehemently opposes the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner-tenant, and submits that the petitioner-tenant and her husband have acted in violation of the condition laid down in the rent note dated 22.09.1988, as was mutually agreed upon between the petitioner-tenant and the original landlady, in the shoes of which the respondent-landlord now stands, and that the petitioner-tenant has sublet shop in question without the knowledge or permission of the original landlady. 38. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord further submits that the petitioner-tenant and her husband have stated regarding non-existence of the alleged sub-lettee, Mr. Ambalal, and have made statements in the Court in that regard. Learned counsel however, submits that the alleged sub-lettee was proven to exist and be in the knowledge of the petitioner-tenant and her husband. 39. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord further submits that at this stage of the litigation, the statements made by the petitioner-tenant and her husband are being portrayed in such a manner so as to restrict the implication of those statements, in their favour. 40. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord also submits that the petitioner-tenant's husband himself stated they do not know any person with the name Ambalal, when asked about the alleged sub-lettee, which is contrary to the material available on record. 41. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord further submits that in light of the above-mentioned, the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal passed a valid and correct judgment and certificate dated 28.05.2019 by which the right of the respondent-landlord was upheld so as to evict the petitioner-tenant. 42. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Hatim Lal Bohara Vs. 42. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Hatim Lal Bohara Vs. Barkati Bai (Smt.) & Ors., reported in 2016 (2) DNJ (Raj.) 644, relevant portion of which reads as under: "8. The settled legal position is that the need of the landlord and his family members as on the date of filing of the suit is required to be seen and that is required to be established and with the subsequent events happening during the long course of litigation, including the death of a family member, for whose need the eviction was sought, does not alter the position and eviction decree can be maintained. Secondly, equally settled legal position is that if the eviction decree can be upheld on any one ground under Section 13(1) of the Rent Control Act, 1950 then such decree deserves to be upheld, even if the findings of the learned courts below for other ground or grounds is not found to be sustainable that would not upset the eviction decree, though it may be mentioned here that this Court has not found any such reason in the present case to upset the findings of the Courts below concurrently arrived at, on any of the grounds of eviction under Section 13(1) of the Act established by the plaintiff landlord against the defendant tenant. 9. That as far as the question of subletting is concerned, it is neither provided in law that sub-letting cannot be in favour of close relative of the tenant may be his father or brother, as the case may be and it is not necessary for the landlord to prove actual passing of the consideration of rent by the sub-lettee in favour of the main tenant as such facts are within the special knowledge of the tenant and sub-tenant and may not even come to the knowledge of the landlord and, therefore, such fact cannot be proved by the landlord." 43. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Prakash Vs. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Prakash Vs. Santosh Kumar Jain & Sons (HUF) & Ors., reported in (2018) 12 SCC 637 , while submitting that the subtenant was in exclusive possession of the property of the landlord, and once the landlord succeeds in establishing the factum of subtenancy, the burden to rebut the same will lie with the petitioner-tenant, and sub-tenancy comes into existence when tenant gives up the possession of tenanted premises wholly or in part, and puts another person in exclusive possession thereof, without knowledge of the landlord. 44. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord further relied upon the judgment rendered by this Hon'ble Court in Amba Lal Vs. Latu Ram & Ors., reported in 2013 (1) DNJ (Raj.) 202, relevant portion of which reads as under: "21. The fact, which the plaintiff-landlord has to prove is that to establish that somebody else than the original defendant-tenant is found to be in possession of the suit shop in question and that the original defendant-tenant has parted with the possession of the suit premises to his own exclusion. The twin conditions, formulated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Benjamin (supra) stands satisfied in the present case inasmuch as the plaintiff-landlord has proved that the sub-tenant, Vijay Ram was in exclusive possession of the suit shop and there was a relationship of sub-tenant and chieftenant between the two. The regular absence of the original-tenant from the suit shop coupled with the continuous presence of subtenant in the same, is sufficient to discharge the burden of the plaintiff. The learned lower appellate court below apparently has fallen into an error in holding that since there were power and electricity bills and even income-tax returns on record of the original tenant, it would establish his continued possession over the suit shop. These documents could also exist in the contemporary period, even if the defendant-tenant has parted with the possession in favour of sub-tenant to his exclusion. It is equally possible that a tenant can continue to have water and electricity bills in his own name even if the possession of the suit property is given to the sub-tenant and it is not necessary that sub-tenant should obtain separate power and water connections in his own name by taking fresh connections. It is equally possible that a tenant can continue to have water and electricity bills in his own name even if the possession of the suit property is given to the sub-tenant and it is not necessary that sub-tenant should obtain separate power and water connections in his own name by taking fresh connections. Equally, the income-tax returns filed by the defendanttenant, Lalu Raj, do not establish the continued possession over the suit shop. A perusal of the Ex.D/5, Sales Tax Return for the Assessment Year 1991-92 and Ex.D/6, Income-tax Return in the prescribed Form No.ITS-2 (Page 197 to 206 of the paper book) reveals that these returns were filed by the defendant-tenant showing himself the proprietor of "Mahaveer Bhojnalaya", Address: outside Suraj Pole, Udaipur, showing certain turn-over exempted from sales tax for the Assessment Year 1988-89 to the extent of Rs.97,622/- and for the Assessment Year 1989-90 to the extent of Rs. 96,205/-. The Assessment Year on the top of the Ex.D/5, reveals that the assessment year is 1991-92. Similarly, the income tax returns Ex.D/6 were filed on 30.09.1991 for the Assessment Year 1991-92. These two documents, in the absence of any further details of turnover and source of income, shown in the income-tax returns without producing Balance-Sheet, Profit & Loss A/c, cannot be accepted in support of contention that the defendant-tenant, Lalu Ram continued to be in possession of the suit shop and on the other hand, these returns which have been filed much after filing of the present eviction suit on 31.03.1990, gives an impression that these documents, as self-serving evidence, was created by the defendant tenant after being served with the notice terminating the tenancy and after service of the summons of the eviction suit upon him, to defend the ground of sub-letting." 45. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord also relied upon the precedent law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Dhanapal Chettiar Vs. Yesodai Am ma I, reported in (1980) 1 SCR 334 , wherein it was held that the service of notice is not necessary when eviction is sought under the State Rent Control Act, unless the same is mandated explicitly by a particular State Rent Control Act, and that was not the case with respect to the Rajasthan Rent Control Act. 46. 46. After hearing learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case, alongwith the precedent laws cited at the Bar, this Court makes the following observations: (a) There has been no objection by the learned counsel for either of the parties regarding the validity of the rent note dated 22.09.1988. (b) The conditions in the rent note dated 22.09.1988 clearly stipulate a prohibition upon subletting of the shop in question without the prior permission of the original landlady, in the shoes of whom the present respondent-landlord now stands. (c) It is clear from the record that the statements made by the petitioner-tenant and her husband about the existence of the alleged sub-lettee Shri Ambalal, are of conspicuous nature; after the existence of the alleged sub-lettee was proven, an attempt was made to show that the context in which the statements were made, were in a different context. (d) Further, in light of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prem Prakash (supra) and this Hon'ble Court in Amba Lal (supra) cited by learned counsel for the respondent-landlord, this Court observes that the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner-tenant that since the electricity bills are being paid by the petitioner-tenant and the income-tax returns are being filed by the petitioner-tenant, therefore, the alleged sub-lettee cannot be said to be in exclusive possession of the shop in question. Such submissions also do not inspire confidence of this Court. (e) It is thus a settled legal position that once the factum of sub tenancy has been proved by the landlord, then the burden to rebut the same lies upon the shoulders of the tenant, which has not been sufficiently discharged by the petitioner-tenant in the present case. (f) The precedent laws cited by learned counsel for the petitioner-tenant are not applicable in the present case. (g) Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned judgment and certificate dated 28.05.2019 has rightly been passed by the learned Appellate Rent Tribunal. 47. In view of the aforesaid observations, no case for making any interference is made out. 48. Consequently, the present petition is dismissed. All pending applications stand disposed of.