ORDER : Heard Sri Ch.Srinivasa Raju, learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Assistant Government Pleader for Revenue. 2. This writ petition is filed challenging the order of the Special Tribunal dated 04.02.2021 on the appeal preferred by the petitioner against the alleged mutation of the name of fourth respondent based on false and forged documents and by impersonating the vendor of the petitioner. The Special Tribunal dismissed the appeal on the ground that the appeal was preferred after long lapse of time of the decision made by the competent authority and the appeal is not maintainable. 3. In Paragraph No.3.4 of affidavit filed in support of writ petition the deponent seek to justify preferring the appeal in the year 2017 by stating that some known contacts informed the petitioner about the changes effected in the revenue records and immediately he has taken steps to challenge the said changes. Except vague averment in paragraph No.3.4 about “some known person” informing the petitioner, the petitioner has not explained the inordinate delay in prosecuting the appeal and how he was dealing with his property till 2017, when the alleged transactions date back to the year 2006 and 2011 respectively. Even in the appeal preferred by the petitioner, he only stated that “recently came to know”. In paragraph No.7 of the appeal, the petitioner stated as under: “The petitioner further submits that for the personal reasons and employment he became resident of Canada and had no source to know of the of above developments”. 4. Thus even in the appeal, the averments are vague and no explanation was offered by the petitioner, except stating that for the first time, just before preferring the appeal, he came to know and therefore, appeal was preferred within time as specified in section 5 (5), (5) Against every order of the recording authority either making an amendment in the record of rights or refusing to make such amendment, [an appeal shall lie to the Revenue Divisional Officer or such authority as may be prescribed], within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the said order and the decision of the appellate authority thereon shall, subject to the provisions of section 9, be final., of the Telangana Rights in Land and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971 (for short “the Act 26 of 1971”). 5. 5. A person aggrieved by the mutation exercise undertaken by Tahsildar can prefer appeal to the Revenue Divisional Officer under Section 5 (5) of the Act. The said appeal has to be preferred within sixty days from the date of communication of the order. The Appellate Authority is not vested power to entertain the appeal filed after 60 days and/or to condone the delay in filing the appeal even if delay was satisfactorily explained. The Revenue Divisional Officer (R.D.O.) as an appellate authority to deal with the matters arising out of decisions of the Tahsildar has to work within the four corners of the provisions of the Act. When the Act stipulates sixty days time to avail the remedy of appeal, if the appeal is not preferred within the time stipulated, the R.D.O. has no competence to entertain the appeal. 6. In the instant case, the petitioner alleges that in the year 2006 there was impersonation and misrepresentation of the gender of pattadar while creating fake transactions. Though vendor of the petitioner is a female, the said vendor was described as male and sale transaction was created on the same property. He further alleges that in the year 2011, the fourth respondent got somebody impersonating the petitioner and got sale deed executed in his favour as if the petitioner was selling the land. From these averments, it appears that substantive grievance of the petitioner is against the alleged misrepresentation/ impersonation while undertaking transactions in the years 2006 and 2011, leading to registration of deeds of conveyance concerning the property claimed to have been owned by the petitioner. 7. Leaving aside the issue of mis-representation/ impersonation, when it comes to the mutation of name in the revenue records, the Tahsildar is required to entertain mutation request based on registered documents presented before him. Unless and until such transactions are declared as illegal by competent Court, the exercise undertaken by the Tahsildar, prima facie, cannot be said as amounting to illegal exercise of power. 8. Be that as it may, what was challenged before the appellate authority was alleged mutation of name of the fourth respondent in the revenue records based on those registered transactions by the Tahsildar, which according to the petitioner, are ex-facie illegal and void. Therefore, against the order of mutation, the petitioner has to avail remedy of appeal within sixty days. Be that as it may, what was challenged before the appellate authority was alleged mutation of name of the fourth respondent in the revenue records based on those registered transactions by the Tahsildar, which according to the petitioner, are ex-facie illegal and void. Therefore, against the order of mutation, the petitioner has to avail remedy of appeal within sixty days. Admittedly, no such appeal was preferred within the time prescribed under Section 5(5) of the Act, but was preferred after long lapse of time. It is not the case of the petitioner that the copy of the order of mutation was served on him in the year 2017 and immediately the appeal was preferred. 9. The Special Tribunal is a creature of the Act 9 of 2020. It is required to consider the pending appeals preferred under the Act 26 of 1971. The Special Tribunal stepped into the shoes of the Appellate Authority while considering the appeal preferred under Section 5 (5) of the Act, 1971. The Special Tribunal being the creature of Act 9 of 2020 with limited jurisdiction, i.e., to consider the appeals/revisions filed under the Act 26 of 1971, it has to work within the four corners of the Act 26 of 1971. When Appellate Authority has no power to entertain an appeal filed after 60 days, the Special Tribunal can not entertain the appeal and decide on merits. 10. Having regard to the provision in Section 5 (5) of the Act, 1971, I do not see any error committed by the Special Tribunal rejecting the appeal preferred by the petitioner on the ground that the appeal was not preferred within sixty days as prescribed under Section 5 (5) of the Act 1971. Therefore, there is no merit in the writ petition. 11. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed. But, however, this order does not come in the way of petitioner working out remedies if any available in law. Pending miscellaneous petitions, shall stand closed.